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CONTROL NO: 8039

FILE:

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N. C. 28201 A. C. Thies			DATE OF DOC. 10-31-73	DATE REC'D 11-6-73	LTR X	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: A. Giambusso			ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR _____ X SENT LOCAL PDR _____ X		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-269			

DESCRIPTION:
Ltr trans the following:

PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit 1

ENCLOSURES:
UNUSUAL EVENT REPORT UE-269/73-9: regarding
the failure of the borated water storage
tank outlet valve LP-22 to operate

**ACKNOWLEDGED
DO NOT REMOVE**

(1 cy rec'd)

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

11-7-73

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✓CASE	✓KNIGHT	BALLARD	LEE (L)	<u>PLANS</u>
GIAMBUSO	✓PAWLICKI	SPANGLER	MAIGRET (L)	MCDONALD
BOYD	✓SHAO		SERVICE (L)	DUBE
MOORE (L)(BWR)	✓STELLO	<u>ENVIRO</u>	SHEPPARD (E)	<u>INFO</u>
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✓16 - CYS ACRS XXXXXX SENT TO LIC. ASST. 11-7-73 GOULBOURNE	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	RM-B-127, GT.
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Regulatory Docket File


DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

October 31, 1973



P. O. Box 2178

Mr. Angelo Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. Giambusso

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report UE-269/73-9, "Borated Water Storage Tank Outlet Valve LP-22."

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "A. C. Thies".

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



8039

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1
UNUSUAL EVENT REPORT UE-269/73-9
BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK OUTLET VALVE LP-22

Received w/Ltr Dated 10-31-73

Description of the Incident

On October 1, 1973 during the monthly test of Engineered Safeguards Channel 8, the borated water storage tank outlet valve LP-22 failed to operate. The Engineered Safeguards control station (see Oconee FSAR Figure 7-3) was in manual for this test, and the signal to open the valve was introduced at that station. Another attempt to open the valve was made immediately, and the valve operated properly. LP-22 was again tested and operated three out of five trials. It was verified that the Engineered Safeguards logic functioned properly each time.

Evaluation

To evaluate this failure of LP-22 to open, further tests were conducted and it was determined that the R_0 contacts in Engineered Safeguards Channel 8 were operating properly, and that the valve could be opened from the control room benchboard independent of the Engineered Safeguards System. Auxiliary circuitry associated with Channel 8 actuation of LP-22 was thoroughly inspected, but the cause of the problem could not be found. The failure of LP-22 to open was apparently due to an electrical malfunction of the field circuitry associated with the Engineered Safeguards Channel 8.

Corrective Action

In addition to the tests and inspections that were performed immediately after the occurrence of the incident, LP-22 was checked for proper operation once each day for a week. The valve operated properly each time. In addition to the extensive testing of Engineered Safeguards Channel 8, Channel 4, which also supplies an Engineered Safeguards signal to LP-22, was tested on October 1, 1973 and operated properly. Valve LP-21 and Engineered Safeguards Channels 3 and 7 are the redundant counterparts of LP-22 and Engineered Safeguards Channels 4 and 8. LP-21 was also tested successfully using Engineered Safeguards Channels 3 and 7 on October 1, 1973.

Safety Analysis

The borated water storage tank outlet valve LP-22 can be actuated by Engineered Safeguards Channels 4 or 8 and from the control room benchboard. There is also a redundant system from the borated water storage tank to the reactor building spray pumps through valve LP-21 actuated by Engineered Safeguards Channels 3 and 7. If Channel 8 failed to open LP-22 on Engineered Safeguards actuation, the valve could be actuated by either Channel 4 or from the control room by the operator. Additional reliability of the reactor building spray system is provided by the redundant flow path through LP-21, actuated independently by Channels 3 and 7. It is concluded that this incident did not affect the safe operation of the plant.