

C09/13/78

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL 50-269

REC: OREILLY J P
NRC

ORG: PARKER W O
DUKE PWR

DOCDATE: 09/05/78
DATE RCVD: 09/11/78

DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO
SUBJECT:

COPIES RECEIVED
LTR 1 ENCL 1

FORWARDING LICENSEE EVENT REPT (RD 50-269/78-017) ON 08/08/78 CONCERNING
DURING STARTUP FOLLOWING UNIT TRIP, THE RB NARROW RANGE PRESSURE INDICATION
ON CHANNEL 1 APPEARED TO BE READING HIGH... CHANNEL TRIPPED DUE TO WATER IN
TRANSMITTER DURING EARLIER INC

PLANT NAME: OCONEE - UNIT 1

REVIEWER INITIAL: XJM
DISTRIBUTOR INITIAL: *MC*

***** DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS *****

NOTES:

1. M. CUNNINGHAM -- ALL AMENDMENTS TO FSAR AND CHANGES TO TECH SPECS

INCIDENT REPORTS
(DISTRIBUTION CODE A002)

FOR ACTION: BR CHIEF ORB#4 BC**W/4 ENCL

INTERNAL:	REG FILE**W/ENCL	NRC PDR**W/ENCL
	I & E**W/2 ENCL	MIPC**W/3 ENCL
	I & C SYSTEMS BR**W/ENCL	EMERGENCY PLAN BR**W/ENCL
	NOVAK/CHECK**W/ENCL	EEB**W/ENCL
	AD FOR ENG**W/ENCL	PLANT SYSTEMS BR**W/ENCL
	HANAUER**W/ENCL	AD FOR PLANT SYSTEMS**W/ENCL
	AD FOR SYS & PROJ**W/ENCL	REACTOR SAFETY BR**W/ENCL
	ENGINEERING BR**W/ENCL	VOLLMER/BUNCH**W/ENCL
	KREGER/J. COLLINS**W/ENCL	POWER SYS BR**W/ENCL
	K SEYFRIT/IE**W/ENCL	

EXTERNAL: LPDR'S
WALHALLA, SC**W/ENCL
NSIC**W/ENCL
ACRS CAT B**W/16 ENCL

DISTRIBUTION: LTR 44 ENCL 44
SIZE: 1P+1P

CONTROL NBR: 781500280

A04

***** THE END *****

DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

September 5, 1978

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

RE: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/78-17.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

KRW:scs
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

781500280

ADD
9/11

Report Number: RO-269/78-17

Report Date: September 5, 1978

Occurrence Date: August 8, 1978

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Reactor Building Pressure Transmitter
Out-of-Calibration

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 90% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

On August 6, 1978, during the performance of PT/1/A/0600/01 (Periodic Instrument Surveillance) operating personnel observed that ES Analog Channel 1, Reactor Building Pressure was reading high. The channel was removed from service due to the anomolous readings. When the channel was recalibrated, on August 8, 1978, the zero-shift was found to be in the non-conservative direction (indicated less than actual pressure) contrary to the requirements of Oconee Technical Specification 3.5.3 (ESF Actuation Setpoints). The channel was recalibrated and returned to service.

Cause of Occurrence:

The transmitter for this channel (1PT4P) is located in the Penetration Room. One week prior to the occurrence a valve leak in the vicinity had allowed water to enter the transmitter and to disrupt its proper operation. The water was drained and the transmitter was recalibrated. The calibration was done with the unit at 47% FP. Changes in temperature and humidity, coupled with excess water remaining in the transmitter apparently caused the transmitter to drift.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Reactor Building Analog Channel 1 is one of three redundant channels which, upon actuation of 2-out-of-3 channels, serves to initiate the HPI, LPI, and other ESF systems. The particular transmitter involved indicated narrow-range pressure. The channels trip at ≤ 4 psig and serve as indications of significant pressure transients within the reactor building. During the period in which Channel 1 was not functioning properly, as well as when it was taken out of service for recalibration, both redundant channels were operable and would have tripped at ≤ 4 psig as required. Thus, the incident did not impair the functional capability of the ES system, nor did it cause any adverse effects on public health and safety.

Corrective Action:

The transmitter involved was recalibrated to restore it to its normal condition. Additionally, the seal on the transmitter housing was tightened to prevent moisture from affecting it and to improve its reliability.

