

7 04/18/78

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (IDS)
DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL

50-269

REC: OREILLY J P
NRC

ORG: PARKER W O
DUKE PWR

DOCDATE: 04/11/78
DATE RCVD: 04/17/78

DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO COPIES RECEIVED
SUBJECT: LTR 1 ENCL 1
FORWARDING LICENSEE EVENT REPT (RO 50-269/78-8) ON 03/15/78 CONCERNING SAMPLE
TAKEN FROM THE 1B OTSG, 1FDW-108 FAILED TO CLOSE... W/ATT

PLANT NAME: OCONEE - UNIT 1

REVIEWER INITIAL: XJM
DISTRIBUTOR INITIAL: *we*

***** DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS *****

NOTES:

1. M. CUNNINGHAM - ALL AMENDMENTS TO FSAR AND CHANGES TO TECH SPECS

INCIDENT REPORTS
(DISTRIBUTION CODE A002)

FOR ACTION: BR CHIEF REID**W/4 ENCL

INTERNAL:

REG FILE**W/ENCL
I & E**W/2 ENCL
SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO**W/ENCL
NOVAK/CHECK**W/ENCL
KNIGHT**W/ENCL
HANAUER**W/ENCL
EISENHUT**W/ENCL
SHAO**W/ENCL
KREGER/J. COLLINS**W/ENCL
K SEYFRIT/IE**W/ENCL

NRC PDR**W/ENCL
MIPC**W/3 ENCL
HOUSTON**W/ENCL
EEB**W/ENCL
BUTLER**W/ENCL
TEDESCO**W/ENCL
BAER**W/ENCL
VOLLMER/BUNCH**W/ENCL
ROSA**W/ENCL

EXTERNAL:

LPDR'S
WALHALLA, SC**W/ENCL
TIC**W/ENCL
NSIC**W/ENCL
ACRS CAT B**W/16 ENCL

DISTRIBUTION: LTR 45 ENCL 45
SIZE: 1P+1P+1P

CONTROL NBR: 781080106

THE END

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

April 11, 1978

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 1217
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

RE: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

US NRC
DISTRIBUTION SERVICES
BRANCH

1978 APR 17 AM 10 53

RECEIVED DISTRIBUTION
SERVICES UNIT

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/78-8.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr. *By [Signature]*

WOPJr/mh

Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

781080106

A002
5
11

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report Number: RO-269/78-8

Report Date: April 11, 1978

Occurrence Date: March 15, 1978

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Valve FDW-108 failed to close

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On March 15, 1978, after taking a steam generator sample, 1FDW-108 failed to close under system pressure. Redundant valve 1FDW-107 was locked closed within four hours pursuant to Technical Specification 3.6.3b(2). After stem lubrication the valve was cycled and verified to be operable.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This type of valve failure on this and other identical valves has occurred on several previous occasions. Corrective actions suggested by the manufacturer have been unsuccessful in resolving the problem. The valves appear to not be suited for long-term operation in the system environment.

Analysis of Occurrence:

1FDW-108 is an isolation valve on the steam generator sample line. The failure of the valve did not violate containment integrity as the redundant valve was operable and would have performed its Engineered Safeguard function if necessary. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

Corrective Action:

The valve stem was lubricated and cycled to assure operability.

This failure is one of several similar failures which have been occurring at the Oconee Nuclear Station. The affected valves (FDW-106 and -108) will be replaced by ones of a different design at the first appropriate outage for each unit after September 1, 1978.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK:										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)									
<div> <div>01</div> <div>SCNEE1</div> <div>200-000000-000</div> <div>3411111</div> <div>4</div> <div>5</div> </div>										<div> <div>7</div> <div>8</div> <div>9</div> <div>14</div> <div>15</div> <div>25</div> <div>26</div> <div>30</div> <div>57</div> <div>58</div> </div>									
<div> <div>01</div> <div>REPORT SOURCE</div> <div>605000269</div> <div>7031578</div> <div>8041178</div> <div>9</div> </div>										<div> <div>7</div> <div>8</div> <div>9</div> <div>60</div> <div>61</div> <div>68</div> <div>69</div> <div>74</div> <div>75</div> <div>80</div> </div>									
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)																			
<div> <div>02</div> <div>At 0830, after a sample was taken from the 1B OTSG, 1FDW-108 failed to</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>03</div> <div>close. The redundant isolation valve 1FDW-107 operated properly main-</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>04</div> <div>taining containment integrity. Since containment integrity was not</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>05</div> <div>jeopardized, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>06</div> <div></div> </div>																			
<div> <div>07</div> <div></div> </div>																			
<div> <div>08</div> <div></div> </div>																			
<div> <div>09</div> <div></div> </div>																			
<div> <div> <div>SYSTEM CODE</div> <div>CCOE</div> <div>HJ</div> <div>11</div> </div> <div> <div>CAUSE CODE</div> <div>E</div> <div>12</div> </div> <div> <div>CAUSE SUBCODE</div> <div>B</div> <div>13</div> </div> <div> <div>COMPONENT CODE</div> <div>V</div> <div>14</div> </div> <div> <div>COMP. SUBCODE</div> <div>F</div> <div>15</div> </div> <div> <div>VALVE SUBCODE</div> <div>D</div> <div>16</div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div> <div>LER/RO REPORT NUMBER</div> <div>78</div> <div>21</div> <div>22</div> </div> <div> <div>EVENT YEAR</div> <div>78</div> <div>23</div> </div> <div> <div>SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.</div> <div>008</div> <div>24</div> <div>26</div> </div> <div> <div>OCCURRENCE CODE</div> <div>03</div> <div>27</div> <div>28</div> </div> <div> <div>REPORT TYPE</div> <div>L</div> <div>29</div> <div>30</div> </div> <div> <div>REVISION NO.</div> <div>0</div> <div>31</div> <div>32</div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div> <div>ACTION TAKEN</div> <div>B</div> <div>18</div> <div>33</div> </div> <div> <div>FUTURE ACTION</div> <div>A</div> <div>19</div> <div>34</div> </div> <div> <div>EFFECT ON PLANT</div> <div>Z</div> <div>20</div> <div>35</div> </div> <div> <div>SHUTDOWN METHOD</div> <div>Z</div> <div>21</div> <div>36</div> </div> <div> <div>HOURS</div> <div>000</div> <div>37</div> <div>40</div> </div> <div> <div>ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED</div> <div>Y</div> <div>22</div> <div>41</div> </div> <div> <div>NPRO-4 FORM SUB.</div> <div>Y</div> <div>23</div> <div>42</div> </div> <div> <div>PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER</div> <div>L</div> <div>24</div> <div>43</div> </div> <div> <div>COMPONENT MANUFACTURER</div> <div>R340</div> <div>25</div> <div>44</div> </div> </div>																			
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)																			
<div> <div>10</div> <div>The initial corrective action was lubrication and cycling of valve.</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>11</div> <div>Failure of this type has occurred on several occasions, evidently</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>12</div> <div>indicating that this valve simply cannot withstand the necessary</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>13</div> <div>environment. Therefore, the valves (FDW-106 and -108) will be replaced</div> </div>																			
<div> <div>14</div> <div>in the future with valves of appropriate design.</div> </div>																			
<div> <div> <div>FACILITY STATUS</div> <div>E</div> <div>28</div> <div>10</div> </div> <div> <div>% POWER</div> <div>100</div> <div>29</div> <div>12</div> </div> <div> <div>OTHER STATUS</div> <div>NA</div> <div>30</div> <div>13</div> </div> <div> <div>METHOD OF DISCOVERY</div> <div>B</div> <div>31</div> <div>44</div> </div> <div> <div>DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION</div> <div>Observation during routine sampling</div> <div>32</div> <div>45</div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div> <div>ACTIVITY RELEASED OF RELEASE</div> <div>Z</div> <div>33</div> <div>10</div> </div> <div> <div>CONTENT</div> <div>Z</div> <div>34</div> <div>11</div> </div> <div> <div>AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY</div> <div>NA</div> <div>35</div> <div>44</div> </div> <div> <div>LOCATION OF RELEASE</div> <div>NA</div> <div>36</div> <div>45</div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div> <div>PERSONNEL EXPOSURES</div> <div>000</div> <div>37</div> <div>11</div> </div> <div> <div>TYPE</div> <div>Z</div> <div>38</div> <div>12</div> </div> <div> <div>DESCRIPTION</div> <div>NA</div> <div>39</div> <div>13</div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div> <div>PERSONNEL INJURIES</div> <div>000</div> <div>40</div> <div>11</div> </div> <div> <div>DESCRIPTION</div> <div>NA</div> <div>41</div> <div>12</div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div> <div>LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY</div> <div>Z</div> <div>42</div> <div>11</div> </div> <div> <div>TYPE</div> <div>NA</div> <div>43</div> <div>12</div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div> <div>PUBLICITY ISSUED</div> <div>N</div> <div>44</div> <div>10</div> </div> <div> <div>DESCRIPTION</div> <div>NA</div> <div>45</div> <div>11</div> </div> </div>																			
<div> <div> <div>NAME OF PREPARER</div> <div>K. R. Wilson</div> </div> <div> <div>PHONE:</div> <div>(704)373-8197</div> </div> </div>																			