

50-269

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

FILE NUMBER
INCIDENT REPORT

TO:
Mr. Norman C. Moseley

FROM:
Duke Power Company
Charlotte, North Carolina
William O. Parker, Jr.

DATE OF DOCUMENT
3/30/77

DATE RECEIVED
4/21/77

LETTER
 ORIGINAL
 COPY

NOTORIZED
 UNCLASSIFIED

PROP

INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED
1 SIGNED

DESCRIPTION

Ltr. trans the following:

PLANT NAME: (1-P)
Oconee Unit No. 1

RJL

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO 50-269/77-7) on 2/28/77 concerning reactor quadrant power tilt limit exceeded....

(2-P)

ACKNOWLEDGED
DO NOT REMOVE

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

BRANCH CHIEF:	SCHWENCER
W/3 CYS FOR ACTION	
LIC. ASST.:	SHEPPARD
W/1 CYS	
ACRS 16 CYS HOLDING /SENT	AS CAT. B

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<u>REG FILE</u>			
NRC PDR			
I & E (2)			
MIPC			
SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO			
HOUSTON			
NOVAK/CHECK			
GRIMES			
CASE			
BUTLER			
HANAUER			
TEDESCO/MACCARY			
EISENHUT			
BAER			
SHAO			
VOLLMER/BUNCH			
KREGER/J. COLLINS			

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPDR: WACHALLA, SC			
TIC:			
NSIC:			

CONTROL NUMBER

71150141

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING


422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

March 30, 1977

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269


Dear Mr. Moseley:

Regulatory

File Cy.

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/77-7.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

LJB:ge
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

77450141

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report No.: RO-269/77-7

Report Date: March 30, 1977

Occurrence Date: February 28, 1977

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Reactor quadrant power tilt limit exceeded

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On February 28, 1977 group 1 control rod 6 dropped into the core due to a failed stator. The unit ranback to 55 percent full power on the resulting asymmetric rod indication. An attempt was made to transfer control rod 6 in group 1 to the auxiliary power supply but the transfer could not be made. All six fuses in the group 1 rod 6 power supply including two blown fuses were replaced but the transfer could not be made. The quadrant power tilt began increasing, therefore in anticipation of the requirements of Oconee Technical Specification 3.5.2.4.c a controlled shutdown was initiated. Approximately one hour after the rod drop, the reactor quadrant power tilt increased above the 9.44% Technical Specification limit. The power level was at approximately 20 percent full power at this time. The reactor was shutdown within another hour, and on March 5, 1977, after the unit was cooled down, the stator was replaced.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This occurrence resulted from the drop of control rod 6 of group 1. The control rod stator had failed, apparently due to control rod drive motor tube leakage.

Analysis of Occurrence:

This occurrence resulted in the core quadrant tilt exceeding the limits specified in Technical Specification 3.5.2.4.c. A reactor shutdown was in progress at this time in anticipation of the technical specification requirements and was completed within the four hour period allowed by the specification. The limits on allowable quadrant tilt, in conjunction with the limits on power level, control rod group position, axial imbalance and xenon conditions, are specified to prevent the maximum linear heat rate from exceeding the LOCA limited values. In this incident, although the indicated tilt exceeded the maximum allowable value, a linear heat rate below the established limits was assured by the conservative values of the other power peak inducing parameters and the gradual power decrease.

The capability of the reactor protective system was not affected by this incident and therefore, it is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The control rod stator was replaced and verified to be functioning properly.

U.S.A.E.C.
REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION II
ATLANTA, GA.

APR 4 10 48 AM '77