

50-269

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR AT 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

FILE NUMBER  
INCIDENT REPORT

TO: Mr. Norman C. Moseley

FROM: Duke Power Co.  
Charlotte, N.C. 28242  
W. O. Parker, Jr.

DATE OF DOCUMENT  
3-17-77

DATE RECEIVED  
3-29-77

LETTER  
 ORIGINAL  
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INPUT FORM

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*1 signed*

DESCRIPTION Ltr trans the following: 1P  
  
**ACKNOWLEDGED**  
  
PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit 1  
  
**DO NOT REMOVE**  
  
DHL

ENCLOSURE R0-269/77-6 occurring on 2-25-77  
regarding failure of a HPI letdown isolation  
valve IHP-5 due to electrical failure of the  
solenoid coil..... 1P  
  
(1 cy encl rec'd)  
  
NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED  
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

BRANCH CHIEF:	<i>Schwencer</i>
W/3 CYS FOR ACTION	
LIC. ASST.:	<i>Skppard</i>
W/1 CYS	
ACRS 16 CYS <del>RECEIVED</del> /SENT	<i>As CAT B</i>

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<u>REG FILE</u>			
NRC PDR			
I & E (2)			
MPC			
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HOUSTON			
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CASE			
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

CONTROL NUMBER

LFDR: <i>Walhalla, SC</i>			
TIC:			
NSIC:			

*9*  
**770880225**

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION

March 17, 1977

TELEPHONE: AREA 704  
373-4083

**REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY**

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 818  
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303




Re: Oconee Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/77-6.

Very truly yours,

  
William O. Parker, Jr.

LJB:ge  
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information  
and Program Control

770880225-

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report No.: RO-269/77-6

Report Date: March 17, 1977

Occurrence Date: February 25, 1977

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Failure of a HPI letdown isolation valve  
LHP-5, which is also a Reactor Building  
containment isolation valve

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 98 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On February 25, 1977, Reactor Building containment isolation valve, LHP-5, failed in the normal ES closed position. This valve is located in the reactor coolant letdown line for the High Pressure Injection System and provides containment isolation upon an ES actuation. A work request was issued to investigate the problem, and within one hour the valve was opened by bypassing the control solenoid. The valve was then manually operable and a person was assigned to close the valve if necessary. During the incident, the pressurizer level increased above the station operating limit of 300 inches, therefore, a reactor shutdown was initiated. Within fifteen minutes the pressurizer level was within the operating limits and the shutdown was terminated. Valve LHP-5 was repaired and its operability verified within the four hours as specified by Technical Specification 3.6.4.b.1.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This incident resulted from the electrical failure of the solenoid coil.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Technical Specification 3.6.4.b.1 specifies that a containment isolation valve may be inoperable provided that the inoperable valve is restored to operable status within four hours. Valve LHP-5 was verified operable within this time period. In the event that containment isolation had been required during the brief interval valve LHP-5 was inoperable, the redundant valves LHP-3 and LHP-4 would have closed upon an ES actuation. Containment integrity was not affected by this incident and therefore it is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The solenoid of valve LHP-5 was bypassed allowing the valve to be manually operated by an air regulator. A person was assigned to close the valve if this action was needed while the LHP-5 controls were bypassed. The solenoid coil was replaced. The valve was tested and returned to service. Further corrective action is considered unnecessary.

RECEIVED DOCUMENT  
PROCESSING UNIT

1977 MAR 28 PM 2 45

U.S. A.E.C.  
REGULATORY OPERATIONS  
REGION IV  
ATLANTA, GA.  
MAR 21 11 04 AM '77