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FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N. C. 28201 A. C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 7-10-73	DATE REC'D 7-16-73	LTR x	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: A. Giambusso			ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR x SENT LOCAL PDR x		
CLASS	UNCLASS	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-269		
x								

DESCRIPTION:
Ltr trans the following:

PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit 1

ENCLOSURES:
(1) REPORT: Abnormal Occurrence Rpt No. AO-269/73-3 - Failure to Maintain Containment Integrity
(2) Unusual Event Report - Failure to Perform a Periodic Test

(1 cy ea encl rec'd)

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 7-16-73 LB

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING


422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

July 10, 1973

Mr. Angelo Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545



Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1 Technical Specifications, please find attached a report of an abnormal occurrence in which containment integrity was not maintained during reactor operation as required by Technical Specification 3.6.1, and an unusual event report concerning the failure to perform a periodic test required by the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,


A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "A. C. Thies".

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr

Attachment

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region II, Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



5457

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1
ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT
AO-269/73-3
FAILURE TO MAINTAIN CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Introduction

On June 13, 1973, during preparations for Oconee Unit 2 Reactor Building Structural Integrity and Leak Rate Test, it was discovered that the Unit 1 Reactor Building Leak Test Pressurization Line was open to the atmosphere. This opening results in an abnormal occurrence as defined in Technical Specification 1.8b, "Exceeds a limiting condition for operation as established in the Technical Specifications." Technical Specification 3.6.1 requires that containment integrity be maintained when the reactor coolant system is greater than 300 psig pressure, 200°F temperature, and nuclear fuel is in the core. Containment integrity, as defined in Technical Specification definition 1.7c was not established.

Containment integrity was established immediately. The station superintendent was absent from the plant at that time and was not informed of the incident until several days later. He notified Regulatory Operations Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia, on June 25, 1973.

Description of the Incident

On June 13, 1973, it was discovered that station air was not being supplied to the pneumatic operators for isolation valves in the Unit 1 Reactor Building Leak Rate Test Pressurization Line. This pressurization line is an 8" nominal pipe size and is the route for air from the air compressors used for leak rate testing into the reactor building. Outside of the building, two air-operated diaphragm valves in series with a 6" vent line between them provide reactor building isolation. The operators were aware that there was a provision to install a blank flange inside the reactor building. Figure 1 is a diagram of this portion of the Reactor Building Leak Rate Test Pressurization System. The isolation valves LRT-15, -16 and -17 require air to close.

Upon discovery, air pressure was immediately supplied to the valves to close them, thereby providing the required double isolation. A reactor trip was experienced on June 14, 1973 following which a check was made inside the reactor building to determine if the blank flange was installed on the terminal end of the pressurization line. It was found that the blank flange was not on the line, and therefore restart of the reactor was delayed until it could be installed.

Corrective Action

To preclude recurrence, the Preheatup Checklist of Operating Procedure OP1102/01, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup," has been revised to include checks to assure that the flange on the terminal end of the pressurization line is in place and valve LRT-17, the common valve in the line outside the reactor building is closed. Since this line is rarely used (only for testing at 3-1/2 year intervals), it was inadvertently omitted from routine penetration checklists. A thorough review of the reactor building penetrations has been initiated to assure that no other penetrations which could affect containment integrity have been omitted from the checklist. Furthermore, a station problem report has been initiated to change the control of the pneumatic operators of the isolation valves to require air to open rather than close.

Safety Analysis

Due to the short time of operation at low power level, activity in the reactor building was practically zero during the time that the valves were open. Further, there was no significant pressure differential between inside and outside the building that would cause air exchange. Therefore, this failure to establish containment did not result in the release of any detectable amounts of activity to the atmosphere. However, it is realized that this failure to fully establish containment integrity required by the technical specifications is a serious matter and that it provided a potential path for the release of activity from the reactor building.




Figure 1
Leak Rate Test
Pressurization System

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1
UNUSUAL EVENT REPORT
FAILURE TO PERFORM A PERIODIC TEST

Introduction

Oconee Unit 1 Technical Specification 4.6.4 requires that the External Grid Trouble Protective System logic shall be tested quarterly to demonstrate its ability to provide an isolated power path between Keowee and Oconee. On June 1, 1973, an audit revealed that this periodic test had not been completed as scheduled. Technical Specification 1.9 defines an unusual event as any observed inadequacy in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls during the operation of the facility which could significantly affect the safety of operation. Failure to perform the above periodic tests is classified as an unusual event and is reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.

Description of the Incident

On June 1, 1973, it was discovered during an audit of the Performance Group's periodic tests for Unit 1 that PT/O/A/610/2, "External Grid Trouble Protective System Logic," which was scheduled to be completed on April 10, 1973 had not been done. This test is a quarterly periodic test as required by Section 4.6.4 of the Technical Specifications. An investigation revealed that the last time the test was performed was October 27, 1971 under TP/1/A/610/2A, 2B, and 3B. The test was not performed as scheduled due to a misunderstanding in assignment of test responsibility.

Corrective Action

PT/O/A/610/2, "External Grid Trouble Protective System Logic," was performed on June 10, 1973. The assignment of the responsibility for completing this periodic test has been defined, and failure to perform the test should not recur.

Safety Analysis

The External Grid Protective System is provided to isolate the 230 kV switching station on failure of the external transmission network. Should the system

fail to operate, providing a power source from Keowee to Oconee via the 230 kV switchyard during a loss of the external network, power to Engineered Safeguards systems would be provided by redundant emergency source of power via the 13.8 kV underground feeder from Keowee. Furthermore, redundant channels for detecting both undervoltage and underfrequency conditions are provided to increase the reliability of transfer of Oconee off of the External Grid System.