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FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FILE

FROM: Duke Power Co. Charlotte, M. C. A.C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 3-21-75	DATE REC'D 3-29-75	LTR XX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Norman C. Moseley			ORIG 1 Signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XXX</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XXX</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-269		

DESCRIPTION:  
Ltr. trans the following...

ENCLOSURES:  
Abnorm Occurr. # 75-4, on 2-9, 2-14, 2-20,  
concerning Failure of personnel hatch  
interlocks...

( 1 cy Encl. rec'd )

PLANT NAME: Oconee #1

**FOR ACTION/INFORMATION**

VCR 4-4-75

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** SEND ONLY TEN DAY REPORTS		

*Sheppard*

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT  
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

March 21, 1975

*NR*



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 818  
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station  
Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event  
Report UE-269/75-4.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr  
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report No.: UE-269/75-4

Report Date: March 21, 1975

Event Date: February 9, 14, and 20, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: Failure of personnel hatch interlocks

Conditions Prior to Event: Unit in cold shutdown on February 9 and 14, 1975  
Unit in hot shutdown on February 20, 1975

Description of Event:

On February 9, 14, and 20, 1975, the Oconee Unit 1 personnel hatch interlock mechanism became out of adjustment and resulted in the interlocks being inoperable. Although the inner and outer doors were maintained to provide containment integrity, when required, the interlock mechanism would not have prevented simultaneous opening of both doors. In all instances, the shift supervisor was notified and corrective maintenance was initiated to repair the interlocks.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

Each door of the personnel hatch has a gear which is rotated by the door handwheel. A pawl mechanism, in conjunction with this gear, creates a ratchet mechanism to prevent rotation of the door handwheel should the opposite door be open. The pawls are raised from or lowered on the gear by motion of the opposite door transmitted through a cable and linkage mechanism. Adjustments of the interlocks consist of adjusting the effective length of the cable and return springs such that the pawls will properly engage the gears and create the ratchet mechanism when the opposite door is opened. The apparent cause of this event was excessive wear of the gear teeth and the pawl making the cable length adjustment extremely sensitive.

Analysis of Event:

The incidents of February 9 and 14, 1975 occurred when the unit was in a cold shutdown state; hence, containment integrity was not required. The February 20, 1975 incident did occur with the unit in a hot shutdown state; however, containment integrity was maintained and the hatch was restored to operable status within the time limitations specified in Technical Specification 3.6.4. In addition to personnel present to prevent simultaneous opening of the doors, a control room alarm also monitors the status of the personnel hatch doors. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The interlocks were adjusted and the personnel hatch returned to service. A maintenance procedure for adjustment of the interlocks has been written. Prior to April 1, 1975, a representative of the designer of the hatch will be on site. Subsequently, a periodic surveillance program will be developed and implemented by May 1, 1975. Identification of recommended spare parts will be discussed with the designer's representative and procurement of the necessary parts initiated. In addition, an investigation is in progress to determine the necessity for modifications to the personnel and emergency hatch interlock mechanisms.