

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 308

FILE: _____

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, North Carolina A. C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 1-7-74	DATE REC'D 1-10-74	LTR X	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. A. Giambusso			ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR XXX SENT LOCAL PDR XXX		
CLASS	UNCLASS	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D		DOCKET NO:		
	XXX			1		50-269		
DESCRIPTION: Ltr trans the following..... DO NOT REMOVE ACKNOWLEDGED PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit #1				ENCLOSURES: REPORT: Unusual Event rpt #UE-269/73-14 on 12-8-73, in which engineered safeguard valve RC-7 failed to open on signal from the engineered safeguards panel (1 cy rec'd)				

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 1-14-74 GMC

BUTLER(L) W/ Copies	✓ SCHWENCER(L) W/7 Copies	ZIEMANN(L) W/ Copies	REGAN(E) W/ Copies
CLARK(L) W/ Copies	STOLZ(L) W/ Copies	DICKER(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies
GOLLER(L) W/ Copies	VASSALLO(L) W/ Copies	KNIGHTON(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies
KNIEL(L) W/ Copies	SCHEMEL(L) W/ Copies	YOUNGBLOOD(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

✓ REG FILE	✓ TECH REVIEW	DENTON	✓ LIC ASST	A/T IND
✓ AEC PDR	✓ HENDRIE	GRIMES	DIGGS (L)	BRAITMAN
✓ OGC, ROOM P-506A	✓ SCHROEDER	GAMMILL	GEARIN (L)	SALTZMAN
✓ MUNTZING/STAFF	✓ MACCARY	KASTNER	✓ GOULBOURNE (L)	B. HURT
✓ CASE	✓ KNIGHT	BALLARD	LEE (L)	PLANS
GIAMBUSSO	✓ PAWLICKI	SPANGLER	MAIGRET (L)	MCDONALD
BOYD	✓ SHAO		SERVICE (L)	DUBE w/Input
MOORE (L) (EWR)	✓ STELLO	ENVIRO	SHEPPARD (E)	INFO
✓ DEYOUNG (L) (PWR)	✓ HOUSTON	MULLER	SMITH (L)	C. MILES
✓ SKOVHOLT (L)	✓ NOVAK	DICKER	TEETS (L)	✓ B. KING E/W BLDG
P. COLLINS	✓ ROSS	KNIGHTON	WADE (E)	
DENISE	✓ IPPOLITO	YOUNGBLOOD	WILLIAMS (E)	
✓ REG OPR	✓ TEDESCO	REGAN	WILSON (L)	
✓ FILE & REGION (2)	✓ LONG	PROJECT LDR		
✓ MORRIS	✓ LAINAS			
✓ STEELE	✓ BENAROYA	HARLESS		
	✓ VOLLMER			

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

✓ 1 - LOCAL PDR <u>Walhalla, S. C.</u>	(1) (2X10) - NATIONAL LAB'S	1-PDR-SAN/LA/NY
✓ 1 - DTIE (ABERNATHY)	1-ASLBP (E/W Bldg, Rm 529)	1-GERALD LELLOUCHE
✓ 1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1-W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	BROOKHAVEN NAT. LAB
1 - ASLB (YORE/SAYRE/ WOODARD/"H" ST.	1-CONSULTANT'S NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	1-AGMED (Ruth Gussman) RM-B-127, GT.
✓ 16 - CYS ACRS Sent to Lic. Asst. Goulbourne	1-GERALD ULRIKSON... ORNL	1-RD..MULLER..F-309 G

50-269

DUKE POWER COMPANY


Regulatory

File Cy.

POWER BUILDING


422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION



January 7, 1974

Mr. Angelo Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545



RE: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report UE-269/73-14, "Engineered Safeguards Valve RC-7."


Yours very truly,

A. C. Thies

ACT/jg
Encl.

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region II
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1
UNUSUAL EVENT REPORT UE-269/73-14
ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS VALVE RC-7



Description of the Incident

On December 8, 1973, the Reactor Building Remotely Operated Isolation Valve and Engineered Safeguards Valve Functional Test was performed. During the test, the engineered safeguards valve RC-7, a pneumatic operated reactor building isolation valve in the pressurizer sample line, failed to open on signal from the engineered safeguards panel. The valve closed as would be required for engineered safeguards actuation; however, the valve jammed in its seat and could not be reopened from the ES Panel. Regulatory Operations, Region II, was informed of this incident on December 8, 1973.

Corrective Action

When the valve RC-7 could not be opened remotely, it was manually unseated and opened. The valve operator was then adjusted to prevent seating the valve with excessive force. After these adjustments, the valve was cycled several times and operated properly. The valve was then tested daily for three days and operated properly each day.

Safety Analysis

Engineered Safeguards Valve RC-7 is one of two valves in the pressurizer sample line which provide reactor building isolation in the event of engineered safeguards actuation. The redundant valve, RC-5, was tested at the time of the incident and operated properly. Furthermore, RC-7 functioned as would be required on engineered safeguards actuation. This incident did not affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.