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TO:	ORIG	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR	SENT LOCAL PDR
A. Giambusso	1			x	x

CLASS: (U) PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D	DOCKET NO:
		1	50-269

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr re two recent unusual events....trans the following:

ACKNOWLEDGED
DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAMES: Oconee Unit 1

ENCLOSURES:

REPORT: (1) Failure of the Operating Mechanism to Fully Open the Core Flood Line Isolation Valve CF-1 on 4-5-73
(2) Failure of Reactor Building Spray Valves to Open During ES System Testing on 4-4-73

(1 cy rec'd)

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 5-8-73 LB

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Regulatory File Cy.

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A. C. THIES
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PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

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

May 4, 1973

Mr. Angelo Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Section 1.9 of the Technical Specifications for Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1, which is under operation pursuant to Facility Operating License No. DPR-38, states, in part, that an unusual event is any occurrence resulting in an engineered safety system component malfunction which could render a safety system incapable of performing its intended safety function. Section 6.2 specifies the action to be taken should such an unusual event occur. Section 6.6.2 specifies the reporting requirements of such an unusual event. Pursuant to these sections of the Oconee Unit 1 Technical Specifications, reports of two recent unusual events are attached for your information.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachments

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region II, Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

FAILURE OF THE OPERATING MECHANISM TO FULLY OPEN THE CORE FLOOD LINE ISOLATION VALVE CF-1

On April 5, 1973, an inspection of the core flood isolation valve CF-1 revealed that it was not in the fully open position although all indications in the control room showed the valve to be open. When the valve was cycled electrically, it opened approximately two inches of the 14 inch travel and could not be opened further manually. The station superintendent was notified, and he verbally reported the incident to Region II Regulatory Operations office in Atlanta, Georgia.

The CF isolation valves are 14 inch Walworth Company cast steel, pressure seal globe valves, serial number C-43202.

Consequently, during unit shutdown, the valve was disassembled. It was discovered that the stem nut locknut had freed itself, allowing the stem nut to travel up the motor drive sleeve instead of the stem traveling up the stem nut. The limit switches which provide open and closed position indication to the control room operate from the motor drive sleeve through gears. Therefore, when the motor operated and the motor drive sleeve rotated, the stem nut moved instead of the stem, causing the limit switches to relay false position indication.

As a result of this incident, an external limit switch has been installed on each core flood isolation valves which will provide position indication independent of the internal limit switch on the limitorque operator.

The other core flood isolation valve and ES valves have been checked to ensure their locknuts were properly secured. As a result of this inspection, it was found that the stem nut locknut on valve LP-18, a Walworth Company Sn. No. C-43201, 10 inch gate valve, had also backed off. The locknuts on both CF-1 and LP-18 were retightened and properly secured.

FAILURE OF REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY VALVES TO OPEN DURING ES SYSTEM TESTING

On April 4, 1973 and during routine monthly testing of the Engineered Safeguards (ES) system, reactor building spray valves BS-1 and BS-2 failed to function when the ES system furnished the opening signal to the valve motor operators. These valves are eight inch ALOYCO 45°, 300 lb. globe valves with limitorque operators. The station superintendent was immediately notified, and he verbally reported the incident to Region II Regulatory Operations office in Atlanta, Georgia. The valve motors, limit switches, and torque switches were inspected but no indication of abnormalities was found. The valves were opened manually and it was found that the seating was extremely tight. After the valves were opened manually, they were successfully operated using the valve motor operators.

During recent hot functional testing, the valves BS-1 and BS-2 were apparently manually closed to prevent some minor leakage through the seats. Consequently, the torque supplied by the valve motor operators was insufficient to reopen these valves.

After verification that valves BS-1 and BS-2 were operating properly, all other ES valves were checked to ensure they had not been jammed closed by manual operation. To prevent recurrence of a similar problem, the Station Review Committee has recommended that a sign be affixed to the manual handwheel of each ES valve stating, "Do not jam valve closed by hand." This recommendation has already been accomplished. Also, operating procedures will require testing of any engineered safeguards valve electrically after it has been manually operated.