

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 1979

FILE: _____

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N.C. 28201 Mr. A.C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 3-6-74	DATE REC'D 3-11-74	LTR X	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: A. Giambusso			ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR XXX SENT LOCAL PDR XXX		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-269			
DESCRIPTION: Ltr trans the following.....				ENCLOSURES: Abnormal Occurrence Report AO-269/74-4 concern...Overpressurization of B Core Flood Tank.....				
PLANT NAME: Oconee #1				<p>ACKNOWLEDGED (1 cy encl rec'd)</p> <p>DO NOT REMOVE</p>				

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

3-11-74 JB

BUTLER(L) W/ Copies	✓SCHWENCER(L) W/7 Copies	ZIEMANN(L) W/ Copies	REGAN(E) W/ Copies
CLARK(L) W/ Copies	STOLZ(L) W/ Copies	DICKER(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies
GOLLER(L) W/ Copies	VASSALLO(L) W/ Copies	KNIGHTON(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies
KNIEL(L) W/ Copies	SCHEMEL(L) W/ Copies	YOUNGBLOOD(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

✓REG FILE	TECH REVIEW	DENTON	LIC ASST	A/T IND
✓AEC PDR	✓HENDRIE	GRIMES		BRAITHAN
✓OGC, ROOM P-506A	SCHROEDER	GAMMILL	DIGGS (L)	SALTZMAN
✓MUNTING/STAFF	✓MACCARY	KASTNER	GEARIN (L)	B. HURT
✓CASE	✓KNIGHT	BALLARD	✓COULBOURNE (L)	PLANS
GIAMBUSSO	✓PAWLICKI	SPANGLER	LEE (L)	MCDONALD
BOYD	✓SHAO		MAIGRET (L)	DUBE w/Input
✓MOORE (L)(EWR)	✓STELLO	ENVIRO	REED (L)	INFO
DEYOUNG(L)(FWR)	✓HOUSTON	MULLER	SERVICE (L)	C. MILES
SKOVHOLT (L)	✓NOVAK	DICKER	SHEPPARD (E)	✓B. KING
P. COLLINS	✓ROSS	KNIGHTON	SMITH (L)	
DENISE	✓IPPOLITO	YOUNGBLOOD	TEETS (L)	
✓REG OPR	✓TEDESCO	REGAN	WADE (E)	
FILE & REGION(3)	✓LONG	PROJECT LDR	WILLIAMS (E)	
✓MORRIS	✓LAINAS		WILSON (L)	
✓STEELE	✓BEHAROYA	HARLESS		
	✓VOLLNER			

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

✓1 - LOCAL PDR <u>Walhalla, S.C.</u>	1-B & M SWINEBROAD	1-P. R. DAVIS
✓1 - DTIE(ABERNATHY)	(1)(2)(10)-NATIONAL LAB'S	1-PDR-SAN/LA/NY
✓1 - NSIC(BUCHANAN)	1-ASLBP(E/W Bldg, Rm 529)	1-GERALD LELLOUCHE
1 - ASLB(YORE/SAYRE/ WOODARD/"H" ST.	1-W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	BROOKHAVEN NAT. LAB
✓16 - CYS ACRS XXXXXX Sent to Goulbourne	1-CONSULTANT'S	1-AGMED(Ruth Gussma
3-11-74	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	RM-B-127, GT.
	1-GERALD ULRIKSON...ORNL	1-RD..MULLER..P-309

DUKE POWER COMPANY


POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

March 6, 1974



Mr. Angelo Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. Giambusso:


Pursuant to Section 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence
Report AO-269/74-4.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley



DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Report No.: AO-269/74-4
Report Date: March 5, 1974
Occurrence Date: February 22, 1974
Facility: Oconee Unit 1
Identification of Occurrence: Overpressurization of B Core Flood Tank
Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Steady-State Power
Oconee Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On February 22, 1974, the Oconee Unit 1 B core flood tank pressure was inadvertently increased to approximately 660 psig. Technical Specification 3.3 requires that the core flood tank pressure be maintained at 600 ± 25 psig. The following describes the sequence of events:

- 1545 Control room operator received computer alarm for B core flood tank low pressure (592 psig). Operator received B core flood tank low pressure alarm on statalarm board. Nitrogen header pressure was not sufficient for makeup to the core flood tanks; therefore, the utility operator was dispatched to increase header pressure by cutting in another nitrogen bottle. At the same time, another utility operator opened the B core flood tank makeup valve.
- 1546 The operator received a call to investigate the radiation monitor panel and left the core flood tank pressure gage.
- 1547 The operator received a computer alarm indicating B core flood tank high pressure (616 psig).
- 1548 The utility operator closed the B core flood tank makeup valve.
- 1600 Pressure in the B core flood tank peaked at about 660 psig, and then decreased to 630 psig.
- 1646 After venting to the reactor building atmosphere, B core flood tank pressure was reduced to below 625 psig.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of this incident was deficiencies in the operating procedure for the core flooding system. The present procedure does not preclude opening

the core flood tank nitrogen makeup valves while the nitrogen header pressure is being increased by cutting in additional nitrogen supplies at relatively high pressure. Operator error also contributed to this incident. The operator should not have permitted himself to be distracted from monitoring the core flood tank pressure while the nitrogen makeup supply valve was open.

Analysis of Occurrence:

There was no structural damage to the tank or associated piping. The core flood tanks have a design pressure of 700 psi and were successfully hydro tested at 1050 psi during preoperational structural testing. The pressure increase was limited to 660 psig by core flood tank relief valve actuation. If the core flood tank pressure had equalized with the nitrogen header pressure, the pressure in the core flood tanks would not have exceeded 700 psig.

If a loss of coolant accident were postulated to occur while the B core flood tank was at its maximum pressure of 600 psig, core flooding would occur slightly sooner, but the present LOCA analyses would be insensitive to such a small time difference.

It is concluded that this incident did not affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Action:

Immediate corrective action was to reduce the core flood tank pressure below 625 psig by venting the nitrogen to the reactor building atmosphere.

To prevent recurrence of a similar incident, operating procedures for the core flooding system will be modified to prevent makeup to the core flood tanks while nitrogen header pressure is being increased. The operating procedure will also be modified to require verification that sufficient nitrogen header pressure exists prior to makeup to the core flood tanks.