AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 11139

FILE:

FROM: Duke Power Co Charlotte, NC AC Thies	DATE OF DOC 10-25-74	DATE REC'D 10-30-74	LTR	TWX	RPT	OTHER FACSIMILE
TO: Mr. Moseley	ORIG NONE SIGNED	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR XXX SENT LOCAL PDR XXX		
CLASS:	UNCLASS XXXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-269	

DESCRIPTION:
Ltr trans the following:

ENCLOSURES:
Abnormal Occurrence # 74-17 on 10-12-74 concerning low pressure infection pump room flooding.....

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME: Oconee 1

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 11-29-74 ehf

BUTLER (L) W/ Copies CLARK (L) W/ Copies PARR (L) W/ Copies KNIEL (L) W/ Copies	SCHWENCER (L) W/ Copies STOLZ (L) W/ Copies VASSALLO (L) W/ Copies PURPLE (L) W/ Copies	ZIEMANN (L) W/ Copies DICKER (E) W/ Copies KNIGHTON (E) W/ Copies YOUNGBLOOD (E) W/ Copies	REGAN (E) W/ Copies LEAR (L) W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE	TECH REVIEW	DENTON	LIC ASST	A/T IND
AEC PDR		GRIMES		BRAITMAN
GC, ROOM P-506A	SCHROEDER	GAMMILL	DIGGS (L)	SALTZMAN
MUNTZING/STAFF	ACCARY	KASTNER	GEARIN (L)	B. HURT
CASE	KNIGHT	BALLARD	GOULBOURNE (L)	
GIAMBUSSO	PAWLICKI	SPANGLER	KREUTZER (E)	PLANS
BOYD	LIAO		LEE (L)	MCDONALD
MOORE (L) (BWR)	STELLO	ENVIRO	MAIGRET (L)	CHAPMAN
DEYOUNG (L) (PWR)	HOUSTON	MULLER	REED (E)	DUBE w/input
SKOVHOLT (L)	NOVAK	DICKER	SERVICE (L)	E. COUPE
GOLLER (L)	ROSS	KNIGHTON	SHEPPARD (L)	
P. COLLINS	IPPOLITO	YOUNGBLOOD	SLATER (E)	THOMPSON (2)
DENISE	TEDESCO	REGAN	SMITH (L)	LECKER
REG OPR	LONG	PROJECT LDR	TEETS (L)	EISENHUT
FILE & REGION (3)	MAIGAS		WILLIAMS (E)	
MORRIS	MENARDY	HARLESS	WILSON (L)	
STEELE	VOLLMER			

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

40 ltr

1 – LOCAL PDR Walhalla, S.C.
1 – TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10) – NATIONAL LABS
1 – NSIC (BUCHANAN)
1 – ASLB
1 – Newton Anderson
1 – ACRS HOLDING
Send to Lic Asst. Sheppard
1 – ASLBP (E/W Bldg, Rm 529)
1 – W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT
1 – B&M SWINEBROAD, Rm E-201 GT
1 – CONSULTANTS
NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN
1 – PDR SAN/LA/NY
1 – BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
1 – G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1 – AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN) Rm B-127 GT
1 – R. D. MUELLER, [illegible] GT

DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

October 25, 1974

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence Report AO-269/74-17.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report No.: AO-269/74-17

Report Date: October 25, 1974

Occurrence Date: October 12, 1974

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Low pressure injection pump room flooding

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit 1 at various power levels, Unit 2 in cold shutdown

Description of Occurrence:

On October 12, 1974, a utility operator at the Oconee Nuclear Station discovered three feet of standing water in a pump room which contains low pressure injection pumps 1B and 2B and reactor building spray pumps 1B and 2B. Electrical power was isolated to these pumps and operation of the redundant low pressure injection pumps 1A and 2A and reactor building spray pumps 1A and 2A were verified. Samples of the water were taken, and the results of chemical and gamma spectrum analysis indicated a radioactivity level and boron concentration consistent with water from the Low Pressure Injection System.

A submersible pump and hose were used to pump the water to the low activity waste tank. Electrical and functional checks of the low pressure injection and reactor building spray pumps were performed to verify operability.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

On October 9, 1974, the Oconee Unit 2 decay heat cooler 2B was isolated in preparation for inspection of valve 2LP-14. The cooler was drained to the high activity waste tank. Drain valves 2LWD-12, 2LWD-272, 2LWD-374 and 2LWD-373 were opened to drain the piping header between the cooler and the 2B low pressure injection pump. This water drains to the pump room floor sump and then is pumped to the high activity waste tank with automatic sump pumps. The utility operator was under the impression that the isolation of the B low pressure injection header had been completed by the control room operator by closing remotely operated valves 2LP-34, 2LP-13, and 2LP-18; however, he did not visually verify that the valves were closed.

The water drained from the header to the floor drains at the base of 2B low pressure injection pump. The automatic cycling sump pumps apparently tripped due to a pump overload and the water draining to the pump room collected. The utility operator did not close the header drain valve because he thought the header was isolated. It could not be determined

whether the header had been isolated; however, leakage from the header allowed the pump room to be flooded to a depth of three feet.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The two low pressure injection pumps are mounted on high bases and the water in the pump room did not rise sufficiently to affect them. The motors for the 1B and 2B reactor building spray pumps were partially submerged and thus one train of Reactor Building spray was removed from service for both Units 1 and 2. The redundant Reactor Building spray pumps, located in another pump room, were unaffected by this incident and were tested to verify operability as soon as this condition was identified. Technical Specification 3.3.5 permits maintenance on one string of low pressure injection and Reactor Building spray for a period of 24 hours. The basis of this acceptability is the small probability of failure within 24 hours following a demonstration. The draining of the pump room and subsequent verification testing of the affected components was completed 10 hours after initial discovery. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

In order to prevent similar occurrences, an evaluation of sump pump reliability will be performed. A modification will be made to install a sump pump monitoring alarm so that early pump failure may be detected. A meeting was held on October 15, 1974 with the station Manager and all supervisors which stressed the necessity for attention to detail and completeness in any station operation.