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DESCRIPTION:

Ltr w/attch.....transmitting a revision to their 9-4-74 Tech Specs Change.....with regard to Containment Integrity.....

ENCLOSURES:

DO NOT REMOVE

ACKNOWLEDGED

PLANT NAME: Oconee 1, 2, & 3

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 1-21-75 ehf

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

January 15, 1975



Mr. Angelo Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

My letter of September 4, 1974 requested certain changes to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.6, "Containment Integrity," which made provision for maintenance on Containment air locks and isolation valves while Containment integrity is required. In some cases, personnel passage through the operable door of the air lock is required to perform maintenance or test of the other door. Specifically, if the inner door gasket has failed, passage through the outer door is necessary for testing of a repaired inner door gasket.

Pursuant to 10CFR50.90, please find attached a proposed revision to Technical Specification 3.6 which would make provision for momentary passage through the operable door of an inoperable hatch. The inoperable door of the hatch would be closed to provide structural integrity. Infrequent and momentary passage through the operable door is justified by the added flexibility to perform necessary repairs and testing during power operation.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment



A. C. THIES, being duly sworn, states that he is Senior Vice President of Duke Power Company; that he is authorized on the part of said Company to sign and file with the Atomic Energy Commission this request for amendment of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, Appendix A to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55; and that all statements and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

A. C. Thies, Senior Vice President

ATTEST:

John C. Goodman, Jr.
Assistant Secretary

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of January, 1975.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

Oct. 24, 1977

3.6 REACTOR BUILDING

Applicability

Applies to the containment when the reactor is subcritical by less than 1% Δk/k.

Objective

To assure containment integrity during startup and operation.

Specification

3.6.1 Containment integrity shall be maintained whenever all three (3) of the following conditions exist:

a. Reactor coolant pressure is 300 psig or greater
b. Reactor coolant temperature is 200°F or greater
c. Nuclear fuel is in the core

3.6.2 Containment integrity shall be maintained when the reactor coolant system is open to the containment atmosphere and the requirements for a refueling shutdown are not met.

3.6.3 The containment integrity shall be intact whenever positive reactivity insertions which would result in the reactor being subcritical by less than 1% Δk/k are made by control rod motion or boron dilution.

3.6.4 Exceptions to 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.3 shall be as follows:

a. If either the personnel or emergency hatches become inoperable, except as a result of an inoperable door gasket, the hatch shall be restored to an operable status within 24 hours, or the reactor shall be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.

If a hatch is inoperable due to an inoperable door gasket:

1. The remaining door of the affected hatch shall be closed and sealed except for momentary personnel passage necessary for repair or test of the inoperable door.

2. The hatch shall be restored to operable status within seven days or the reactor shall be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.

b. A containment isolation valve may be inoperable provided either:

1. The inoperable valve is restored to operable status within four hours.

2. The affected penetration is isolated within four hours by the use of a deactivated automatic valve secured and locked in the isolated position.

3. The affected penetration is isolated within four hours by the use of a closed manual valve or blind flange.

4. The reactor is in the hot shutdown condition within 12 hours and cold shutdown within 24 hours.

3.6.5 The reactor building internal pressure shall not exceed 1.5 psig or five inches of Hg if the reactor is critical.

3.6.6 Prior to criticality following refueling shutdown, a check shall be made to confirm that all manual containment isolation valves which should be closed are closed and tagged.

Bases

The Reactor Coolant System conditions of cold shutdown assure that no steam will be formed and hence no pressure buildup in the containment if the Reactor Coolant System ruptures.

The selected shutdown conditions are based on the type of activities that are being carried out and will preclude criticality in any occurrence.

The reactor building is designed for an internal pressure of 59 psig and an external pressure 3.0 psi greater than the internal pressure. The design external pressure of 3.0 psi corresponds to a margin of 0.5 psi above the differential pressure that could be developed if the building is sealed with an internal temperature of 120°F with a barometric pressure of 29.0 inches of Hg and the building is subsequently cooled to an internal temperature of 80°F with a concurrent rise in barometric pressure to 31.0 inches of Hg. The weather conditions assumed here are conservative since an evaluation of National Weather Service records for this area indicates that from 1918 to 1970 the lowest barometric pressure recorded is 29.05 inches of Hg and the highest if 30.85 inches of Hg.

Operation with a personnel or emergency hatch inoperable does not impair containment integrity since either door meets the design specifications for structural integrity and leak rate. Momentary passage through the outer door is necessary should the inner door gasket be inoperative to install or remove auxiliary restraint beams on the inner door to allow testing of the hatch. The time limits imposed permit completion of maintenance action and the performance of a local leak rate test when required or the orderly shutdown and cooldown of the reactor. Timely corrective action for an inoperable containment isolation valve is also specified.

When containment integrity is established, the limits of 10CFR100 will not be exceeded should the maximum hypothetical accident occur.

REFERENCES

FSAR, Section 5