



D. W. Gregoire  
Columbia Generating Station  
P.O. Box 968, PE20  
Richland, WA 99352-0968  
Ph. 509.377.8616 | F. 509.377.4150  
dwgregoire@energy-northwest.com

January 25, 2016  
GO2-16-024

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject: **COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397  
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTION 5.6.4 POST ACCIDENT  
MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION REPORT**

Dear Sir or Madam:

Transmitted herewith is the Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report for Columbia Generating Station. This report is submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications (TS) Section 5.6.4.

On December 20, 2015 during a planned surveillance activity, Operations personnel identified the dual position indication for the Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MS-V-28B) did not indicate when expected. The most likely cause is a limit switch failure.

This required entry into TS Section 3.3.3.1, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation" Condition A, due to an inoperable indication channel for Function 7 of Table 3.3.3.1-1 "Penetration Flow Path PCIV Position." Condition A requires restoration of the required indication channel to an operable status within 30 days, or initiate reporting requirements in accordance with TS Section 5.6.4.

Resolution of this issue within the 30-day requirement was not feasible due to the significant power reduction and potential steam tunnel entry required to complete the necessary repairs (see attachment). For this reason, Energy Northwest is submitting this report in accordance with TS Section 5.6.4. Accordingly, the attached report outlines the preplanned alternate method of monitoring and the apparent cause of the inoperability along with the plans and schedule for restoring the instrument channel to an operable status.

There are no commitments being made to the NRC by this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Ms. D.M. Wolfram, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor, at (509) 377-4792.

Executed on January 25, 2016

Respectfully,



*for* D. W. Gregoire  
Manager, Regulatory Affairs & Performance Improvement

Attachment: Technical Specifications Section 5.6.4 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report

cc: NRC Region IV Administrator  
NRC NRR Project Manager  
NRC Senior Resident Inspector/988C  
CD Sonoda – BPA/1399  
WA Horin – Winston & Strawn

**Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report  
Inoperable Channel for Penetration Flow Path PCIV Position**

**Preplanned Alternate Method of Monitoring**

An alternate method of monitoring the isolation function for the outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) has been implemented. The alternate method requires Operations personnel, following an isolation signal, to verify that flow indication for the 'B' Main Steam Line in the Main Control Room is indicating zero flow in addition to verifying the inboard MSIV indicates closed.

It should be noted that the position indication for the inboard MSIV on the 'B' Main Steam Line is fully functional.

This guidance has been communicated to Operations personnel initially with a Night Order, sustainability maintained with a Caution Tag, and is included with the "Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Outage Report." This alternate method provides an acceptable means of indication to ensure the Main Steam Line isolation function has been accomplished. In addition, the MSIV indication anomaly has been entered into the Corrective Action Program for final resolution.

**Apparent Cause of the Inoperability**

The most likely cause is a faulty limit switch which provides the open indication for the outboard MSIV. The cause will be determined when the limit switch is replaced.

**Plans and Schedule for Returning Function to Operable Status**

The limit switch will be replaced during the next appropriate forced outage, or the next refueling outage scheduled for May 2017.