



## **Planning FY2016-2020 I&C research at the NRC**


Sushil Birla

Senior Technical Advisor


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Software Certification Consortium, January 11, 2016


## Current State & Trends




## Contributory Hazard Scenario (1/2): Safety – “Non-Safety” Interconnections




## Contributory Hazard Scenario (2/2): Cross-Divisional Interconnections



**Issues → Resolution Plan → Gaps → Research**



## Gaps → Research directions



# Transformational

## Need driven research planning

- Starting from industry-perceived issues
- Addressing foundational gaps ← [technical collaboration opportunities](#)
- Iterative, evolutionary paradigm shift

<b>From Past Practice</b>	<b>To Future Vision</b>	<b>Example research activity</b>
Compliance-based	Goal-driven ( <a href="#">example</a> )	Improved hazard analysis methods & tools
Prescriptive	Performance based	Future regulatory & guidance framework
Rework. Patchwork. Workaround. Mitigation.	Prevention ( <a href="#">example</a> )	Designed in assurance Correct by construction
Short term fragments	Integrative foundation	Integrated safety-security evaluation
Reactive	Proactive	Embedded digital devices



# Collaboration examples & opportunities





**U.S. NRC**  
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
*Protecting People and the Environment*

# Cross-domain collaboration opportunity

## Common core R&D:


- NSF, NIST, DoD, NSA, NIH
- ...
- Academia

## Domain-specific R&D:

- Industry
- Government

## Pilot apps, e.g.:

- NRC, EPRI.
- FDA



Adapted from: CISE Overview of CPS R&D: Frontiers of Computing: A View from the National Science Foundation

## Collaboration channels: Examples

### Industry

EPRI

IEEE

INPO

### International

OECD/Halden

MDEP

TF SCS

SCC

IRSN

KAERI

STUK

### Interagency

NSF

NASA

FAA

DoD/  
OASD

SERC

AFRL

SEI

AMRDEC

FDA

DHS

NSA

NIST

NRL

### Academia

MIT

UVA

KSU

CMU

Vanderbilt

York



## Cross-domain collaboration opportunities: Technical

1. Work product evaluation – necessary and sufficient criteria
2. Technological infrastructure, e.g.:
  - a. Harmonized vocabulary. Ontologies of key concepts.
  - b. Modeling different types of [dependencies](#)
  - c. [Strict stepwise refinement](#)
  - d. Tools. Their qualification
  - e. Reusable assets
  - f. [Third party certification infrastructure](#)

See in U.S. NRC [RIL-1101](#):

- Appendices C for item 1
- Appendix A for item 2a
- Appendix D for item 2c
- Appendix K for item 2b

[Aspirational Roadmap: Assurance Capability:](#)

<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1511/ML15113A337.pdf>



## Collaboration opportunities: Other than technology

1. Capability development: individual
2. Capability development: communal
3. Business case: societal; [lifecycle economics](#)
4. Culture
5. Growing digital content; shrinking resources.


Modeling different kinds of dependencies, e.g.:

- Function
- Control flow
- Data; information
- Resource sharing or constraint
- Conflicting goals or losses of concern
- States or conditions in the environment
  - Controlled processes
  - Supporting physical processes
- Concept
- Some unintended, unrecognized form of coupling.

(See U.S. NRC RIL-1101 Appendices I, J, K)



Concept of stepwise refinement - steps S0, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 ... Sn




See U.S. NRC RIL-1101 Appendix D

Enables "[correct by construction](#)"




Hazard analysis (HA) → Requirements → Architecture  
*Broken chain*


## Valid requirements are needed







## Safety: some sub-characteristics






## How a safety function can be degraded

[[RIL-1002](#)]


1. Not provided; examples:
  - Data sent on a communication bus is not delivered.
2. Provided when not needed
3. Incorrect value provided; causes:
  - Invalid data
  - Stale input value is treated inconsistently.
  - Undefined type of data
  - Incorrect message format
  - Incorrect initialization; etc.
4. Provided at wrong time or out of seq.
5. Provided: duration too long (e.g., for continuous-control functions).
6. Provided: duration too short; e.g.:
  - Signal is de-activated too early (e.g., for continuous-control functions).
7. Incorrect state transition
8. Intermittent, when required to be steady; examples:
  - Chatter or flutter
  - Pulse; spike
  - Impairment is erratic
9. Byzantine behavior
10. Interference in other ways:
  - Deprives access to a needed resource; for example:
    - “Babbling idiot”
    - Locking up and not releasing resource
  - Corrupts needed information

[Identify & specify constraints to prevent degradation](#)

## Process Activity (e.g., Hazard Analysis): General influencing factors



## Reasoning Model [*adapted from Toulmin*]




## Work products - examples

- 2011:** [NUREG/IA-0254](#), “Suitability of Fault Modes and Effects Analysis for Regulatory Assurance of Complex Logic in Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems” [[IRSN-USNRC collaboration](#)]
- 2011:** [RIL-1001](#), “Software-Related Uncertainties in the Assurance of Digital Safety Systems” [*Internal + expert clinic*]
- 2014:** [RIL-1002](#), “[Identification of Failure Modes](#) in Digital Safety Systems” [*Internal + expert clinic*]
- 2016:** RIL-1003, “Feasibility of Applying Failure Mode Analysis to Quantification of Risk Associated with Digital Safety Systems” [*Internal + expert clinic*]
- 2015:** [RIL-1101](#), “[Technical Basis](#) for review of Hazard Analysis” [*Internal + experts*]




Incremental evolution of Assurance capability






Evolve Assurance capability: NPP Case






# Aspirational Assurance Process

for [lifecycle economics](#)






Aspirational pre-certification activities






Aspirational standardization activities






## Other Information for Reference

HA: Source of validated safety requirements




# Contribution of uncertainties





# Framework to integrate evidence





## Hazard Analysis explained in terms of IEEE Std 603 criterion 4h

A specific basis shall be established for the design of each safety system of the nuclear power generating station; the design basis shall document as a minimum ...

the *conditions* having the potential for functional degradation of safety system performance

Hazards

and for which provisions shall be incorporated to retain the capability of performing the safety functions.

Hazard Controls



# Architecture - definition

Structure or structures of the **system**, which comprise **elements**, the **externally visible properties** of those elements, and the **relationships** among them and with the **environment**

WHERE:

**System:** combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more stated purposes. Systems can comprise of systems. A system with only software elements is also a system.

**Environment:** includes the combination of systems and elements external to this system, human elements interacting directly with the system and the commensurate manual procedures.

**Element:** a discrete part of a system that can be implemented to fulfill specified requirements. Examples: hardware, software, data (structure), human, process (e.g., process for providing service to users), procedure (e.g., operator instructions), facility, materials, or any combination.

**Externally visible properties:** include behavior – normal, as well as abnormal.

**Relationships:** include interactions and interconnections (communication paths).



United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

*Protecting People and the Environment*

## Acronyms 1/3

<b>ACRS</b>	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
<b>AERB</b>	Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India
<b>AFRL</b>	U. S. Air Force Research Labs
<b>AMRDEC</b>	U. S. Army Aviation & Missile Command Research Development & Engineering Laboratory
<b>AP</b>	Advanced Passive (1000)
<b>APR</b>	Advanced Power Reactor (1400)
<b>APWR</b>	Advanced Pressurized-Water Reactor
<b>CCF</b>	Common Cause Failure
<b>CFR</b>	Code of Federal Regulations
<b>CGD</b>	Commercial Grade Dedication
<b>CMU</b>	Carnegie Mellon University
<b>DE</b>	Division of Engineering
<b>DG</b>	Draft Guide
<b>DHS</b>	U. S. Department of Homeland Security
<b>DI&amp;C</b>	Digital Instrumentation and Control
<b>DFMEA</b>	Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DOE</b>	Department of Energy
<b>DSRS</b>	Design Specific Review Standard
<b>EDD</b>	Embedded Digital Device
<b>EPR</b>	Evolutionary Pressurized Reactor
<b>EPRI</b>	Electrical Power Research Institute
<b>ESBWR</b>	Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor
<b>FAA</b>	U. S. (Department of Transportation) Federal Aviation Administration
<b>FAT</b>	Factory Acceptance Test
<b>FDA</b>	U. S. (Department of Health and Human Services) Food and Drug Administration
<b>FTA</b>	Fault tree analysis
<b>FY</b>	Fiscal Year
<b>HA</b>	Hazard Analysis
<b>HCU</b>	High Cost and Unpredictability
<b>HFE</b>	Human Factors Engineering

<b>I&amp;C</b>	Instrumentation and Control
<b>IA</b>	International Agreement (report)
<b>ICEEB</b>	Instrumentation, Controls, and Electrical Engineering Branch
<b>IEEE</b>	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
<b>Info</b>	Information
<b>INPO</b>	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
<b>IRSN</b>	Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté
<b>ITAAC</b>	(NRC) Inspections, Tests, Analyses, Acceptance Criteria
<b>KAERI</b>	Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
<b>KSU</b>	Kansas State University
<b>Lab</b>	Laboratory
<b>LAR</b>	(NRC) License Amendment Request
<b>MDEP</b>	Multinational Design Evaluation Programme
<b>MIT</b>	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>NASA</b>	(U.S.) National Aeronautics and Space Administration
<b>NEI</b>	Nuclear Energy Institute
<b>NIST</b>	National Institute of Standards and Technology
<b>NPEC</b>	(IEEE Power & Energy Society) Nuclear Power Engineering Committee
<b>NRL</b>	(U.S.) Naval Research Laboratory
<b>NRC</b>	(U. S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission
<b>NRO</b>	(NRC) Office of New Reactor
<b>NRR</b>	(NRC) Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
<b>NSA</b>	(U.S.) National Security Agency
<b>NSF</b>	(U.S.) National Science Foundation
<b>NSIR</b>	(NRC) Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
<b>NUREG</b>	(NRC) publication identifier ( <u>N</u> uclear <u>R</u> egulatory Commission)
<b>OASD</b>	(U.S. Department of Defense) Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>OIS</b>	(NRC) Office of Information Services
<b>PLD</b>	Programmable Logic Device



## Acronyms 3/3

<b>RES</b>	(NRC) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
<b>RG</b>	(NRC) Regulatory Guide
<b>RIL</b>	(NRC) Research Information Letter
<b>SC6</b>	(IEEE/NPEC) Subcommittee Six (for Safety Systems)
<b>SCC</b>	
<b>SEI</b>	(CMU Software Certification Consortium) Software Engineering Institute
<b>SERC</b>	Systems Engineering Research Center
<b>SMR</b>	Small Modular Reactor
<b>SRM</b>	(NRC) Staff Requirements Memorandum
<b>SRP</b>	(NRC) Standard Review Plan
<b>STUK</b>	Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (Säteilyturvakeskus), Finland
<b>TF SCS</b>	Regulators' Task Force on Safety Critical Software for nuclear reactors
<b>UNR</b>	(NRC) User Need Request (a form of new research work request)
<b>U. S.</b>	United States of America
<b>UVA</b>	University of Virginia
<b>V&amp;V</b>	Verification and Validation



# Acronyms 1/2

<b>DARPA</b>	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
<b>DI&amp;C</b>	Digital Instrumentation and Control
<b>EPRI</b>	Electrical Power Research Institute
<b>HACMS</b>	High Assurance Cyber Military Systems
<b>I&amp;C</b>	Instrumentation and Control
<b>IEC</b>	International Electrotechnical Commission
<b>IEEE</b>	International Electrical & Electronics Engineering Society
<b>ISO</b>	International Standards Organization
<b>JTC1</b>	Joint Technical Committee 1
<b>min.</b>	minimum
<b>NPP</b>	Nuclear Power Plant
<b>NRC</b>	Nuclear Regulatory Commission



# Acronyms 2/2

<b>QA</b>	Quality Assurance
<b>QM</b>	Quality Management
<b>R&amp;D</b>	Research and Development
<b>RE</b>	Requirements Engineering
<b>RES</b>	NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
<b>RIL</b>	Research Information Letter
<b>spec.</b>	specification
<b>SQuaRE</b>	Software Quality and Requirements Engineering
<b>SW</b>	Software
<b>USC</b>	University of Southern California
<b>V&amp;V</b>	Verification and Validation
<b>Vocab</b>	Vocabulary