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FILE INCIDENT REPORT FILE 5-4 FROM: Duke Power Co. DATE OF DOC DATE REC'D LTR TWX **RPT** OTHER Charlotte, N.C. William O. Parker 8-27-75 ORIG CC OTHER SENT AEC PDR TO: XXX SENT LOCAL PDR. XXX NRC None **UNCLASS PROPINFO** INPUT NO CYS REC'D DOCKET NO: **CLASS** XXX J. 50-270 **ENCLOSURES: DESCRIPTION:** Letter trans the following. Unusual Event # 75-11, on 7-28-75, Concerning Inadvertent removal of high energy line break (1 Copy Enclosure Received) PLANT NAME: Oconee 1 FOR ACTION/INFORMATION SAB 9-3-75 ZIEMANN (L) BUTLER (L) SCHWENCER (L) REGAN (E) DO NOT REMOVE W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies LEAR (L) CLARK (L) STOLZ (L) DICKER (E) W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies PARR (L) VASSALLO (L) KNIGHTON (E) SPELS ACKNOWLEDGED W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies YOUNGBLOOD (E) KNIEL (L) ∕PURPLE (L) W/JCopies W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION REG FILE TECH REVIEW LIC ASST A/T IND DENTON **GRIMES NRC PDR SCHROEDER BRAITMAN R. DIGGS (L) **SALTZMAN** OGC, ROOM P-506A **MACCARY** GAMMILL H. GEARIN (L) GOSSICK/STAFF KNIGHT KASTNER MELTZ E. GOULBOURNE (L) CASE PAWLICKI BALLARD P. KREUTZER (E) **GIAMBUSSO** SHAO SPANGLER PLANS J. LEE (L) BOYD ✓ STELLO MCDONALD M. RUSHBROOK (L) **CHAPMAN** MOORE (L) HOUSTON **ENVIRO** S. REED (E) MULLER DUBE (Ltr) DEYOUNG (L) NOVAK M. SERVICE (L) SKOVHOLT (L) ROSS DICKER E. COUPE S. SHEPPARD (L) GOLLER (L) (Ltr) **IPPOLITO** KNIGHTON PETERSON M. SLATER (E) P. COLLINS **OTEDESCO** YOUNGBLOOD HARTFIELD (2) H. SMITH (L) DENISE REGAN KLECKER J. COLLINS S. TEETS (L) REG OPR LAINAS PROJECT LDR EISENHUT G. WILLIAMS (E) FILE &, REGION (2) BENAROYA *WIGGINTON V. WILSON (L) MIPC/PE **HARLESS** (3) **VOLLMER** R. INGRAM (L) F. WILLIAMS STEELE M. DUNCAN (E) HANAUER **EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION** -1 - LOCAL PDR Walhalla, S.C. -1 - TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10) - NATIONAL LABS__ 1 - PDR-SAN/LA/NY 1 − NSIC (BUCHANAN) 1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT

1 - ASLB - CONSULTANTS

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1 - G. ULRIKSON, ORNL

1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN) Rm B-127 GT

1 - J. D. RUNKLES, Rm E-201

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

August 27, 1975

Regulatory

File Cy.



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report UE-270/75-11.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.

MST:vr Attachment

cc: Mr. Roger S. Boyd



DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: UE-270/75-11

Report Date: August 27, 1975

Event Date: July 28, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: Inadvertent removal of high energy line break

door

Conditions Prior to Event: Unit 1, cold shutdown

Unit 2, power operation

Description of Event:

On July 28, 1975, a modification to Oconee Unit 1 was performed to replace the temporary "high energy line break doors" with a permanent installation. The prerequisite condition for performing this modification was that the appropriate unit be in a cold shutdown condition prior to replacing the doors. In the performance of the procedure, personnel unfamiliar with the Auxiliary Building layout removed the door to the Unit 2 rather than Unit 1 cable room while Unit 2 was at power operation. This situation was immediately reported to the Shift Supervisor and the door replaced within three hours.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

The procedure used for this modification listed the doors which were to be replaced and specified that the applicable unit had to be in a cold shutdown condition. It did not, however, specify which doors were applicable to each unit. Personnel not familiar with the Auxiliary Building layout confused the Unit 2 door with the Unit 1 door.

Analysis of Event:

The high energy line break doors are provided to protect the cable room from overpressurization and missile damage which might result during a postulated main steam or main feedwater break. The door was removed for only a short period of time, thus there was a very remote possibility of a line break at the same time. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The high energy line break door was replaced immediately following the discovery of this incident. In order to prevent future recurrence, the modification procedure has been revised to show those doors which are to be replaced during the time each unit is shut down.

27-270/75-11 DUKE POWER COMPANY POWER BUILDING 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, N. C. 28242 WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR. VICE PRESIDENT TELEPHONE: AREA 704 STEAM PRODUCTION 373-4083 August 27, 1975 Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Oconee Unit 2 Docket No. 50-270 Dear Mr. Moseley: Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report UE-270/75-11.

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