STRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCK MATERIAL (TEMPORARY FORM) NRC

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CONTROL NO:_

13977

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FI

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FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N.C. 28242		DATE OF DOC		E REC'D	LTR	TWX	RPT	OTHER		
	Wm. O. Parke		12-8-75	ļ	16-75	XX		<u> </u>		
TO:	· .		ORIG	CC	OTHER		ENT AE		XX	
	Mr. Norman C. Moseley		1 signed			SENT LOCAL PDRXX				
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DESCRIPTION: Ltr trans the following:					OSURES:	Unu	sual E	vent 270	/75-19 on 10	
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Duke Power Company

Power Building 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR. VICE PRESIDENT STEAM PRODUCTION

Telephone: Area 704 373-4083

Regulatory Docket File

13977

December 8, 1975

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Re: Oconee Unit 2 Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report UE-270/75-19.

Ver truly yours, 1. Tara William O. Parker, Jr.

EDB:mmb

Attachment

CC Mr. Benard C. Rusche



DUKE POWER COMPANY

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION



Concepted in Lar Dated 12

Report No.: UE-270/75-19

Report Date: December 5, 1975

Event Date: October 31, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: ES valve failure during Reactor Coolant System fill

Conditions Prior to Event: Unit in Cold Shutdown

Description of Event:

On October 31, 1975, Oconee Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System was being filled following a shutdown for reactor coolant pump seal repair. An attempt was made to cycle valve 2LP-21 to complete a station modification involving replacement of thermal overloads in the valve's electrical cables. The valve, which is located in the line between the unit's borated water storage tank (BWST) and low pressure injection (LPI) pumps, opened, but failed to close and resulted in water from the BWST draining to the Reactor Coolant System. Valves 2LP-1, 2LP-2, and 2LP-3 were immediately closed, isolating the LPI reactor coolant return line from the BWST and securing the Reactor Coolant System fill through valve 2LP-21. Valve 2LP-21 was then closed manually.

Apparent Cause of Event:

This event was apparently caused by failure of the motor which operates the valve. This resulted from binding which occurred between the valve stem and the motor operator while the valve was being cycled. Investigation revealed that the four bolts securing the motor operator to the valve body were loose, causing the valve to bind when the motor was operated.

Analysis of Event:

Valve 2LP-21 is an Engineered Safeguards valve which is normally closed, but opens to supply water from the Unit 2 BWST to the LPI pumps following an ES actuation. In this incident, the valve failed open as would have been required by an ES actuation. In addition, the redundant valve 2LP-22 was operable and is sized to supply both LPI pumps. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The damaged motor on valve 2LP-21 was replaced, and the motor-operator mounting bolts were tightened. A further check revealed that the bolts securing the motor-operator to the valve body on valves 1LP-21, 1LP-22, and 2LP-22 were also loose. As a corrective measure, these bolts on valves LP-21 and LP-22 for all three Oconee units have been lock wired to prevent loosening.

Additionally, a representative sample of other ES motor-operated valves will be checked for loose bolts by January 15, 1976. If this is determined to be a generic problem, all ES motor-operated valves will have lock wires placed on the motor-operator mounting bolts.



DEC 11 10 05 AM '15

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