

**NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)**

CONTROL NO: 6255FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FILE

FROM: Duke Power Co. Charlotte, N.C. 28201 A.C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 6-3-75	DATE REC'D 6-9-75	LTR XX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. Norman C. Moseley			ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XX</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XX</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-270		
DESCRIPTION: Ltr trans the following:				ENCLOSURES: Unusual Event 270/75-8 on 5-8-75 re incorrect sizing of engineered safeguards valve thermal overloads... (1 Orig cy encl rec'd)				
PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit 2								

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION DHL 6-10-75

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KNIEL (L) W/ Copies	1 PURPLE (L) W/ 3 Copies	YOUNGBLOOD (E) W/ Copies	

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

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1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1 - CONSULTANTS	1 - G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1 - ASLB	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN) Rm B-127 GT
1 - Newton Anderson		1 - J. D. RUNKLES, Rm E-201 GT
5 - ACRS SENT TO LIC ASST Sheppard 6-1075		
** SEND ONLY TEN DAY REPORTS		

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

Regulatory Docket File

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

June 3, 1975

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report
UE-270/75-8.



Very truly yours,



A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



6255

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Regulatory Docket File

Report No.: UE-270/75-8

Report Date: June 3, 1975

6-3-75

Event Date: May 8, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: Incorrect sizing of Engineered Safeguards valve thermal overloads

Conditions Prior to Event: Not Applicable

Description of Event:

As a result of the discovery of an incorrect thermal overload coil in an Engineered Safeguards valve, described in Abnormal Occurrence Report AO-270/74-13, a procedure was written to verify that the thermal overloads in all Engineered Safeguards valve motor control centers were properly sized and located in the proper phases. In the performance of this procedure, it has been discovered that some Engineered Safeguards valves do not have the overload protection described in FSAR Section 8.2.2.13(h). The FSAR states that two of the three overload elements are oversized for cable protection rather than motor protection and are wired in the contactor trip circuit. The third element is sized for motor protection but is wired to alarm only. In some instances, overloads sized for cable protection were discovered to be rated at twice the current carrying capacity of the cable.

Analysis of Event:

In most instances, the discrepancies found were oversizing of thermal overloads associated with Engineered Safeguards motor operated valves. As previously indicated the overloads are to be sized for cable protection. The oversizing of these overloads will in no way prevent an Engineered Safeguards valve from performing its intended function. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action:

A station modification is being prepared which will assure overload coils are replaced with those compatible with the description in the Final Safety Analysis Report. It is expected that this action will be completed by September 15, 1975.

U.S.A.E.C
 REGULATORY OPERATIONS
 REGION II
 ATLANTA, GA.
 JUN 5 10 49 AM '75