

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 4973
FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FILE

FROM: Duke Power Co. Charlotte, N.C. A.C. Thies			DATE OF DOC 4-30-75	DATE REC'D 5-6-75	LTR XX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Norman C. Moseley			ORIG 1 Signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XX</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XX</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS XX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1		DOCKET NO: 50-270		

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr. trans the following....

PLANT NAME: Oconee # 2

ENCLOSURES:

Abnorm. Occurr. # 75-4, on 3-26-75, concerning Quench tank low level....

(1 cy. Encl. rec'd) **REMOVE**

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION **ACKNOWLEDGED** VCR 5-8-75

BUTLER (L) W/ Copies	SCHWENCER (L) W/ Copies	ZIEMANN (L) W/ Copies	REGAN (E) W/ Copies
CLARK (L) W/ Copies	STOLZ (L) W/ Copies	DICKER (E) W/ Copies	LEAR (L) W/ Copies
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KNIEL (L) W/ Copies	PURPLE (L) W/ Copies	YOUNGBLOOD (E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE NRC PDR	TECH REVIEW SCHROEDER	DENTON **GRIMES	LIC ASST R. DIGGS (L)	A/T IND. BRAITMAN
OGC, ROOM P-506A	MACCARY	GAMMILL	H. GEARIN (L)	SALTZMAN
GÖSSICK/STAFF	KNIGHT	KASTNER	E. GOULBOURNE (L)	MELTZ
CASE	PAWLICKI	BALLARD	P. KREUTZER (E)	
GIAMBUSSO	SHAO	SPANGLER	J. LEE (L)	PLANS
BOYD	**STELLO		M. MAIGRET (L)	MCDONALD
MOORE (L)	**HOUSTON	ENVIRO	S. REED (E)	CHAPMAN
DEYOUNG (L)	**NOVAK	MULLER	M. SERVICE (L)	DUBE (Ltr)
SKOVHOLT (L)	ROSS	DICKER	S. SHEPPARD (L)	E. COUPE
GOLLER (L) (Ltr)	IPPOLITO	KNIGHTON	M. SLATER (E)	PETERSON
P. COLLINS	TEDESCO	YOUNGBLOOD	H. SMITH (L)	HARTFIELD (2)
DENISE	LONG	REGAN	S. TEETS (L)	KLECKER
REG OPR	LAINAS	PROJECT LDR	G. WILLIAMS (E)	EISENHUT
FILE & REGION (2)	BENAROYA		V. WILSON (L)	WIGGINTON
MIPC/PE (3)	VOLLMER	HARLESS	R. INGRAM (L)	F. WILLIAMS
STEELE				HANAUER

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

1 - LOCAL PDR <i>Thalbert</i>	1 - NATIONAL LABS	1 - PDR-SAN/LA/NY
1 - TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10)	1 - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1 - CONSULTANTS	1 - G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1 - ASLB	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN) Rm B-127 GT
1 - Newton Anderson		1 - J. D. RUNKLES, Rm E-201 GT
5 - ACRS SENT TO LIC ASST	<i>Sheppard</i>	
** SEND ONLY TEN DAY REPORTS		

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

April 30, 1975

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event
Report UE-270/75-4.



Very truly yours,



A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



4973

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: UE-270/75-4

Report Date: April 30, 1975

Event Date: March 26, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: Quench tank low level

Conditions Prior to Event: Unit at 100 percent full power

Description of Event:

On March 26, 1975, a quench tank low level alarm was received in the Oconee Unit 2 control room. The alarm was acknowledged; however, it was incorrectly identified. Approximately 20 minutes later, the Assistant Control Operator observed a low quench tank level of 40 inches. Corrective action was taken and normal quench tank level was regained 45 minutes after the initial alarm.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

Immediately prior to this incident, the alarm next to the quench tank low level alarm had been intermittently alarming. The operator heard the audio portion of the alarm, looked up, and mistakenly thought this alarm was the intermittent alarm again. The apparent cause of this event was misidentification of an alarm due to the proximity of the alarm panels.

Analysis of Event:

The quench tank is used to condense steam from the pressurizer relief valves. In the event the pressurizer relief valves had actuated and the water level in the quench tank been below the spray nozzles, it is probable that the quench tank rupture discs would have actuated. This would have allowed steam to be relieved to the steam generator cavity. However, all radioactive effluent would have been contained in the reactor building. In addition, this incident would not affect the safe operation of the unit. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

Personnel involved in this incident have been reminded of the importance of considering each alarm as a new and different alarm. It is considered that further corrective action as a result of this incident is not warranted.