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(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 4549

FILE: 210

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N. C. 28201 A. C. Thies		DATE OF DOC 5-15-74	DATE REC'D 5-21-74	LTR X	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. Giambusso		ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR	X	
					SENT LOCAL PDR	X	
CLASS	UNCLASS XXXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-270		

DESCRIPTION:
Ltr trans the following:

PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit # 2

ENCLOSURES:
Abnormal Occurrence Report # AO-270/74-3,
on 5-5-74, concerning the failure to verify
containment integrity prior to unit startup

Do Not Remove
ACKNOWLEDGED

(1 cy rec'd)

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

5-22-74

AB

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INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<u>REG FILE</u>	<u>TECH REVIEW</u>	DENTON	LIC ASST	<u>A/T IND</u>
✓ AEC PDR	✓ HENDRIE	GRIMES		BRAITMAN
✓ OGC, ROOM P-506A	✓ SCHROEDER	GAMMILL	DIGGS (L)	SALTZMAN
✓ MUNTZING/STAFF	✓ MACCARY	KASTNER	GEARIN (L)	B. HURT
✓ CASE	✓ KNIGHT	BALLARD	GOULBOURNE (L)	<u>PLANS</u>
GIAMBUSO	✓ PAWLICKI	SPANGLER	LEE (L)	MCDONALD
BOYD	✓ SHAO		MAIGRET (L)	DUBE w/Input
MOORE (L)(BWR)	✓ STELLO	<u>ENVIRO</u>	REED (E)	<u>INFC</u>
DEYOUNG(L)(PWR)	✓ HOUSTON	MULLER	SERVICE (L)	C. MILES
SKOVHOLT (L)	✓ NOVAK	DICKER	✓ SHEPPARD (L)	B. KING (E/W-358)
✓ GOLLER(L)	✓ ROSS	KNIGHTON	SLATER (E)	KLECKER
P. COLLINS	✓ IPPOLITO	YOUNGBLOOD	SMITH (L)	EISENHUT
DENISE	✓ TEDESCO	REGAN	TEETS (L)	
REG OPR	✓ LONG	PROJECT LDR	WADE (E)	<u>AOR FILE</u>
✓ FILE & REGION(3)	✓ LAINAS		WILLIAMS (E)	D. THOMPSON(2)
✓ MORRIS	✓ BENAROYA	HARLESS	WILSON (L)	
STEELE	✓ VOLLMER			

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

✓ 1 - LOCAL PDR Walhalla, S. C.	(1)(2)(10)-NATIONAL LAB'S	1-PDR-SAN/LA/NY
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✓ 1 - NSIC(BUCHANAN)	1-W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	BROOKHAVEN NAT. LAB
1 - ASLB	1-CONSULTANT'S	1-AGMED(Ruth Gussman)
✓ 1 - P. R. DAVIS (AEROJET NUCLEAR)	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	RM-B-127, GT.
✓ 16 - CYS ACRS HOLDING SENT TO LIC ASST. S. SHEPPARD ON 5-22-74	1-GERALD ULRIKSON...ORNL	1-RD..MULLER..F-309 GT
	1-B & M SWINEBROAD, Rm E-201 GT	

DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

May 15, 1974



Mr. Angelo Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Giambusso:


Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence
Report AO-270/74-3.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley



DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: AO-270/74-3

Report Date: May 15, 1974

Occurrence Date: May 5, 1974

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Failure to verify containment integrity prior to unit startup

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Shutdown since January 22, 1974.
At the time of discovery of the occurrence, reactor coolant temperature was 465°F and reactor coolant pressure was 2155 psig.

Description of Occurrence:

Oconee Technical Specification 3.6 requires that containment integrity be maintained whenever all three of the following conditions exist:

1. Reactor coolant pressure is 300 psig or greater.
2. Reactor coolant temperature is 200°F or greater.
3. Nuclear fuel is in the core.

One of the conditions which must be satisfied to establish containment integrity (Technical Specification definition 1.7) is that the containment leakage determined at the last testing interval satisfies Technical Specification 4.4.1. Specification 4.4.1.2.5(b) requires that a local leak detection test be performed on the personnel hatch outer door seals at intervals not to exceed four months if the hatch has been opened in that period.

On April 25, 1974, it was brought to the attention of members of the Oconee supervisory staff that the leakage test for the personnel hatch had been scheduled for January 22, 1974. The Administrative Procedure No. 11, "Performance of Periodic Testing or Sampling," permits postponement of periodic tests if the condition of the unit, system, or component is such that the testing cannot or need not be performed within the required time interval. Since the unit was in a cold shutdown condition, it was decided, under the provisions of Administrative Procedure No. 11, that the personnel hatch leak test could be postponed until immediately prior to unit startup.

On May 5, 1974, unit startup had commenced with reactor coolant temperature at 465°F and pressure at 2155 psig; the reactor had not been made critical. Operations personnel reviewed the technical specifications and Administrative Procedure No. 11 and subsequently concluded that Technical Specifications 4.4.1 and 3.6.1 had not been met in that the leakage test on the personnel hatch had not been completed prior to exceeding 300 psig and 200°F.

Reactor coolant system cooldown and depressurization was initiated immediately.

The personnel hatch leak rate test was initiated on May 5, 1974 and completed satisfactorily on May 6, 1974.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The failure to perform the leak rate test on the personnel hatch was discovered prior to criticality, and the reactor coolant system was immediately cooled down and depressurized. The personnel hatch was tested immediately and met all acceptance criteria. Therefore, it is concluded that this occurrence did not affect the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Action:

As immediate corrective action, cooldown and depressurization of the reactor coolant system was initiated. The leak rate test of the personnel hatch was performed and all acceptance criteria were satisfied.

To prevent recurrence of similar incidents, Administrative Procedure No. 11 will be clarified to assure that the latitude permitted by this procedure remains within the requirements of the technical specifications.