AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL (TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 435

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT

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Mr. Norman C. Moseley		no		SE	NT LO	CALPDF	{ <u> </u>		
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Duke Power Company

Power Building 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, N. C. 28201

File Cy.

A. C. THIES Stnice Vice President Production and Transmission

January 10, 1975



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 2 Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report UE-270/74-10.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



CORRECTED COPY

P. O. Box 2178

DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: UE-270/74-10

Report Date: January 10, 1975

Event Date: December 23, 1974

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Letdown filter gashet failure

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit in power operation

Description of Occurrence:

On December 23, 1974, the control room operator for Oconee Unit 2 shifted letdown filters by remotely opening inlet valve to the B filter, 2HP-18 (see Figure 1), and closing the inlet valve to the A filter, 2HP-17. A decrease in level of the letdown storage tank was observed and water was found to be leaking in the letdown filter room. Isolation of both filters was attempted by remotely closing both inlet valves 2HP-17 and 2HP-18, manually closing outlet valves 2HP-57 and 2HP-58 and opening bypass valve 2HP-19. This did not stop the leakage. Letdown isolation valve 2HP-5 was closed and the leak was isolated. A reactor shutdown was commenced.

Investigation revealed that the leak was the result of a gasket failure on the A filter. Initial attempts to isolate the filters had been unsuccessful because valves 2HP-196 and 2HP-197, used when the letdcwn system is in the prefiltering mode, were found open. The A filter was properly isolated, the B filter placed in service, and the reactor shutdown was terminated.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

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The failure of the gasket on the A letdown filter occurred coincidentally with shifting to the B filter in service. The A filter outlet valve 2HP-57 is a manual valve which had been open while the A filter was in service and while the B filter was put on service, hence there was no possibility of an overpressure condition causing a failure of this gasket.

Valves 2HP-196 and 2HP-197 were open and 2HP-195 was shut, a valve lineup which is used when prefiltering of reactor coolant is desirable prior to demineralization. These valves were inadvertently left in the prefilter lineup following a crud burst. Hence, initial attempts to isolate the leak were not successful.

Analysis of Event:

The leak caused by the gasket failure on the A letdown filter was detected immediately by a decreasing level in the letdown storage tank. Isolation of the filters and the use of the bypass valve 2HP-19 wes initially attempted due to the relatively small leakage rate. The leak was readily isolated by the use of letdown isolation valve 2HP-5, and could also have been isolated by the use of the redundant letdown cooler isolation valves.

- 2 -

Approximately 13.9 curies of gaseous activity was released to the Auxiliary Building and subsequently released through the unit vent. This was only 0.027 percent of the allowed annual station release. There was no incidence of personnel contamination. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The gasket on the A letdown filter was replaced. All valves were checked and a normal valve lineup was verified.

Oconee Nuclear Station Administrative Procedure 9, "Equipment Removal and Restoration Control," is being changed to incorporate the use of an outof-normal checklist to keep operators informed of plant status. This change will be implemented by February 15, 1975.



Figure 1. Simplified Diagram of the Lotdown System

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