

**AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)**

CONTROL NO: 1425

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, NC 28201 A C Thies		DATE OF DOC 2-4-75	DATE REC'D 2-7-75	LTR XX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr Moseley		ORIG none signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XX</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XX</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-270		

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr trans the following:

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME: Oconee #2

ENCLOSURES:

Abnormal Occurrence #75-3 on 1-21-75 concerning failure to tag core flood discharge valves...

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 2-7-75 ehf

BUTLER (S)	SCHWENCER (S)	ZIEMANN (S)	REGAN (E)
W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies
CLARK (S)	STOLZ (S)	DICKER (E)	LEAR (S)
W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies
PARR (S)	VASSALLO (S)	KNIGHTON (E)	SPEIS (S)
W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies
KNIEL (S)	PURPLE (S)	YOUNGBLOOD (E)	
W/ Copies	W/4 Copies	W/ Copies	W/ Copies

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<u>REG FILE</u>	<u>TECH REVIEW</u>	<u>DENTON</u>	<u>LIC. ASST.</u>	<u>A/T IND</u>
✓ AEC PDR	✓ SCHROEDER	GRIMES	DIGGS (S)	BRAITMAN
✓ OGC, ROOM P-506-A	✓ MACCARRY	GAMMILL	GEARIN (S)	SALTZMAN
✓ GOSSICK /STAFF	✓ KNIGHT	✓ KASTNER	GOULBOURNE (S)	B. HURT
✓ CASE	✓ PAWLICKI	BALLARD	KREUTZER (E)	
GIAMBUSSO	✓ SHAO	SPANGLER	LEE (S)	<u>PLANS</u>
BOYD	✓ STELIO		MAIGRET (S)	MCDONALD
MOORE (S) (BWR)	✓ HOUSTON	<u>ENVIRO</u>	REED (E)	CHAPMAN
DEYOUNG (S) (PWR)	✓ NOVAK	MULLER	SERVICE (S)	DUBE w/input
SKOVHOLT (S)	✓ ROSS	DICKER	✓ SHEPPARD (S)	E. COUPE
GOLLER (S)	✓ PIPPOLITO	KNIGHTON	SLATER (E)	✓ R. Hartfield (2)
P. COLLINS	✓ TEDESCO	YOUNGBLOOD	SMITH (S)	✓ KLECKER
DENISE	✓ LONG	REGAN	TEETS (S)	✓ F. WILLIAMS
<u>REG OPR</u>	✓ LAINAS	PROJECT LDR	WILLIAMS (E)	
✓ FILE & REGION 3	✓ BENAROYA		WILSON (S)	
✓ T.R. WILSON	✓ STEELE	✓ HARLESS	INGRAM (S)	
	✓ VOLIMER			

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

1-LOCAL PDR <u>Walthalla, S.C.</u>	(1) (2) (10) -NATIONAL LABS	1-PDR SAN/LA/NY
1-TIC (ABERNATHY)	1-W. PENNINGTON, RM E-201 G.T.	1-BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
1-NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1-CONSULTANTS	1-G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1-ASLB	NEWMARK/BLUME/ACBABIAN	1-AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN)
1-NEWTON ANDERSON		RM B-127 G.T.
5-ACRS SENT TO LIC. ASST. <u>sheppard</u>		1-J. RUNKLES, RM E-201
		G.T.

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

February 4, 1975

RECEIVED COPY

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. Moseley:


Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence Report AO-270/75-3.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies
A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report No.: AO-270/75-3

Report Date: February 4, 1975

Occurrence Date: January 21, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Failure to tag core flood discharge valves

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Startup mode 1150 psig, 330°F

Description of Occurrence:

On January 20, 1975, as part of the startup sequence for Oconee Unit 2, the control operator instructed the utility operator to lock open and tag the core flood tank discharge valves. The control operator signed this step in the procedure and Reactor Coolant System pressure was increased to 1400 psig. Corrective maintenance activities required depressurization of the unit. During the depressurization, it was discovered that although the core flood tank discharge valves were locked open, they were not tagged. Oconee Technical Specification 3.3.3.c requires that when Reactor Coolant System pressure is above 800 psi, the electrically-operated discharge valves from the core flood tanks shall be open and breakers locked open and tagged.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of this occurrence was the utility operator's lack of familiarity with this procedure and poor communications between the utility and control operators. The utility operator reported that he had completed the task; however, he did not realize that tagging the breakers was required in addition to locking them open.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The core flood tank discharge valves were open, as required, when system pressure was above 800 psig. The discharge valve electrical breakers were locked open to prevent inadvertent operation of these valves. The key to the lock on the electrical breakers is under the control of the shift supervisor, who is knowledgeable of both plant conditions and the requirements for the Core Flood System. Thus, the omission of the tags did not reduce the reliability or operability of the Core Flood System. It is concluded that this incident did not affect the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Action:

The individuals involved in this incident have been counseled as to the importance of proper communications to ensure that procedures are fully complied with. In addition, procedures have been revised to require that tag numbers of all white tags required by procedures be recorded as part of the sign off steps of that procedure. This will ensure that formal acknowledgement of white tags being properly placed is received.