

**Record of Review
Dispositions to Waterford 3 Internal Events PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os)**

Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID	ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA		
	Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) ⁱ	RAI Response	
		Not Discussed in SE	Discussed in SE
AS-A7-01	A		
AS-A7-02	C		
AS-B3-01		See PRA RAI 44.a. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains that modeling of accident sequence phenomena was reviewed against the eighteen phenomena identified in WCAP-16679-P - 'Accident Sequence Phenomena Considerations' which are listed by the licensee in the response.	
DA-C2-01	A		
DA-C6-01			See PRA RAI 44.b.
DA-C7-01	A		
DA-C8-01			See PRA RAI 44.c
DA-C10-01			See PRA RAI 44.b
DA-C12-01			See PRA RAI 44.b
DA-C12-02			See PRA RAI 44.b
HR-A1-01	A		
HR-B1-01	A		
HR-D1-01	A		
HR-F2-01	A		
HR-G4-01		See PRA RAI 44.d. Acceptable to staff based on the licensee's explanation that the cited time discrepancy does not impact the updated HRA because the cause-based analysis used was more limiting than the time-based analysis.	
HR-G6-01	A		
HR-H2-01			See PRA RAI 44.e.
IE-A6-01	A		
IE-C6-01	C		
IE-C12-01	C		
IF-B2-01	C		

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		Not Discussed in SE	Discussed in SE
IF-C3c-01	C		
IF-C7-01	C		
IF-D5a-01	C		
IF-D7-01	C		
IF-D7-02	C		
IF-E5a-01	C		
IF-E6-01	C		
LE-F1b-01	A		
LE-F3-01	C		
QU-E4-01	C		
SC-A5-01	A		
SC-B1-01			See PRA RAI 44.f
SC-B1-02		See PRA RAI 44.g. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains that a fire in the battery room is assumed to fail all equipment in the room and hydrogen accumulation was not expected to cause a hydrogen explosion that would fail the fire barrier.	
SC-B3-01		See PRA RAI 44.i and F&O disposition. Acceptable to staff for the following reasons: 1) The licensee explains in the F&O disposition that MAAP runs have been updated and used to verify and redefine LOCA break sizes, and 2) The licensee explains in the RAI response counter to the implication in the F&O disposition that the Fire PRA does include fire-induced small LOCAs, including spurious opening of the reactor Head vent valves, Pressurizer vent valves, and Letdown line valves.	
SC-B3-02		See PRA RAI 44.h. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains that "load stripping" was intentionally excluded from the Internal and Fire	

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		Not Discussed in SE	Discussed in SE
		Event PRA because it has an insignificant risk reduction impact and because recovery of off-site power is not credited in the Fire PRA.	
SC-B5-02	A		
SC-C1-02	A		
SC-C3-01			See PRA RAI 44.j
SY-A8-01	A		
SY-A12b-01			See PRA RAI 44.k
SY-A12b-02	A		
SY-A16-01	A		
SY-A16-02	A		
SY-A18a-01	A		
SY-B4-01	A		
SY-B13-01			See PRA RAI 44.l.
SY-B16-01	A		
SY-C2-01	C		
SY-C2-02		See PRA RAI 44.m. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explains the Temporary EDG is not permanently installed or normally on site, therefore, it is not credited in the Internal Events or Fire PRA.	
SY-C3-01	A		

ⁱ A: The NRC staff finds that the disposition of the F&O as described by the licensee in the LAR provides confidence that the issues raised by the F&O have been addressed and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application.

B: The NRC staff finds that the disposition of the F&O as described by the licensee in the LAR and further clarified during the audit provides confidence that the issues raised by the F&O have been addressed and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application.

C: The NRC staff finds that the resolution of the F&O, as described by the licensee in the LAR, would have a negligible effect on the evaluations relied upon to support fire risk evaluations and has no impact on the conclusions of the risk assessment and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application. Examples of such F&Os may be suggestions, as well as those F&Os that don't affect the fire PRA. Documentation issues may fall into this category as well.

Record of Review
Dispositions to Waterford 3 FIRE PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) and Supporting Requirements (SRs) Not Met or Met at Capability Category (CC) I

Finding/ Suggestion (F&O) ID ¹	ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA		
	Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) ²	RAI Response	
		Not Discussed in SE	Discussed in SE
CS-A3-01	A		
CS-B1-01	A		
ES-A2-01	A		
ES-A3-02		See PRA RAI 45.a. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that an evaluation was performed of fire impact on cables (including DC cables) that could prevent tripping the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs)	
ES-B1-01		See PRA RAI 45.b. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that a systematic evaluation was performed to ensure all risk important components were included in the Fire PRA from the following sources: (1) the Internal Events PRA, (2) the Safe Shutdown Equipment List, (3) components identified by the Multiple Spurious Action (MSO) expert panel, and (4) components whose spurious actuation could cause unwanted operator actions.	
ES-B2-01	A		
ES-C1-01	A		
FQ-A3-01			See PRA RAI 45.c
FQ-B1-01			See PRA RAI 45.d
FQ-D1-02		See PRA RAI 45.e. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that re-quantification of the updated Fire PRA included a reasonableness review of LERF results and an update of the associated documentation.	
FQ-E1-01		See PRA RAI 45.e. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that re-quantification of the updated Fire PRA included a reasonableness review of CDF and LERF results and	

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	Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) ²	RAI Response	
		Not Discussed in SE	Discussed in SE
		an update of the associated documentation.	
FQ-E1-02		See PRA RAI 45.e. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that re-quantification of the updated Fire PRA included a quantitative uncertainty evaluation for both CDF and LERF and an update of the associated documentation.	
FSS-B2-01			See PRA RAI 07 and PRA RAI S04
FSS-D7-01			PRA RAI 45.f
FSS-E3-01	A		
FSS-H10-01	A		
HRA-A2-01		See PRA RAI 45.g. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that basic event RHFPU MPOFP did not appear in any cutset with a screening applied, so no detailed calculation was performed for it.	
HRA-A4-01		See PRA RAI 45.g. Acceptable to staff because the licensee explained that operator interviews and simulator and control room observations were added to the documentation.	
HRA-C1-01			PRA RAI 45.h, PRA RAI 13, and PRA RAI S07
HRA-D1-01	A		
HRA-E1-01			PRA RAI 45.h, PRA RAI 13, and PRA RAI S07
IGN-A10-01	A		

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	Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C) ²	RAI Response	
		Not Discussed in SE	Discussed in SE
PP-A1-01	A		
PP-B7-01	A		
UNC-A1-01			
FSS-H1-01 FSS-H1-02			See PRA RAI 16 and PRA RAI S08
FSS-H2-01			See PRA RAI 15
FSS-H3-01			See FM RAI S04.a
FSS-H9-01	A		
QLS-A2-01	A		
QLS-A4-01	A		
QLS-A4-01	C		
QLS-A4-01	A		
FSS-C1-01	C		
FSS-C2-01	C		
FSS-C3-01	C		
FSS-H5-01	A		
ES-C2-01			PRA RAI 45.h, PRA RAI 13, and PRA RAI S07
FQ-C1-01			PRA RAI S07 and PRA S10
HRA-A4-01	A		
FSS-F2-01	A		

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Dispositions to Waterford 3 FIRE PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os) and Supporting Requirements (SRs) Not Met or Met at Capability Category (CC) I

¹ Table includes: 1) F&Os provided in Table V-1 of the LAR Supplement listing all Finding from the original November 2010 full-scope peer review and subsequent September 2012 and May 2013 focused scope peer reviews with the exception of Findings associated with SRs determined only to meet Capability Category I, and 2) F&Os provided in Table V-2 of the LAR Supplement which lists all Findings from the full-scope and focused-scope peer reviews for SRs determined only be met at Capability Category I.

² A: The NRC staff finds that the disposition of the F&O as described by the licensee in the LAR provides confidence that the issues raised by the F&O have been addressed and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application.

B: The NRC staff finds that the disposition of the F&O as described by the licensee in the LAR and further clarified during the audit provides confidence that the issues raised by the F&O have been addressed and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application.

C: The NRC staff finds that the resolution of the F&O, as described by the licensee in the LAR, would have a negligible effect on the evaluations relied upon to support fire risk evaluations and has no impact on the conclusions of the risk assessment and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application. Examples of such F&Os may be suggestions, as well as those F&Os that don't affect the fire PRA. Documentation issues may fall into this category as well.