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MC TSB-B 3.6.6 Containment Spray System

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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.6 Containment Spray System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Containment Spray System provides containment atmosphere cooling to limit post accident pressure and temperature in containment to less than the design values. Reduction of containment pressure and the iodine removal capability of the spray reduce the release of fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment, in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The Containment Spray System is designed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 38, "Containment Heat Removal," GDC 39, "Inspection of Containment Heat Removal Systems," GDC 40, "Testing of Containment Heat Removal Systems," GDC 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup," GDC 42, "Inspection of Containment Atmosphere Cleanup Systems," and GDC 43, "Testing of Containment Atmosphere Cleanup Systems" (Ref. 1).

The Containment Spray System consists of two separate trains of equal capacity, each capable of meeting the system design basis spray coverage. Each train includes a containment spray pump, one containment spray heat exchanger, spray headers, nozzles, valves, and piping. Each train is powered from a separate Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) bus. One train of Containment Spray flow is manually initiated with suction on the Containment Sump after commencement of the ECCS sump recirculation mode of operation.

The diversion of a portion of the recirculation flow from each train of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System to additional redundant spray headers supplements the Containment Spray System heat removal capability. Each RHR train is capable of supplying spray coverage, if desired, to supplement the Containment Spray System.

The Containment Spray System provides a spray of cold or subcooled borated water into the upper containment volume to limit the containment pressure and temperature during a DBA. In the recirculation mode of operation, heat is removed from the containment sump water by the Containment Spray System and RHR heat exchangers. Each train of the Containment Spray System provides adequate spray coverage to meet the system design requirements for containment heat removal.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

For the hypothetical double-ended rupture of a Reactor Coolant System pipe, the pH of the sump solution (and, consequently, the spray solution) is raised to approximately 7.9 within one hour of the onset of the LOCA. The resultant pH of the sump solution is based on the mixing of the RCS fluids, ECCS injection fluid, and the melted ice which are combined in the sump. The alkaline pH of the containment sump water minimizes the evolution of iodine and the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components exposed to the fluid.

Containment Spray is manually initiated from the Control Room by opening the Containment Spray System (CSS) Pump discharge valves and starting the CSS Pump. The CSS is typically not activated until an RWST low level alarm is received. After the RHR pumps have been aligned for containment sump recirculation, containment spray pumps are aligned to the sump. Once adequate sump level and containment pressure above 3 PSIG have been confirmed, one spray pump is manually started. The CSS maintains an equilibrium temperature between the containment atmosphere and the recirculated sump water. Operation of the CSS in the recirculation mode is controlled by the operator in accordance with emergency operation procedures.

The RHR spray operation is initiated manually, when required by the emergency operating procedures, after the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is operating in the recirculation mode. The RHR sprays are available to supplement the Containment Spray System, if desired, in limiting containment pressure. This additional spray capacity would typically be used after the ice bed has been depleted and in the event that containment pressure rises above a predetermined limit. The Containment Spray System is an ESF system. It is designed to ensure that the heat removal capability required during the post accident period can be attained.

The operation of the ice condenser is adequate to assure pressure suppression subsequent to the initial blowdown of steam and water from a DBA. During the post blowdown period, the Air Return System (ARS) is automatically started. The ARS returns upper compartment air through the divider barrier to the lower compartment. This serves to equalize pressures in containment and to continue circulating heated air and steam through the ice condenser, where heat is removed by the remaining ice.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The Containment Spray System limits the temperature and pressure that could be expected following a DBA. Protection of containment integrity limits leakage of fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The limiting DBAs considered relative to containment OPERABILITY are the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and the steam line break (SLB). The DBA LOCA and SLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. No two DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed, in regard to containment ESF systems, assuming the loss of one ESF bus, which is the worst case single active failure, resulting in one train of the Containment Spray System, the RHR System, and the ARS being rendered inoperable (Ref. 2).

The DBA analyses show that the maximum peak containment pressure results from the LOCA analysis, and is calculated to be less than the containment design pressure. The maximum peak containment atmosphere temperature results from the SLB analysis and was calculated to be within the containment environmental qualification temperature during the DBA SLB. The basis of the containment environmental qualification temperature is to ensure the OPERABILITY of safety related equipment inside containment (Ref. 3).

The Containment Spray System actuation modeled in the containment analysis is based on the time associated with reaching the RWST Low Level Setpoint and operator action prior to achieving full flow through the containment spray nozzles. A delayed response time initiation provides conservative analyses of peak calculated containment temperature and pressure responses. The Containment Spray System total response time is composed of operator action, system startup time, and time for the piping to fill.

For certain aspects of transient accident analyses, maximizing the calculated containment pressure is not conservative. In particular, the ECCS cooling effectiveness during the core reflood phase of a LOCA analysis increases with increasing containment backpressure. For these calculations, the containment backpressure is calculated in a manner designed to conservatively minimize, rather than maximize, the calculated transient containment pressures in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix K (Ref. 4).

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Inadvertent actuation is precluded by design features consisting of an additional set of containment pressure sensors which prevents operation when the containment pressure is below the containment pressure control system permissive.

The Containment Spray System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 5).

LCO

During a DBA, one train of Containment Spray System is required to provide the heat removal capability assumed in the safety analyses. To ensure that this requirement is met, two containment spray trains must be OPERABLE with power from two safety related, independent power supplies. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one train operates.

Each Containment Spray System includes a spray pump, headers, valves, heat exchangers, nozzles, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of being manually initiated to take suction from the Containment Sump and delivering it to the Containment Spray Rings.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment and an increase in containment pressure and temperature requiring the operation of the Containment Spray System.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Thus, the Containment Spray System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 or 6.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one containment spray train inoperable, the affected train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. The components in this degraded condition are capable of providing 100% of the heat removal after an accident. The 72 hour Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal and iodine removal capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

If the affected containment spray train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 84 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The extended interval to reach MODE 5 allows additional time and is reasonable when considering that the driving force for a release of radioactive material from the Reactor Coolant System is reduced in MODE 3.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.6.1

Verifying the correct alignment of manual and power operated valves, excluding check valves, in the Containment Spray System provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for Containment Spray System operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since they were verified in the correct position prior to being secured. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown or computer status indication, that those valves outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned, are in the correct position. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The surveillance includes verifying the correct alignment of the containment spray pump discharge valves.

SR 3.6.6.2

Verifying that each containment spray pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that spray pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential head are normal tests of centrifugal pump performance required by the ASME OM Code (Ref. 6). Since the containment spray pumps cannot be tested with flow through the spray headers, they are tested on bypass flow. This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.6.6.3 and SR 3.6.6.4

Not Used.

SR 3.6.6.5 and SR 3.6.6.6

These SRs require verification that each containment spray pump discharge valve can be manually opened or is prevented from opening and each containment spray pump can be manually started or is de-energized and prevented from starting upon receipt of Containment Pressure Control System start and terminate signals. The EDG Load Sequencer must be reset in order for the containment spray pump to start. The CPCS is described in the Bases for LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS." The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.6.7

With the containment spray inlet valves closed and the spray header drained of any solution, low pressure air or smoke can be blown through test connections. The spray nozzles can also be tested using a vacuum blower to induce air flow through each nozzle to verify unobstructed flow. This SR requires verification that each spray nozzle is unobstructed following activities that could cause nozzle blockage. Normal plant operation and activities are not expected to initiate this SR. However, activities such as inadvertent spray actuation that causes fluid flow through the nozzles, major configuration change, or a loss of foreign material control when working within the respective system boundary, may require surveillance performance.

BASES

- REFERENCES
1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 38, GDC 39, GDC 40, GDC 41, GDC 42, and GDC 43.
 2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
 3. 10 CFR 50.49.
 4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.
 5. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
 6. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.