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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

(ACRS)

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RELIABILITY AND PRA SUBCOMMITTEE

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MONDAY

OCTOBER 19, 2015

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ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND

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The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room T2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 1:00 p.m., John W. Stetkar, Meeting Chairman, presiding.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

JOHN W. STETKAR, Meeting Chairman

RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member

DENNIS C. BLEY, Member

JOY L. REMPE, Member

STEPHEN P. SCHULTZ, Member

DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:

MICHAEL SNODDERLY

ALSO PRESENT:

VICTORIA K. ANDERSON, NEI

DENNIS DAMON, NMSS

STEPHEN C. DINSMORE, NRR

RICHARD DUDLEY, NRR

K. RAYMOND FINE, FirstEnergy

JOSEPH GIITTER, NRR

DONNIE HARRISON, NRO

NATREON J. JORDAN, NRR

STANLEY H. LEVINSON, AREVA

MARVIN LEWIS*

ROBERT RISHEL, Duke Energy

JOSEPH RIVERS, NSIR

STACEY ROSENBERG, NRR

MICHAEL TSCHILTZ, NEI

*Present via telephone

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Adjourn

PROCEEDINGS

1 2 1:04 p.m. CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The meeting will now 3 4 come to order. This is a meeting of the Advisory 5 Committee on Reactor Safeguards Subcommittee Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment. 6 7 I'm John Stetkar, Chairman of the 8 Subcommittee meeting. Members in attendance today 9 are Steve Schultz, Dennis Bley, Ron Ballinger, and 10 Joy Rempe. 11 The purpose of today's meeting is to 12 review a draft of the SECY Paper on Recommendations 13 Issues Related to Implementation of a 14 Management Regulatory Framework. In 2011, the Risk 15 Management Task Force led bv Commissioner 16 Apostolakis was created. The Risk Management Task 17 Force published its report in April 2012 as NUREG-18 2150, Risk Management а proposed Regulatory 19 Framework. "This report proposes a Risk Management 20 Regulatory Framework for how the Agency should be 21 regulating 10 to 15 years in the future," and that's 22 a quote from the Task Force's report. 23 The Subcommittee has met previously on

this matter in September of 2013, October of 2014, and in February and June of this year.

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This meeting is open to the public. The meeting is being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Rules for the conduct of and participation in the meeting have been published in the Federal Register as part of the notice for this meeting.

The Subcommittee intends to gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate proposed positions and actions, as appropriate, for deliberation by the Full Committee.

Mr. Michael Snodderly is the Designated Federal Official for this meeting.

A transcript of the meeting is being kept and will be made available, as stated in the Federal Register Notice. Therefore, it's requested that all speakers first identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be readily heard. I'll remind you all to check and silence all of your little communications devices.

Also, for those of us at the table; Dick, I don't know if you've been here. When you speak, turn on your microphone, when you're not speaking turn it off. It helps with our transcript and the people on the bridgeline.

We've received no written comments requests for time to make oral statements members of the public regarding today's meeting. I understand there may be individuals on the today who are listening in, bridgeline the bridgeline will be closed on mute so that those individuals can listen in. At the appropriate time later in the meeting, we'll have an opportunity for comments from the bridgeline, and public members of the public in attendance. And I'll make sure to open the bridgeline at that time.

We'll now proceed with the meeting, and I'll ask Joe Giitter, Director of Division of Risk Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to open the presentations. Joe.

MR. GIITTER: Thank you, John. Good afternoon. Appreciate the opportunity to discuss the SECY Paper on the Risk Management Regulatory Framework.

When we met with the Subcommittee on February 20th of this year, we said that there may be no better time for the Agency to move toward an approach that would allow us to consistently risk decisions. Afterwards, consider in our worked to outline at a high level a voluntary risk-

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informed licensing basis approach that would allow power reactor licensees to make risk-informed changes to their licensing basis without the need for NRC to approve an exemption request under 10 CFR 50.12.

We discussed that approach in two public meetings and requested written public comments two different occasions. However, it was apparent based on the feedback we received from industry that there was insufficient support for the voluntary initiative without more detail and certainty on what the voluntary rule would entail. Specifically, public meetings industry stakeholders explained that they could not assess the costs and benefits of the initiative and, thus, could not support the conceptual approach.

Based on this feedback, the Staff determined that the time and effort to more fully develop this voluntary approach was needed, and that any efforts to do this would be on a longer time frame than the RMRF SECY.

Another risk-informed alternative we evaluated was the approach recommended in NUREG-2150. In essence, this approach would require all licenses to have updated PRAs and use them to

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develop a licensing basis based on plant-specific risk profiles. This approach was considered in SECY-13-0132 on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 1. As you can imagine, this approach received even less support from industry stakeholders, and even NRC Staff questioned whether this requirement to have licensees update their PRAs would pass traditional regulatory backfit analysis.

There was also broad concern about the practicality of applying a universal Risk Management Regulatory Framework across all classes of regulated entities; today will explain so, we our recommendation continue using to current our regulatory framework and processes.

I want to make it clear that this is not do nothing option. In fact, as you will hear today, the Staff has never been more involved in reviewing risk-informed licensing applications. And because some of these initiatives require licensees to meet Reg Guide 1.200, Rev 2, PRA quality has improved considerably across the operating reactor importantly, fleet. More many licensees are beginning to incorporate risk insights into daily operation of their plants in a way that hasn't been done in the past.

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In NRR, we've started an initiative to look at how we can use risk insights to more efficiently and effectively make decisions on non-compliance issues of low safety-significance. Thus, the Staff's proposed option involves expanded, even accelerated risk-informed regulation just without changing the existing regulatory framework.

With that, I'm going to ask Dick Dudley to go ahead with the Staff's presentation.

MR. DUDLEY: Thank you, Joe.

On Slide 2, I have an outline of what I'll be presenting today. First, I'll give you a little bit of background, then I'll discuss the four different sections and the four different topics in the RMRF SECY Paper. Section 1 on implementation options for power reactor safety; Section 2, our reevaluation of two improvement activities from Near Term Task Force Recommendation 1; Section 3 on the Agency-wide Risk Management Policy Statement; and then Section 4, Donnie Harrison will talk about the interrelationships between the ongoing power reactor risk-informed activities. And then my last slide will be on the next steps with this SECY Paper.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Dick, for my benefit, and it's something that will help me kind of better

understand the Staff's recommendations and positions on this whole topic.

One of the issues that I think Fukushima Near Term Task Force and the Risk Management Task Force, at least in my opinion was trying to address, is a regulatory framework that uses risk assessment in a forward-looking approach to identifying issues that could be of concern for a particular operating plant site, or for reactor design such that the Agency's regulatory efforts are focused on those types of issues rather a strict deterministic compliance mode licensing, or I think has been somewhat of the practice in the past, a reaction to events. So, we've reacted to Three Mile Island, we've reacted to issues Fukushima, we react to that identified because of operating experience, but we never seem to kind of look forward and examine those events while we have the opportunity before they happen. So, if you can keep that in mind and try to least, little bit for give me, at а my own perspective how the proposed path forward addresses kind of that itch that I have, I'd appreciate it.

MR. DUDLEY: Joe, do you want me to start with that, and then have Donnie talk about ---

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1	MR. GIITTER: I would go through your
2	presentation. I think
3	MR. DUDLEY: Okay.
4	MR. GIITTER: that will touch on it,
5	but I think we may want to have an expanded
6	discussion on the particular topic later
7	MR. DUDLEY: Okay.
8	MR. GIITTER: during the
9	presentation.
10	MR. DUDLEY: Would that be okay if we
11	_
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, that would be
13	fine. I just wanted to kind of raise it now so that
14	as you're going through your presentations, if you
15	can sort of recollect that and say here's how we're
16	trying to address that, or how this particular issue
17	addresses it.
18	MR. DUDLEY: Thank you. Okay.
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I'd appreciate that.
20	Thank you.
21	MR. DUDLEY: So, now on Slide 3, the
22	background. We released a White Paper in May that
23	gave our preliminary thinking on three of these four
24	issues. We had a public meeting on May 27th, and we
25	met with the Subcommittee on June the 8th. We had a

public comment period on this White Paper that we released that initially closed on June 11th. And then we issued a meeting notice subsequently on July 14th where we put forth additional details on one of the RMRF implementation options, Option 2, and we reopened the public comment period on that RMRF implementation option. We held that public meeting on July 29th. The public comment period ended on August 31st.

About a week and a half ago, the SECY Paper, the draft SECY Paper was distributed internally for office concurrence review, and office concurrence comments will be due to me by this Wednesday, so that's where we stand in the history, and that's where we stand in the process.

On Slide 4, I'm going to talk about the first section of the paper which are the RMRF Implementation Options for Power Reactors. RMRF stands for Risk Management Regulatory Framework.

In our evaluation, the Staff considered three different options. Number one was to maintain the current regulatory framework. Number two was to implement a voluntary alternative risk-informed licensing basis that would be done on a plant-specific basis. And option three was the approach

2 has already described that approach to you in his 3 opening remarks. 4 So, we addressed three options, Option 5 1, Option 2, Option 3. You'll note that the SECY 6 itself doesn't in the paper numerically 7 describe the options. We described them generally 8 within the text of the paper, but the White Paper 9 enumerated the options. The public comments 10 enumerated the options, and so for the purposes of 11 this presentation, I will talk about the numbered 12 options, even though they're not actually laid out 13 that way in the current draft SECY Paper. On Slide 5 14 Dick, I'm assuming 15 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 16 that there was a lot of thought put into that, and 17 intentional omission of those that was 18 options. 19 MR. DUDLEY: Ιt was the result of 20 management discussions. 21 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. 22 MR. DUDLEY: The options are described in 23 the paper. If you go to the public comment section, 24 one of the enclosures, I think each of the three 25 options are laid out in a description, so it's --

that was recommended by NUREG-2150, and Joe Giitter

1 - that information is available. Of course, the 2 White Paper is available, also ---CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. 3 4 MR. DUDLEY: --- and referenced many 5 times within the SECY Paper. So, on Slide 5, Power Reactor Option 1, 6 7 maintain the current framework; we would not be 8 making any extensive revisions to our current 9 regulatory framework. We believe that the current 10 framework meets four general criteria the 11 NUREG-2150 laid out as what a Risk Management 12 Regulatory Framework should contain with respect to 13 a mission, objective, a goal, and a decision making 14 process. 15 Now, there are a spectrum of ways that 16 ao about developing one could the mission, 17 objective, and goal, and certainly the one that we 18 are --- will recommend to maintain the existing 19 regulatory framework is on one end of the spectrum, 20 and the approach recommended by NUREG-2150 is pretty 21 much near the other end of the spectrum. And that is 22 the --- that's just the way it is. 23 Again, as Joe has mentioned, maintaining 24 our existing regulatory framework is --- well, maybe

it's not quite so far on the end of the spectrum

because, you know, what we're doing is we're constantly moving towards the middle with a number of our ongoing and planned risk-informed improvement activities. And we will continue under the existing make risk-informed regulatory framework to regulatory improvements based on risk insights or other considerations whenever it's deemed necessary. And we can certainly do that with our existing regulatory processes.

On Slide 6, I'll be talking about power reactor Option --- wait a minute, I skipped a slide here. Hold on, let's go back. Yes, okay. On Slide 6, the second power reactor option we looked at, as Joe also briefly described for you, is a risk-informed alternative licensing basis.

Under this approach, we would maintain the existing generic regulatory structure. We'd issue a rule that would allow licensees who choose to upgrade their PRAs to apply for approval of a risk-informed alternative licensing basis. Those licensees would be allowed to select a number of plant-specific design changes or compliance issues that their PRAs demonstrated were of low risk-significance. And then they would be allowed to deviate from their current deterministic

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requirements with the condition that thev also mitigated all known plant-specific risk vulnerabilities that met NRC-specified criteria. And those would be --- the search for vulnerabilities would be limited to the PRA that the licensee had to do, or the expansion of the PRA that the licensee did to support the design changes that they would propose under this process.

If vulnerabilities were identified, then information on the mitigation of these events that criteria, information on how met the NRC the licensee would mitigate these events would have to be documented in the plant's updated FSAR. And, of course, mandatory monitoring and feedback would be required to insure that the changes in risk design associated with the changes remained acceptable throughout the lifetime of the facility.

that, let me --- I've read some of the things, and I think at least at the Subcommittee level, you know, we discussed Option 2 to some extent in previous meetings. You want to wait until --- I'm curious about why this option has been summarily dismissed. In fact, I was quite surprised why it was summarily dismissed, so maybe in some of your follow-on slides

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1	you can expand on that.
2	MR. DUDLEY: We will talk about that.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
4	MR. DUDLEY: I believe industry has a
5	presentation, also.
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
7	MR. GIITTER: Dick, if I might just add.
8	I wouldn't use the word "summarily dismissed." It
9	was carefully evaluated and like anything, because
10	it was a voluntary rule, or a voluntary approach, it
11	required support from industry.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's true, and I'll
13	be interested, very interested in hearing industry's
14	response on that.
15	MR. GIITTER: Yes.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Because I read some of
17	the words and it says there seemed to be some
18	support by industry, maybe not NEI officially, but
19	some support, but that the industry required more
20	details of the guidance as if they wanted a
21	complete, you know, specification laid out
22	beforehand. I understand that on one end of the
23	spectrum.
24	MR. GIITTER: Yes.
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I, quite honestly,

understand concerns about this issue of search for vulnerabilities, and identify those. I understand that. It's not clear to me why those are showstoppers in the sense of not going forward with it; especially, if there was some indication that specific licensees might be interested in it. And I'll tell you why, and I might as well get this on the record now.

Back in the 1980s when PRA was first it was an industry initiative, but developed, wasn't the industry. It was a few plants who were looking forward and saying we think that we actually use this tool to our benefit. Now, whatever their rationale was at the time, whether it was licensing, legal, self-desire to understand risks, that doesn't make any difference. The point is that few specific power plants. It wasn't was a supported very heavily at that time by the entire industry. In fact, the industry didn't want to talk that way, and it wasn't supported very heavily by the NRC at that time because that was contrary to the current status quo of licensing. And, yet, those utilities went ahead and here we are where everybody talks about PRA. Now we're arguing about well, you different it know, criteria, and how shall be

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applied, but nobody seems to argue that PRA is not a good thing. Were it not for those individual utilities 30 years ago, we wouldn't be where we are now. So, my point is that if there are individual utilities who see that there might be a benefit in a voluntary initiative, should the NRC Staff foreclose initiative simply because of on that resource requirements, or holistic industry feedback saying that the industry, whoever that is, doesn't want to do it?

MR. GIITTER: I understand your comments and I tried to, in my opening remarks I tried to leave the door open for the possibility that we would go back and explore something like Option 2 in the future. But right now in terms of the timing and getting the paper up to the Commission, I felt it would be a challenge, and we would run the risk of sending something up that, ultimately, would --- you know, we might get an answer that would permanently foreclose that option. So, the thinking was at this point let's --- we see some momentum right now with the risk-informed tech specs, and the advancement of PRA quality through things like 50.69 and 4b, and we certainly would leave the door open to going back to something like Option 2 in the future provided

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there's at least some support for it. And agree, it wouldn't have to be all of industry but, you know, you need at least one utility out there that would be willing to pilot something like that.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay, thanks. That helps me a little bit. Thank you.

MR. DUDLEY: Okay. Now, on Slide 7, power reactor Option 2 had a number of implementation uncertainties, have developed and we not implementation details for this approach. To do so would require a lot of resources, and we're in the situation where we don't think we're at liberty to spend those resources without the Commission's prior approval. So, that's why these uncertainties remain, and we're at this situation as we present the RMRF SECY Paper to the Commission.

Just to list some of the uncertainties associated with this option, the Staff would have to review all power reactor regulations and determine what rules are amendable to risk-informing under this voluntary Option 2. We'd have to look at the minimum scope and technical accuracy of a suitable PRA to enter into the approach. We'd have to figure out if there would be a certification or some sort of review of that PRA. We'd have to look at the

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selection and scope of the permissible design changes under the approach, the process for Staff design of changes, reporting documentation requirements would need to be worked out. And the whole process would have to be structured in that it would а way transparency of licensee design changes to the NRC, and review where necessary, and also transparency to the public of the basis --- of what's being done and the basis for why that is safe. So, there are quite a few implementation uncertainties with this option.

MEMBER SCHULTZ: But, Dick, isn't that a given? If you look at the way that the Option 2 has been structured, then by definition it has all these hooks that need to be established, and addressed in order forward. to move So, it predefines a huge level of effort both by the Staff and by a licensee that would like to take advantage process. So, we're --- we've the in а way predisposed the process to be an complicated one. Has the Staff figured out a better way? You indicated on the last slide that the Staff --- intends examine to --- maybe intends misread; to review the power reactor regulations and develop a list of rules which would

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be amendable to the ---

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MR. DUDLEY: If we were truly ---

MEMBER SCHULTZ: Okay, so that's an if.

MR. DUDLEY: Yes.

MEMBER SCHULTZ: But it's kind of a chicken and an egg situation that we've got ourselves into with the way it's been posed.

MR. DUDLEY: I think --- you know, Joe mentioned it already. This just may not be the time to propose such a large effort to the Commission, and there is some thought that if we, you know, put this option the table, might aet on we back Commission direction that would preclude us pushing in this --- from working in this --- from pursuing this sort of approach in the future. So, we're trying to be very careful to keep moving forward but not too quickly. And, especially, this is --- budget-wise, this is a very awkward time. We don't know our Fiscal '16 budget, both Congressional and House levels are substantially lower than the level we have right now under Continuing Resolution, so I think timing has a great deal to do with our recommendation for the meantime to, maintain the existing regulatory framework.

MR. GIITTER: Let me just add. Thank you,

Dick. This is Joe Giitter.

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One of the things we did do was we kind of looked at what some of the fundamental, I'll call regulatory impediments were to implementing something like this. And we just had to go back and look at the experience we had with NFPA-805. And I think the peer review process, although it served us well, it also presents some challenges. evidence of that with the NFPA-805 reviews. So, one of the things we explored and we talked about at the public meeting was the idea of, and I use the word "certified." I know it makes people a little queasy, but certified PRA concept, but the idea is that you have a PRA that NRC has approved. So, once that PRA has been approved it could be used for all regulatory applications with minimal review by the NRC. It requires more up front resources but, what it would do would be to provide essence, regulatory certainty once you have certified PRA. So, the process you would go through with something like Option 2 would be much less --- much more certain, and much less intensive on the part of the Staff to do the review. But something like that, I think, is necessary to make --- because lot of negative feelings, there's still а

feelings isn't probably the right word, but negative feedback on NFPA-805, some of the challenges we have with the peer review process with the new methods that were used.

We would have to come up with something to prevent that from happening again, so the PRA certification concept was one way of doing that. But like anything, it requires a commitment on the part of industry to participate in that. We do have some interest from licensees. And I think if we were to pilot that concept and work out the bugs we would, in essence, be setting ourselves up for something like this in the future.

MEMBER SCHULTZ: Thank you, Joe.

MR. DUDLEY: So, now on Slide 8. At our meeting on July 29th when we discussed in additional detail our RMRF Option 2, the Staff presented the additional details that it was able to develop within about a two-week period of time, or maybe three-week period of time. And we also discussed thoughts and approach for a way to determine the suitability or establish the suitability of a PRA. And during this meeting, industry stakeholders were still concerned about the lack of implementation details.

have to admit, Again, we we have process that's fleshed out, but there's still a lot of decisions that would need to be made, and we did not have enough information at the time. So, NEI stated that without explicit details on how this process would work, that they can't assess safety benefits and the costs of the approach. And they also recommended that we not even present the option to the Commission without having developed more details regarding how this process would work. And that puts us in a conundrum in that we really need Commission authorization to expend the resources to develop these details, so we're in a bit of an awkward situation.

On Slide 9, this is the third option, the NUREG-2150, plant-specific RMRF. Under this approach, we'd issue a regulation requiring all plants to have PRAs. They would then develop a plant-specific licensing basis based on the plant-specific risk profiles. The NRC would specify a risk management objective, but we'd also -- in order to prevent this from being a risk-based approach, we would also have to specify enhanced criteria for determining the adequacy of non-risk factors so that we would have a risk-informed approach. And defense-

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in-depth is one of the key non-risk factors, but we could give additional details on safety margins and that sort of thing. So, there would be --- in addition to the risk criteria, there would have to be enhanced criteria for the other non-risk factors that would need to be considered.

So, under this approach based on risk profile and adequacy of defense-in-depth and other non-risk issues, licensees would implement the plant-specific licensing basis by determining how to meet the risk objective, insure that the necessary protections in place the risk were to meet management goal. They'd have to demonstrate adequacy of the non-risk factors, defense-in-depth safety margins, the monitoring. They'd have establish a risk-informed decision making process, they'd have to establish a monitoring feedback, and a reporting process.

So, on Slide 10, I have a very brief summary of the written public comments we received on these three RMRF implementation options for power reactor safety. Only four commenters specifically addressed Option 1, maintain the existing regulatory framework, and all of those four commenters were in favor of maintaining the current regulatory

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	On Op	tion 2	, three	commente	ers
specifically	y address	sed Optic	on 2, and	all three	of
the comment	ers expr	ressed so	me level	of detail	
- some level	l of int	erest in	Option 2,	but they a	all
said that	we ha	ad not	developed	d sufficie	ent
implementati	ion detai	ls to er	nable poss	ible users	of
that appro-	ach to	analyze	potentia	l costs a	and
henefits					

3, only two Option On commenters specifically Option 3, addressed but neither commenter supported Option 3. One said the approach was simply not viable, and the other commenter said insufficient information again, there was available to properly assess the costs and benefits of Option 3, but in that commenter's judgment, it was unlikely that it would be justifiable for the current fleet of operating reactors. So, those are the public comments we got.

MEMBER SCHULTZ: Dick, were these all independent commenters? Did any --- as you present this, did one commenter address all three options?

MR. DUDLEY: No. See, it's not really --

24 | -

MEMBER SCHULTZ: It wasn't like that.

1	MR. DUDLEY: It's not like each
2	commenter didn't necessarily comment on all of the
3	three options. So, the commenter that
4	MEMBER SCHULTZ: No, my question was
5	really on the numerics here.
6	MR. DUDLEY: Well, there were 10 total
7	commenters.
8	MEMBER SCHULTZ: All right. So, that's
9	enough then.
LO	MR. DUDLEY: NEI submitted two comment
L1	letters, but there were 10 total commenters.
L2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And they're I
L3	guess, you know, only because I think PRA is my
L 4	middle name, but I guess I was surprised when I
L 5	looked at the commenters, and they're listed in the
L 6	SECY Paper so they're not secret. That aside from
L7	two individuals there did not seem to be input from
L8	the public. These are the vast majority of
L9	MR. DUDLEY: That's correct.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: There was Organization
21	of Agreement States, Commonwealth of Virginia seemed
22	to be more concerned about extensions to beyond
23	power reactor licensing. NEI, you know, and other
24	licensees commented from the industry side, but I

was a bit surprised that apparently there's either

1	not very much interest among the public on this
2	particular issue, which may be the case. I mean,
3	that may be the case.
4	Did you in your public meetings was
5	there participation by the public outside of the
6	industry?
7	MR. DUDLEY: I don't believe we've
8	had
9	the
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, I want to name
11	particular groups or individuals, but have you had
12	much interaction with the public?
13	MR. DUDLEY: Well, I guess really the
14	only participation from the general public might be
15	would be the Union of Concerned Scientists, and they
16	participated in some previous meetings, but I don't
17	believe they
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But they didn't submit
19	obviously, they didn't submit
20	MR. DUDLEY: They didn't attend, I don't
21	think, the
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: any formal
23	comments.
24	MR. DUDLEY: meeting on the 29th.
25	They were not there. I don't know if Dr. Lyman's on

1	the phone today.
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We'll find out.
3	MR. DUDLEY: Yes.
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But I was just
5	curious.
6	MR. DUDLEY: They seem to have lost
7	interest.
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, yes.
9	MR. DUDLEY: Or they well, they
10	certainly haven't increased interest.
11	(Off microphone comment)
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You have to come up to
13	the microphone and identify yourself, and speak with
14	sufficient clarity and volume to be readily heard I
15	think is what it says here.
16	MR. JORDAN: My name is Nate Jordan.
17	Early on in the process we did have some public
18	interaction, but most of the comments that we
19	received, some of which we tabulated as outside of
20	scope of what we were dealing with.
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Oh, okay.
22	MR. JORDAN: Most of the individual
23	comments were general comments outside of the scope
24	of what we were
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okav, that's fair. I

1	understand that.
2	MR. DUDLEY: And let me restate that.
3	Let's see, Prasad Kadambi, ex-NRC employee, but he
4	is a member of the public.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes.
6	MR. DUDLEY: And he did weigh in on many
7	of these issues.
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. As I've said,
9	I've seen two there are two individuals, Prasad
10	Kadambi and Dan Cronin.
11	MR. DUDLEY: Right, on the materials
12	issues.
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right, on the
14	materials issues.
15	MR. DUDLEY: No, I'm sorry, on non on
16	Research and Test Reactors.
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. I don't remember
18	what his comments
19	MR. DUDLEY: Right, Research and Test
20	_
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But, anyway, I was
22	looking more for larger public interest groups and
23	things like that.
24	MR. DUDLEY: Right. USC
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: USC, I could imagine,

1 but you can name any number of other organizations. 2 MR. DUDLEY: Right. CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay, thank you. 3 4 MR. DUDLEY: So, on Slide 11, this is how 5 the Staff --- this is the Staff's evaluation. We 6 rejected Option 2 because it's a voluntary approach, 7 it's not supported by stakeholders. And 8 invest substantial resources in putting together a 9 voluntary approach that people are not likely to use 10 doesn't seem to be а good use of resources, 11 especially when resources are scarce. 12 The Staff also rejected Option 3 because 13 it is too expensive. We evaluated its cost in SECY-14 13-0132 on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 1, 15 and our assessment then was that the cost for the 16 entire fleet of operating reactors to upgrade their 17 PRAs and maintain them for the remaining lifetime of 18 the plants would be in excess of \$700 million. So, 19 we believe Option 3 is too expensive, and it was 20 also not supported by stakeholders. 21 Therefore, the Staff recommends Option 22 1, maintain the existing regulatory framework. Under 23 this approach, all ongoing and planned risk-informed 24 initiatives would continue, and the Staff would

incremental improvements,

continue to make

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risk-

1	informed regulatory improvements whenever necessary.
2	MEMBER BLEY: Just so I
3	MR. DUDLEY: That doesn't, necessarily,
4	preclude moving somewhere closer to Option 2, but in
5	an incremental piecewise fashion.
6	MEMBER BLEY: Lacking Option 2, there
7	isn't anything that we can't really do that you were
8	envisioning, except for an easier approval process,
9	or an initiative by licensees on their own under an
10	approved PRA. Right?
11	MR. DUDLEY: Maybe I'm
12	MEMBER BLEY: Never mind.
13	MR. DUDLEY: You know, Option 2 could
14	actually be implemented by a licensee now if the
15	licensee chose to submit an exemption request.
16	MEMBER BLEY: Yes.
17	MR. DUDLEY: That mechanism is available
18	under Reg Guide 1.174 and 50.12.
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, but they
20	- that's I'm trying to be very careful here
21	because I'm not an attorney, so I don't want to say
22	that's true or that's false. And I know we probably
23	have attorneys sitting over on the side.
24	Option 2, in my interpretation, expanded
25	the scope of thought beyond particular risk-informed

1	applications like tech specs, like things like that,
2	and said do I want to risk-inform the entire
3	licensing basis of the plant?
4	MR. DUDLEY: Right.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And I don't know I
6	guess probably legally if you read the words in the
7	regulations, people are allowed to do that right
8	now, but probably not too awfully encouraged to do
9	it.
10	MR. DUDLEY: Yes. I mean, a licensee
11	probably would feel it was taking a significant risk
12	
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right.
14	MR. DUDLEY: if it were to invest a
15	lot of money in that approach.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Without some prior
17	condition
18	MR. DUDLEY: And it wouldn't
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Without some prior
20	Commission endorsement
21	MR. DUDLEY: Exactly.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: of that notion.
23	MR. DUDLEY: Yes. Yes.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
25	MR. DUDLEY: I mean, in a substantial

Τ	application like that, the approval of that might
2	even go all the way to the Commission.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes.
4	MR. DUDLEY: You know, even if it was
5	just a license amendment, I would surmise.
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. By the way, I
7	have to say this because I was chastised for using
8	the term "summarily dismissed." I think I'm
9	going to have to look at the transcript to see
10	exactly what words I used. The term "rejected" seems
11	pretty doggoned strong to me, so when you're
12	presenting this material using words like "Staff
13	rejected" seems to me to be synonymous to summarily
14	dismissed.
15	MR. DUDLEY: The Staff did not select
16	_
17	MR. GIITTER: I agree that's strong. I
18	didn't prepare the slide, so
19	MR. DUDLEY: We might
20	MEMBER BLEY: But summarily might imply
21	you didn't think about it.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Actually, that's true,
23	but these bullets and written presentation material
24	like this conveys somewhat different opinions than
25	we heard orally today. And sometimes that matters,

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1	so
2	MR. DUDLEY: That's a very good point,
3	and I need to go back and look at the SECY and
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And the SECY Paper, I
5	don't recall because I didn't do a word search. I
6	doubt
7	(Off microphone comment)
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, I didn't recall
9	the word "rejected," but it certainly didn't present
10	the same
11	MR. GIITTER: Point's taken; got it.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: thing we heard
13	orally today.
14	MR. DUDLEY: Right. Well, that's a good
15	comment. Are there any more questions on RMRF
16	implementation options? If not, the second section
17	of the SECY Paper is the reevaluation of power
18	reactor regulatory improvement activities that the
19	Commission told us to do in their May SRM on SECY-
20	13-0132 on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 1.

In that SRM, the Commission directed the Staff to reevaluate the objectives of Improvement Activity 1, which was to establish a new design basis extension category, and Improvement Activity 2, to develop Commission expectations for defense-

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The Commission told us to reevaluate those improvement activities within the context of Commission direction on the Risk Management Regulatory Framework, but because the Staff believes that these improvement activities are very closely related to the evaluation we were also directed to do by the Chairman's Tasking Memo, our evaluation of NUREG-2150, we decided to provide our reevaluations of Improvement Activities 1 and 2 to the Commission in the RMRF SECY Paper. So, the Commission will get thoughts on both RMRF and then Improvement Activities 1 and 2 simultaneously.

Slide 14 is our reevaluation of Improvement Activity to establish the design basis category of extension events and associated regulatory requirements. The Staff determined that creating this new category is not necessary. Really, the main purpose of the new category was to insure that when we write future new rules, that all these new rules properly address the additional regulatory attributes that you need to address when you're regulating in the realm that exceeds the existing So, design basis. instead of establishing the category, the Staff has decided to write internal

rulemaking guidance that this guidance will insure consistent criteria, and specifying performance requirements, treatment documentation requirements, change processes. The 50.59 change process only applies to design basis activities. And reporting requirements whenever new regulations, especially beyond-design-basis regulations are being developed. And example, the mitigating as an systems, the mitigating strategies for bevonddesign-basis events, that rule is being implemented information with this in mind. and they're specifying change processes, and all of the criteria here that we've specified are going to be addressed in the mitigating strategies rule.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okav. I hear words that are said. I'm trying to recall the mitigating strategies rule. I struggle with the notion of --- I think I understand, but I probably don't -- the process to justify rulemaking, and the analyses that are done to do that. And for the post-Fukushima things, exceptions were always made. Right? We have the orders because you couldn't justify the orders based on standard analyses that are done to say that cost-justified. the improvements can be Can't justify the rulemaking based on ---

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1 MR. GIITTER: There was an administrative 2 me, this is Joe Giitter. There is --- excuse 3 administrative exemption for the spent fuel pool 4 instrumentation. 5 MR. DUDLEY: Yes, we can implement rules either as adequate protection rules ---6 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right. 8 MR. DUDLEY: --- or as cost-justified 9 substantial safety improvements, but yet there was a 10 third category that was used on the spent fuel ---11 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: On the spent 12 pool, the --- I don't want to get into specifics of 13 the mitigating beyond-design-basis rulemaking that's 14 in play right now. Looking forward, going forward, 15 this design extension category of events would 16 ostensibly apply things that don't to you 17 necessarily --- don't necessarily meet the current 18 cost-benefit analyses, but show an improvement in 19 safety that is enough to justify some special 20 treatment without full regulatory treatment. That's 21 always been my interpretation of it. So, that it 22 would apply to things that don't necessarily meet 23 quantitative safety goal criteria that 24 applied as a screen for current rulemaking.

MR. DUDLEY: Let me --- I have a backup

slide, if I can find my cursor.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: What I'm concerned
about is, I hear you saying we're going to improve
the rulemaking process, the guidance for rulemaking,
the guidance for regulatory basis evaluations,
things like that, but until I sort of better
understand how that's being done, I don't see that
as a surrogate to the notion of this design
extension category, other than the practice that's
been used up until now, which has gone on kind of an
ad hoc episodic event-by-event basis. Yes, we're
going to consider station blackout as something
separate, so we have to throw that in the category.
And we're going to consider ATWS as something
separate, so we're going to throw that in the
category. Now, we're going to consider ELAP and
coincident loss of alternate heat sink, and we're
going to throw that in. What about an ELAP without
coincident loss of alternate heat sink, what about
the next one that comes up, how are we going to
consider that consistently?

MR. DUDLEY: I don't know how much time you want to spend on this.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, a little bit, not a lot.

MR. DUDLEY: But just this is a slide
from the Commission meeting on SECY-13-0132, and
that design basis extension category is shown at the
very bottom. I guess that's the blue box. And it is
where we put the additional requirements that exceed
the design basis. Now, some of those are adequate
protection requirements, some of them would be cost-
justified substantial safety increases, and some of
them when we would implement the administrative
exemption to get a rule into that category. But the
common thing about all the rules in that box is that
you need to establish additional criteria for the
regulatory attributes that are provided for you
automatically for design basis events, anticipated
operational occurrences, and normal operation
requirements. So, you know safety grade and all that
for those things, but when you're in that box below
you don't know that. So, when you write the rule,
you need to address those criteria within the rule
itself.
CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And if I can try to
understand. The slide that we transition from here
you're talking about better processes or inform
MR. DUDLEY: Sorry.
CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You can go back to

1	_
2	MR. DUDLEY: Let me
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: the simple one.
4	MR. DUDLEY: You want to go to 14?
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, I actually don't -
6	I want to stay on the one that had the simple
7	color-coded
8	MR. DUDLEY: Oh, I'm sorry.
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: boxes that you
10	were on, that backup slide. Here we go.
11	MR. DUDLEY: That one. I'm sorry. Okay.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: What you're talking
13	about is better guidance for establishing the
14	criteria off to the left of that gray box?
15	MR. DUDLEY: Well, in Recommendation 1,
16	we had hoped to actually establish internal guidance
17	that would help one choose treatment requirements
18	and that sort of thing. That was what we had hoped
19	we would be able to do under that.
20	In our reevaluation, we backed off a
21	little bit, and we're not going to say that this
22	internal rulemaking guidance will specifically
23	- it's not an algorithm that figures out what your
24	treatment is for a particular set of requirements,

but it just lets you know that that is something you

1 need to include in the rule. And we would develop 2 the treatment requirements on a case-by-case basis based on what was deemed appropriate by management 3 4 and the Commission at the time. 5 STETKAR: Okay, CHAIRMAN thanks. That helps. Now we can go back to the ---6 7 MR. DUDLEY: All right, let's see. Okay. 8 So, we determined that we didn't need the category. 9 We were going to write internal rulemaking guidance, 10 and we're going to use existing resources to do that. Three public commenters specifically commented 11 12 on our recommendation on the design basis extension 13 category, and all three of the commenters agreed 14 that it isn't necessary to establish a new design 15 basis official category of events and associated 16 requirements. So, the next slide, Slide 15, is our 17 18 reevaluation of the Improvement Activity 2 to 19 establish the Commission's expectations for defense-20 in-depth. And the Recommendation 1 SECY Paper said 21 that the Commission --- excuse me, that the Staff 22 would develop a definition and then develop criteria

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And the Staff's reevaluation of

determining --- objective

determining the adequacy of defense-in-depth.

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this

criteria

activity concluded that while this proposed effort
may very well be meritorious, I mean, it could
potentially succeed. And if it did, it would be
great, if we had predictable objective criteria for
determining the adequacy of defense-in-depth for
power reactor safety. And, I guess, we were
optimistic in the Recommendation 1 SECY that we
could do that, but the resources to do that were
estimated to be over 6 FTE over a period of three to
four years, and that's significant. And, also, if
you go back to the SECY Paper and you read the pros
and cons, one of the cons was that it's possible
- this is very hard to do. And it's possible, you
know, we may not succeed in being able to establish
predictable objective criteria that the Commission
would find acceptable. So given that uncertainty,
and given the current resource limitations, the
Staff recommends in the SECY Paper that the NRC
should not undertake this activity at the present
time. All right? This is not a rejection, this is a
deferral until perhaps a more opportune time in the
future. And one of the reasons for that is that
there were three commenters that commented on this,
and all three commenters said yes, you should do
that. You know, you should establish these criteria.

1	I think the paper mentions NEI has
2	suggested has offered to write a White Paper on
3	defense-in-depth, and I think the schedule for that
4	is uncertain, and was probably overtaken by events
5	associated with Fukushima. But if the industry took
6	a shot at that and then submitted it, you know,
7	there may be a better time in the future for us to
8	pursue this. But right now, I think everybody's
9	plate is pretty full with all the other activities
10	that we're undertaking. So, that's our evaluation of
11	defense-in-depth.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Dick, when you talk
13	about the defense-in-depth, again I focus on the
14	third sub-bullet under the public comments, that you
15	said three commenters addressed the issue of
16	defense-in-depth, and two of them apparently had a
17	condition that says well, you can't treat defense-
18	in-depth separately from risk information.
19	MR. DUDLEY: Well, I mean, they didn't
20	want two sets of criteria in other words.
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right.
22	MR. DUDLEY: Risk had to be X, and
23	defense-in-depth has to be Y.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right.
25	MR. DUDLEY: They wanted interactive

1	criteria, that they should be interactive and not
2	independent.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So, in your discussion
4	you said well, the Staff, because of all the reasons
5	that you noted, hasn't in the sense of the preceding
6	slides rejected the notion of going forward with
7	this issue of defense-in-depth, but you've postponed
8	it because of resource issues and things like that.
9	MR. DUDLEY: Yes.
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Does that mean that if
11	it were to be taken up, you would also follow these
12	comments regarding the integration of risk with
13	criteria for defense-in-depth?
14	MR. DUDLEY: You mean meet the condition?
15	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Meet the condition
16	there, because right now as they're presented
17	MR. DUDLEY: There's levels of meeting
18	that condition, too, you know. So, clearly, at some
19	point defense-in-depth some level of risk, the
20	criteria for defense-in-depth is very low, and
21	perhaps nonexistent. So, it's I don't want to
22	postulate
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: What I'm trying to
24	_
25	MR. DUDLEY: This was

1 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. What I'm trying 2 to get at here is, this is --- to me, it's a bit of example of parsing things up into you 3 4 Improvement Activity 2, defense-in-depth. And you're 5 talking about what has been done in the area of it might merit 6 defense-in-depth and saying well, 7 further examination but not necessarily right now. 8 When I read the paper, I see those 9 comments, but I still see the Staff as looking at 10 defense-in-depth in isolation. I don't see it being 11 --- I don't see the Staff being responsive to 67 12 the comments percent of that says you 13 consider defense-in-depth integrally with risk. 14 MR. GIITTER: Yes, this is Joe Giitter. I 15 would just comment on that quickly. 16 One of the things we are doing, we 17 started off to do prior to the Fukushima event was 18 to include a better definition of defense-in-depth 19 in Reg Guide 1.174. And that's precisely where you 20 want to do it. 21 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right. 22 MR. GIITTER: Because the purpose of Reg 23 Guide 1.174 is, of course, is to integrate decision making process, integrate defense-in-depth safety 24

margin, and any quantitative risk insights you might

have.

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MEMBER BLEY: I'm wondering if you folks would care to comment on this. This isn't new. Over the years, several members of the Staff have put together papers trying to address defense-in-depth. Prasad who made comments here was one, Mirelick Ravelas has done it. The Technology Neutral Framework took a shot at it, and there was a NUREG or a draft NUREG on defense-in-depth five years ago or something like that. What's our stumbling point on this issue? I mean, this is --- I mean, one more time we said well, let's put it off for a while. What's the stumbling point? Is it just too many different opinions? I have no idea what you'll get from the industry if they submit a paper to you, if it will look anything like those previous ones.

MR. GIITTER: My perspective is that there are a lot of different ideas and perspectives on what defense-in-depth means. And I think if you go back to even, you know, the early days of the Atomic Energy Commission, defense-in-depth has always been a concept that has been important. But people --- you can define it, you can get a room of six people together and you'll get six different interpretations of what you mean by defense-in-

depth, so I think that's precisely what the problem is, is trying to define it in a way that maybe wasn't intended given that it is kind of a high-level philosophical concept. Sometimes trying to implement that, or provide details or criteria to how to implement that, I think can be challenging.

MEMBER BLEY: Okay. I guess if you go all the way back, the first mention I recall of it anywhere was back in the beginnings, nuclear power with the fuel inside a clad, inside a reactor, so reactor coolant system inside a containment, all of that was defense-in-depth, and then it started spinning into many other things ---

MR. GIITTER: That's right.

MEMBER BLEY: --- that have led to great confusion along the way. And we have an ACRS paper on it 20 years ago or something like that, too.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We do. And in some sense we've evolved a bit, other cases maybe not, from the early days in that in those days those are excellent principles, design principles, engineering principles. We didn't have the tools in those days to be able to measure the effectiveness of the actual designs, and to determine --- you know, it's the old how safe is safe enough? How much defense-

1	in-depth, is defense-in-depth enough? We have better
2	tools these days.
3	MEMBER BLEY: Well, now that we have the
4	tools, we've made some attempts, as well. And we
5	still run into the same
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You still run into
7	some
8	MEMBER BLEY: That's not defense-in-
9	depth.
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's right. That's
11	right.
12	MR. DUDLEY: Yes, and when we get to the
13	interrelationships section of the SECY Paper, we're
14	going to mention an ongoing effort by the Office of
15	Research to put together the history and a NUREG
16	associated with that. And I think they recently even
17	held a public not a public, an interagency work
18	shop to see if there are other what other
19	agencies believe defense-in-depth should consist of,
20	or how they use the concept. Okay, so that's
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We're good on time, by
22	the way.
23	MR. DUDLEY: Okay. I think we're going to
24	well, my slides really only run about half an
25	hour total, so okay. So, I guess there were no

1	questions.
2	MR. GIITTER: I want to just add, this
3	might be a good opportunity to go back to a question
4	you asked earlier, John.
5	You talked about the risk absent
6	Option 2 or Option 3, what would the Staff be doing,
7	or what risk insights would we get that would
8	address plant-specific vulnerabilities? Maybe I
9	- I think that was kind of your question. What would
10	be the process going forward to insure that plant-
11	specific vulnerabilities or plant-specific risk
12	would be addressed in our current regulatory
13	framework?
14	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But it's two parts,
15	though, Joe. One part is plant-specific, the other
16	is looking forward to try to understand what those
17	vulnerabilities are before events actually occur
18	_
19	MR. GIITTER: Right.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: that prompt us to
21	go look for those vulnerabilities.
22	MR. GIITTER: Right.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So, it's both plant-
24	specific and sort of forward-looking.
25	MR. GIITTER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Rather than this, it's a strong word but I'll call it reactionary approach that when an event happens, it prompts us then to think about the vulnerabilities either of the entire industry, seismic events, or more focused on a plant-by-plant basis.

MR. GIITTER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Because the next one that happens, the next event ---

MR. GIITTER: Yes.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: --- that happens is probably not going to be like any of the ones that happened in the past. And, you know, we'll react to that one as we've reacted to all of the other ones.

MR. GIITTER: So, to answer your question, I think ideally if you had a complete full PRA, I mean, you know, for example we don't have PRA models for shutdown risk, and that's a blind spot right now. You know, we don't know that there might not be vulnerabilities out there related to shutdown I can say because of the voluntary But initiatives like NFPA-805 and the fire PRAs that were done, that there have been some vulnerabilities that have been addressed, and I'll give you some examples of that.

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Early in my career, I was sent out to
Davis-Besse following the 1985 loss of feedwater
event, and that was a very significant event. And as
a result of the fire PRA that First Energy did for
Davis-Besse, they determined they needed to add a
non-safety grade aux feedwater pump. And to me that
even though it's a fire risk, that addresses
risk much broader than fire. So, I think the
voluntary initiatives that are being done, and the
seismic PRAs that are being done for NTTF 2.3,
there's 20 plants I think that are going to be doing
seismic PRAs. I think some of those vulnerabilities
will be identified and addressed but it won't be
complete, it won't be as holistic as it would be if
you had a requirement that looked at everything. I
don't know if that answers your question or not.
CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Part way, thanks.
MR. DUDLEY: If there are no other
questions on defense-in-depth, I'll start on Slide
18, which is Section 3 of the paper on the Agency-
wide Risk Management Policy Statement.
CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Go back one and start
on 17.
MR. DUDLEY: Oh, thank you.
CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Just saying.

MR. DUDLEY: I have my paper out of sync with my --- with the audiovisual. Thank you.

Okay. So, on 17, the Staff believes that Agency-wide Risk Management Policy Statement could potentially improve and make more consistent the regulatory framework used by the NRC across all program areas. And the reasons for this although consideration of risk, and tailoring the regulations and oversight inherent to manage risk, inherent all of the programs it's in that regulate. The regulatory approaches for all these different program areas evolved separately, based on their own individual attributes, so it is possible that an Agency-wide Risk Management Policy Statement could improve and make more consistent our overall regulatory framework across programs.

In response to this recommendation which was made in NUREG-2150, we requested public comments on two draft example conceptual policy statements, one that we wrote in November of 2013, and one in May of 2015. The public comments on our first draft policy statement example were mixed, some were positive, a lot were negative, and I think a lot of the negativity had to do with the fact that that policy statement kind of tried to define defense-in-

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depth across all programs. And it was a little vague lot that, and а of people in were with uncomfortable, I think, how we discussed defense-in-depth in the initial draft policy statement.

So, we took another shot at it, right, and we published in May 2015 a simplified example policy statement. And it said, you know, it would --- it was a risk management policy statement, but it would still --- you would have to insure adequate defense-in-depth. And we didn't get into the criteria of what defense-in-depth meant, and how different it might apply across the policy statements. We just kind of moved that out. thought maybe that would simplify things if we did that.

So, in response to the second policy statement that we published, we got 10 commenters. All 10 commenters addressed the Agency-wide Policy Statement, and 9 of the 10 commenters recommended against our issuing an Agency-wide Risk Management Policy Statement. And, in general, the reason they did that is they seem to --- they thought that it was not needed because the existing programs in the different program areas could be risk-informed, as

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1 appropriate, under current policy and guidance. You 2 don't --- you're not precluded from making 3 appropriate risk-informed changes in any 4 ongoing program areas by current policy, so public 5 comments were fairly negative, highly negative on our proceeding with an Agency-wide Policy Statement. 6 So, our evaluation is on Slide 18, and 7 8 we agree with the public commenters that existing 9 NRC program areas can be appropriately risk-informed without an Agency-wide Policy Statement. It might be 10 11 nice to have, but it's certainly not essential. And 12 because of that, we believe it wouldn't 13 appropriate right now given our resource situation 14 to divert resources away from other activities that 15 more safety-significant. Therefore, will 16 recommend against developing an Agency-wide Risk 17 Management Policy Statement. Are there questions on 18 that activity? 19 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Just a question. That 20 policy statement would replace the Commission PRA 21 Policy Statement from 1995? 22 MR. DUDLEY: That was one of the issues, 23 and it was really unresolved. 24 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Because, you know, I

still go back --- there is a Commission policy from

1	the 1995 Policy Statement, "The use of PRA
2	technology should be increased in all regulatory
3	matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-
4	art in PRA methods and data, and in a manner that
5	complements the NRC deterministic approach and
6	supports NRC traditional defense-in-depth
7	philosophy." It doesn't say only for power reactors.
8	It says all regulatory.
9	MEMBER BLEY: But it says it reads to
10	me more like it's telling you to support risk
11	analysis but not a risk management process.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That it does not
13	talk about risk management. It says use PRA more
14	_
15	MEMBER BLEY: Now, 1.174 does, although
16	it's not a policy statement.
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right, 1.174 is not
18	regulation from a policy statement. That's true. It
19	is a bit of
20	MEMBER BLEY: It's not restricted to
21	reactors either, is it, or is it?
22	MR. GIITTER: I think it's something just
23	used by reactors.
24	MEMBER BLEY: Is it? Okay, I was just
25	looking through the front and I don't see anything

1	right there that pins it down.
2	MR. GIITTER: Yes. But, I mean, I would
3	just comment on that. I served about nine years in
4	NMSS and I could tell you that there's many aspects
5	of the regulations for the Materials licensees that
6	are also risk-informed. And a good example of that
7	would be Part 70
8	MEMBER BLEY: Sure.
9	MR. GIITTER: which is risk-informed
10	performance-based.
11	MEMBER BLEY: Those folks come here, too.
12	I see one, at least one. Has there been any thought
13	of doing something like 1.174 for other issues
14	around the Agency, even though it's not linked to a
15	Commission Policy Statement?
16	MR. DUDLEY: Other program areas, or
17	MEMBER BLEY: Yes, like NMSS.
18	MR. DUDLEY: Well, you're going to hear,
19	I think
20	MEMBER BLEY: He can tell us about that
21	when he comes up, or she.
22	MR. DUDLEY: Yes.
23	MR. SNODDERLY: This is Mike Snodderly,
24	ACRS Staff. Yes, Dennis Damon was going to come up
25	with Joe Rivers from NSIR to update the Subcommittee

on their risk-informed activities in light of the Staff's new recommendation.

MEMBER BLEY: Thank you, Mike. They've heard my first question.

MR. SNODDERLY: Yes, so we were going to have them after --- right after Donnie talks about interrelationships.

MR. DUDLEY: Okay. So, that I don't interrupt Donnie's presentation, what I'm going -- what I'd like to do is flip directly to Slide 22, and I won't change the audiovisual one because there's some animations coming up that I don't want to spoil. I guess I've spoiled it by telling you you have some animations, but nevertheless, if you just go to Slide 22, the next steps on the RMRF SECY.

said, I'11 receive office concurrence comments and hopefully concurrences on this Wednesday, and what we will do is we'll provide the ACRS with a markup of any substantive changes that we make as a result of office concurrence comments. And you'll get that, hopefully, before your Full Committee meeting when we meet with you again on November 4th. So, then we would expect letter from the ACRS somewhere midaround November. We'll respond to that letter, and we would

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--- our paper is due to the Commission by December 18th. Ideally, we'd like to have both your letter and our response to that letter included as enclosures to the SECY Paper, but depending on the timing of those, that correspondence, that may or may not happen.

So, that concludes my presentation on the RMRF Secy Paper. I'd like to get Donnie Harrison now to --- you want to come push the buttons? Donnie will discuss the interrelationships, because he did --- he had the lead on this work.

MR. HARRISON: Good afternoon. I'm Donnie Harrison from the Office of New Reactors. And just as kind of a quick reminder, in the SRM that was on the SECY for the Near Term Task Force, they included a direction to the Staff to provide a description of any interrelationships of ongoing risk-informed activities. And the intent of that was, it says, is to insure the activities are well coordinated and effectively planned and implemented, so it was kind of with all these different activities going on, how do we insure things mesh together, if you will, in an effective way?

In doing that, and previously we had presented at a Subcommittee meeting what's referred

to here as an Influence Diagram to illustrate those interrelationships between those activities. We're doing it strictly for the power reactors. I mean, there's also activities going on within the other arenas. Even within the power reactors, you're going to see it's not all-inclusive. It's some of the major activities, but there's a number of other risk-informed activities that are ongoing, as well.

So, we'll start with some of these interrelationships, the Commission actually directed us to address five specific topics. As we went through, we found relationships with other activities, and we also broke it out into two general areas, that area of policy development, and the area of implementation.

You'll see this umbrella. This is being called the Umbrella Chart now. It is the Risk-Informed Steering Committee, that's led by the Office Director in NRR, there's Deputy Directors from each of the other offices that are on that Steering Committee. There's also an industry steering committee which they interact with on a periodic basis. Matter of fact, there's one this afternoon, an internal meeting, and then there's a joint meeting afternoon between the tomorrow

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industry and the NRC Steering Committee. And they discuss various topics and issues that might be fresh and active areas to pursue, and some of those relate to what we're doing.

There's supposed to be monthly or every couple of weeks meetings of the Risk Management Team. That's just a group that gets together, it's within the Risk arenas within the different offices. Primarily, Research, NRR, and NRO, but there are representatives from NSIR and NMSS that can and do participate. And that is a way to share technical work that's going on between the offices, to see if there's overlap. It also achieves direction from the Commission previously to make sure we're coordinated and consistent in our approaches. So, those are a

few of the areas that are identified of how we kind of stay in touch with each other.

I'll also mention there's --- Research, if it's doing --- the Office of Research, if they're doing research specifically for each of the offices, they have periodic meetings where they discuss the research and its goals. That's another opportunity for us to interact on the activities to make sure there's interaction from one office to another, that that happens.

Some things, not everything is under the Risk-Informed Steering Committee, and some of the activities we are going aren't actually directed by the Risk, but they're familiar to, and they can elevate to that management, if desired.

Dick mentioned earlier, there's this NUREG on defense-in-depth. It was --- the SRM also directed us to enshrine the discussion that was in the enclosure there. They had a public interagency meeting, as Dick referred to, so that currently is proceeding towards development of a NUREG to capture those insights.

There's activities going on under the Economic Consequences, and there was a 2014 SRM related to Qualitative Factors, somewhat defense-in-

depth, and those considerations, as well. There's the Cumulative Effects of Regulation that is going on. You'll see a number of SRMs related to that and COMSECY. Those have interactions with other activities. Again, the defense-in-depth NUREG that's going on with Research also has the potential to influence some of the discussion on defense-in-depth of what's going on in this effort on RMRF for power reactors. The Economic Consequences influencing the regulatory analysis and backfit analysis depending on how that comes out, as well as what we're doing here would influence the regulatory analysis backfit analysis description, as well. So, you're going to see a flow of defense-in-depth in a number of these items. It is one of the key areas that's interlinked among these activities. Those are all on the policy development and how to change current policy, or develop new policy.

I'11 note the Risk Prioritization Initiative was identified as an activity to perform. They did tabletop exercises on that. In a recent SRM Commission, from the their recommendation or direction was to terminate that effort, incorporate any of that into existing programs that we use to prioritize or consider initiatives.

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Under the implementation side, there's future rulemaking. There's currently activity going on in 10 CFR 50.46c. That's coming to an end to SECY Paper development right now. There's some other related ones that have been awaiting attention depending where things finish.

There's an update to Reg Guide 1.174, and you heard I think Joe Giitter mention earlier, there's a piece of that that's on defense-in-depth that the Commission directed the Staff to improve the understanding, if you will, the hierarchal structure of that. That was done as part of an SRM on CAP credit discussion.

The outcome of that Reg Guide and those associated application risk-informed Reg Guides would influence the risk-informed licensing actions, like risk management tech specs, 10 CFR 50.69, risk-informed surveillance frequencies and that type of thing.

And then there's influences that come out that have an influence on the implementation side. There's a couple of working groups that were formed under the Risk-Informed Steering Committee.

One was addressing methods in the peer review process, another one was on uncertainty. And, again,

started on the far left with a discussion defense-in-depth. On the far right, there's a number discussing uncertainty, uncertainty both within the NRC under NUREG-1855, as number of EPRI documents. And well as а then aggregation in light of large uncertainties, and the hazard is what you'll see is the relationship of the bottom box with the two EPRI documents called up there.

Those all interact with the Risk Working Group, too, but they also have an influence on what eventually becomes the update to Reg Guide 1.174. I want to see if I actually have it. And then how that the policy side translates between and the implementation side is changes that we make here on defense-in-depth, or on the Risk Management Regulatory Framework would influence what can happen in future rulemakings, as well as the Reg Guide 1.174. And the changes that ultimately get made to the reg analysis or the backfit analysis effort will then also influence any future rulemaking that would have to come out and address that new guidance. So, in a nutshell that's --- this activity is, again, described in Enclosure 2.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, I read that. I

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guess the Subcommittee, and I think to a lesser extent even the Full ACRS isn't really familiar what's going on with the Risk-Informed Steering Committee. The Subcommittee had, I believe, one briefing on the one box under RISC Working Group 2 Uncertainty, which is on this picture, a small box.

This picture leads me to believe that the Steering Committee will become the curator for any possible paths forward in the sense of a Risk Management Regulatory Framework which we might not call it that. But, for example, foregoing options to proceed. Is that the case, and is --- have they done anything? Are they doing anything? In other words, all of the blue boxes there --- I see bits pieces of stuff that we're familiar with, they're bits and pieces of things that in terms of policy development activities, the blue there, I haven't really heard much of the Steering Committee doing anything in that area.

MR. HARRISON: And I don't want to give the impression that the Steering Committee is actually driving the work that's going on here. There are suggestions that are brought up to the Steering Committee ---

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes.

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different 1 MR. HARRISON: --- on 2 initiatives that might be pursued. That's one way. 3 If there ---4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But that, again --5 - see, in my whole sense back an hour and a half 6 ago, I said looking forward this --- the Steering 7 Committee is reacting to people saying well, we need 8 additional guidance on the quality of the PRA, this 9 Working Group 1. You know, so please Steering 10 Committee, put together an industry and a Staff side of that and see if we can come to some consensus. We 11 12 need better guidance on treatment of uncertainties, 13 you know, so please do that. But those, again, 14 they're focused on particular issues. I don't see 15 the Steering Committee providing that guidance that 16 this picture would lead me to believe would come 17 under the blue column of the picture, but I don't 18 see it happening. 19 MR. HARRISON: Right. Within, 20 - specifically, the RMRF there were --- was that 21 part of the Steering Committee? I believe it was, 22 right? 23 GIITTER: Yes. Ι understand MR. 24 comment. It's a good comment. In fact, I have to 25 leave here in about 20 minutes or so to go to the

internal meeting we have, but what we typically ——

- the reason the Risk-Informed Steering Committee

was developed, I think it started with some of the

concerns that came out of NFPA-805. And we made a

conscious effort to not make it about NFPA-805. We

wanted to address things broader than NFPA-805. So,

for example —— and we're also very careful that we

want the NRC Risk-Informed Steering Committee to be

independent and operate separately than the industry

one.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Sure.

MR. GIITTER: They come together and meet, but I think we need to identify issues to take on on our own. And so I can give you some examples of some of the issues we're working right now that I think are forward-looking, but ---

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That would help, Joe, because see, the problem is, if I'm --- if I pick up this SECY Paper and I look at this drawing and say, you know, you're answering the Commission's SRM in terms of identifying the activities and the relationships. Well, this picture has a lot of arrows, and it has colors on it, and it has report numbers and things like that. It, to me, doesn't answer how that Steering Committee is guiding the

1 Agency going forward from today. Again, in the sense 2 of NTTF Recommendation 1 and the Risk Management 3 Task Force, you know, how are we going forward 4 looking at where we're going to be 10 or 15 years in 5 the future, and using risk information there? 6 Now, if you want to call that policy 7 development, okay, call it that. But sort of this 8 overarching notion of using risk information not in 9 the piece parts of all of these little --- you know, 10 here's a problem. Please, Steering Committee, come to us with a solution for it. 11 12 MR. GIITTER: In fact, when I go back at 13 the meeting, I'm going to be talking about RMRF, and that's one of the messages I plan to deliver to the 14 15 Steering Committee is, you know, what --- I guess 16 challenge think, you them to know, 17 strategically as to where we should be in 15 years 18 from now. But when I say "forward-looking," I'm not 19 talking 15 years, I'm talking, you know, some of the 20 current problems we have now; how to avoid those 21 problems. 22 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But that's also, you 23 know --- my personal concern is that's also part of 24 the problem, is that ---

MR. GIITTER: Yes, I understand.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: --- too many people are putting out too many brush fires in reaction to whether it's an event like Fukushima, or whether it's a particular problem that's come up like NFPA-805 and thinking about how it might affect the next issue that's being evaluated. Those are still kind of piece part approaches.

MR. GIITTER: Yes. And I think there is a lot of that, to be honest with you. I don't think the Risk Informed Steering Committee it maybe perhaps as strategic as what you're thinking, but I'll give you an example. One issue that I think is forward-looking that we're currently taking on, and that is kind of the cultural impediment to risk-informed decision making.

Okay, we have over the course of decades Staff that have --- who believe that compliance equals safety. And in some cases it does, but in some cases we spend a lot of resources focusing on compliance issues that have very little safety-significance. And so one of the things we're looking at is, in our regulatory decision making process, when as a result of a CDBI inspection or whatever, a compliance issue is identified, to immediately evaluate or as soon as possible evaluate what is the

1 risk-significance of this? Just simply asking that 2 question, getting the right people together so don't spin our wheels and turn, and spend a lot of 3 4 time on something that's of low safety-significance. 5 It still may be a compliance issue, but how we treat 6 that compliance issue can be measured based on the 7 risk-significance that we see. So, that's something 8 we're actively working on right now that I believe 9 is forward-looking. And in the spirit of trying to 10 do things more efficiently and effectively, I think 11 we have to start doing more of that sort of thing. 12 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay, thanks. And that 13 example starts to help. 14 MR. GIITTER: I understand. 15 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. 16 MR. DUDLEY: Mr. Chairman? 17 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes? ANDERSON: Victoria Anderson 18 MS. 19 NEI. Just wanted to give a little context for what 20 those working groups are. That certainly is not the 21 only thing that the Risk-Informed Steering Committee 22 is working on. They're routinely getting information 23 about what we're doing on this effort on Management Regulatory Framework and what the Staff 24

is doing, and everything that's under that umbrella,

but what the Risk-Informed Steering Committee does is identifies work that needs to get done to support the advancement of implementation of risk-informed regulation that is not otherwise getting done. And that's why those two working groups got formed, was that those activities weren't taking place elsewhere. They are providing some direction for the other activities, as well.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. I think it would probably be useful for us, we have time constraints this afternoon, but it might be useful for us at some time in the near future, near being measured in to have like early next year, at least Subcommittee have a meeting so we better understand what's going on, you know, in the Industry Working Group, and in the Staff's Working Group, because as I said, if --- the way I view this is in the context of the SECY Paper, a indication that a reader of the SECY Paper would say well, look, we do have these considering policy, activities. We are looking forward somehow, which is encouraging, but I know that, as I mentioned, our Subcommittee has only been briefed on that one little box that says RISC WG2 Uncertainty. And we don't really know what's going on either on the industry side or, quite

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1 honestly, on the Staff side under the Staff's 2 Working Group. So, I think it would be useful for us to hear about that. 3 4 MS. ANDERSON: We're going to be talking 5 today briefly about the other little box and Working 6 Group 1. 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, okay. 8 MS. ANDERSON: But that would certainly 9 be something we'd be happy to support early next 10 year. 11 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But yes, I mean, 12 the sense of how the industry is looking --- I'm 13 more interested at the top and how you're winnowing 14 down the things that actually get more focused on. 15 And similarly from the Staff's perspective, how do 16 you come to that agreement that we should place 17 effort in WG1, WG2, and not in some other areas. 18 MR. HARRISON: Yes. What I hear you 19 saying is it's more than just the working groups, as 20 much as the --- what are the issues that are --- or 21 what's the focus of the RISC groups? CHAIRMAN STETKAR: How did we get to the 22 23 that we have some statement of work 24 Working Group 1, and some statement of work for

Working Group 2, and why don't we have Working Group

3 on some other issue that I can't particularly think about at the moment.

MR. HARRISON: Right. It's more --- it's bigger than just those working groups.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's bigger than just those working groups and what their intent is. We're interested in that, certainly, but how did we get to those working groups, and what else is being done to examine issues that affect the industry, affect the entire risk-informed regulatory process?

MEMBER REMPE: I have a question, also, about this diagram. What about emerging issues like multi-unit risk with the small light water integral reactors, or all the popular press stuff that we see about the non-LWR designs, and how would that -- would that affect something on this diagram?

MR. HARRISON: Well, yes, that's a level below probably some of this. Within the New Reactor arena, addressing the multi-module piece, there's some guidance that was already developed for -- - it's in the Standard Review Plan, Chapter 19, to address at least from the PRA risk perspective of how we expect people to look at that. It's qualitative. Within --- going forward there's a number of activities. And, again, that's why I

started by caveating, this is not all the work, there's been efforts on defense-in-depth, and the ROP program that could be influenced by these things. That's Near Term Task Force 12.1. There's a number of the Near Term Task Force activities on seismic and flooding that obviously have risk components to them.

So, this doesn't cover everything. There are those activities they would be influenced. Again, if we changed something about defense-in-depth, that would tend to have a fairly dynamic influence on a number of activities that might come forward. I can think of defense-in-depth in multimodule risk, how would you address that? That type of thing. So, yes, there's spider webs that go everywhere.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You folks are done, I believe. Do any of the members have any other questions for Dick or Donnie? If not, we have a dynamic agenda this afternoon, and next up we're going to hear from Joe Rivers and Dennis Damon of NSIR and NMSS, which I can never pronounce. But the first thing we're going to do is we're going to take a break. So, let's recess until 3:00.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter

went off the record at 2:46 p.m., and resumed at 3:01 p.m.)

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We are back in session, and as I mentioned we recessed, we're shuffling around the agenda a bit this afternoon, and we're going to hear from Joe Rivers and Dennis Damon of NSIR and NMSS about I think how you're using risk information, or whatever you want to talk about. So Joe, I'll give you the floor.

MR. RIVERS: The last time I talked to you was about back in February, I think, and so Dick suggested that I give you sort of an update as to how things have progressed and where we might be going. So I won't cover the same things over again, but if you have questions on anything I've talked about in the past, I'd be happy to discuss that.

Basically in March, we had a workshop, the INMM, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Reducing Risk workshop, which I sort of co-opted when it wasn't going anywhere and out of the few sessions that were pertinent to what we were interested in doing.

So I had a session on cybersecurity that brought in folks from industry, as well as some of the think tanks on cybersecurity. Had some

1	interesting discussions there. We had a session on
2	perception of risk. We had Trish Milligan from my
3	office, as well as Maureen, I can't think of her
4	last name, from Public Affairs, and we also brought
5	in Ed Lyman from Union of Concerned Scientists to
6	give different perceptions of risk, and that led to
7	some very interesting discussions.
8	And then we had a session on insider
9	mitigation, where we had one of our people, Mark
10	Resner, talk about how we do it at NRC, and we had
11	some of the folks from some of the other
12	organizations around the world that looked at
13	insider risk. So it was a fairly interesting
14	discussion. I think people got some insights from
15	each other, so very useful.
16	MEMBER BLEY: I've been reminded by the
17	Chairman that I should probably note that I attended
18	two other INMM workshops on this.
19	MR. RIVERS: We'll get to those.
20	MEMBER BLEY: Okay. I just wanted to
21	get on the record that one of the members was at the
22	one in April and
23	MR. RIVERS: One of your staff was at
24	the March workshop.
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The only thing the

1 Subcommittee, you know, separately from RMRF, we're 2 interested very much, the PRA Subcommittee, on risk information in the security area --3 4 MR. RIVERS: I've gotten those insights 5 from Dennis. CHAIRMAN STETKAR: -- and we're following 6 7 it. 8 MR. RIVERS: So I'm anyway, and 9 interested in it too, so I'm happy to share. 10 had a very interesting April we workshop, essentially one of the things that had come out in 11 12 earlier workshops was the need to bring safety and 13 security risk professionals together. 14 So I worked with Nathan Siu to identify 15 a forum to do that, and there was a PSA conference 16 that ANS was putting on in Sun Valley. 17 thought that if we could tack a one day workshop on 18 the front end of that, that we'd have the safety 19 risk professionals there, and then we just had to 20 convince enough of the security ones to come to make 21 it interesting. 22 So we ended up with about 35 people, to 23 include former Commissioner Apostolakis, who is one of the more wildly participants in the workshop. 24 25 lot of discussion on how each of the two disciplines

could leverage off of each other when they looked the risk at the plants.

We actually had four utility personnel at the workshop too. Probably one of the areas I know that former Commissioner Apostolakis really pushed a lot was the likelihood of event. I think there's always the -- you know, people talk about it in different ways.

They say in security we assume the event will happen. I try to be more, you know, take my statistical training at heart and I say it's really the conditional risk. If it were to happen, how well would we perform.

I think there was some discussion as to how we might try looking at that likelihood of event and trying to get some bounds on that, and you know, using some sensitivity analyses and things like that might give us some insights.

So that was definitely a good workshop. I know that a number of NRC staff participated in that, and they've actually approached me about how can we get both the safety and security risk professionals to work together. I know there's interest in having future workshops, but also some internal interactions within NRC would be a good

idea as well.

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Then actually one of our most recent workshops was the INMM workshop on vulnerability assessment tools. VA tools are basically sort of the security pro bono PRAs that are used in the safety arena. It was held last month in Boston, Massachusetts. Ι was fortunate enough to Commissioner Ostendorff to give the keynote address, and he actually got the thing headed in the right direction.

We had a discussion of VA tools, about how you do VV&A for those tools. Had a lot of discussions about modeling issues and data. We had demonstrations by the vendors.

I actually was able to take the project I shared in Vienna, the Nuclear Security Assessments Methodology project that had a case study for nuclear power plants, and got the three vendors that actually participated to each independently model that case study, so everybody could see how the different tools did things probably a little bit differently.

Then at the end, we had a discussion about users and then also had a panel discussion, where we talked about how the use of these tools fit

1 into the regulatory framework. A very interesting 2 discussion and actually one of your current staff was on the panel, Chris Lui. 3 But definitely was a 4 very interesting thing. 5 A positive aspect of it is that 6 actually had about a dozen of our licensees present 7 at that, along with about a dozen NRC staff and the 8 mix of the licensees was about ten from the 9 utilities and two from the fuel cycle facilities. 10 there was definitely a lot of interest, 11 overall I think it was pretty -- fairly successful 12 workshop. 13 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Joe, I'll ask you a 14 leading question. 15 MR. RIVERS: Okav. 16 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Do you see in this 17 particular area support among the licensees 18 developing risk-informed approach а more to 19 security? I mean quite honestly I'll be critical 20 and Victoria will correct me later, that in 21 power reactor licensing light, I tend to hear, this 22 is my own opinion, a lot of pushback saying it's too 23 We don't see the benefits, you know. expensive. 24 MR. RIVERS: I think that's -- I had to

a little different approach than you

take this,

would normally do in a regulatory environment. I actually approached the vendors and told them they had a market they weren't taking advantage of.

So the vendors actually approached the industry through NEI, got two or three of them that were interested with the whiz bang stuff that the software can do for them, and then actually three of them, Excelon, PSEG and Excel are in the process of submitting 50.54(p) changes that are supported by analysis from these modeling and simulation tools.

So we actually -- and there's at least three or four of the utilities that are in the process of getting up to speed on modeling their facilities. So I think this is something that, you know, if we're able to essentially address it well, that -- and actually come up with a process that essentially takes into consideration what they're submitting and the analysis that they're using in this -- the analysis of their facilities using these tools, I think it will be a very successful thing.

You know, the tool can be expensive to use, but if you look at how much these plants spend on security, it's about ten or more percent of their budget. So if they're going to offer up some savings, help them do things more, you know, risk-

informed, I think in the end it's a positive thing.

I think most of the utilities are starting to see that.

MEMBER BLEY: I was at that September workshop and I got an indication from a number of utility people that they were waiting to see how things went. But some of the ones who have actually tried it have really interest and reports of things they learned that make physical sense to them, that they were not learning through force on force drills or from other analysis tools they have used in the past. So it was pretty interesting.

MR. RIVERS: Yes. I think in the end, it's probably going to be something that they use. One of the things I also have tried to do is try to move the discussion sort of outside of the NRC industry framework, put it into the professional society environment.

I think they appreciate that a lot. It also allows us to bring in folks from the national laboratories, from the DOE facilities, and we had actually some active participants from the IEA and the United Kingdom in the workshop as well. So I think although that adds a lot of value to the process, I think right now I'm looking at how can we

continue this effort.

approval to have a session at the RIC, to have some open discussion at the RIC. I've got, working on putting together a session at the INMM meeting that will focus on this, allow industry the opportunity to engage with other security professionals in the nuclear community, and also trying to look at -- we sort of gave a three day coverage of both these model and simulation tools and other VA tools.

Now, maybe we need to have a little more focused type workshops, to look at things like how do I take things in data libraries and my plant-specific data, and try to use a combination of that to do a better job modeling my facility. So there was a lot of possibilities. It's just trying to figure, you know, what makes the most sense to start with.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Joe, as you've mentioned, the IAEA activity and I've seen it a couple of times. Could you characterize the level of international interest in this area at the IAE?

MR. RIVERS: Basically, the project I share over there is called the Nuclear Security Assessment Methodology project. So it's looking at

actually developing approaches to conducting security assessments for a wide range of facilities, all the way down to even an irradiator facility up to a nuclear power plant.

So some of them would require modeling and simulation tools, but like at an irradiator facility, it's probably not that necessary. In fact, the gentlemen from the UK actually gave a presentation that showed essentially that analysis of an irradiated facility and, you know, essentially what he was able to derive from table top analysis to using modeling and simulation tools.

But that project I have about 25 to 30 people that participated in it from about 15 countries. So fairly extensive involvement. So basically, I've already talked previously about the material attractiveness cybersecurity NUSAM, but probably the one that give you a little bit of insight into sort of the ongoing type things is the use of simulation modeling.

Essentially, industry has been using these tools. We've got three 50.54(p) changes and two in right now and one expected soon that use it to support their submissions. I am in the process — in fact, on Thursday, I start training the

Licensing staff on vulnerability assessment and it will be about a series of three sessions just to try to bring them up to speed, so that they're at least familiar with what they're seeing.

I will also be trying to establish a more formal process for training for NRC staff here at headquarters and in the regions on what these tools can do and how it fits into what they do in their jobs.

MEMBER BLEY: Are you needing to -- I guess it's two questions from me -- actually learning how to use the tools or how to interpret the results, and are you -- if you actually are about to have some submittals coming in, are you putting together any guidance for review?

MR. RIVERS: Well, we will be putting in guidance, but I think part of it is we'll sort of work our way through these first three, and as a result of how we do those and experiences we gain from that, Doug Huyck in our division will be putting together interim staff guidance on how to actually, you know, essentially evaluate it for a submission supported by that type of analysis.

The staff training will sort of give them the concepts, understanding the data, the

modeling, understanding the approaches. They're scenario-based approaches, they're pathway type approaches, trying to help them understand how the tools might use different approaches that are used in VA tools.

We'll probably see if we can get copies of software so they can at least play around with the software, so they get familiar with it, also see the types of reports. The one thing that we have to be cautious about is that the industry is very leery about NRC essentially digging into their actual facilities and using it against them in force on force and things like that.

So I'd rather not approach that until some time off in the distant future, when everybody's comfortable that these tools have a benefit for everybody. So I think initially, any access the staff would have to the modeling tools would be more just to get experience and exposure to them.

So we're essentially in the process of assessing how do we process these. So I'll be working with Licensing staff and what probably will happen is they'll -- we'll get the submissions. We'll develop questions that we want to pose to the

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1	utilities, probably pay a visit to the site to look
2	at the actual analysis and then go from there.
3	That's basically it. That's sort of the
4	big task right now, in addition to probably trying
5	to organize a couple of workshops in the near term.
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Anything more for
7	Joe? If not, thank you. Personally to me, that's
8	really encouraging. Down at the base right in front
9	of you. There you go.
10	MR. DAMON: My name is Dennis Damon.
11	I'm in the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
12	Safeguards, but I am not the director of that
13	office, and so anything I say, keep that in mind. I
14	cannot predict what the director will do.
15	MALE SPEAKER: Thanks Dennis.
16	MALE SPEAKER: If you're lucky, they'll
17	fire you and then you won't have to worry.
18	MR. DAMON: Well, I thought I'd first
19	off remind all of us, including myself, how diverse
20	NMSS is in terms of the things that it regulates.
21	Think about the risk profile, the things that I'm
22	mentioning, to realize there isn't one single story
23	about risk and how it's handled and used.
24	In other words, whether a given category
25	of things has a risk assessment and how they use it.

We've got 70 or 80 different stories in NMSS, because for example there's the industrial medical area. They did a thing called byproduct risk study many years ago.

То that, it was it do wasn't, wouldn't be described as a fully quantitative PRA, but it was an attempt to do what you can do. had, in order to do that risk assessment, they had to divide up just the -- into categories the things They had 60 categories of facilities they regulate. that they and activities and devices they regulate.

Then of course you have the Fuel Cycle Division that I'm formally within is just the front end of the fuel cycle. So you've got all the steps in the front end. You've got the steps on the back end. It's all the spent fuel management, ultimate waste disposal, decommissioning, environment analyses.

So there's -- that's what I'm saying.

It's 70 or 80 different stories. There is a framework for what we do. We were tasked in 1999, the office was, with developing a framework and doing something analogous to reactor safety goals.

Christiana Lui over here was the last

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head of the risk task group that was set up to do that, and the results of that work were published in this document, "Risk-Informed Decision-Making for Nuclear Material Waste Applications." This is Revision 1, but this document was essentially complete at the end of 2004, so it's 11 years old.

In the front of it, there's a list of the people who participated in it. So you can get some idea of who actually is aware of what's in here. It's taught in a couple of courses that we give, but it's not widely known. But it's well-understood by us; like a subset of the people in NMSS know what this is.

There's a framework in here and there are what are called risk guidelines. We took the name "goal" off of them because it was a -- there was a constant miscommunication that a goal was something you should be meeting, and that's not what these risk guidelines are. They're a level of risk to individual persons that is regarded as negligible.

But they are the same numbers as the reactor safety goals for the same things. For example, acute fatality risk to a person offsite.

There's a number for that which is QHO1 on the

reactor side. We use the same number for the same thing here, but we have six different things like OHO1.

So this framework exists, and it's been farmed out. The application of it -- it basically you do risk informing as appropriate whatever your problem is, and you go through a structured process of reasoning that out. Rosenberg helped develop that, and so you reason out going to propose risk you're to inform something, what risk information you need, what does it cost, is it worth the cost.

So you make a conscious, go through a conscious process of deciding how to risk inform. Now the second -- so that's Subject No. 2. Subject No. 3 is what are we actually doing in NMSS? There's a thing that was called a risk-informed performance-based plan.

Its original incarnation was the RERIP, which was a paper plan actually for how to risk inform, and it listed all the risk informing activities in the entire agency. Its successor still exists. It's implemented as a website, and I sent in how you find this website. It's through the public website under About NRC and how we regulate

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risk assessment. You can trace down, find this plan.

activities. NMSS had 11 activities in that plan. They're not listed as a 11, you know, 1 through 11. They're part of the longer list of the whole agency that goes up into the 50's somewhat, and they're grouped under what we call sub-arenas.

For example, the fuel cycle is a subarena, and under there there's only two activities.

So you can go online on the website and find a
description of what these activities are, and each
of those activity descriptions has a link to a big
thicker document or other references that describe
what's going on or to products that past activities
that are produced related to that thing.

I'll just read some of the things that are going on here. There's an activity that's called Gap 5, related to developing a rule for a reprocessing plant. You know, if an application were to come in for a reprocessing plant, how would we regulate it? Currently, it's under Part 50, but there's no description of what a tech spec should be or no general design criteria for a reprocessing plant.

So there's an effort to talk, develop a reprocessing rule base. Part of that is how would you do risk assessment of a reprocessing plant and what are the impediments to it. So there's a whole activity on that.

Another one in the area, I'm in Fuel Cycle. There's a whole process going on to revise the fuel cycle oversight process to be -- to make more use of risk information like the reactor oversight program.

Not exactly the same way, but in a different way. Because for example, fuel cycle facilities don't have PRAs. They have these ISA things, which are not generally quantitative, so how do you do that? But there's work ongoing on that.

Then there's several activities in the spent fuel area that are ongoing, to extend and develop a framework in risk metrics that might be useful for them risk informing spent fuel. Primarily, it's focused on the certification of storage packages is where that's focusing on.

But another thing that happened recently in that area of spent fuel is there's a study that was done many years ago, but it's been just recently updated, which is a risk analysis of spent fuel

transportation. I mean it's a fuel blown PRA that thick, fully quantitative. They've done -- this is like the third iteration of this refinement of this thing.

So as I say, in certain areas there are full blown legitimate PRAs, and then in other areas you've got something different. In other areas, you don't -- you have something much less. I think that gives a flavor of what's happening in NMSS. So if there's any questions, I can discuss things further.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I'm familiar with some of the things. I'm not familiar with some of the other things you mentioned. So that's good information. You did say that I think, and I want to make sure I understand it, that risk assessment in the sense of quantitative risk assessment is applied, I think with some justification, to a different extent, depending on the type of facility that you're looking at.

Coming back to kind of the focus of today's meeting, how are those decisions made? I mean how do you decide that well a qualitative ISA is okay for these types of facilities, and perhaps a more quantitative analysis is needed for transportation of spent fuel?

2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And that that's sort
3 of a reasonable balance of using risk information

Yes. Well I've been --

MR. DAMON:

across, you know, everything that you're responsible

for.

MR. DAMON: Yes. Well first off, I've only been here since 1994. Decisions, a lot of the decisions like that were made before I even got here, right. The one I can talk about are some of the things they've had subsequently. But you know, those decisions about which things to do risk assessment, full blown risk assessments for or to do

The ISA thing, I was here for. I'm a guilty member of the rulemaking team that did that, you know. But like the transportation risk study, I'm fairly sure the first iterative of it was before I got here. So they made -- decisions were made that someone was, felt they wanted to understand the risk in that area.

There was also, for example, a risk, full blown risk analysis of dry cask spent fuel storage that was done in large part by NRC staff, with some assistance from outside. But you know, choices were made to have some risk assessments

done, I think, just to understand what the -- you know, what universe are we in here, that kind of approach.

The byproduct study was intentionally augustly done to be comprehensive. That's why I say it really isn't a full blown PRA. I mean it just would have been too challenging to do it that way. But then from another perspective, some of the things --

Some of the risks that they controlled in the industrial medical area, they get enough events in a year to just use statistics to follow. They don't need to do a PRA. They get statistics, and so that shows you kind of the range of -- so to answer the question, you know, how are these decisions made, I'll give you an example from the fuel cycle area.

Typically, well it's not required that fuel cycle facility integrated safety analyses be quantitative. However, there was a facility and it actually was a facility not required to do integrated safety analysis by regulation, but by license commitment.

But the facility was on the New Madrid fault, and as a result of Fukushima, a team of staff

1	were sent around to many of fuel cycle facilities to
2	just take a look and see do we need to take a closer
3	look at any facilities. When they looked at that
4	one, they said oh yes, we do need to take. As a
5	result of that, a full blown quantitative, seismic
6	structural analysis and risk analysis was done for
7	that facility.
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But only for the
9	seismic events?
10	MR. DAMON: Just for seismic.
11	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
12	MR. DAMON: Well, seismic and wind.
13	They looked at high winds, because there are also
14	the largest tornado that's ever crossed the United
15	States went right by that plant.
16	MR. JORDAN: Let me add, if I may add
17	something to it. Nate Jordan.
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Sure.
19	MR. JORDAN: As far as spent fuel and
20	transportation casks, one of the PRAs that was done,
21	we actually looked at misloads in transportation
22	casks, and we looked at both theoretical and
23	empirical procedures. Actually, we looked at the
24	empirical methods based on, just like he said, we

had a number of events that allowed us to do so.

So

1	we did that on both cases.
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah. I mean in
3	that, you know, when I go over to the power reactor
4	side of the business, one can count up certain types
5	of events that have occurred and other types of
6	events haven't. So
7	MEMBER BLEY: Dennis, in the beginning
8	of your talk, you held up a study that you of course
9	participated in and some others, and said there's a
10	set of those available through the public website.
11	I know we'll get the transcript in a bit, but what's
12	the path through the public website?
13	MR. DAMON: Oh. This is the list of the
14	risk informed activities.
15	MEMBER BLEY: Yeah.
16	MR. DAMON: If you go to the public
17	website
18	MEMBER BLEY: Okay yeah, thank you.
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Mike can get it for
20	us. Make sure we get it. Sometimes they're
21	torturous and the good Dr. Bley has been trying to
22	find it over here and apparently hasn't.
23	MR. DAMON: And he also has a ML number
24	for this document.
25	MEMBER BLEY: Yeah, an ML number for

1	that one would help too.
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So Mike will get
3	that. He could even send us the report, yeah.
4	MR. SNODDERLY: Yeah.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thanks, Dennis.
6	Anything else for Dennis or Joe? If not, thanks.
7	That helps, because we kind of focus so much on the
8	power reactor side of the business, and indeed the
9	RMRF, the Risk Management Task Force and the NTTF
10	folks didn't necessarily restrict their
11	recommendations to only the power reactors.
12	So it's useful to hear what people are
13	doing elsewhere, in addition to the presentation
14	that we had earlier. So that helps. Thank you.
15	(Off mic comment.)
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Joe, make sure your
17	mic is on, just so we get you on the transcript.
18	MR. RIVERS: If we organize another
19	workshop, we'll make sure you're all aware of it, so
20	that if you want to participate, you'll be able to
21	do that.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah. We're as I
23	said, in the security area, we've been interested
24	for quite a while, and to me, it's encouraging to
25	see that there seems to be finally some movement

1 afoot to get the safety and security people starting 2 I hope to speak the same language at least. With that, if there's nothing more for 3 4 Dennis and Joe, we'll have the industry come up and 5 hear from whoever we're going to hear from. As I said, this is --6 7 (Off mic comments.) 8 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And apparently we're 9 going to hear from the PRA and BWR Owners Group 10 first. 11 Yeah. Ray and Bob when -- the only 12 thing I'll alert you to, and you can instruct Bob 13 whenever he gets back, is when you speak, make sure 14 your little green light is on, and when you're not 15 speaking, turn it off so that we don't get the paper 16 rustling and stuff in the background. Now you're 17 the approved instructor on the front. With that, 18 Ray it's yours. 19 All right. My name is Ray MR. FINE: 20 fleet supervisor, PRA at First Energy I'm 21 and I'm also the Vice Chair of the Risk Management 22 Subcommittee, and I'm going to talk a little bit 23 about the SECY, draft SECY. So overview, I'm going 24 talk about the current state and successful

and

challenges

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forward and conclusions.

Our current state is the NRC policy statement, combined with industry and NRC experience, have established a workable structure for risk-informed applications. We have Reg Guide 1.174 through 1.178. We have Reg Guide 1.200 that defines an acceptable way to assess PRA technical adequacy using ASME, ANS PRA standards, and PRA peer review process independently assessing the PRA technical adequacy.

But in all things, there's always room for improvement, and so we have many task forces that we use in the industry. Particular to the peer review process is the NEI peer review task force, which is addressing enhancements for review of qualification, PRA peer review consistency.

So you know, we address things like, you know, what constitutes being a lead for a particular technical element or for the peer review itself, versus a reviewer, and then we've also implemented processes like a working observer.

So before you can even be qualified to do a peer review, you would have a working observer, so that you participate in a peer review, and then you get to actually be a reviewer in your next one.

So it's like a training process, so that they understand the overall process.

But that's the gist of what we do, and like I said, it's a constantly improving and developing thing, and we have many people involved in these task forces.

Examples of successful applications. As you know, the industry and the NRC have developed successful applications under the current regulatory framework, such as the surveillance frequency control program, risk-informed completion times, 10 C.F.R. 50.69 maintenance rule and so forth. All these have developed accordingly, and they're a basically established goal post for us to meet.

Now it's just a matter of us working with our management to get there. So it's important to us that those goals remain constant and set, because that's what we're working towards, because it does take a lot of momentum to get a plant there and their PRAs and the programs in place, and get the -- not only the NRC staff but the utility staff because, you know, in the case of, for example, TSTF-425 and TSTF-505, it's not just PRA; it's everybody. You have to get Operations and everybody up to speed and moving in the right direction.

So it takes a tremendous amount of momentum for the PRA guys to push these applications out, and so we really need the staff to stay firm and not dance around when we get to those goals. As long as we can do that, we can get forward motion. If those goals move, forward motion is stopped.

So we have challenges, and these challenges are being addressed by the NRC risk-informed steering committees known as Risk, and here are four particular, as you saw two earlier in the presentation. But we have PRA technical adequacy, which is acceptance of new methods, closure of peer review findings, PRA peer reviewer qualifications.

Then we have treatment of uncertainty, which is training for decision-makers and NUREG-1855 updates. We have incorporation of FLEX and risk-informed decision-making, which is maximizing the safety benefits of those plant changes, and then the quantitative and qualitative assessments that can go along with it.

Avoid unintended consequences а primary focus point, and enhance quidance So you know, one of the -- staff mentioned about Davis-Besse and earlier us crediting the emergency feedwater system. Well that is a FLEX

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system. It's also a fire system. It's also a seismic system.

So you know, all of -- that system applies in all facets of PRA, and that's not the only FLEX system that we're looking to credit, to add defense indepth, which is another cornerstone.

So FLEX truly is a defense indepth addition that you can really see show up in PRA, and it doesn't, you know, it in no way diminishes the it capabilities of the plant; adds the capabilities of the plant, and we just want to take advantage of that fact.

We also have risk metric aggregation, which is, you know, everybody deals with aggregation differently, and EPRI has put together a guidance document and owners groups are working to pilot that. But it has to do with understanding the uncertainty. When you build these models, some people build the models as independent entities; some people build them as an integrated PRA.

But how do you deal with, you know, say a fire model or a seismic model that has very large uncertainties? When you compare it to internal events problem it doesn't, and how do you weight the solutionings and the importances coming from each of

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1	those, in a way that makes sense?
2	Because right now we just kind of add it
3	all up and say that's the answer, when we know
4	that's really not the right answer. It's a little
5	bit off kilter. So how do we balance that? So EPRI
6	came up with an approach to do that, and we're going
7	to start piloting it.
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Ray?
9	MR. FINE: Yeah, go ahead.
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You want to start
11	some questions before you leave this one. On the
12	staff slides and what I'm somewhat familiar with,
13	they noted that they have their Risk Steering
14	Committee, Working Groups 1 and 2, which address
15	clearly the first sub-bullet and the second sub-
16	bullet, and maybe or maybe not the fourth sub-
17	bullet, because I know they've addressed under the
18	uncertainty kind of a bit of the aggregation.
19	I haven't heard anything on the third
20	sub-bullet. Is the staff actively addressing that,
21	or is this only the
22	MR. FINE: Yeah. We actually had a
23	meeting earlier last week on this. So I'm going to
24	let Mike, if he wanted to mention
25	MR. TSCHILTZ: Mike Tschiltz, NEI. The

1 industry has a task force on the use of risk-2 informed decision-making for FLEX. Also, the work 3 aggregation is being bundled with the 4 uncertainty working group. So that work is going to 5 be combined --Yeah, that's what I 6 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 7 understood. But this kind of broader notion of how 8 do you account for FLEX-type things I hadn't heard 9 about. 10 Yeah. This is fairly new. MR. FINE: 11 MR. TSCHILTZ: It was, I quess in the 12 Risk-Informed Steering Committee meeting just prior to this one that's scheduled for tomorrow, it was 13 14 decided that that was one of the top two priorities for 2015 and 2016, because it is -- we're facing 15 16 that issue right now, because utilities are using 17 FLEX equipment during outage periods to provide 18 defense indepth, and it's going to be used in SDPs. 19 There's number of different а 20 implications. So we want to make sure that we have 21 a consistent approach for simplification. 22 I'll keep on my theme CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 23 on looking forward, big picture stuff. When you say 24 FLEX, do you only mean FLEX in its sense of stuff

that prevents core damage, or do you mean all of

1 that other stuff that you can bring in to not only 2 prevent core damage but possibly mitigate severe What's the context of this? 3 accidents? MR. FINE: 4 The context is yes. No, I'm 5 a bit serious, but that is the intent in every way, 6 yes. 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. That's good, 8 if that's the approach that's being taken, because 9 I'm trying to probe this notion of a single well-10 defined perfectly square, perfectly black or white 11 box issue that gets addressed very narrowly, rather 12 than sort of broader issues. Right, and one of the things 13 MR. FINE: 14 that, at least on the utility side and we only just recently presented to the staff last week, but we're 15 16 looking at it from an overall perspective, shut 17 down, at power. Even if it's qualitative and not 18 specifically in the PRA, but we know that it adds 19 defense indepth in a particular area. 20 So use of equipment in the shutdown 21 defense indepth process. But you could also think 22 of it, you know, from an A-4 perspective. I want to 23 do a 14 day AOT at one of my plants, but in order to 24 do that, I have to have a diesel to supply

compensatory action. I have that capability with

FLEX.

So it permeates into every facet and every direction, and now you accredit it is only limited to how creative you want to be. But you have to remember the intent of FLEX and its focus, and it has to be able to be implemented the way it was designed to be implemented.

So you can't prevent -- you have to, if you're going to accredit it, how do you go about accrediting it, to make sure that you didn't just invalidate the intent of FLEX? So we're being very careful in how we credit and what we want to do, and that's those unintended consequences. We don't want to create any of those.

But we also want to take full advantage of the money that we've spent, and we realize, at least in my models, because I'm way further ahead than most, the benefits are huge. So we want to take advantage of it.

MEMBER BLEY: I'm really -- go ahead -this recent discussion. We heard things like this
from individual licensees, but some industry folk
and you've talked about your side. How about the
other reactors? Are the Owners Groups going after
this too, and it sounds like it's a larger --

1 MR. RISHEL: I quess we're all -- we're 2 in this together. So much of this is joint efforts, either with EPRI or NEI. So the FLEX is a 3 4 joint effort. The Uncertainty Steering Committee; 5 the B's are a full participant of that, as the P's 6 are. 7 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. I'm really glad to 8 glad hear this. I think it offers 9 benefits. I'm glad you had the unintended 10 consequences side you're looking at. But I've been 11 hearing lots of resistance. I thought I'd been 12 hearing lots of resistance to this, and I'm really 13 pleased to see it going forward. 14 MR. RISHEL: And a lot of it came from 15 concerns with maintenance rule and some of 16 But we think we can work through that. others. 17 It's for some people it may be a hard spot, but I 18 think when they see the benefits, a lot of those 19 hard spots are going to go away. 20 MEMBER BLEY: Right. I'm sure you can. 21 I think that's good. 22 And the way we look at it MR. RISHEL: 23 is by using this equipment the way we're planning on 24 using it, the staff operations and everyone else

would be much more familiar with the equipment, much

1	more able to implement it. So when something does
2	happen, it's not a first time evolution, you know.
3	It will be something they just know how to do it.
4	MEMBER SCHULTZ: The resistance comes
5	from organizations that feel that the FLEX equipment
6	was intended for single purpose, and to apply it in
7	these other areas is additional effort.
8	MR. FINE: Additional burden, yes.
9	MEMBER SCHULTZ: And now you're working
10	to demonstrate that with that additional burden
11	comes some real benefits?
12	MR. RISHEL: Right. I would say it's
13	twofold. It's the burden and additional
14	consequences of monetary effort and intentionally
15	regulatory effort, and then there's others that just
16	say that equipment is for this purpose and this
17	purpose only, and you cannot, by some reading of the
18	Reg Guides, divert it something else.
19	MEMBER SCHULTZ: Are those people
20	industry people or NRC people?
21	MR. RISHEL: These are industry people.
22	MEMBER SCHULTZ: Okay. So they're
23	becoming regulators, if you will.
24	MR. RISHEL: Self-regulators.
25	MEMBER SCHULTZ: Yes, and you're working

1	through that?
2	MR. FINE: We're working through that,
3	yes.
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And you've just
5	when you say this is recent, sounds like it's quite
6	recent.
7	MR. FINE: Well, it's recent as in I've
8	been working on this for almost two years, and I saw
9	what was going on because I was ahead. I was doing
10	seismic, I was doing
11	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah, but it sounds
12	you personally may be out in the forefront, I mean
13	in terms of
14	MR. FINE: I was everybody else was
15	starting to see what I was saying, and now there's
16	like light bulb, and they're moving in
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But in terms of
18	industry, if I can characterize industry as industry
19	
20	(Simultaneous speaking.)
21	MR. FINE: Yeah, yeah, mostly.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Interaction with the
23	staff.
24	MR. FINE: That just started in the last
25	month.

1 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's what I was 2 pointing to, to see what -- we've kind of probed a 3 little bit of coalescing, if that's too strong, 4 support within the utilities. It's probably 5 premature to ask, you know, what types of interactions you've had with the staff so far. 6 7 (Simultaneous speaking.) 8 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Was there resistance or is there resistance? 9 Our first interaction 10 MR. FINE: Yeah. 11 with the staff, I felt, and Mike can chime in, I 12 thought it went really well. I think we were pretty 13 much totally in line with each other. I didn't see 14 anything that was a surprise, and I was actually --15 other than the fact that we were almost in lock 16 step, you know. 17 MR. TSCHILTZ: So this is Mike Tschiltz 18 I think our plan is to have another meeting again. 19 with the staff in the near term, I think some time 20 later this month, in that industry is developing two 21 white papers, one on a semi-qualitative approach or 22 semi-quantitative approach and а qualitative 23 approach for accrediting FLEX and risk assessments. 24 Our goal is to be able to share with

those with the staff to get their comments by the

1 end of the year, and then figure out where we go 2 from there as far as whether those get incorporated 3 kind of quidance document that 4 endorsed through NSIG. But to promote some kind of 5 consistency and approach across the industry, that 6 both the NRC and the industry have agreed to. 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's really, and as 8 Dennis said, it's referred bits and pieces of this 9 with some encouragement and a lot of discouragement. 10 When you get to the point where you have those 11 papers prepared, I think our Subcommittee would be 12 really interested. 13 You know, I mentioned earlier that we'd 14 be interested in hearing more of what's going on on 15 both the industry side and the staff side, under the 16 auspices of this umbrella of the Risk-Informed 17 Steering Committee. particular is 18 This in an area that 19 sounds really interesting. MR. FINE: Well, it's creative. 20 21 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And creative, 22 that's a bit -- if you listened to what I was saying 23 earlier about the creativity of the industry 35 years ago, sort of driving a lot of the use of risk 24

information and the regulatory acceptance of that.

1 This might be an example of that. 2 MR. FINE: Uh-huh, yeah. I think so. MR. RISHEL: I would just add that it's 3 4 possible the staff is going to see some license 5 amendments with FLEX in them, before any of these 6 white papers are approved. 7 MR. FINE: I can quarantee they will be 8 by the end of the year. Okay. So recommended path 9 The PWR Owners Group agrees with the NRC 10 staff to continue the pursuit of the incremental 11 improvements in current regulatory framework. 12 clear case has not been made that a new regulatory framework would be cost beneficial. 13 Significant effort has been expended by 14 both industry and the NRC, and the current framework 15 16 is well understood and has been used successfully. 17 We understand it's an evolving process, and we'd 18 like to evolve that way. 19 We'd leverage existing lessons learned and improve the efficiency of the NRC risk-informed 20 21 application review process; we improve consistency 22 in licensing submittals and NRC reviews; and we're 23 looking to finalize 10 C.F.R. 50.46 Alpha, 24 Informed Emergency Core Cooling System as continuing

that move forward.

So conclusions. The PWR Owners Group endorses the staff's recommendations in the draft maintain paper. We the NRC's regulatory framework. The NTTF Recommendation 1 improvement activities of a new category of events should not be established, and defense indepth policy statement is not needed because we already do it, and then the development of an overarching agency-wide policy statement is not needed, quite frankly you already have one. It just needs to be implemented as an agency-wide statement.

Then the PWR Owners Group will continue to work with the staff to ensure appropriate methods are available to develop, implement and regulate risk-informed applications and risk-informed regulations. That's it.

MEMBER SCHULTZ: Ray, would you go as far to say that the current approach, where the requirement is for an individual licensee to come in and have a singular submittal for a particular application, and to have the responsibility to demonstrate their capabilities to the staff and make the case for their own facility, that that is in fact better than having an approach that's more generic?

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1 MR. FINE: Well, I'm going to have to 2 answer that as a personal answer, not as --MEMBER SCHULTZ: 3 A personal answer is 4 fine. 5 MR. Personally, I do FINE: not understand why the staff reviews the way they do in 6 7 some cases. The standard is written, and when you get a finding on the standard, you're getting a 8 9 finding to meet a capability category. It's not 10 relative to an application; it's relative to the 11 standard. 12 I'm answering -- if I get a finding or 13 observation on my model, I am correcting it to the 14 standard, and therefore it is correct for all 15 applications, okay, once I do that. So why does the 16 staff review me to that specific application? 17 should be reviewed -- if it's good for 18 application, it's good for all, right, because of 19 the way that it was answered. 20 therefore And SO why are 21 reviewed that way? Now I understand the staff, 22 because I made it specific to that application, 23 that's the way they're reviewing it and I get that. 24 I understand that we can get our Reg Affairs guys to

let us say review it for all. But they think that

opens a can of worms, okay.

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I don't understand, but that's what they So we're kind in this situation. say, all right. We're also in the situation of closing F&Os and what is defined as closed, and we're working through the Committee to come up with what definition of closed. So that I'm not giving same finding in four different submittals to reviewed four different times by four different That's just a tremendous waste of money and people. effort.

I don't think by going through a certified PRA you are going to stop that, okay. I honestly don't, and you know, because everybody's going to second-guess everybody else. So the -- and the certified PRA then puts a lot more burden and money on me. My peer reviews become way more expensive, the process way more laid out.

It's just a huge burden on me compared to what I'm doing now. So I think if we just could fix, with a couple of small fleets, what we're doing now, it's not going to be nearly as expensive as going over to that full certified process that was proposed.

Now the certified process was never

fully fleshed out, but just the pieces that we're seeing were troublesome. So the -- because, you know, you're also talking about tossing out SPAR, you're talking about tossing out -- and then me getting my model over to the staff, and then the staff, you know, we saw with Southern and them going to the Level 3 with their model, all of the extra help they got with maintaining and updating their model.

There's just a lot of burden that we just -- we can't handle. We just don't have the staff to handle it. So everything would come to a stop just to rebaseline everybody for the next fiveten years. So redoing that just doesn't make any sense, at least from my perspective.

Others liked it because it made things easier for them, because they're at the very beginning of the process. You know, I'm near the end of the process. I don't want to have to review everything. So it's a personal choice by an individual utility. If they want to do it, let them do it, you know.

But I would rather find a way to close F&Os and find a way to do a submittal that I can make an application and I'm done and I'm out, you

1	know. But the big thing is if I could close my
2	findings, my submittals get really easy really fast.
3	So we just need to come with a consensus
4	way of this means closed and I'm out, and we're
5	good, because I would be done tomorrow.
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thank you.
7	MR. DINSMORE: Yeah, hi. This is Steve
8	Dinsmore on the staff, PRA Licensing Branch. I
9	guess I was a little confused. The FLEX stuff,
LO	every plant got inspected to make sure you were
L1	meeting the FLEX criteria or guidelines. Then you
L2	switch all of the sudden to F&Os. I'm sorry if I'm
L3	asking a question to you.
L 4	MR. FINE: Oh no. He asked a different
L5	question. The FLEX was a different conversation
L 6	from this conversation, to my understanding.
L7	MR. DINSMORE: Are you
L8	MEMBER SCHULTZ: Yes, it was a different
L 9	question, yeah. Ray answered the question I asked.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And for the record,
21	Ray answered the question I asked about the FLEX.
22	So I think Rick.
23	MR. FINE: I don't know how to bring up
24	your presentation.
25	MALE SPEAKER: Why don't we swap?

1	MR. FINE: If you'd like, yeah we can
2	swap or I can drive for you and you can do
3	MR. DUDLEY: Could I ask a quick
4	question right before you leave? On Slide 7, you
5	say a defense indepth policy statement is not
6	needed. Does that also mean that you don't believe
7	that the NRC should establish a definition of
8	defense indepth in criteria, more objective criteria
9	for determining its adequacy?
10	MR. FINE: In 1.174?
11	MR. DUDLEY: Yes.
12	MR. FINE: Yes, I think you should do
13	that.
14	MR. DUDLEY: We should do that?
15	MR. FINE: Yeah. That's where it should
16	be, yeah.
17	MR. RISHEL: I'm Bob Rishel. I'm the
18	Chairman of the BWR Owners Group IRIR Committee,
19	Integrated Informed Risk, Integrated Regulation, and
20	also from Duke Energy.
21	So I take a so I just take a little
22	different tact. We had a committee meeting not too
23	long ago, and had a very energetic discussion about
24	the Option 1, 2 and 3 and where's PRA going.
25	The owners, the BWR Owners Group is a

1	bit schizophrenic, in that some utilities are going
2	one way up and the other utilities are maybe
3	actually retrenching, and a lot of it is due to
4	economics.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I suspect the same is
6	true for the PWRs, so you don't have the own the
7	whole thing.
8	MR. RISHEL: On the edge, yeah.
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah.
10	(Off mic comment.)
11	MR. RISHEL: So talk about the vision of
12	the Owners Group, BWR Owners Groups, where we're
13	going here in the near term, future applications, in
14	context of Option 1, 2 or 3. I will review a lot of
15	what Ray covered for the B's is also applicable to
16	the P's, technical adequacy question, and some
17	concerns our members brought up with Options 2 and
18	3.
19	So the PRA development has been and will
20	continue to be an evolution, incremental approaches.
21	Individual models are developed as plant sites
22	develop a need, and it's really been dependent upon
23	the business, the business need.
24	There's an application that I need a
25	model for. They will proceed of and get that or, in

the case of like Fukushima requirements, seismic PRAs are being developed to support that. Model maintenance is continuing and, you know, Ray sort of talked about it a little bit also.

We do model upgrades as needed, consistent with the design of the plant. As we modify the plant, we've got to change the PRA models and update them. Frankly, all of these models are becoming quite a burden and quite a cost, and in fire alone, you know, you've seen those.

Those models are monster models and one little mod can require, you know, six to nine months of work for one little mod, when you start circling out where the cables go and new cabinets and new fire scenarios. But it is a burden we are maintaining.

Really with the PRA and where we're going, a lot of concern over the conservatism. Fire PRA is one talked about here before. Similar with seismic. We're a little concerned about where seismic might end up, and how that artificially inflates the risk, the numerical risk of the site and how that impacts any risk-informed applications and hence using of it.

So that's what we're working with the

NRC and the staff and EPRI, to try and get as realistic effort as we can out of this stuff. Part of that is the development and hindrance of new methods is slow, and that's providing a hindrance to the BWR Owners Groups to like take on and build a fire PRA.

They want to wait, wait, until they see there's more reasonable methods out there that they could use. I think that will also have an impact on seismic.

Going forward, at 2016-2017. So for the Risk-Informed Surveillance Initiative 5b submittal, TSTF-425, we've got about six BWRs that expect to submit here in the next two years. Some towards the end of this year and others out into 2017. The tech spec completion time. There's a lot of utilities looking at that very closely, and making plans to get their PRAs in the position where they can submit those.

So there's about eight BWR licensees and for 2015 to 2018, and the other one that's come up has been very beneficial is the extended ILRTs and most will apply as the need dates approach for those. So the NRC should expect to see a continuing trickle of those come in.

Some of the items that we would like to see out of continuing going forward would be completion time for containment isolation bounds. I think that's -- talk about defense indepth and low risk. That's sort of a match made there.

of that's being held back by the perceived cost versus benefit, and there is an initiative, I'm sure you've heard discussions about licensees' PRA for SPAR, for the SBP process. I was also going to say other discussions were on operability also, which I think the staff is -- has introduced as a potential use for PRA.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Just I'll put you on the spot and no is a perfectly good answer if you don't want to answer. What does the industry, the Owners Groups come in on that third sub-bullet there, use of the licensee's PRAs as a replacement for the SPAR models? You don't have to answer. I mean that's -- I realize it's --

MR. RISHEL: You know, I'll speak for myself, and so there's another double-edged sword there, and most of the time we would prefer to use our PRA for the SPAR model. I'd be interested to see how the NRC staff would propose to make that

work, whether -- I know we have given the region most of our PRAs.

Whether they can -- if they want to run them themselves or have us run them for them, there's some of the mechanics that would need to be worked out. So but we have actually given Region II our CDs with our PRA on them. So I'm not totally against it, but --

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thanks.

MR. TSCHILTZ: So this is Mike Tschiltz again. I just would offer, we have a group -- NEI has a group of industry people that is looking at this issue. There's not a common position across the industry about giving the NFC (phonetic). It's been an issue for quite a while actually. I think for over ten years it's been an issue, and there are pluses and minuses on both sides.

I think the working group that's looking at this is going to do some table tops and look at different situations, where you could compare the SPAR versus the licensee's PRA models, and come up with some pluses and minuses for the approach before we go much further with that. But that's where we're at right now.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thanks.

1 MR. FINE: And mу comments were 2 basically what he just said, that we're going to be working with this new group and try to figure out 3 4 what's the best way to go forward. I don't know how 5 NRC's handle all the going to these spatial interactions models, seismic, fire, flood, all that. 6 Their SPAR models can't do that, and that's 7 8 percent of the PRA results. So clearly they're not getting the right 9 10 insight, and so -- and then because they're using other methods and HRA and support, that just makes 11 12 it worse. So the -- I don't see -- we have to 13 figure out a path forward that's mutually agreeable, 14 and I think this group is going to do that. 15 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay, thank vou. 16 Before you leave, I'm curious if you've talked to 17 any plants over in Europe or other places that may 18 already be on this track, and gotten information 19 about it? 20 MR. RISHEL: Well actually that's very 21 interesting. I just came back from England with the 22 Horizon Group, and they're very interested and being 23 very aggressive use of PRA. Essentially, their 24 vision is a risk-informed tech spec and with the

completion times all driven from the PRA.

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well but in England,
2	you don't have the regulator doesn't have
3	separate PRA models right now. The regulator
4	doesn't have SPAR models in the UK right now. So
5	the only thing they have is the licensees' models.
6	MR. RISHEL: That's of course everywhere
7	else in the planet except
8	(Simultaneous speaking.)
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I think Switzerland
10	at one time was developing the regulator was
11	developing separate models, and I know the Swiss,
12	only because I was working there, went through this
13	type of mutual angst among the utilities and the
14	regulator about
15	MR. RISHEL: Who's right, yeah.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, it's an issue
17	of independence. It's an issue of the ability to
18	run the models. Who's going to run the models? Who
19	can make changes to the model, things like that?
20	MR. RISHEL: Right, right.
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I'm not aware of
22	anybody else that's gone through that. But I know
23	the Swiss went through it.
24	MR. RISHEL: But you know, maybe a
25	little more, you know. Perhaps we could learn from

-- this is not the BWR Owners Group speaking right this minute. This is Bob Rishel speaking, could from Spain or England, where their rate -- and even Canada, where their regulator spends a lot more time looking at the model, licensees' model.

But they're not so much into, you know, it doesn't seem to me criticizing so much about, you know, the method you use to get whatever the hazard was. If it was a reasonable approach, they seem to have -- at least my interaction, they seem to agree to that. But so that's a different regulatory model, so --

Ray talked about peer reviews and so I'll just kind of highlight some of the differences. So we are coordinating any feedback we get from the staff and our peer reviews, to try and improve them. We put a lot more emphasis on the peer review team, and the team lead has been qualified.

When we've done that, we have a -- the BWRs have a qual process for the team lead, with training slides and there's no qual card. But there's a -- there is a, I'd say pretty formal training program for the peer review team leads that we put them through. So far, we only have four so --

MEMBER SCHULTZ: Bob, just a question. How is the team considered in terms of the team's qualification? I mean a good team performing the review ought to be diverse and have a certain element of depth, and is there specific requirements for that -- for the team?

MR. RISHEL: There is requirements for the team, and mostly it's laid in the NEI document. But going beyond that, then the question of how much experience does the individual really have in that area he's going to review, or -- and so there's a lot of, let's say, behind the scenes back and forth about and you did what and when did you do that and what exactly is it you did, and how long ago and how many times.

You know, probing the resume, I guess, or verifying the resume that the individual provides. The peer review team leaders looks at all the resumes that he's got for his team and goes how does it fit with what I have, and then we pass it to the licensee, the host utility, and they then do another search on their end.

If need be, I as the Chairman I've gotten involved and we've -- I'll just say recently we took a member off the team, because too much

1 angst about whether they were qualified or not and 2 replaced them actually with a contractor. So we're trying to pay a lot of attention to the team. 3 4 in the next slide I'll get into that and --5 MR. DINSMORE: Excuse me. This is Steve 6 Can you hear me? Is this working, okay. 7 One quick comment about the team. The licensee 8 selects the team and then ten years later, we might 9 get an application, and if we look at the 10 review team and decide, for example recently there 11 was somebody who was supposed to be an expert in 12 human error, just line one line in there about human 13 error. 14 in a difficult position, It puts us 15 because the review was done ten years ago. 16 licensees come in for an application, and so we have 17 to somehow deal with that. So we often don't really 18 check the team qualifications, and we have to trust 19 the licensees and almost -- they do a good job. 20 It does give us some problems with this, 21 and I think that's why Joe keeps talking about this 22 certification, that if we set up this a little 23 better beforehand, we won't be faced with these type 24 of difficulties later.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR:

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Yeah, but Steve in

1	practice, you know doggone well now matter how you
2	set up the certification process, ten years later
3	somebody's going to come and question a particular
4	area on a particular topic and say well, you didn't
5	think about it carefully enough anyway.
6	MR. DINSMORE: Yeah, but it would reduce
7	that. It would also
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's not clear.
9	MR. DINSMORE: If it was done open
10	before, then it wouldn't be an NRC question. It
11	would be
12	MR. LEVINSON: This is Stanley Levinson
13	from AREVA. In partial response to Steve's
14	question, I want to just remind everybody that the
15	peer review process is a consensus process. So
16	having one individual that may or may not have the
17	appropriate credentials, you know, looking back on
18	it.
19	You had a whole team of individuals that
20	were looking at all of the SRs; they were looking at
21	all of the assessments of the capability categories;
22	they were looking at all of the F&Os. So no peer
23	review report is the product of a single individual.
24	It is a consensus process from the whole team.
25	MR. DINSMORE: Yeah, but there's

1 supposed to be at least two experts from each arena. 2 MR. LEVINSON: In making the teams yes, 3 an effort for enough variety 4 expertise, so that you know, one person doesn't 5 hijack the team, nor would one person, you know, be responsible for creating, you know, bad results. 6 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Steve. The big news 8 is for the ACR Subcommittee meeting is that the ACR 9 Subcommittee doesn't have aet involved to 10 populating the peer review teams. We understand the 11 problems, but let's get back on today's topic. 12 MR. RISHEL: And just the last bullet, 13 licensees have stepped to the plate up 14 demonstrate that they are in fact right. 15 been a problem mostly in the fire realm, where there 16 are schedule-driven peer reviews, and that 17 thing of the past. 18 Just the on team make-up, SO 19 expectations, you know. It is a team and they have 20 to have a lot of ground to cover, especially when 21 you start talking about the size of some of these 22 So we're expecting them to have external hazards. 23 40 percent of the requirements reviewed before they

get the site, and typically they'll have a laundry

list of questions to have.

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1 Some licensees have started using 2 follow-up peer reviews to resolve F&Os or specific 3 areas of weakness, and the industry peer review task 4 list has some quidance on what is technically 5 accepted for some supporting requirements, we've gone -- the peer review task force has gone. 6 7 So to meet this SR, this is what you 8 need to do. So that is trying to reduce some of the 9 subjectivity from the acceptance part. 10 So right now for the fire peer reviews, 11 we have a heavy reliance on industry contractors, 12 typically three to four out of a six to seven person 13 A lot of that's driven by the limited number 14 of licensees that are qualified and have, you know, 15 expert knowledge in that area. 16 talked about, Like Ray working 17 observers, and the other issue, of course, is heavy 18 workload at each licensee. They don't want to let 19 their best guys go off, you know, for what is 20 essentially a three to four week commitment of time, 21 to execute this. Just one week on site, but there's 22 preps and there's time afterwards. 23 into We are getting more of the

technically challenging ones, fire, seismic and high

wind, which have a high reliance on very specialized

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knowledge, 1 and hence the contractors. Seismic, 2 we've had two to date, significant contractor Again, very few licensees. We also 3 involvement. identified a 4 gap between what the contractors 5 technically know and what the standard was trying to have them look at. 6 7 So they know all there is to know about 8 ground motion response spectrum, but when you go to 9 how does that translate into what okav, 10 standard's looking for, we found a little bit of a 11 gap there. So we have some training with the 12 vendors, the contractors on understanding what the 13 standard is trying to ask for. 14 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Just to be clear, the 15 standard -- your experience is that the standard, 16 you feel, is requiring more indepth information than 17 what the contractors can supply or --18 MR. RISHEL: No, I don't think so. 19 think actually Ray you had one of the two. 20 MR. FINE: Yeah. It's actually kind of 21 the opposite. The state of the art and state of 22 knowledge in especially ground motion has 23 moving really fast, with computers and simulations. 24 I mean these guys are learning at light speed right

now.

And you know, when we froze the model three years ago and started developing, versus what he knows today, he's like well but we know now that dah dah dah, you know. Like whoa, time out. We started here. I developed under this understanding. I can't go back and constantly keep up with you. So you've got to draw the line, you know.

It's not like they're changing the number by a lot. They're changing it by, you know, very, very small amounts. But it's, you know, these guys are very detail oriented people, and they -- when they get the state of knowledge constantly moving and the standard says you have to use state of the art or whatever --

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I see. So that's the issue, is the standard's saying you have to use the state of the art, the state of the art at the moment.

MR. FINE: And I'm the Vice Chairman of that particular working group in the Standards Committee. We're rewriting it to get rid of that kind of wording and to be more specific as to what it is we're after. Those particular individuals that were kind of holding onto these words and running with them, they're on the committee too.

1 MR. RISHEL: So the end result, these 2 F&Os that look, you know, are hard to accurately portray what the situation is. 3 4 MR. FINE: Right. 5 MR. So the responses RISHEL: will 6 reflect that. But they are going forward, and I 7 think we've covered -- I quess the last bullet is 8 just again, just because of the resources, we're not 9 going to be able to do that many a year, and I think 10 the staff has taken that into account as far as 11 going forward. 12 MEMBER SCHULTZ: The update of the 13 standards approach is a really good idea, and I like 14 way that you're handling it, including 15 contractors and the process. 16 RISHEL: So just future looking MR. 17 We're looking to strengthen our process, 18 Owners Groups, increase the number of peers using 19 the working observer process, and we get feedback 20 from the staff, incorporate it and developing a list 21 of approved methods, which will help everybody. 22 Technical adequacy. So you're kind of 23 going into the discussion about Option 2 and 3, and understanding of the gap between the current peer 24

review and what would be needed for Option 2 or 3.

I don't think we understood, understand what that gap looks like.

It is, as Ray indicated, it is a limited resource, small group of individuals. The other part is that, you know, objective criteria, saying we have consistency, because we're making -- individuals are making judgment calls on acceptability of things, and those judgments do vary.

A little bit of concern with staff making individual judgments of what the Reg Guide and the PRA standard requires, and essentially pushing harder on some technical attribute, which you know, the issue there is cost. It's not whether we get the right number or not, but things can quickly escalate cost-wise.

Current process, as Stanley indicated, is a consensus peer review, and that's what's required. Concerns with Option 2 and 3 again is projected benefits in the time line. If the time line stretches out, we don't get the benefits. The cost to achieve, what is the cost to achieve. PRA models are already about a million -- I'd say we budget about a million dollars for an update.

When I, you know, talk about Duke

1 Energy, that's a pretty significant amount 2 dollars. NRC and licensee interactions on specific 3 technical elements could drag out, and again sort of 4 sabotage the benefits. So the BWR Owners Group 5 wants to continue with sort of Option 1, 6 incremental use, and the fire PRA has become a large 7 consumer of resources for our utilities. It doesn't matter whether you're an 805 8 9 It is a much more complicated monster plan or not. 10 than anybody thought there would be. It's the 11 conservatism we've talked about. Technical adequacy 12 and make improvements in the peer review process and 13 again, we want to make sure that any option, the 14 cost benefits are well vetted. So anv 15 questions? 16 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Any more questions 17 If not, thank you. It's a useful for Bob? 18 Now I guess we're going to hear from perspective. 19 Mike Tschiltz. Mike, I always mispronounce your 20 name. 21 MR. TSCHILTZ: No, Victoria. 22 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No. We're going to 23 hear from Victoria. Okay. I can't keep the players 24 -- I don't have the score card that was given to the

umpires, so --

MS. ANDERSON: I guess I'm going first.

No, that's fine. All right. So as promised earlier this afternoon, I'm going to talk a little bit about the Risk-Informed Steering Committee's efforts on PRA technical adequacy, and based on some of the feedback we got earlier, I'm also going to talk a little bit about the RISC in general and sort of how we've been conducting business.

So our two RISCs were reformed to foster οf risk information in nuclear increased use operations and regulation, and one of the critical components involved in moving the barriers to full implementation of key risk-informed applications. We've gone and developed all these risk-informed applications, risk-informed tech specs, riskinformed special treatment, and we're not really getting full advantage out of them yet.

We went through -- as far as how the process went and how we decided what we were going to work on, each risk-informed steering committee identified what they thought their top three impediments to realizing the full benefit of risk-informed regulation were.

The NRC identified PRA inequality, aggregation of PRA results across hazards and

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cultural barriers. What the industry identified was PRA realism, achieving integrated decision-making, in other words, using all the components of risk-informed decision-making, not just the numbers, and seismic and other external events, and essentially the aggregation question.

So we were relatively well aligned, and we looked at well, you know, if we look at those top three impediments that are common themes we can pull out and some things that we can work on the near term, that will help address those impediments. We picked uncertainty, which you've received a briefing on previously, and PRA technical adequacy. So that was the other one we picked.

We formed our working groups in the middle identify of last key year to some improvements we could make to the regulatory infrastructure associated with PRA technical adequacy.

overview of So just an what objectives Our ultimate objective was are. bridge this gap between the existing guidance and staff needed for what the their licensing We had Reg Guide 1.200, which talks applications. about the peer review process and the standard.

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For applications, the NRC staff was really looking for assurance of PRA technical adequacy to support the decision, and there was this big gap between those two, between what Reg Guide 1.200 said and what the staff needed to make their decision.

So while licensee were going off Reg Guide 1.200, this became very much apparent during the NFPA-805 submittal and review process. So we were following Reg Guide 1.200 and turning everything in, and the staff was coming back and asking us questions that we believed went beyond the scope of Reg Guide 1.200.

So what we identified was there is this gap in guidance. How do you resolve peer review findings? Are methods, tools and data suitable for the way they've been applied? So we looked at that gap and said well what can we do to improve things for the future.

So our key objectives were to develop a process for making new methods available for regulatory application, to improve the process for closing out peer review facts and observations, and to identify any other open issues in the peer review process.

We're just waiting on the NRC staff memo endorsing or commenting on our white paper to be finalized. I think it should be out relatively soon. But the conclusions of our work was that we have a proposal to establish a methods vetting process, where we'll have a panel of experts that will evaluate new methods and determine what review level will be necessary to support use and licensing applications.

So you may have a situation where there's a method that's been in use internationally for a while and maybe that doesn't need large review panel effort. Or you may have something that a contractor and licensee developed together, and that may need EPRI and NRC research to do some joint review. So there are a lot of review options.

Another conclusion was that we developed a close out process for peer review facts and observations, just to remove some of the burden associated with constantly carrying facts and observations forward until the next peer review. So we've suggested that utilities would have a process laid out.

We've written out the process that they would use to close you those facts and observations,

1 and it could be independent; it could be utility-2 led, or it could be an NFC close out. is closed out via that 3 Once an F&O 4 process, it doesn't need to be carried forward to 5 the new licensing application. So that's a huge 6 burden reduction. It's essentially just a paper 7 work exercise and not --8 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But also Victoria, 9 those closeouts would be done in somewhat of a 10 timely manner from the initial peer -- related to 11 the initial peer review? 12 MS. ANDERSON: It would depend. Ιt licensing 13 probably be done before would а 14 application went in. So for example if I have -- if 15 I did my peer review two years ago, I have 16 licensing application I'm about to turn in, and I 17 need to make sure I have all those F&Os closed out. 18 You know, I go through one of those 19 processes, and maybe they're not able to close out So then I have those four I need to 20 four of them. 21 address in the licensing application. Then I turn 22 in another application a year later. Maybe I bring 23 somebody back in to close out those last four. 24 So I think we'll see it more tied to 25 when people need to turn in licensing applications.

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But then don't you
2	run the risk that Steve is talking about, that as
3	these things drag out in time, different sets of
4	eyes have different interpretations about what's
5	required to close it out?
6	MS. ANDERSON: It's possible that that
7	happens. I mean I think in all honesty, if
8	you're talking about like a long time scale, where
9	things would change drastically.
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah, that's
11	MS. ANDERSON: If you're talking about a
12	long time scale, a licensee is probably going to run
13	into reaching the point where they have changed
14	their PRA, such that it constitutes an update. We
15	have enough to do new peer review anyway.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
17	MS. ANDERSON: So essentially I
18	understand the concern, but I think in most cases it
19	would be overcome by events.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay, because some of
21	the things I've been hearing kind of is that, you
22	know, an undercurrent, is the fact that by the time
23	you convene a group to come in and try to close out
24	something, the different people have different

interpretations of the original findings, or what's

2 iterative head butting. Yep, and the way we've 3 MS. ANDERSON: 4 written the process, we've tried to keep it simple. 5 We've in fact said you could have just one or two individuals come in, depending on the scope of what 6 7 needs to be reviewed, and the scope of the review is 8 very much constrained to just closing out those 9 facts and observations. They're not supposed to go 10 digging into the rest of the model, unless they need 11 to do so to close out the facts and observation. 12 MR. DINSMORE: This is Steve Dinsmore. 13 Mr. Stetkar, if I could just make one quick comment. 14 The ASME standard, I believe says that if you're 15 going to have a focused scope peer review, they have 16 review the full element. So what you 17 proposing, we've always allowed you to do a focused 18 scope peer review, and based on that, close out the 19 F&Os. 20 We have not yet agreed to 21 somebody just look at the come in and F&Os 22 So we haven't disagreed, but this is a themselves. 23 proposal which is on the table right now that we're 24 talking about. 25 Right. This is what's in

required to close it out. So then you get into this

MS. ANDERSON:

1 our white paper and what we anticipate getting a 2 memo from the staff on shortly. 3 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I got it, thanks. 4 MS. ANDERSON: And there were just a 5 couple of other miscellaneous updates to our peer 6 review quidance documents. I think Ray and Bob 7 talked about those. So as far as how the RISC PRA 8 technical adequacy work ties in with the risk 9 management regulatory framework, we've talked about 10 how that brought up the certified PRA process. 11 We looked through the discussion on the 12 certified PRA process and the specific peer review 13 and PRA technical adequacies that it brought up, and 14 we were pretty much able to map all of these to work 15 that was going on either through this effort or 16 though some other effort. 17 So what the industry concluded was that 18 most of the issues identified would be addressed by 19 this effort or some other. 20 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So does that mean 21 that the industry is not opposed to the notion of a 22 certified PRA, because all of the initiatives that 23 are in progress can be somehow coalesced to satisfy that objective? Or am I -- I'm obviously putting 24 25 words in your mouth. So you can put your own words

in your mouth.

MS. ANDERSON: I think what the objection is to is to the way that the certified PRA process was described in the white paper we saw, because it was described as another layer on top of all of this. We saw that, we said well, I think you can close all these gaps you've identified through existing processes. There's really no need to put another layer on top.

MR. TSCHILTZ: So if I could add to that, I think in our comments under the certified PRA, we looked at what was proposed at the meeting, and I think one of the things that had been offered was kind of a like a new type of process, where you let an independent organization like an Underwriters Lab, that would come in and independently review.

So we looked at all the time and effort that had been put towards development of the infrastructure for the standards for Reg Guide 1.200 for the peer review process, and said why do we want to start all over and throw out all that 10 to 15 years of work that's been undertaken to develop all that?

Why don't we look at the gaps that are out there, where we think we need to enhance or

1	improve the existing process and tackle those? It
2	seems like a much more doable effort in the time
3	frame when we actually need it, rather than trying
4	to start with this new undefined certified PRA
5	process.
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thanks. That helps
7	me.
8	MS. ANDERSON: And that is all I have on
9	the PRA technical adequacy.
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Anything else among
11	the members for Victoria? If not, Mike I guess
12	you're up.
13	MR. TSCHILTZ: Thank you. So I will
14	just start out by saying that my presentation is
15	kind of pro forma, from the standpoint of it goes
16	through point by point on the staff's
17	recommendations, that basically says that the
18	industry agrees with the staff recommendations for -
19	- in the draft SECY paper, because they reflect the
20	industry's position that was submitted in the
21	comments.
22	So it may be of limited benefit to go
23	into my presentation, other than I wanted to be on
24	the record that the industry was supportive of what
25	was in the draft SECY paper.

1 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And that's important 2 get on the record. So these slides -- these slides will be in the record. 3 4 MR. TSCHILTZ: So I would like to 5 comment on a couple of things. If you want to do 6 the slides, if you even want me to do that. 7 first comment, I think, reflect back on the comments 8 made to the committee when we had the first 9 meeting about the RMRF, and I questioned the process 10 that was being used to go through and develop the 11 options here. And what was laid out was a time frame 12 13 over the period of a year that we were halfway 14 through when we first met. The staff was going to 15 provide a white paper to the industry to comment on, 16 and then develop a SECY paper with options. 17 I think that process led us to the end 18 point we're at right now, I think, because it didn't 19 allow the time for industry interaction and input 20 into what a viable process would be, to give people 21 comfort that where we would end up would actually be 22 a viable alternative. 23 So in large part, I think we're here because we didn't allow enough time to fully vet 24

this out and consider the Option 2 alternative,

because I think I was questioning how can you represent the industry, and what have you done other than brought in the BWR and PWR Owners Group. But there may be isolated utilities that are interested in Option 2 approach.

But I think when you -- if you were to ask some utilities, they probably would be if it was better defined. So the problem was how do we go forward without a better definition, and what it would take, what the staff's review would consist of, whether it would need to be industry guidance documents developed, that the staff would need to endorse.

If you go down all of these process time lines, your savings from the existing process would diminish. So without knowing, you know, what was actually going to be required, it was hard for people to make a judgment.

So I talked a little bit about the certified PRA. One of the other aspects of the certified PRA that was in question was, you know, if you have this independent type of body that's reviewing, you know, how would you handle updates? How would you handle revisions to the PRA? Would they need to be reviewed by this independent body?

1 So there are a whole number of questions 2 that needed to be addressed, that weren't really fully fleshed out in what was offered to the staff 3 4 for the public meeting. 5 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Can I ask you 6 little bit on the first issue that you raised? 7 was making notes here, so what I heard you say and I 8 want to make sure I understand, is that you feel 9 the time constraints that the staff that 10 operating under, based on the Commission's 11 didn't allow enough time for a full discussion of 12 certainly Options 2 and Options 3. Option 1 13 pretty clear. Is that, or am I putting words 14 your mouth? Well, I think Option 3 15 MR. TSCHILTZ: 16 an option that the existing fleet 17 reactors would want to consider basically, because 18 it would require complete rewrite of the SR and the 19 licensing basis of the plant, which I would -- I 20 want to say would be difficult to justify. 21 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Under Option 2 then, 22 I heard, and I've heard you say that there wasn't 23 enough specificity in what the staff had proposed in 24 the white paper for the industry to be able to fully

understand what that option might entail.

MR. TSCHILTZ: So if you look at the examples that were in the paper, they're pretty much examples of risk-informed activities that had already taken place, that people could already take advantage of under the existing system. That being said, I think I know where you're going here.

I think where the industry needs to have successes on the existing risk-informed applications that are out there that they haven't been able to take advantage of, that were talked about and raised in Bob's presentations about tech spec 4b initiative, 50.69, the industry's undertaking an effort to kind of reinvigorate the interest in those applications.

There was a lot of time and resources put into the development of the guidance for all of those applications. So I think it's kind of a return on investment, and to make sure that people can be successful with those applications, after having what I think someone characterized as a negative experience with NFPA-805 and what were some of the issues that came out of that.

So I think the emphasis is -- I think the industry's focus is on taking advantage of the existing risk-informed applications and getting the

benefits we can from that. There's a lot to implement that. I think we heard from a station standpoint of the education that needs to take place across the different organizations at the plant to fully implement those different initiatives. It's not a small task.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I think I understand that, but a little bit of the position I was trying to come from is one, if one's going to start a process, one needs to start somewhere. I mean we're all aware of what happened on NFPA-805. You're now saying well, we've gotten to a point where there is some understanding, I think, between the industry and the staff in that particular area.

My concern is a little bit that if the industry says we need to have fully described criteria, so that we can then -- you as the industry can then evaluate those criteria and comment on them, that's the other end of the spectrum, that NFPA-805 would have come out better if the industry and the staff had gotten together and worked through those pilots that never got worked through, so that a lot of the rough things got worked out in real time, before -- before the time lines of the license submittals, in a broader sense of something like an

2 You have to start some place, and you 3 can't say well, you know, the party of the second 4 part must bring to the party of the first part 5 everything fully defined a priori, so that then you have the opportunity to criticize it. 6 If there's a desire on both of the parties to move forward, you 7 8 start to move forward. 9 You start to work out these things, 10 rather than an adversarial relationship of show me 11 the absolute requirements and then I'll comment on 12 That's the direction I was heading. This is Bob Rishel with 13 MR. RISHEL: 14 Duke Energy. 15 MALE SPEAKER: It's on now. 16 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's on now. 17 MR. RISHEL: It's on now, okav. 18 have one of those plants that may or may not be 19 considered for Option 2. The PRAs are getting 20 pretty far along and pretty well developed, 21 maybe it could help us. But so I go back to -- so 22 in order to go to Option 2, I have to do a -- I have 23 to be able to sell it to the executives, and right 24 now what's in there is not -- is not going to fly.

So I think part of what NEI and industry

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Option 2 on the RMRF.

were trying to say is in order to be able to sell it
as we're going to go invest money in this effort,
and the payback will be in Year X, that we need to
make sure that the payback is there in Year X, and
that the amount of money we say we're going to spend
is the amount of money, you know, that it doesn't
you know 805, I love it to death. I say that every
day. But you know, it left a bad taste in
everybody's mouth.
MEMBER BLEY: Before you give up on
that, just following up on what John asked while
I've got you up here. We're kind of throwing back
at bring us another rock, and have you guys worked
out at all what it would need to look like to be
useful to you? I mean I don't know. You might have
lots of conversations with the staff about this that
we're not privy to.
MR. RISHEL: My sort of thought is what
we have right now is a line drawing of a concept
car, if you want to go to the Ford, the automotive
industry. What we probably need to see is a concept
car, not the line drawing.
MEMBER BLEY: Yeah, but you don't
necessarily need
MR. RISHEL: We don't need the

1	production model.
2	MEMBER BLEY: Yeah. You don't need to
3	know precisely how they're going to finish the top
4	coat on it.
5	MR. RISHEL: Yeah. We don't need
6	everything, but I think we need a little more than
7	what we have.
8	MEMBER BLEY: I think they probably, and
9	I shouldn't speak for them, they probably need to
LO	know if you want a little car or a big car or, you
L1	know, what the car looks like a little bit.
L2	Somehow, we're at the point of that's not it and
L3	it's not good enough, and well then we're done with
L4	it.
L5	MR. TSCHILTZ: So let me try to clarify,
L6	because my comments weren't meant to breathe life
L7	back into the RMRF.
L8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We understand that.
L9	(Laughter.)
20	MR. TSCHILTZ: Okay. My comments were
21	really a reflection on how we ended up where we are,
22	and it's more of a process, you know. I think we're
23	kind of from the outset destined to end up at this
24	place, based upon the way we conducted the activity.
25	So I think our best path forward is to

follow the priorities that have been set forth by the Risk-Informed Steering Committee, to focus on those activities that we think are impediments and to remove them, and those will take -- get some near-term wins for risk applications that, you know, we can then build on. So I think that's our recommendation --

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thanks. That helps.

MR. TSCHILTZ: So I don't think I really need to really go through these, because it repeats what Dick Dudley did in his presentation, on each of the points for each of the recommendations. It's there for the record.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah, and unless, you know, unless you want to do that, as Dennis mentioned, the slides are indeed in the record of the meeting, unless any of the members had any particular items as you skim through the slides that you want to ask Mike about.

I did want to probe a little bit on the Option 2, because that seemed to be a little less black and white, at least as I read things, compared to some of the other things. The other ones were pretty clear and straightforward. Anything else for Mike? You got off easy.

1	MR. DUDLEY: Can I ask a question?
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You may.
3	MR. DUDLEY: (off mic) On Slide 5, the
4	industry supports the revision guidance document
5	1.174, to ensure consistency consistent
6	application
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Dick, you turned it
8	off.
9	MR. DUDLEY: Slide can you hear me
LO	now?
L1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah.
L2	MR. DUDLEY: The industry supports
L3	revisions of guidance documents Reg Guide 1.174, to
L 4	ensure consistent application of Defense Indepth and
L5	Regulatory Act decisions. So that would include the
L6	definition, the development of a definition of
L7	defense indepth, and try to come up with more
L8	objective criteria for adequacy of defense indepth?
L9	MR. TSCHILTZ: So there was a whole work
20	session on definitions of defense indepth. I think
21	there are nine different definitions that are out
22	there for defense indepth, and I don't think any one
23	of them is any more right than another. So there's
24	a lot of different ways to go after that issue.
25	But I think where the benefit can be had

1	with this is the increased use of examples in the
2	guidance documents. So I think that's where the
3	real benefit would be, and I know that on the
4	industry side, that's one of the things that we're
5	looking for. We've already got some work that's
6	been developed as part of EPRI's aggregation report
7	that addresses this issue. So that's where I think
8	we see the benefit.
9	MR. DUDLEY: Well, several years ago,
10	industry said they were planning to write a white
11	paper on defense indepth. Do you know if that's
12	still on your to do list or
13	MR. TSCHILTZ: It is, but I think to a
14	large extent it may be already incorporated into the
15	what's been done for the EPRI report. We're
16	going to go back and look at that, where that
17	stands, whether we need to do anything more or
18	whether what's in the EPRI aggregation report
19	suffices.
20	MR. DUDLEY: EPRI aggregation report?
21	Okay.
22	MR. TSCHILTZ: Yeah. I can give you the
23	number.
24	MR. DUDLEY: Okay. Just yeah. If
25	you'll email it to me, thank you.

1	MEMBER REMPE: Could we also get a copy
2	of it?
3	MS. ANDERSON: The EPRI aggregation
4	report?
5	MEMBER REMPE: Yes.
6	MS. ANDERSON: We should be able to
7	actually, maybe if we do have this meeting to talk
8	about the Risk-Informed Steering Committee, because
9	that's one of the priorities is aggregation.
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That is, yeah.
11	MS. ANDERSON: Maybe that would be the
12	time to discuss the report, and we could probably
13	get
14	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah. I honestly, I
15	closed my file here. So I don't know whether we've
16	theoretically seen it or not. I've heard about it.
17	MS. ANDERSON: Right.
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I just don't know,
19	because I don't know whether it's EPRI proprietary
20	or whether it's EPRI public.
21	MS. ANDERSON: I think it's public.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It may be. But I
23	agree with you.
24	MEMBER REMPE: I'll go up through Mike.
25	MEMBER SCHULTZ: Mike has made notes.

Mike has made 1 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah. 2 and Victoria, I agree with you, because I think it probably would be -- not probably. 3 would be useful for the PRA Subcommittee, regardless 4 5 of RMRF, to better understand what's going on with the Risk-Informed Steering Committee, so that the 6 7 industry and the staff. 8 And it was my understanding that that 9 aggregation has been bundled in with the uncertainty We didn't hear much about it under the 10 stuff. 11 uncertainty, because the uncertainty focused mostly 12 -- the uncertainty part of uncertainty, rather than that aspect. We can go back and revisit --13 14 (Simultaneous speaking.) MS. ANDERSON: Right. We are working on 15 16 aggregation and actually piloting the guidance 17 that's in that report. So we'll have something to 18 share. 19 (Off mic comment.) 20 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Good. Anything else 21 for Mike or Victoria? If not, then thanks again to 22 both of you from NEI and both of the Owners Groups. 23 It was really useful information. 24 What I'd like to do now is -- this is an 25 open meeting. So let's -- what I'd like to do now

1	is ask if we have anybody in the room who'd like to
2	make a comment. Please come up and do that, and
3	while we're doing that, I'll try to get the phone
4	bridge line open, to see if we have anyone out on
5	the bridge line who'd like to make a comment.
6	So if there's anybody in the room who
7	would like to make a comment, come on up and
8	identify yourself and do so.
9	MALE SPEAKER: They've all talked.
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, but sometimes
11	you have after-thoughts, you know. One final
12	parting shot that you'd like to get in, and I'll see
13	if we can get the bridge line open.
14	MALE SPEAKER: Mike's back.
15	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Mike's back and it is
16	theoretically open.
17	MR. LEWIS: Marvin Lewis.
18	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Hi Marvin. Good, and
19	thank you for confirming that it's open. So now, if
20	we have anyone on the bridge line who'd like to make
21	a comment, please do so.
22	MR. LEWIS: Yeah, sure. I'd love to
23	make a comment, and here's my problem with PRA and
24	that sort of approach. Recently over in California,
25	it was a hearing on transportation of spent fuel,

and sure enough, the applicant came in with a certification on his casks.

Not until after the meeting did they find out that the certification had come through the night before. There was no way to find out, to present any objection to it. Now that was the same tactic used at Three Mile Island No. 2 for fuel loading.

The fuel loading was done on an emergency order from a judge, written up at night and the fuel loading was at night before the opposition again could present any other questions issue, or file for raise any а temporary restraining order or whatever.

This is my problem. My problem is yes, PRAs sound wonderful. Yes, you do it by the numbers. It's great, maybe. But I go back to WASH-1400, and how WASH-1400 was kicked out because Dr. Rasmussen on an open mic pretty much told how they made up magic numbers, and this is what I'm afraid of.

I'm afraid of oh, the rules made by NRC what have you, they're wonderful. The question is are they for real? Take a look at your past. Take a look specifically at Fukushima of course. Lovely

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beach, Fukushima. Put it in English, Fukushima, 2 lovely beach. Okay. It's a lovely beach. 3 there's three melted 4 continuously melting down nuclear reactors there. We have all sorts of NTTF. 5 We have all sorts of Fukushima lessons learned. 6 But I'm wondering if 7 anybody's gone over there and actually taken what's 8 going on over there and bringing it back in the 9 rules and regulations. I don't see it. Thank you 10 for allowing me to comment. 11 Thank you very much, CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 12 Marvin. We appreciate that. Any other members of 13 the public or anyone out on the bridge line who'd 14 like to make a comment, please identify yourself and 15 We have this rule that says five minutes of 16 silence is about all you get. 17 So I'll assume that we don't have any 18 other public comments. We'll close the bridge line 19 from this direction, just so we don't get the pops 20 and crackles that we hear. 21 What I'd like to do now, as we usually 22 do at the close of the Subcommittee meeting, is go 23 around the table and see if any of the members have 24 any final comments. Dick Dudley's coming back up to

the front.

25

1	He asked me as we do this, if anyone has
2	any specific recommendations for the staff for their
3	presentation to the full Committee meeting in
4	November, recognizing what they presented today in
5	terms of either additional material on certain
6	issues or less material, to see if we can give him
7	any feedback, so that we're a little bit more
8	focused if necessary at the full Committee.
9	Because we started with Steve this
10	morning, I'll start with Joy this afternoon.
11	MEMBER REMPE: Okay. Thank you. I
12	appreciated the staff as well as industry coming and
13	providing some details behind the SECY and the
14	reasons that they've made decisions that are
15	documented here, that I might not have gotten from
16	reading it on my own.
17	So I think definitely when you come to
18	the full Committee that you'll to be discussing
19	that. I like the umbrella graphic a lot that's in
20	the SECY, by the way too, and I appreciated the BWR
21	Owner Group and PWR Owners Group as well as NEI
22	coming in, giving their perspective too. Thanks.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Ron. Turn your mic
24	on.
25	MEMBER BALLINGER: It looks like things

1	have come full circle, so to speak. But that was
2	very the presentation was very good, and like
3	Joy, the industry perspective is also added an awful
4	lot in reinforcing what you concluded. Thank you.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Dennis.
6	MEMBER BLEY: Nothing more to add, and
7	I'm kind of thinking about the full Committee
8	meeting and it's got to be I don't have a good
9	idea on that. I think maybe you have the right for
10	it. It needs to be an hour and a half, two hours I
11	suppose.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We've got, I think,
13	two and a half allocated.
14	MEMBER BLEY: We have two and a half
15	hours allocated, so you could almost do all of Rick
16	Dudley's stuff. I'm not sure.
17	MR. DUDLEY: You know, absent questions,
18	my talk is about half an hour. I think Donnie
19	Harrison spoke for maybe what, ten minutes? You
20	know, we don't typically have industry speak at
21	full Committee meetings or do we?
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, we do.
23	MEMBER BLEY: We do, and that's part of
24	the
25	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: They'll be let me

1 get through Steve, because Steve is being patient. 2 Steve. 3 MEMBER SCHULTZ: I don't have anything 4 specific, Dick. I think what you presented is good 5 content, and that you can simply summarize it for the full Committee appropriately, and that would be 6 7 just fine. I would recommend that the industry come 8 for the meeting as well. 9 The examples that were provided by the 10 staff could be presented to the full Committee. 11 think that could be advantageous. But I wouldn't --12 presentations, discussions, need those be 13 shortened a bit, just to hit the highlights, rather than the whole industry and general discussions that 14 15 we had the opportunity to hear. We might think 16 about that some more. But I'd certainly recommend 17 that industry be part of the discussion. 18 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thanks Steve, 19 I'll echo your comments. I would hope that industry 20 I think that the -- again the owners will come. 21 can't tell people what to present. The Owners 22 Groups perspectives I found very useful. As you 23 mentioned, I think they could be shortened a bit. 24 They would have to be.

So but you can work, you know, through

170 1 Mike Snodderly to sort of organize things. For your 2 perspective Dick, the only -- and I think yours is -- the material you presented today was probably at 3 the right level for the full Committee. If there's 4 5 -- this is my own, I keep coming back to this itch 6 that I have. 7 If there's any way that your discussion 8 of the ongoing activities, the umbrella cartoon, 9 help the full Committee better understand 10 notion of how steering committee this the 11 addressing that big blue box in the upper left-hand 12 corner that says "Policy Development Activities," 13 which has this notion of using risk information 14 forward, rather than iust aoina the 15 applications that are highlighted in the 16 boxes, it might help. 17 MEMBER SCHULTZ: The other piece is the

MEMBER SCHULTZ: The other piece is the orange side of the presentation, which is to demonstrate the interaction between the staff and the industry, to move forward with the key features associated with the application, the applications that are going to be coming forward.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Some of that may come up. If you listen to what --

MEMBER SCHULTZ: It's not orange, it's

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
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1	green.
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Oh, the green. Okay,
3	the green. Because the orange stuff
4	MEMBER SCHULTZ: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The orange stuff
6	Victoria sort of addressed.
7	MEMBER SCHULTZ: I misremembered. I
8	misremembered. It's those elements that are
9	associated with essentially working together to make
10	things move forward with the current approaches, to
11	reinforce that what we have is not only capable of
12	working, but it is working.
13	MR. DUDLEY: So how the staff is working
14	with industry to improve the areas and the
15	challenges? Is that what
16	MEMBER SCHULTZ: Yeah, and to
17	demonstrate your fundamental concept, that the
18	regulatory framework that is currently in place is
19	just fine. But it needs to be we need to address
20	certain elements, and that's being done, now and
21	moving forward. There's a plan in place that's
22	working.
23	MR. DUDLEY: Okay.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Anything else from
25	the members? If not, Dick and whoever from the

1	industry, if you can participate, I think you're
2	hearing us say that at least the Subcommittee
3	members feel that it would be very useful. As far
4	as coordinating times and stuff, do that through
5	Mike. Mike is more qualified than any of us to do
6	that. And if there's nothing else do you have
7	any more questions Dick?
8	MR. DUDLEY: No.
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You're looking a bit
10	fuzzy.
11	MR. DUDLEY: I do not.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay, good. Then we
13	are adjourned.
14	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
15	went off the record at 5:08 p.m.)
16	
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Staff Recommendations Regarding a Risk Management Regulatory Framework

ACRS Subcommittee Meeting

October 19, 2015

Outline of NRC Staff Presentation on Risk Management Regulatory Framework (RMRF)

- Background
- Discussion of RMRF SECY paper
 - I. RMRF Implementation Options for Power Reactors
 - II. Re-evaluation of Improvement Activities 1 and 2
 - III. Agency-wide risk management policy statement
 - IV. Interrelationships between risk-informed activities
- Next Steps

Background

- White paper (ML15107A402) released on May 6, 2015
- Public meeting on May 27, 2015
- ACRS subcommittee meeting on June 8, 2015
- Public comment period on white paper closed on June 11, 2015
- Meeting notice on July 14, 2015 contained additional details on RMRF implementation Option 2 and reopened public comment period
- Public meeting on July 29, 2015
- Public comment period on Option 2 closed on August 31, 2015
- SECY paper distributed internally for Office concurrence review on October 8, 2015; comments due on October 21, 2015

Section I. RMRF Implementation Options for Power Reactors

Staff Considered 3 options:

- 1. Maintain current regulatory framework
- 2. Voluntary alternative risk-informed plantspecific licensing basis
- 3. NUREG-2150 recommended approach

Power Reactor Option 1 – Maintain Current Framework

- No extensive revision of NRC's regulatory framework
- The current power reactor regulatory framework meets the RMRF criteria in NUREG-2150
 - 1. Mission Public health and safety; common defense and security; protect the environment
 - 2. Objective Manage the risks via current regulations, guidance, and oversight (including defense-in-depth, safety margins, single failure criterion, fail-safe design, reactor oversight program, etc.)
 - 3. Goal Provide sufficient risk-informed and performance-based protections to ensure risks are acceptably low (utilizing Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement and subsidiary risk metrics)
 - 4. Decisionmaking Process that includes monitoring and feedback (e.g., LIC-504, "Integrated Risk-Informed Decision-Making Process for Emergent Issues;" Regulatory Guide 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis;" Generic Issues Program; Operating Experience Program; Accident Sequence Precursor Program; Industry Trends Program, etc.)
- Not a "do nothing" option -- staff would continue its risk-informed approach and would make incremental regulatory improvements (based on risk insights or other considerations) whenever necessary using existing regulatory processes

Power Reactor Option 2 – Risk-Informed Alternative Licensing Basis

- Maintain existing generic regulatory structure
- Issue rule allowing licensees who upgrade PRAs to apply for approval of a risk-informed alternative licensing basis
 - Licensees allowed to select a plant-specific set of design changes/compliance issues of low risk-significance that would deviate from current deterministic requirements and must mitigate all known plant-specific risk vulnerabilities meeting NRC-specified criteria
 - New information on mitigation of risk-significant events and/or accident sequences (risk vulnerabilities) must be documented in the plant's updated Final Safety Analysis Report
 - Mandatory monitoring and feedback (as described in RG 1.174) to ensure changes in risk remain acceptable throughout the lifetime of the facility

Power Reactor Option 2 – Risk-Informed Alternative Licensing Basis (continued)

<u>Implementation uncertainties</u>:

- Staff has not developed implementation details for this approach
- Staff intends to review all power reactor regulations and develop list of rules amenable to risk-informing under Option 2
- Other implementation uncertainties include:
 - Minimum scope/technical accuracy of "suitable" PRA for entry into the alternative approach
 - Certification/review of PRA?
 - Selection and scope of permissible design changes
 - Process for staff review of design changes
 - Reporting and documentation requirements
 - Ensure transparency (NRC and public) of process

Public Meeting on RMRF Option 2 July 29, 2015

- Staff presentation
 - Additional details on Option 2
 - Thoughts/approach for "suitable" PRA
- Industry stakeholders still concerned about the lack of implementation details on Option 2
 - Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) stated that without explicit details of how the Option 2 process would work, it is very difficult to assess safety benefits and costs
 - NEI said NRC should not present its recommendations to the Commission without having developed more details regarding how the processes would work

Power Reactor Option 3 – Plant-Specific RMRF from NUREG-2150

- Issue regulation requiring PRAs and plant-specific licensing basis based on:
 - Plant-specific risk profiles
 - NRC-specified risk management objective
 - Enhanced criteria for determining adequacy of non-risk factors (defense-in-depth, safety margins, etc.)
- Based on the risk profile, licensees would implement the plant-specific licensing basis by:
 - Determining how the risk objective is met
 - Ensuring that the necessary protections are in place to meet the risk management goal
 - Demonstrating the adequacy of non-risk factors (defense-in-depth, safety margins, etc.)
 - Establishing the risk-informed decision-making process
 - Establishing the monitoring/feedback and reporting process

Written Public Comments on RMRF Options for Power Reactors

Option 1 - Maintain Current Regulatory Framework

 Four commenters addressed Option 1. All four recommended maintaining the current regulatory framework.

Option 2 – Voluntary Alternative Risk-Informed Plant Licensing Basis

■ Three commenters addressed Option 2. All three expressed some level of interest but said the NRC had not developed sufficient implementation details to enable commenters to analyze potential costs and benefits.

Option 3 – NUREG-2150 recommended approach

Two commenters addressed Option 3. Neither supported Option 3 for currently operating reactors. One said the approach was not viable. The other said that although insufficient implementation details had been provided to allow an evaluation of its safety and cost benefits, Option 3 is unlikely to be justifiable for the current fleet of operating reactors.

Section I. RMRF Implementation Options for Power Reactors - Staff Recommendation

Staff Evaluation:

- Staff rejected Option 2 because it is not supported by stakeholders
- Staff rejected Option 3 because it is too expensive and is also not supported by stakeholders
- Staff recommends Option 1 Maintain the existing regulatory framework
 - All ongoing and planned risk-informed initiatives would continue.
 - Staff would continue to make incremental risk-informed regulatory improvements whenever necessary.



Questions?

Section II. Re-evaluation of Power Reactor Regulatory Improvement Activities

- Commission's May 19, 2014 SRM on SECY-13-0132 on Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 1
 - Directed staff to re-evaluate objectives of Improvement Activity 1 (new design-basis extension category) and Improvement Activity 2 (Commission expectations for defense in depth) within context of Commission direction on the Risk Management Regulatory Framework
- Because these improvement activities are closely related to the staff's evaluation of NUREG-2150, the staff is providing its re-evaluations of Improvement Activities 1 & 2 in RMRF SECY paper

Re-evaluation of Improvement Activity 1: Establish Design-Basis Extension Category

Staff Re-evaluation:

- Staff determined that creating new design-basis extension category is not necessary
- Main purpose of new category was to ensure that all new rules properly specify the additional regulatory attributes necessary for requirements that exceed the existing design basis
- Instead, the staff will develop clear internal rulemaking guidance to ensure consistent criteria for specifying performance goals, treatment requirements, documentation requirements, change processes, and reporting requirements whenever new regulations (especially beyond design-basis) are developed
 - Develop guidance using existing resources (routine, periodic guidance updates)

Public comments:

- Three commenters provided comments on establishing the design basis extension category.
- All three commenters agreed with the NRC staff's preliminary determination that it is not necessary to establish a new design basis extension category of events and associated requirements.

Re-evaluation of Improvement Activity 2: Establish Commission Expectations for Defense in Depth

Staff Re-evaluation:

- While this proposed effort could potentially succeed in establishing predictable, objective criteria for determining the adequacy of defense in depth for power reactor safety, the estimated resource requirements (6.3 FTE over a period of 3 to 4 years) are significant.
- It is also possible that after spending these resources, the staff would be unable to establish predictable, objective criteria acceptable to the Commission.
- Based on current resource limitations, the staff recommends that the NRC should not undertake this activity at the present time.

Public comments:

- Three commenters addressed defense in depth
- All supported the NRC staff's initial recommendation in SECY-13-0132 to develop additional criteria and guidance on defense in depth for power reactors
- Two comments with the condition that the criteria and guidance meaningfully integrates defense in depth with risk information (instead of treating the two approaches as separate decision criteria)



Questions?

Section III: Agency-wide Risk Management Policy Statement

- The staff believes that an agency-wide risk management policy statement could potentially improve and make more consistent the regulatory framework used for all program areas
 - Although consideration of risk and tailoring regulations and oversight to manage risk is inherent in current NRC programs, the regulatory approaches for different NRC program areas have evolved separately based on their own individual attributes and characteristics
- NRC requested public comments on two draft example policy statements (November 2013 and May 2015)
- Public comments on November 2013 draft were mixed
- In May 2015, staff published a simplified example policy statement
- Public Comments (May 2015):
 - 10 commenters addressed the agency-wide policy statement
 - 9 of 10 commenters recommended against an agency-wide risk management policy statement (not needed because programs can be appropriately risk-informed under the current policy and guidance)

Section III. Agency-wide Risk Management Policy Statement – Staff Recommendation

Staff Evaluation:

- The staff agrees with public commenters that NRC programs can be appropriately risk-informed without an agency-wide risk management policy statement
- The staff believes that it would not be appropriate to divert scarce NRC and licensee resources away from more safety-significant activities
- Staff recommends against developing an agency-wide policy statement




Questions?

Section IV. Interrelationships Between Ongoing Risk-Informed Initiatives

- In its SRM on SECY-13-0132 on Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 1, the Commission directed the staff to provide a "description of any interrelationships of ongoing risk-informed initiatives"
- The staff prepared a graphic "influence diagram" to illustrate the interrelationships between ongoing riskinformed power reactor safety initiatives

Inter-relationships Between Ongoing Risk-informed Activities



Next Steps

- Staff will receive office concurrence comments on October 21, 2015; provide ACRS a markup showing changes made to SECY
- Full Committee meeting on November 4, 2015
- ACRS letter mid-November
- Staff response to ACRS letter mid-December
- RMRF SECY due to Commission by December 18, 2015

Backup Slides

Section I. RMRF Implementation Options for Power Reactors - Staff Recommendation

Generation IV reactor designs:

The staff believes that the adoption of a risk-informed regulatory framework, similar in concept to an RMRF, would provide the greatest benefit for new reactor designs that employ non-traditional technologies (e.g., Generation IV designs). The staff will continue to engage stakeholders interested in pursuing such a risk-informed framework.

Agency-wide Risk Management Policy Statement

- Organization of Agreement States provided comments:
 - Policy statement would be a useful way to provide the Commission's expectations for a Risk Management Regulatory Framework
 - "We cannot state or endorse the concept that there is a general understanding [in the radioactive materials program] of the terms risk-informed and defense-in-depth."
 - "[A] risk management approach is already being performed with our current regulatory system and IMPEP [Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program] process" to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety
 - Policy statement should say to "review current [risks and practices] and provide recommendations for enhancement."

NUREG-2150 Hierarchy and Structured Decision-making Process





Figure ES-1 A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework

Improvement Activity 1- Establish Design-Basis Extension Category

Events/Requirements





Risk Informing Security Update

Joe Rivers, NSIR October 2015



INMM Reducing Risk Workshop

- March 2015 in Washington, DC
- Session on Cyber Security
- Perception of Risk
- Insider Mitigation



ANS/INMM Workshop on Safety/Security Risk

- April 2015 in Sun Valley, Idaho
- Engaged safety and security risk professionals in a discussion of risk applied to their discipline
- Safety/Security Interface
- Likelihood of Event



INMM Workshop on VA Tools

- September 2015 in Boston
- Discussion of VA Tools
- Discussion of VV&A
- Discussion of modelling issues
- Discussion of data
- Demonstration by Vendors
- Discussion by users
- Panel Discussion



Current Activities

- Use of Simulation Modelling
- Material Attractiveness
- Cyber Security
- NUSAM



Use of Simulation Modelling

- Industry initiative to incorporate vulnerability assessment modelling tools into regulatory process
- Industry pilot to model a number of NPPs
- Staff Training
- NRC staff assessing process to determine requirements for use in regulatory process



Questions?



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Direction of Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework

K. Raymond Fine (FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.)
Vice-Chair, Risk Management Committee
October 19, 2015



Overview

- Current State
- Successful Applications
- Challenges
- Recommended Path Forward/Conclusions



Current State

- Current NRC Policy Statements, combined with industry and NRC experience, have established a workable structure for risk-informed applications
 - RG 1.174
 - RG 1.175
 - RG 1.176
 - RG 1.177
 - RG 1.178
- RG 1.200 defines an acceptable way to assess PRA technical adequacy using the ASME/ANS PRA Standard
- PRA Peer Review process independently assesses PRA technical adequacy
 - NEI PRA Peer Review Task Force is addressing:
 - Enhancements for reviewer qualifications
 - PRA Peer Review consistency



Successful Applications

- Industry and NRC have developed successful applications under the current regulatory framework
 - Surveillance Frequency Control Program (TSTF-425)
 - Risk-Informed Completion Times (TSTF-505)
 - 10 CFR 50.69 Special Treatment Rule
 - Maintenance Rule
 - Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI)
 - Integrated Containment Leak Rate Testing

PWROG PWners Cros

Challenges

- Challenges being addressed by industry and NRC Risk-Informed Steering Committees (RISCs):
 - PRA Technical Adequacy
 - Acceptance of new methods
 - Closure of Peer Review findings
 - PRA Peer Reviewer qualifications
 - Treatment of Uncertainty
 - Training for decision-makers
 - NUREG-1855 update
 - Incorporation of FLEX in risk-informed decision-making
 - Maximize safety benefits
 - Quantitative and qualitative assessments
 - Avoid unintended consequences
 - Enhanced guidance and pilots
 - Risk Metric Aggregation
 - PWROG pilot of EPRI 3002003116 (Risk Aggregation for Risk-Informed Decision-Making) in 2016



Recommended Path Forward

- The PWROG agrees with the NRC staff to continue to pursue incremental improvements in current regulatory framework
 - A clear case has not been made that a new regulatory framework would be cost beneficial
 - Significant effort has been expended by both the industry and NRC
 - The current framework is well understood and has been used successfully
 - Leverage existing lessons-learned to improved the efficiency of the NRC risk-informed application review process
 - Improve consistency in licensee submittals and NRC reviews
 - Finalize 10 CFR 50.46a (Risk-Informed Emergency Core Cooling System)

PWROG PARON OWNERS COS

Conclusions

- The PWROG endorses the staff's recommendations in the draft SECY paper:
 - Maintain the NRC's current regulatory framework
 - NTTF Recommendation 1 Improvement Activities
 - A new category of events should be not established
 - A defense-in-depth policy statement is not needed
 - Development of an over-arching agency-wide policy statement is not needed
- The PWROG will continue to work with the staff to ensure appropriate methods are available to develop, implement, and regulate risk-informed applications and risk-informed regulations



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BWROG IRIR

Future of PRA

October 19, 2015
Robert Rishel (Duke Energy)Director, Nuclear Engineering PRA



BWR Expertise - Proven Solutions

Topics – BWROG Integrated Risk Informed Regulation (IRIR)



- BWROG near term vision of PRA
- BWROG Planned submittals 2016-2017
- BWROG IRIR Future PRA Applications
- BWROG PRA Technical Adequacy Peer Reviews
- PRA Technical Adequacy Question
- BWROG Concerns With Option 2 or 3
- Conclusions

October 19, 2015

BWROG Near Term Vision of PRA

- BWR
 DWNERS' GROUP
- PRA development is a continuing evolution
 - Incremental approach
 - Licensees continue develop new PRA hazard models
 - Dependent upon business need
- PRA model maintenance is a continuous process
 - Model upgrades as needed
 - Update PRA model consistent with plant design and operational changes
- PRA model development and maintenance costs have significantly increased

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BWROG Near Term Vision of PRA



- Concerns with over conservatism
 - Fire PRA
 - Concern with similar impact of Seismic PRA results
 - Impact ability to use risk informed applications
- Development and acceptance of new methods is slow and hinders PRA hazard model development

Current plans are to continue with current approach (Option 1)

BWROG IRIR Planned Submittals 2016-2017



- Continue with Licensee Controlled Tech Spec Surveillance Frequency (Risk Informed Initiative 5b)
 - Approximately 6 BWR Licensees expect to submit 2015-2017
- Submit for Risk Informed Technical Specification Completion Time (Risk Informed Initiative 4b)
 - Approximately 8 BWR Licensees expect to submit 2015-2018
- Containment Extended ILRTs Appendix J
 - Expect most will apply as need dates approach

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BWROG IRIR Future PRA Applications



- Extended Tech Spec Completion time for containment isolation valves
- Risk Informed SSC categorization
 - 10 CFR 50.69
- Use of Licensee PRA as a SPAR replacement



Improvements made

- Incorporated NRC feedback on Peer Review process
- Greater emphasis on Peer Review team and team lead as being qualified
- Training of Peer Review team leaders is occurring
- Improved licensee ownership of "being ready"
 - Reschedule as needed to ensure Peer Review accomplishes goal



Improvements made

- Peer Review team expectations
 - Review 40% of the Supporting Requirements before site visit
- Some licensee use of follow-up Peer Reviews has increased
 - Determine if F&Os resolved in some specific areas of weaknesses
- Industry Peer Review Task Force has provided some guidance on "what is technically acceptable" for limited number of Supporting Requirements



- Fire PRA Peer Reviews provide most challenges
 - Heavy reliance on industry contractors
 - Typically 3-4 contractors (total team of 6 7)
 - Limited number of licensee peers available
 - Number of qualified peers is limited
 - BWROG using "working observers" to improve number of qualified peers
 - Heavy work load at each Licensee impacts availability of peers
 - Technically challenging to review external hazards PRAs (fire, seismic, high wind)



Seismic PRA Peer Review Challenges

- Two BWROG Seismic PRA conducted to date
 - Significant contractor involvement
 - Very few licensee peer reviewers qualified
 - Identified resource gaps in industry Seismic PRA
- Seismic PRA Peer Review going forward are expected to similar
- Contractor knowledge of the Seismic PRA standard requirements is at times limited
- Knowledgeable resources will limit the number of Seismic PRA conducted per year

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Future of Peer Reviews

- Industry PRA Peer Review Task Force looking for opportunities to strengthen process
- Owners groups working to increase number of qualified utility peers
 - Working observer process
- Incorporate any additional NRC feed back on how to further improve the process
- Seismic PRA Peer Reviews will be a challenge
- List of "approved PRA methods" to be developed

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PRA Technical Adequacy Question



Understanding the "Gap" between current PRA Peer Review and what would be needed for Option 2 or 3

- Limited resource issue
 - Same small group of individuals
- Use of objective criteria has same consistency issue
 - Individuals make determination of acceptability
- Concern with NRC staff members making individual judgments beyond ANS/ASME PRA Standard - R.G. 1.200 requirement
- Current process relies heavily upon "consensus" of Peer Review results

BWROG Concerns With Option 2 or 3



- Projected benefits are not realized or achievement timeline stretches out
- Concerns with costs to achieve a PRA model that NRC staff determines is adequate
- NRC and Licensee interactions on specific technical elements PRA elements

Conclusions



- Current Licensee staffing support the continued incremental increase in PRA
- Fire PRA has become a large consumer of resources limiting other work
- Continued concerns with conservatism in Fire PRA and the efforts required to remove the conservatism
- Licensee are continuously improving the technical adequacy of their PRAs models
- BWROG will continue to work with the industry (NEI/PWROG/EPRI/ANS-ASME) and NRC to make improvements in the PRA Peer Review process
- Cost / Benefit for Option 2 or 3 needs to be considered





Risk Informed Steering Committee (RISC) Work on PRA Technical Adequacy

Victoria Anderson, NEI ACRS PRA Subcommittee Meeting October 19, 2015



Objectives of RISC PRA Technical Adequacy Work

- RISC (industry and NRC) were formed to foster increased use of risk information in nuclear operations and regulation
 - Critical component involved removing barriers to full implementation of key risk-informed applications
 - Issues with PRA technical adequacy expectations was identified as a substantial impediment to implementation of risk-informed licensing applications
- Industry and NRC working groups formed in mid-2014 to identify key improvements to regulatory infrastructure associated with PRA technical adequacy



Objectives of RISC PRA Technical Adequacy Work

 Ultimate objective: Bridge gap between existing guidance and information needed to support risk-informed licensing applications

RG 1.200:

Peer Review

PRA Standard

Gap:

Resolution of Peer Review Findings
Suitability of Methods, Tools, and
Data

Applications:

Assurance of PRA
Technical Adequacy to
Support Decision



Objectives of PRA Technical Adequacy Working Group

- Develop a process for making new methods available for regulatory application
- Improve process for closing out peer review Facts and Observations (F&Os)
- Identify any other open issues associated with the peer review process

Conclusions of PRA Technical Adequacy Work

- Proposal to establish a methods vetting process
 - Panel of experts will evaluate new methods and determine review level necessary to support use in licensing applications
 - Review options include gap assessment by vetting panel, joint industry-NRC review, etc.
- Proposal to close out peer review F&Os
 - Utilities may use independent close out, utility-led close out, or NRC close out
 - Once an F&O is closed out via this process, it need not be carried forward into new licensing applications
- Miscellaneous updates to peer review documents
 - Documentation of reviewer qualification



Relationship to Risk Management Regulatory Framework

- RMRF papers identified opportunity to address perceived issues with peer review process
- Suggested using a new "Certified PRA" process to address
- Determined that identified issues addressed by efforts in progress and little value would be added by certified PRA process



INDUSTRY COMMENTS ON DRAFT SECY "RECOMMENDATIONS ON ISSUES RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF A RISK MANAGEMENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK"

Michael Tschiltz Director of Risk Assessment, NEI



I. Path Forward for enhancing risk management approach

- NUREG 2150 findings and recommendations
 - Agency adopt the proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework(RMRF) through a Commission Policy Statement
- Staff Evaluation and Recommendation in draft SECY
 - Existing policy statements on safety goals and use of PRA along with guidance and experience have established most key aspects of RMRF for nuclear power reactor safety program area.
 - Maintain current framework and continue to make improvements on incremental basis. <u>Industry agrees with this recommendation</u>.
 - Utilize Risk Informed Steering Committee (RISC) to expand the use of risk-informed decision making.



I. Path Forward for enhancing risk management approach

- Consideration of Alternatives
 - Plant Specific regulatory framework
 - The industry does not find this to be a viable option.
 - Significant resource concerns
 - redefine licensing basis using PRA
 - potential for need to spend resources on the PRA scope and technical adequacy
 - Regulatory Uncertainty
 - vagueness of PRA scope and technical adequacy requirements
 - cumulative effects for some plants with limited projected lifetimes, the cost to upgrade the PRA may be so expensive as to result in early plant closures
 - Staff agrees with public commenters that this approach should not be implemented for currently operating reactors.



II. Re-evaluation of Improvement Activity 1 from Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 1

- Improvement Activity 1: Establish Design-Basis Extension Category

 An improved structure and set of criteria for identifying and categorizing hazards and events not previously recognized as significant that may require regulatory action (e.g., extended station blackout).
 - Staff indicated, for the recommended option, the internal rulemaking guidance would make it unnecessary to apply resources to establish the formal "design-basis extension" category.
 - Rulemaking guidance provides consistency in specifying necessary regulatory "attributes" (performance goals, treatment requirements, documentation requirements, change processes, and reporting requirements) whenever new regulations (both design-basis and beyond design-basis) are developed.
 - Staff recommends that a new category of events should not be established at this time. This is consistent with the industry's comments.



II. Re-evaluation of Improvement Activity 2 from Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 1

Improvement Activity 2: Establish Commission Expectations for Defense-in-Depth

Establish Commission expectations for defense-in-depth through the development of a policy statement that includes: the definition, objectives, and principles of defense-in-depth; associated implementation guidance containing decision criteria for ensuring adequacy of defense-in-depth; and conforming guidance to ensure integration of defense-in-depth with risk.

- Benefits from the development of defense-in-depth policy statement would not justify cost.
 - D-in-D philosophy is already well-established in regulations and existing policy statements
- Staff recommends that a defense-in-depth policy statement is not needed. This is consistent with the industry's comments.
- Staff intends to complete a previous effort to modify the guidance on defense-in-depth in RG 1.174.
 - The industry supports the revision of guidance documents (e.g., RG 1.174) to ensure consistent application of defense-in-depth in regulatory decisions.



III. Consideration of an overarching policy statement on using the Risk Management Approach

Industry Comment:

Accomplishing this across the entire agency in a coordinated, consistent manner would appear to be an extremely challenging task for the NRC that will require a long period of time, inter-agency coordination, and perhaps a dilution of methodological approaches to satisfy all of the agency's desires.

 NRC staff recommends maintaining current framework and not to develop an agency-wide policy statement. Industry agrees with the staff recommendation.



Conclusions

 The industry agrees with the staff's recommendations in the draft SECY paper.

 Will continue to work with the staff to ensure appropriate methods and guidance are available to develop, and implement riskinformed applications.

