

KHNPDCRAIsPEm Resource

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Sent: Monday, June 29, 2015 7:53 AM
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Subject: APR1400 Design Certification Application RAI 55-7940 (04.03 - Nuclear Design)
Attachments: APR1400 DC RAI 55 SRSB 7940.pdf

KHNP

The attachment contains the subject request for additional information (RAI). This RAI was sent to you in draft form. Your licensing review schedule assumes technically correct and complete responses within 30 days of receipt of RAIs.

Please submit your RAI response to the NRC Document Control Desk.

Thank you,

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Hearing Identifier: KHNP_APR1400_DCD_RAI_Public
Email Number: 60

Mail Envelope Properties (A67A2D233B3FBB4C8B5109AD7C39550715C4F4FEC7)

Subject: APR1400 Design Certification Application RAI 55-7940 (04.03 - Nuclear Design)
Sent Date: 6/29/2015 7:53:26 AM
Received Date: 6/29/2015 7:53:39 AM
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Files	Size	Date & Time
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APR1400 DC RAI 55 SRSB 7940.pdf		118084
image001.jpg	5020	

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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 55-7940

Issue Date: 06/29/2015

Application Title: APR1400 Design Certification Review – 52-046

Operating Company: Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Ltd.

Docket No. 52-046

Review Section: 04.03 - Nuclear Design

Application Section:

QUESTIONS

04.03-3

RAI 4.3-2, Use of ENDF/B-IV cross section for nuclear design

REQUIREMENTS

10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 10 requires the reactor core design to include appropriate margin to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits (SAFDLs) are not exceeded during normal operation or anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs). GDC 11, "Reactor Inherent Protection," requires that, in the power operating range, the prompt inherent nuclear feedback characteristics tend to compensate for a rapid increase in reactivity. GDC 20, "Protection System Functions," requires automatic initiation of the reactivity control systems to assure that SAFDLs are not exceeded as a result of AOOs and that automatic operation of systems and components important to safety occurs under accident conditions. In addition, GDC 28, "Reactivity Limits," requires that the effects of postulated reactivity accidents neither result in damage to the reactor coolant pressure boundary greater than limited local yielding nor cause sufficient damage to impair significantly the system's capability to cool the core.

In accordance with these regulations, a reactor design must include various protection systems and mitigation functions. The regulations also prescribe specific transient analyses to assess the system's performance under AOOs and design basis accident conditions. The majority of the system protection design and transient analyses depend on accurate nuclear analyses, such as power distribution, the Doppler coefficient, moderator temperature coefficients, and control rod worths.

To achieve these goals, NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition – Reactor," Section I, item 2 requires the reviewer to review core power distributions, including normal and extreme cases for steady-state and allowed load-follow transients and covering a full range of reactor conditions of time in cycle, allowed control rod positions, and possible fuel burnup distributions. In addition, the SRP requires the reviewer to examine the applicant's presentation of the core power distributions as axial, radial, and local distributions and peaking factors to be used in the transient and accident analyses. Power distributions within fuel pins is also required as discussed in Regulatory Guide (RG 1.206).

Furthermore, Item 2.F of the SRP requires the reviewer to review measurements in previous reactors and critical experiments and their use in the uncertainty analyses and the measurements to be made on the reactor under review, including startup confirmatory tests and periodically required measurements. And item 2.G requires the reviewer to examine the translation of design limits, uncertainties, operating limits, instrument requirements, and setpoints into technical specifications.

With respect to core nuclear design, the SRP requires the reviewer to examine the correctness and accuracy of the reactivity coefficient calculations and results. Specifically, the SRP indicates that the areas of concern with respect to reactivity coefficients are: "The applicant's presentation of calculated nominal values for the reactivity coefficients, such as the moderator coefficient, which involves primarily effects from density changes and takes the form of temperature, void, or density coefficients; the Doppler coefficient; and power coefficients. The range of reactor states to be covered includes the entire operating range from cold shutdown through full power and the extremes reached in transient and accident analyses."

Regarding control rod design, the SRP requires the reviewer to examine parameters and items such as control rod patterns and reactivity worths throughout the core life, misaligned rods, stuck rods, or rod positions used for spatial power shaping, maximum worths of individual rods or banks as a function of position for power and cycle life conditions appropriate to rod withdrawal transients and rod ejection or drop accidents. The SRP also requires the staff to examine descriptions and graphs of scram reactivity as a function of time after scram initiation and other pertinent parameters and shutdown margin.

ISSUES

All of these parameters, together with many others, are typically calculated in nuclear design using computer codes. The applicant states in Section 4.3 of the APR1400 Design Control Document (DCD) that it has performed reactor nuclear design analyses using the ROCS/DIT codes and nuclear cross section data from the ENDF/B-IV library with some adjustments based on ENDF/B-V data. The staff notes that ENDF/B-IV and ENDF/B-V were developed in 1974 and 1978 respectively and several significant revisions and improvements have been made since then to address the differences identified in the data for many important nuclides, including U-235, Pu-239, Pu-241, and gadolinium.

To assess the impact of different cross section libraries on the core nuclear calculations, the staff first compared the measured values of the total absorption cross section of gadolinium provided in ENDF/B-IV with the data published in the later versions of the ENDF/B libraries. From the comparison, the staff notes large differences between the ENDF/B-IV and the later versions for several important isotopes, particularly for gadolinium.

In order to access the overall impact of the cross section data, excluding gadolinium, the staff also performed a basic criticality benchmark analysis using the SCALE 6.1 computer code for the low enrichment critical experiment, "LEU-COMP-THERM-001-

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001," from the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments. The results show that the calculated k_{eff} value using ENDF/B-IV library is 0.00824 (0.824%) lower than the results using ENDF/B-VII continuous energy cross section library. This reactivity difference is about $\$1.32$ in terms of β_{eff} .

In addition, the staff performed a preliminary confirmatory analysis on a single unpoisoned bundle of the APR1400 fuel (PLUS7 fuel). Based on the analyses result, the staff found that the differences between the calculated k_{inf} values using ENDF/B-V and ENDF/B-VII libraries are significant. Since cross sections are the basic values for all nuclear design, inaccuracies in these data will directly affect the calculated power distribution, reactivity, reactivity coefficients, control rod worth and other parameters that are related to reactor safety.

INFORMATION NEEDED

The applicant is requested to demonstrate that using ENDF/B-IV library can adequately predict the APR-1400 reactor physics parameters with sufficient accuracy to ensure that the values used in the safety analyses, transient analyses, and accident analyses in other chapters produce conservative results. The applicant should also evaluate the additional uncertainties of the reactor operating parameters introduced by the deficiencies the ENDF/B-IV cross section library. The parameters should include, but are not limited to:

1. Power distributions and peaking factors;
2. Differential and integral control rod worths;
3. Shutdown CEA reactivity and reactivity shutdown margin;
4. Doppler coefficients; and
5. Moderator temperature and density coefficients.

Given the fact that these parameters are important to the transient and accident analyses, the applicant is requested to evaluate the subsequent impacts on the following transient and accident analyses and update the relevant technical reports and DCD as appropriate:

1. Uncontrolled Control Element Assembly Withdrawal from a Subcritical or Low-Power Startup Condition;
2. Uncontrolled Control Element Assembly Withdrawal at Power;
3. Control Element Assembly Misoperation;
4. The types of AOOs that include one or more CEAs moving or displaced from normal or allowed control bank positions are as follows:
 - a. Dropped CEA or CEA subgroup;
 - b. Statically misaligned CEA;
 - c. Single CEA withdrawal;
5. Identification of Causes and Frequency Classification;
6. Inadvertent Loading and Operation of a Fuel Assembly in an Improper Position; and
7. Anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) as it relates to reactivity insertion.

The staff needs this information to determine the APR1400 nuclear design meets the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and Part 52 and GDC 10, 11, 20, 28 and other design criteria related indirectly to the nuclear design.



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