

April 2, 1999

Duke Energy Corporation  
ATTN: Mr. W. R. McCollum  
Vice President  
Oconee Nuclear Station  
P. O. Box 1439  
Seneca, SC 29679

SUBJECT: MEETING SUMMARY - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION (ONS)

Dear Mr. McCollum:

This refers to the meeting conducted by mutual request at the Oconee Nuclear Station on March 24, 1999, to discuss the activities of the NRC management oversight group (MOG), and for you to provide an update to the Oconee Recovery Plan and related plant performance. Enclosures 1 through 3 are a list of meeting attendees, your presentation handout, and an updated Oconee Recovery Plan Issues Checklist, respectively.

During the Oconee plant performance review (PPR) conducted on February 9, 1999, an assessment of Oconee performance by template area was performed. The MOG concluded that Operating Performance was acceptable; however, performance had declined from last period. This decline was reflective of several operator related events resulting from human performance shortcomings and mixed performance in operating programs and processes. Performance related to Operations During Transients remained good. Plant Material Condition generally improved. Human Performance remained consistent with the previous assessments. Despite improved performance in the Engineering Support sub-area, Engineering Design was again evaluated overall as poor. This was directly attributed to a number of major variances from requirements. Performance in the previously unrated area of Engineering Program and Processes was evaluated as adequate. Overall, Problem Identification/Resolution at Oconee improved from poor to adequate. Noteworthy was the improved good performance in Analysis and Resolution of problems. A decline in identification of problems was noted during this assessment. This was due to several missed opportunities in the Engineering area. The results of this assessment as well as the previous Oconee performance assessment by template areas are provided in Enclosure 4.

As a result of this assessment, the Regional Administrator directed termination of MOG activities. Focused inspections will be performed for items remaining from the MOG, which require further NRC review. Items from the Recovery Plan Issues Checklist that will be inspected in the near term were provided to you in the PPR letter dated April 1, 1999. Other items remaining from the Recovery Plan Issues Checklist will be reviewed by future PPRs for inclusion in upcoming inspections.

Remaining open items associated with MOG-sponsored inspection of the emergency feedwater system are presented as Enclosure 5. When your efforts to resolve the problem investigation process (PIP) reports associated with these issues are complete or sufficient progress has been made in your actions to allow inspection of these issues, please inform us.

Enclosure 6 provides a list of existing ONS violations for which specific inspection activities will be conducted. As discussed at the meeting, other existing violations will be closed without an

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item-by-item verification of your corrective actions. As you are aware, these items could be inspected during future corrective action program reviews. As discussed in the previous paragraph, when you feel that sufficient progress has been made to allow inspection of the violations listed in Enclosure 6, please inform us.

In accordance with Section 2.790(a) of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this meeting summary, please contact Mr. C. Ogle at (404) 562-4510.

Sincerely,

(Original signed by)  
Charles A. Casto  
Deputy Director  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287  
License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Enclosures: 1. List of Attendees  
2. Licensee Presentation Handout  
3. Oconee Recovery Plan Issues Checklist  
4. Oconee Rollup 2/9/99  
5. EFW System Open Items  
6. Violations Requiring Inspection for Closeout

cc w/encls:  
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cc w/encls cont'd:  
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Distribution w/encls: (See page 4)

Distribution w/encls:

- L. Plisco, RII
- D. LaBarge, NRR
- R. Carroll, RII
- H. Berkow, NRR
- C. Casto, RII
- K. Landis, RII
- C. Ogle, RII
- NRC Resident Inspector
- PUBLIC

OFFICE	RII:DRP	RII:DRP	RII:DRP				
SIGNATURE	<i>R. Carroll</i>	<i>C. Ogle</i>	<i>K. Landis</i>				
NAME	RCarroll:	COgle	KLandis				
DATE	3.31.99	4/2					
COPY?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

## LIST OF ATTENDEES

### Nuclear Regulatory Commission

L. Reyes, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)  
B. Mallett, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), RII  
C. Casto, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII  
C. Ogle, Chief, Branch 1, DRP, RII  
K. Landis, Chief, Engineering Branch, DRS, RII  
M. Scott, Senior Resident Inspector - Oconee Nuclear Station, DRP, RII  
D. Billings, Resident Inspector - Oconee Nuclear Station, DRP, RII  
S. Freeman, Resident Inspector - Oconee Nuclear Station, DRP, RII  
R. Hannah, Public Affairs Officer, RII

### Duke Energy Corporation (DEC)

M. Tuckman, Executive Vice President, Nuclear Generation, DEC  
W. McCollum, Vice President, Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS)  
J. Forbes, Station Manager, ONS  
W. Foster, Safety Assurance Manager, ONS  
J. Fiscaro, Nuclear Assessments/Issues Department Manager, DEC  
M. Nazar, Engineering Manager, ONS  
E. Burchfield, Regulatory Compliance Manager, ONS  
T. Hartis, Business Manager, ONS  
L. Azzarello, Mechanical Systems Engineering Supervisor, ONS  
T. Pettit, Customer Relations Manager, DEC  
R. Gambrell, Licensing Engineer, ONS  
L. Nicholson, Licensing Engineer, ONS  
J. Smith, Technical Specialist, ONS  
J. Weast, Licensing Engineer, ONS

### Others


T. Crego, Reporter, Greenville News

# Oconee Nuclear Station

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## Bi-Monthly Performance Meeting




March 24, 1999



# Purpose of Meeting

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- Plant Status
- Results of Recovery Plan
- Independent Assessment
- Overview of Performance Improvement Plan
- Closing Remarks




# Plant Status

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	<u>Current</u>			
	<u>Power Level</u>	<u>Days on Line</u>	<u>1999 Capacity Factor YTD</u>	<u>Next Refueling</u>
<b>Unit 1</b>	100%	210	100.2%	5/1999
<b>Unit 2</b>	100%	21	95.9%	11/1999
<b>Unit 3</b>	100%	80	99.1%	3/2000
<b>Station</b>			98.4%	






# Plant Status

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
- Unit 2 forced outage
  - Repaired steam generator risers
  - Safe outage
  - All outage goals exceeded
- Unit 2 reactor trip
  - Caused by fuse
  - Good operator response
  - Thorough investigation by FIP team



# Oconee Recovery Plan

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- Initial concept discussed at July 23, 1997 meeting with Region II
- Oconee in mid-1997
  - Too many events
  - Process weaknesses
  - Standards did not keep pace with industry
  - Significant regulatory issues emerging



# Results of Recovery Plan

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- Strengthened management team
- Structure and processes in place
- Safety culture has improved
- Operational performance has improved
- Design issues being addressed
  - Discovery
  - Resolution
- Performance Improvement Plan will carry momentum forward

# December 1997 Recovery Plan Annunciator Panel

## Operational Quality and Safety of Operations

MANAGEMENT	OPERATIONAL
OPERATIONAL	MANAGEMENT

	PIP Activity Backlog (> 6 months old) R S Matheson 25%
Pre-Job/Post-Job Briefs T K McQuarrie 30%	PIP Quality R T Bond 25%
Culture Index NGD measure 10%	
Self Identified Problems R T Bond 30%	Enhance SRG Self Assessment Processes R T Bond 25%

## Production

PRODUCTION	OPERATIONAL
OPERATIONAL	PRODUCTION

Problem Prevention Index L J Azzarello 20%	
System Reliability Performance Index L J Azzarello 10%	

## Financial Management

FINANCIAL	MANAGEMENT
MANAGEMENT	FINANCIAL

Outage Performance R M Weatherford 50%

### KEY

RED	1.0-1.99 POINTS
YELLOW	2.0-2.99 POINTS
GREEN	3.0-3.99 POINTS
WHITE	4.0 POINTS

(Unreported)

QUARTERLY STATUS YTD	1Q 97	2Q 97	3Q 97	4Q 97
CURRENT STATUS	(MEASURE)			
	(EXPERT)		(PO)	

Oconee Nuclear Station

# December 1998 Recovery Plan Annunciator Panel

## Operational Quality and Safety of Operations

HUMAN PERFORMANCE McCOLLUM	SELF ASSESSMENT FOSTER
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CULTURE INDEX LECROY 10 %
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ROOT CAUSE QUALITY BOND 20 %
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## Production

DESIGN BASIS HAZAR	SYSTEM EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY HAZAR	OPERATIONAL FOCUS FORBES
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PROGRESS ON SITE LEVEL DESIGN BASIS INITIATIVES AZZARELLO 100 %	REWORK INDEX AZZARELLO 18 %
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PROBLEM PREVENTION INDEX AZZARELLO 20 %	HOUSEKEEPING HUNNICUTT 12.5 %
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EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCY INDEX AZZARELLO 18 %
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LOST GENERATION DAYS DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURES AZZARELLO 28 %
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## Financial Management

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT MARTINE
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PERFORMANCE OF 2001 MARTINE
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**KEY**

RED [Red Box] 1.0 - 1.99 POINTS

YELLOW [Yellow Box] 2.0 - 2.99 POINTS


GREEN [Green Box] 2.7 - 3.0 POINTS

WHITE [White Box] 0 POINTS

QUARTERLY STATUS YTD → [2Q 98] [4Q 98]

CURRENT STATUS → [Current Status Box]


Oconee Nuclear Station



# Results of Recovery Plan

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- Significant reduction in operating events
- Then:
  - Three AITs and one special inspection between 10/96 and 6/97
- Now:
  - Number and nature of operating events reduced
  - Substantial efforts reviewing design basis
  - Step change in performance of operators




# Results of Recovery Plan

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- Substantial progress in reviewing key safety systems
  - High Pressure Injection
  - Low Pressure Injection
  - Emergency Feedwater
  - Emergency Power




# Results of Recovery Plan - Operations Improvements

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- Substantial improvements in quality of Operations Procedures
  - All Ops procedures with 5 or more outstanding changes reviewed, revised and re-issued
  - All Ops procedure changes resulting from ITS review completed (3200 items)
  - Enhancement request backlog reduced from 1675 to 264 by year end '98 with 1999 target of 250






# Results of Recovery Plan - Operations Improvements

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- Control Room Standards Significantly Upgraded
  - Clear expectations through Core Values
  - Physical upgrading of the Control Room
  - Improving Control Room housekeeping standards
  - Stricter Control Room Access controls
  - Hour by hour schedule
  - Peer Checking, Six Tools, Animated STAR, Pre and Post Job Briefs are now habits
  - OAC and ICS replacement
  - Structured benchmarking and follow-up process




# Results of Recovery Plan - Operations Improvement

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- Control Room Standards Significantly Upgraded
  - CRIP backlog reduced from 44 to 15
  - Cleared 39 workarounds in 1998
  - Corrective Work Orders reduced from 625 to 337
  - Established Control Room Improvement Team
  - Site wide Housekeeping Upgrade project
  - Increased standards for Operator rounds
  - Supervisor Observation and on the spot coaching




# Results of Recovery Plan - Operations Improvement


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- Results:
  - Active leadership by operators
  - Improved operator response during trips and transients
  - Reduction in outage delays
  - One procedure induced Control Room LER in 1998
  - Reduction in the number of mispositionings



# Results of Recovery Plan - Improved Operator Performance



Oconee Nuclear Station



# Results of Recovery Plan

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- More rigorous processes to address equipment issues
  - TEPR
  - MEPR
  - FIP
  - Plant Concerns list
- Proactive Initiatives
  - Steam Generator Reliability
  - Piping Reliability
  - Equipment Aging
  - Secondary System/Equipment Reliability
  - System Teams




# Results of Recovery Plan


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
- Major Mods Completed
  - OAC
  - ICS
  - Service Water
- Number and nature of equipment issues improving
  - EFPDs lost due to equipment problems declined from 106 per unit 12/97 to 35 per unit 12/98
  - System Reliability Performance Index increased from 6 year end '97 to 11 year end '98
  - Unplanned capability loss factor decreased from a rolling 12 month average of 32.0% in December 1997 to 6.1% in February 1999
  - Power history curves improving




# 1997-1999 Unit 1 Power History



Oconee Nuclear Station




# 1997-1999 Unit 2 Power History




Oconee Nuclear Station






# 1997-1999 Unit 3 Power History



Oconee Nuclear Station



# Results of Recovery Plan

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
- Steady progress in corrective action program
  - More self-critical (2846 PIPs in 1996, 4676 PIPs in 1997, 6101 PIPs in 1998)
  - Backlog reduced
    - PIP corrective actions > 6 months old reduced from 512 in August 1997 to 175 in December 1998
    - Management exception corrective actions reduced from 593 in August 1997 to 498 in December 1998
  - Quality improving



# Results of Recovery Plan

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
- Corrective Action Program Focus Areas
  - Backlog Reduction
  - Backlog Prioritization
  - Quality
  - Monitor PIP Generation Threshold and Categorization



# Summary

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- Recovery Plan laid foundation for further improvement
- Progress in each focus area
- More work remains
- Independent review requested to validate Oconee trends
- Improvement Plan continues to address key areas vital to achieve and sustain high level performance




# Purpose

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
- Requested by ONS Site - Vice President
- Assess progress of recovery plan efforts
  - Determine if sufficient progress has been made to transition to continuous improvement plan (Compare 1997 to 1999)
- Not a complete review of all recovery plan items



# Team Composition

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
- Led by Manager - NAID
- Senior Managers and Specialists
- Independent of ONS
- Multi-Site and General Office Involvement



# Areas for Review

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- Operations Focus Area
- Design Bases, UFSAR, and Equipment Reliability
- Self Assessment, Corrective Action, Work Management, and Human Performance




# Method of Evaluation

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- Four areas to address
  - Evaluate extent of progress
  - Evaluate adequate programs and processes in place to support process improvements
  - Change institutionalized
  - Adequate measures and programs in place to move to continuous improvement plan
- Interview, observation, and verification





# Summary

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## 1997 Perspective

- Lack of clear direction and vision
- Expectations not clearly communicated
- Lack of Accountability
- Some standard Duke processes had not been implemented
- Self-critical culture lacking
- High number of plant events
- Lack of engineering focus

## 1999 Perspective

- Exists now and is reinforced
- Communicated and reinforced at most levels
- Accountability significantly improved
- Processes now implemented, used, and producing results
- Improved culture now exists
- Events significantly reduced
- Engineering working on right issues

Progress has been made

Plant realizes continued effort for improvement is necessary

Plant is developing 1999 plan



# Recommendations


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Identified a number of recommendations (80)

Three Categories :

- Important for success
  - Root cause quality
  - Maintenance Work Control
- Important to help improve process (Heads up)
- Good Ideas



# Operations Review


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## Scope

- Areas selected for review
  - Equipment reliability (operations perspective only) \*
  - Housekeeping and material condition
  - Work management process improvements \*
  - CRIP management reduction
  - Technical specifications surveillance program
  - Technical quality of operations procedures
  - Operations ownership

\* Results reported later in presentation.




# Operations Summary

## 1997 Perspective

- Vision and expectations lacking
- Outstanding operations enhancement requests high (1675)
- High number of control room indicator
- Control and ownership of T. S. surveillance program lacking
- Reluctance to take charge and demand results
- Poor housekeeping and material condition

## 1999 Perspective

- Focus and emphasis improved. Reinforcement through APA and shift briefings.
- Backlog reduced to 230. Turnaround time considerably reduced. Operators using process. Significantly fewer procedure inadequacies.
- Reduced to 15 per unit. Focused efforts by Operations to implement CRIP process.
- Established accountability, improved tracking and monitoring.
- Standards in control room significantly upgraded (i.e., traffic and noise reduced, control board monitoring, etc.) Operations leadership evident in work around process. Operations driving resolution to issues.
- Upgraded rooms (HPI, LPI, Penetrations, etc.) Significant amount of material taken out of plant. Matcon Team established-reduced deficiencies from 4500 to 2300. Ownership improved.




# Operations

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## Recommendations

- Total for this area - 15
- Sample of recommendations



# Engineering Review

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## Areas for Review

- Equipment Reliability
  - TEPR Program
  - System Team Development
  - Fluid Leak Management
  - Management of Temporary Modification
  - Equipment Aging
  - Secondary System/Component Reliability
  - Piping Reliability
  - Engineering Support Program
  
- Design Bases
  - Safety system reviews
  - Improved technical specifications
  - UFSAR review project
  - Configuration management



# Engineering Review


## Design Bases, UFSAR, Equipment Reliability

### 1997 Perspective

- Unclear direction and expectations
  - Engineering priorities not aligned with customers
  - Lack of accountability and follow-up
- Engineering work management poor
- Equipment reliability lacked focus

### 1999 Perspective

- Engineering direction and focus clear
  - Development of leadership model. Daily tracking and monitoring of issues and projects. Accountability is reinforced. Customers satisfied with support/products.
- Work management tool developed.
  - Organization understands priorities. Improved focus and follow-up.
- Process (TEPR) implemented.
  - Some long standing issues resolved. Remaining items requiring action tracked and prioritized. Organization using processes.



# Engineering Review (Continued)

## Design Bases, UFSAR, Equipment Reliability

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
### 1997 Perspective

- Many processes/tools not implemented
- Safety System Reviewed
- UFSAR Review Project

### 1999 Perspective

- Duke standard processes implemented. (i.e., Nuclear Excellence Team, Design Review Board, Daily Focus Meetings, TEPR, Configuration Management, etc.) Program institutionalized. Organization using tools/processes.
- A number of reviews completed (HPI, LPI). Process laid out to schedule future systems.
- Initial effort complete. Follow up on project.






# Engineering Review

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## Engineering Recommendations

- Total for this area - 29
- Sample of recommendations




# Safety Culture / Work Process Review

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## Areas for Review

- Human Performance
- Self Assessment
  - Manager Observation/Group Assessment Effectiveness and Benchmarking
  - Enhances SRG Self-Assessment
- Corrective Action Program (CAP)
  - PIP Quality
  - PIP Backlog
  - Root Cause Quality
  - Note: Didn't look at entire CAP because of recent assessment
- Work Management



# Human Performance

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
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## 1997 Perspective

- Several significant human performance related events
- Organization had not implemented the Duke standard human error reduction techniques

## 1999 Perspective

- ONS implemented numerous initiatives to improve human performance (i.e., six tools, manager observation program, etc.)
- Human performance related events have declined
  - \* Human error site wide PIPs are down
  - \* Component mispositionings are lower
- Direct observation of job briefings and workers indicate positive use of six tools
- Programs have been institutionalized




# Human Performance

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## Recommendations

- Total for this area - 2
- Sample of recommendations



# Self Assessment (INOT)

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
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## 1997 Perspective

- SRG Oversight was not at required levels
- SRG not finding issues, as required
- Overall, not a good self critical culture

## 1999 Perspective

- Independent Nuclear Oversight Team (INOT) implemented
- Personnel rotated through group  
INOT continues to improve
- Recently, two (2) good assessments were done by INOT (i.e., corrective action program, ITS)
- This is an improving area
- Continued management focus in this area will ensure that we continue to improve process
- The concept of having a self critical culture continues to improve at Oconee



# Self Assessment


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## 1997 Perspective

- The number of manager observations, group self assessments, and benchmarking were low
- Inwardly focused
- Lack of self assessment culture

## 1999 Perspective

- Processes were implemented
- A high number of manager observations performed. Many were of good value
- Group self assessments increased considerably
- Benchmarking was performed
- Many actions were initiated as a result of the above reviews
- Self assessment culture is emerging as a standard ONS concept




# Self Assessment

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Total for this area -14

Sample of recommendations



# Corrective Action Program

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
## 1997 Perspective

- PIP quality low
- PIP backlog high (350)
- Root causes needed work
- Identification low (2000)

## 1999 Perspective

- PIP quality improved
- SRG rejection rate lowered 30% to 10%
- Backlog reduced to 175
- Number of root causes increased
- Quality of root causes improved. Still need work
- Rate now 6000+
- New processes implemented to improve management focus (i.e., corrective action review board and corrective action review team)






# Corrective Action

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## Recommendations

- Total for this area - 10
- Sample of recommendations



# Work Management

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
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## 1997 Perspective

- Not implemented in accordance with Duke process
- Work items not scheduled
- Changing priorities
- Backlog high

## 1999 Perspective

- Implemented standard WCQIP process
- Control room has been freed of traffic and noise
- Scheduling/Planning from T-2 to T-0 window is in need of work
- Process has been institutionalized
- The organization is not using the PIP process to learn from improvement areas
- Backlogs have been reduced significantly



# Work Management

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## Recommendations

- Total for this area -10
- Sample of recommendations



# Conclusions of Review

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- Significant progress made
- Generally completed recovery plan items
- Staff generally knew problem areas
- In process of documenting plan for 1999
- Staff open to input/feedback (learning organization)
- Continued effort is necessary
- Evidence supports moving to continuous improvement plan



# 1999 Improvement Plan

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- Focus areas consistent with Recovery Plan
- Key is effectiveness of implementation
  - Accountability
  - Focus on execution
  - Enforcing standards

# ONS Improvement Plan Focus Areas for 1999

## Nuclear Safety

<b>HUMAN PERFORMANCE</b>	<b>SELF ASSESSMENT</b>	<b>DESIGN BASIS</b>							
McCOLLUM	FOSTER	NAZAR							
Organization Performance & Effectiveness	Corrective Action Program Health	Design Basis Milestones							
Grobusky	Foster	Azzarello							
	Corrective Action OE Benchmarking	Plant Configuration							
	Foster	Coutu							
	Self Assessment OE Benchmarking	Configuration Management							
	Foster	Azzarello							
	Root Cause Quality								
	Foster								

## Production

<b>SYSTEM EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY</b>	<b>OPERATIONAL FOCUS</b>								
	FORBES								
Equipment Reliability Performance Index	Innage Planning & Execution								
Curtis	Boyd								
Engineering Work Quality	Outage Planning & Execution								
Wilkie	Boyd								
Quality of Maintenance	Housekeeping								
Medlin	Medlin								
	Procedure Quality								
	Coutu								
	Engineering Work Management								
	Dobson								

## Business and Work Process Efficiency




<b>FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT</b>									
MARTIN									
Cost Control Budget Performance									
Martin									
Resource Utilization & Management									
Medlin									
Long Range Planning									
Medlin									

# OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE PERFORMANCE MEASURES February 1999


**Indicators of Success**

- Top Quartile in Nuclear Safety measured by NRC SALP & INPO Rating
- Top Quartile in Capacity Factor & On Peak Availability
- Top 10 in Production Cost
- Top Decile in Industrial Safety



**NGD OBJECTIVES**





**Nuclear Safety**




**Business and Work Process Efficiency**



**OCONEE IMPROVEMENT FOCUS AREAS**



Oconee Nuclear Station



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# Closing Remarks

*Oconee Nuclear Station*



# OCONEE RECOVERY PLAN ISSUES CHECKLIST

[Status: 30 of 44  
"Essential to Recovery"  
items have been closed;  
14 remain open, with NRC1  
(EOPs) having the longest  
lead time of 9/99]

Area	Action	NRC Lead	Licensee Status	NRC Inspection/Action (Date/IR/Results)	NRC Status
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LICENSEE RECOVERY PLAN ACTIONS					
Design Basis					
[DB1] (1970)	HPI System Review	Landfills	Completed	7/6-10/98, 98-07 (Rogers), A-2B, 4B, 5C 11/2-6/98, 98-10 (Thomas), A-4A, 4B, 5C	Closed
[DB2] (1970)	SITA HPI/LPI System Review	Landfills	Projected completion 12/11/97 - 12/31/98	7/18-17/98, 98-06 (Thomas), E-5A, P-5B 11/30 - 12/11/98, 98-11 (Thomas), C-4B, 5C	Closed

[DB3] N9702	Oconee Safety Related Designation Clarification (OSRDC)	Landis (NRR-Any licensing issues)	Projected completion- 5/15/98-1/99	7/27-31/98; 98-08 (Schin, Thomas); A-5C, 4A 8/24-9/4/98; 98-08 (Schin, Thomas); P-4C & G-4C	Open
[DB4] N9705	Resolve EOCW Suction Supply to LPSW (OSW)	Landis	Projected completion 6/1/98-5/1/99	98-05 (Keillogg); E-2B 98-08; P-2B & A-5A, 5B, 5C 11/2-6 & 116-20/98 98-10 (Thomas); G-3A, 4B	Closed
[DB5] N9706	UFSAR Review Project	Landis	Projected completion- 12/31/98-6/30/99	10/5-9/98; 98-09 (Schin, Thomas); P-4A, 4C, 5A 4/19-23/99 (Schin) 6/7-11/99 (Schin)	Open
[DB6] N9705	SOCG Outlier Resolution Review	Landis	Projected completion- 6/30/98-2002	8/31-9/4/98; 98-08 (Chou); G-4B, 5B, 5C & P-2A, 5A	Closed

[[DB7] 115707 157103]	Emergency Power Project	Christmoot	5/1/99	98-07: E-4A, 4C, 5A, 5C 98-08: E-4B & G-4B, 5B, 5C	Closed
[[DB8] 115767]	EL 96-06 Review (non-licensing issues)	Landis	Projected completion 7/10/98 - UBEOC 18	7/13-17/98; 98-07 (Moore); G-4B 98-08: A-4B, 5A, 5C & G-1A, 5B 10/5-9/98; 98-09 (Moore); A-4A	Closed
[[DB9] 119801]	EFW SSEI	Landis	Complete Action Plan 30 days after report entered into PIP	8/24-9/4/98; 98-08 (Schin); P-4A, 5A 98-09 (Schin, Thomas); P-4A, 5A	Open
[[DB10] 119811]	Configuration Management Project	Landis	Projected completion 12/31/98	9/14-18/98; 98-09 (Schin, Thomas); No Assessment 11/30 - 12/11/98; 98-11 (Thomas); P-4A, 4C, 5C 2/1-5/99 (Thomas), 2/22-26/99 (Smith); P-4C, 5C	Open

System Equipment					
[SE1] N9712	Material Condition Upgrade	Scott	10/99	98-06: G-2A, 2B, 3A 98-07: G-2A, 3C 98-11: G-2A, 2B 99-01: A-2A (closure pending)	Closed (P)
[SE2] N9714	Control Rod Drive Mechanism Replacement	Billings	U3EOC19	98-06: G-4B, 5B 98-09: A-4B, 5B 99-02 (Proposed)	Open
[SE3] N9715	Top Equipment Problem Resolution Process (TEPR)	Freeman	Ongoing	98-10: G-2A, 2B, 5C	Closed
[SE4] N9716	System Team Development	Landis	Complete	10/5-9/98, 98-09 (Moore, Thomas) A-4B	Closed
[SE5] N9717	Fluid Leak Management Program	Freeman	Projected completion 11/1/98	98-09: A-2B	Closed
[SE6] N9718	Temporary Modifications	Landis	Projected completion 4/15/99	10/5-9/98, 98-09 (Schlin, Thomas) G-4B, 4C	Closed
[SE7] N9719	CRIP Management and Reduction	Billings	9/1/98	98-09: G-1A, 2B, 3C	Closed

[SE8] 1142121 D	Inservice Inspection Program Assessment (includes temporary defense D)	Fredrickson		98-06: A-2B (HP), 98-06: G-2B (OTSC)  98-07 (Chirard), G-6C (AUG ISL)  8/17-21/98, 98-08 (Blake) G-2B(OTSC)  10/26-30/98, 98-10 (Blake), A-2B, 3A (TSL)  11/9-10/98, 98-10 (Blake), G-2B, 3A (OTSC)	Closed
[SE9] 11722	Secondary System Component Reliability	Landis	Complete	10/5-9/98, 98-09 (Schala, Thomas), G-2C, 4B	Closed
Human Performance					
[P1] 19720	Human Performance Measures and Organization Direction (ORP)	Scott	12/31/98	98-06: G-1A, 3B & A-2B, 3A  98-10: P-1A, 3A (Proposed)  98-11: P-3A, 3B, 3C  99-03 (proposed)	Open

Self-Assessment					
[SA1] N9730	PIP Activity Backlog	Landis	12/31/98	8/24-9/4/98; 98-08 (Schin, Thomas); P-5C  11/30 - 12/11/98; management exception items: 98-11 (Schin, Thomas); P-4B,5C  2/1-5/99; 3/8-12/99 (Girard); 99-01; P-4B,5C-NCV  99-02 Proposed	Open
[SA2] N9732	PIP Quality Improvements	Landis	Complete	8/24-9/4/98; 98-08 (Schin, Thomas); G-5A,5B & A-5B,5C  11/30-12/11/98; 98-11 (Moore, Schin, Thomas); P-5C  3/8-12; 99-02 (Girard); P-5B,5C proposed	Open

[SA3] N9731	Manager Observations and Group Self-Assessment	Landis	12/31/98	11/30-12/11/98; 98-11 (Schin, Thomas); A-5A	Open
[SA4] N9732	Implant Review/SRG (Job Observation Program)	Landis	12/31/98	98-08; A-5A 11/30 - 12/11/98; 98-11 (Thomas); A-5A	Closed
Operational Focus					
[OF1] N9740	Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action for Operational (Misposition) Related Events	Billings	12/31/98	98-06; G-5B, 5C, 4B & P-5B 98-11; P-1C, 3C, 5C 99-02 proposed	Open
[OF2] N9741	Technical Quality of Operating Procedures	Scott	Projected completion 12/1/98	99-01; A-1C (proposed closure)	Closed (P)
[OF3] N9742	Response to Operational Concerns	Billings	Projected completion 10/01/98	98-06; A-3B, 1C 98-09; G-1A, 3C	Closed
[OF4] N9743	Risk Assessment	Freeman	Projected completion 10/01/98	98-11; A-2B	Closed

[OF5] 11720	Work Backlog Management	Fredrickson	Projected completion 10/1/98	11/2-6/98, 98-110 (Gibbs), G-2B	Closed
[OF6] 10112	Outage Readiness	Fredrickson	Projected completion 11/1/98	11/2-6/98, 98-110 (Gibbs), G-2B	Closed
<b>Temporary Defense</b>					
[TD1] 11720	A.1 Management oversight observation	Freeman	Complete	98-06, G-1A, 3A, 3C 98-10, G-3C, 5C	Closed
[TD2] 11720	A.2 Management oversight during startup/shutdown	Freeman	Complete	98-06, G-1A, 5C	Closed
[TD3] 11720	A.3 Inventory Monitoring Enhancements	Freeman	Complete	98-06, G-1A, 5C	Closed
[TD4] 11720	B. Eng/Ops/Maint Interface	Lanchis/ Fredrickson	Complete	10/5-9/98, 98-09 (Moore), G-4B	Closed
[TD5] 11720	C. Improved Trouble-Shooting	Freeman	Complete	98-11, A-2B 99-01, A-2B (closure proposed)	Closed (P)



[TD6]	E. Post Maint/Mod Testing	Landis/ Fredrickson	Projected completion 2/99	10/5-9/98 98-09 (Moore), P-4B, G-2B, 5A 3/8-12/99 (Thomas, Girard), 99-02, A-5B, 5C (proposed closure)	Closed (P)
[TD7]	F. Chemistry/Ops Interface	Christnot	Complete	98-07, G-1A, 5C, P-5C, E-1C, 5C	Closed
<b>NRC AREAS OF CONCERN</b>					
[NRC1] Operational Focus	Emergency Operating Procedures	Landis	8/99	9/99; (Rogers, Schin, Hopper) Proposed	Open
[NRC2] Problem ID and Resolution	Safety Assessment, Quality Verification (including OEF)	Christnot		98-09, G-1C, 4C (OEF) 99-01, A-4B, 5A, 5B, 5C (closure proposed)	Closed (P)

[NRC3] Design Basis/Tech Support	CREV SSEI	Landis		98-03 (Poor)  8/24-9/4/98; 98-08; G-5C.4B  10/5-9/98; 98-09 (Shin); G-2B.4B  99-02; (Thomas) proposed	Open
[NRC4] Design Basis/Tech Support	Emergency Electrical Distribution System Review (TAC A0886, A0887, A0888)	NRR		Final Report Issued 1/19/99	Closed
[NRC5] Equipment	Containment Coatings	Landis		10/14/98; 98-09 (Lenahan); G-4A.5B  11/16-20/98; 98-10 (Lenahan); P-2B  6/99 (U1RFO); (Lenahan) proposed	Open
[NRC6] Equipment	Keowee W Breaker Mods/Replacement	Christnot		98-10; G-4A.4B.4C	Closed
[NRC7] Human Performance	Maintenance Procedures (Adequacy and Compliance)	Christnot		98-10; P-2B  99-02 (Proposed)	Open

Issues Not Essential for Recovery					
	98-01 Pwr & Letdown welds	NRR			
	98-GO-001 VII-3 exam red	NRR		Closed 10/11/98	Closed
	98-GO-002 Bolting torque	NRR			
	98-GO-008 Alt to exam of concrete containment	NRR		Closed 10/11/98	Closed
	Fatigue Analysis	NRR			
	Operating Experience Program	Christoni		98-09 (Proposed)	Closed
	Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE)	Landis			
	Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs)	Britlings		97-18	Closed
	OAC Replacement Project	Freeman		98-06	Closed
	ONS Equipment Aging Project	Julian		(Proposed review under licensee renewal)	Open

	Integrated Control System Replacement	Freeman		98-06	Closed
<b>Other NRR Actions (Not Essential for Recovery)</b>					
	SQUG (Outliers monitored under licensee's program)	NRR			
	ITS	NRR			
	HPI Amendment	NRR			
	CREV (TIA)	Landis			
	Service Water Amendment	NRR		NRC letter dated 4/24/98 (TAC M99487, M99488, M99489)	Closed
	MSL Break Detection (BL 80-04)	NRR			



### EFW SYSTEM OPEN ITEMS

<u>ITEM NUMBER</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
50-269,270,287/98-09-02	VIO	No QA Records to Assure the Ability of EFW Pumps to Operate at Runout
50-269,270,287/98-15-01	VIO	Failure to Update the UFSAR
50-269,270,287/98-15-02	EEI	Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations
50-269,270,287/98-15-03	EEI	Emergency Procedure Not Adequate to Mitigate Secondary Pipe Break Events
50-269,270,287/99-10-01	URI	EFW System was Designed to Fail During a Main Feedwater Line Break or Non-Seismic Pipe Break
50-269,270,287/99-10-02	URI	10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations Incorrectly Implemented the EFW Licensing Basis
50-269,270,287/99-10-03	IFI	Testing HPI Pumps when Powered From ASW Switchgear
50-269,270,287/99-10-04	IFI	EOP Steps Not Written Clearly or in a Consistent Format
50-269,270,287/99-10-05	IFI	Ability to Throttle EFW Within Three Minutes
50-269,270,287/99-10-06	IFI	Licensing Basis Revision to Credit Main Steam Line Break Protection Circuit for Protection of the TD EFW Pump From Insufficient NPSH
50-269,270,287/99-02-XX*	IFI	Procedure AP/0/A/1700/25 Guidance for Establishing Flow to the RCP Seals and to a Dry OTSG from the SSF

\* Proposed

VIOLATIONS REQUIRING INSPECTION FOR CLOSEOUT

<u>ITEM NUMBER</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
EA 97-298-01012	Failure to Adhere to the TS Operability Requirements for the Unit 3 High Pressure Injection System
50-269,270,287/98-03-01	Untimely Reporting of Design Issues (denied violation)
EA 98-199-01014	USQ Involving Single Failure Introduced by a 1984 Control Room Ventilation System Modification
50-269,270,287/98-08-02	Inadequate 50.59 Safety Evaluation for 1996 UFSAR Revision Related to ECCS Pumps' NPSH Analysis
50-287/98-10-06	Failure to Provide Separation of Redundant Safety-Related Cables Inside Enclosures
EA 98-268-01012	Failure to Meet Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.46 for Long Term Cooling
50-269,270,287/98-15-01	Failure to Update the UFSAR