

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 7912130411 DOC. DATE: 79/12/10 NOTARIZED: NO
 FACIL: 50-269 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Duke Power Co.
 50-270 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Duke Power Co.
 50-287 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Duke Power Co.
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 PARKER, W.O. Duke Power Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

BUCKET #
 05000269
 05000270
 05000287

SUBJECT: RO: on 791126-30, only one standby bus had been energized by LEE Station gas turbine, although Tech Specs require both standby buses be energized during Keowee hydro outage. Caused by inadequately revised procedures.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A0155 COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 0 SIZE: 2
 TITLE: Onsite Emergency Power Systems

NOTES: M. CUNNINGHAM - ALL AMENDS TO FSAR & CHANGES TO TECH SPECS.

ACTION:	RECIPIENT	COPIES		RECIPIENT	COPIES	
	ID CODE/NAME	LTR	ENCL	ID CODE/NAME	LTR	ENCL
	05 BC <u>ORB #4</u>	7		LA <u>ORB #4</u>	1	0
INTERNAL:	01 <u>REG FILE</u>	1	1	02 NRC PDR	1	1
	12 TA/EDD	1	1	13 I&E	2	2
	15 OELD	1	1	16 MPA	1	1
	17 AUXIL SYS BR	1	1	18 I&C SYS BR	1	1
	20 ENGR BR	1	1	21 REAC SFTY BR	1	1
	22 PLANT SYS BR	1	1	23 ADV REAC BR	1	1
	24 PWR SYS BR	1	1	25 WAMBACH T	1	1
	26 TUNDI, D	1	1	27 MCDONALD, D	1	1
	29 BRINKMAN	1	1	30 EEB	1	1
	S HANAUER	1	1			
EXTERNAL:	03 LPDR	1	1	04 NSIC	1	1
	31 ACRS	16	16			

DEC 14 1979

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTR 46 ENCL 0

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

December 10, 1979

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.7.8 as a result of degradation in the emergency electrical power system beyond that permitted by the Technical Specifications. My letter of December 5, 1979 addressed the delays involved in the preparation of this report.

At 0609 on November 26, 1979 both Keowee Hydro units were removed from service for maintenance. Two Lee Station gas turbines had been started the previous day to energize the Oconee standby buses during the Keowee outage. Keowee Unit 1 was returned to service on November 29, 1979, but Unit 2 remained out of service for further maintenance, as described in my letter of November 7, 1979 to Mr. James P. O'Reilly. At 1551 on November 30 as a result of performance of a periodic test to verify proper alignment, it was discovered that only one of the two standby buses was energized by the Lee turbine, although Technical Specification 3.7.4 requires both standby buses to be energized when a Keowee unit is out of service. The open standby bus breaker was then closed. The operating procedure for the 100 KV power supply, by which the Oconee standby buses are energized from the Lee combustion units, had been revised recently to require the Lee units to carry a load from Oconee in order to improve the gas turbine reliability. However, the revision failed to retain instructions to have both standby buses energized. The procedure has been revised to assure that both buses are energized during Keowee outages.

During the period from November 26 to November 30 that only one standby bus was energized, Oconee 1 was in a refueling shutdown, and Oconee 2 and 3 were at approximately full power. In the unlikely event that a Lee combustion unit had been required to supply emergency power, the Engineered Safeguards switchgear for

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
7912130 417

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Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
December 10, 1979
Page Two

each Oconee unit would have been energized by Standby Bus No. 2. In addition, the breaker for Standby Bus No. 1 could have been closed manually from the Control Room if desired. Therefore, this incident is not considered to be significant with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Very truly yours,



William O. Parker, Jr.

SRL:scs

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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 RECIP. NAME: AUTHOR AFFILIATION: DUCHESS COUNTY RECIP. AFFILIATION: DUCHESS COUNTY

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TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTR 46 ENCL 0

004
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | S | I | C | N | E | E | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 37 38 49

CON'T
01 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 9
7 8 9 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | During a routine inspection of the Turbine Building basement while Ocone 3
03 | was at 74% full power, excessive packing leakage from LPSW pump 3B was dis-
04 | covered. LPSW pump 3A was started and pump 3B was secured and repaired. Since
05 | only one pump is required for normal or emergency conditions, one pump is
06 | permitted to be removed from service for up to 24 hours. Therefore, this
07 | incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the
08 | health and safety of the public were not affected.

09 | SYSTEM CODE | W | A | 11 | CAUSE CODE | E | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | B | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | P | U | M | P | X | X | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | B | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16 |
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 7 | 9 | 21 | 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 24 | 26 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | 28 | 29 | REPORT TYPE | L | 30 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 31 |
18 | ACTION TAKEN | D | 18 | Z | 19 | 33 | 34 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | 35 | 36 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 40 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 22 | 41 | NPRO-4 FORM SUB. | Y | 24 | 42 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | L | 25 | 43 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | I | 0 | 7 | 5 | 26 | 44 | 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | The pump's outboard shaft sleeve was discovered to have worked loose, damaging
11 | the pump's packing. Since no damage was observed which could have allowed
12 | the sleeve to work loose, the lock nut may not have been tightened properly.
13 | The pump was repaired and after a successful performance test, returned to
14 | service less than 12 hours after being declared inoperable.

15 | FACILITY STATUS | E | 28 | 7 | 4 | 29 | 10 | 12 | 13 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 30 | 44 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | B | 31 | 46 | 48 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Routine Turbine Building Inspection | 32 | 60
16 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | 10 | 11 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 35 | 44 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36 | 45 | 60
17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 38 | 11 | 12 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 39 | 60
18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 11 | 12 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 41 | 60
19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | Z | 42 | 11 | 12 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 43 | 60
20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | 44 | 10 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 45 | 60

Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to start LPSW pump 3A and secure pump 3B. The outboard shaft sleeve was repositioned correctly, and the packing was adjusted. The pump was declared operable after successful completion of the performance test. Since the procedure for tightening the shaft sleeve lock nut is adequate and since no similar problems have been encountered previously, this appears to be an isolated occurrence, and no further corrective actions are considered to be necessary