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 FACIL: 50-269 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Duke Power Co. 05000269
 50-270 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Duke Power Co. 05000270
 50-287 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Duke Power Co. 05000287

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 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT: Special rept: on 871028, Unit 2 emergency power switching logic Channel A retransfer to startup panel discovered w/o lights after Standby Bus 1 removed from svc for testing. Standby Bus 1 returned to svc.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 2
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
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NOTES: 1 1

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November 2, 1987

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555


Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Sir:

Please find attached a Special 5-Day Report concerning the degradation of more than one functional unit of the Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) for Units 2 and 3. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.7.9 and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

A License Event Report (LER) describing this incident will be provided, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 requirements. A more detailed safety evaluation will be provided with the submittal of the LER for this incident.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

PFG/77/sbn

Attachment

xc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
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Duke Power Company
Oconee Nuclear Station
Special Report

Degradation of More Than One Functional Unit of
The Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) For Units 2 and 3

On October 28, 1987 at 0415, with Unit 1 down for refueling and Units 2 and 3 at 85% and 100% of full power respectively, Standby Bus 1 was removed from service to perform a test. The removal of Standby Bus 1 is accomplished by "racking out" the Standby Bus Keowee Feeder breaker (SK₁) and the Standby Bus to Main Feeder Bus Breaker (S₁) for Units 1, 2 and 3. The process of "racking-out" these breakers, SK₁ and S₁, includes the removal of the respective control power fuses. With the removal of these fuses, two functional units of the EPSL (Items 9 and 10 of Table 3.7-1) were placed in the degraded operating conditions of Table 3.7-1. Technical Specification 3.7.2(b) allows only one of the functional Units of Table 3.7-1 to be in a degraded operating condition. Accordingly a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.2(b) occurred and, as such, is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission per Technical Specification 3.7.9.

Standby Bus 1 was removed from service for testing at 0415 on October 28, 1987. During a routine check of plant equipment, a Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO) found the Unit 2 "EPSL Channel A retransfer to Startup" panel with no lights. Normally, this panel would have three lights on. This situation was evaluated and it was determined that Units 2 and 3 were in a condition less conservative than that allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.2(b). Based on this preliminary determination, Standby Bus 1 was returned to service at 1045 on October 28, 1987.

A safety evaluation of the plant conditions during the 6 hours and 30 minutes that the Standby Bus 1 was isolated was performed. With the standby bus 1 isolated, the safety evaluation concluded that there would be no impact to the ability to provide emergency power to all three units, if required. In the event of a design bases accident and a simultaneous loss of offsite power, the Engineered Safeguard Switchgear buses (4160 volt switchgear) would still be supplied emergency power, even assuming a worst case single failure. Both Keowee units were available to provide emergency power via the overhead path through the units startup transformer or the underground feeder through transformer CT-4 and Standby Bus 2. Also available was the normal Duke Power Transmission System to the 230 Kv Switchyard via at least two 230 KV transmission lines on separate towers. The probability of losing offsite power and/or a design basis accident occurring during the time that the Standby Bus 1 was isolated is very small; therefore, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.