

**E-42575**

**Enclosure 1**

**CoC 1004 Amendment 0**

**Technical Specifications**

**Markup for Revision 1**

ATTACHMENT A  
CONDITIONS FOR SYSTEM USE  
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

72-1004

AMENDMENT 0  
REVISION 1



, if available

If fuel needs to be removed from the DSC, either at the end of service life or for inspection after an accident, precautions must be taken against the potential for the presence of damaged or oxidized fuel and to prevent radiological exposure to personnel during this operation. This can be achieved with this design by the use of the purge and fill valves which permit a determination of the atmosphere within the DSC before the removal of the inner top cover plate and shield plugs, prior to filling the DSC cavity with borated water (see SAR paragraph 5.1.1.9). If the atmosphere within the DSC is helium, then operations should proceed normally with fuel removal either via the transfer cask or in the pool. However, if air is present within the DSC, then appropriate filters should be in place to preclude the uncontrolled release of any potential airborne radioactive particulate from the DSC via the purge-fill valves. This will protect both personnel and the operations area from potential contamination. For the accident case, personnel protection in the form of respirators or supplied air should be considered in accordance with the licensee's Radiation Protection Program.

### 1.1.3 Quality Assurance

Activities at the ISFSI shall be conducted in accordance with a Commission-approved quality assurance program which satisfies the applicable requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and which is established, maintained, and executed with regard to the ISFSI.

### 1.1.4 Heavy Loads Requirements

Lifts of the DSC in the TC must be made within the existing heavy loads requirements and procedures of the licensed nuclear power plant. The TC design has been reviewed under 10 CFR Part 72 and found to meet NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6. (Reference 8). However, an additional safety review (under 10 CFR 50.59) is required to show operational compliance with NUREG-0612 and/or existing plant-specific heavy loads requirements.

### 1.1.5 Training Module

A training module shall be developed for the existing licensee's training program establishing an ISFSI training and certification program. This module shall include the following:

1. Standardized NUHOMS Design (overview);
2. ISFSI Facility Design (overview);
3. Certificate of Compliance conditions (overview);
4. Fuel Loading, Transfer Cask Handling, DSC Transfer Procedures; and
5. Off-Normal Event Procedures.

## 1.2.8 HSM Maximum Air Exit Temperature

### Limit/Specification:

Following initial DSC transfer to the HSM or the occurrence of accident conditions, the equilibrium air temperature difference between ambient temperature and the vent outlet temperature shall not exceed 100°F for  $\geq 5$  year cooled fuel, when fully loaded with 24 kW heat.

### Applicability:

This specification is applicable to all HSMs stored in the ISFSI. If a DSC is placed in the HSM with a heat load less than 24 kW, the limiting difference between outlet and ambient temperatures shall be determined by a calculation performed by the user using the same methodology and inputs documents in the SAR and SER.

### Objective:

The objective of this limit is to ensure that the temperatures of the fuel cladding and the HSM concrete do not exceed the temperatures calculated in Section 8 of the SAR. That section shows that if the air outlet temperature difference is less than or equal to 100°F (with a thermal heat load of 24 kW), the fuel cladding and concrete will be below the respective temperature limits for normal long-term operation.

### Action:

The cask may be unloaded into the spent fuel pool, if one is available. If a spent fuel pool is not available, alternate means shall be employed to reduce cask temperatures.

If the temperature rise is greater than that specified, then the air inlets and exits should be checked for blockage. If the blockage is cleared and the temperature is still greater than that specified, the DSC and HSM cavity may be inspected using video equipment or other suitable means. If environmental factors can be ruled out as the cause of excessive temperatures, then the fuel bundles are producing heat at a rate higher than the upper limit specified in Section 3 of the SAR and will require additional measurements and analysis to assess the actual performance of the system. If excessive temperatures cause the system to perform in an unacceptable manner and/or the temperatures cannot be controlled to acceptable limits, then the cask shall be unloaded.

### Surveillance:

The temperature rise shall be measured and recorded daily following DSC insertion until equilibrium temperature is reached, 24 hours after insertion, and again on a daily basis after insertion into the HSM or following the occurrence of accident conditions. If the temperature rise is within the specifications or the calculated value for a heat load less than 24 kW, then the HSM and DSC are performing as designed to meet this specification and no further maximum air exit temperature measurements are required. Air temperatures must be measured in such a manner as to obtain representative values of inlet and outlet air temperatures.

### Basis:

The specified temperature rise is selected to ensure the fuel clad and concrete temperatures are maintained at or below acceptable long-term storage limits.

, the DSC and TC

### 1.2.10 DSC Handling Height Outside the Spent Fuel Pool Building

- Limit/Specification:
1. The loaded TC/DSC shall not be handled at a height greater than 80 inches outside the spent fuel pool building.
  2. In the event of a drop of a loaded TC/DSC from a height greater than 15 inches: ~~(a) fuel in the DSC shall be returned to the reactor spent fuel pool; (b) the DSC shall be removed from service and evaluated for further use; and (c) the TC shall be inspected for damage and evaluated for further use.~~

Applicability: The specification applies to handling the TC, loaded with the DSC, on route to, and at, the storage pad.

- Objective:
1. To preclude a loaded TC/DSC drop from a height greater than 80 inches.
  2. To maintain spent fuel integrity, according to the spent fuel specification for storage, continued confinement integrity, and DSC functional capability, after a tip-over or drop of a loaded DSC from a height greater than 15 inches.

Surveillance: In the event of a loaded TC/DSC drop accident, the system will be ~~returned to the reactor fuel handling building, where, after the fuel has been returned to the spent fuel pool, the DSC and TC will be inspected and evaluated for future use.~~

Basis: The NRC evaluation of the TC/DSC drop analysis concurred that drops up to 80 inches, of the DSC inside the TC, can be sustained without breaching the confinement boundary, preventing removal of spent fuel assemblies, or causing a criticality accident. This specification ensures that handling height limits will not be exceeded in transit to, or at the storage pad. Acceptable damage may occur to the TC, DSC, and the fuel stored in the DSC, for drops of height greater than 15 inches. The specification requiring inspection of the DSC ~~and fuel~~ following a drop of 15 inches or greater ensures that the spent fuel will continue to meet the requirements for storage, the DSC will continue to provide confinement, and the TC will continue to provide its design functions of DSC transfer and shielding.

### 1.3.2 HSM Thermal Performance

**Surveillance:** Verify a temperature measurement of the thermal performance, for each HSM, on a daily basis. The temperature measurement could be any parameter such as (1) a direct measurement of the HSM temperatures, (2) a direct measurement of the DSC temperatures, (3) a comparison of the inlet and outlet temperature difference to predicted temperature differences for each individual HSM, or (4) other means that would identify and allow for the correction of off-normal thermal conditions that could lead to exceeding the concrete and fuel clad temperature criteria. If air temperatures are measured, they must be measured in such a manner as to obtain representative values of inlet and outlet air temperatures. Also due to the proximity of adjacent HSM modules, care must be exercised to ensure that measured air temperatures reflect only the thermal performance of an individual module, and not the combined performance of adjacent modules.

**Action:** If the temperature measurement shows a significant unexplained difference, so as to indicate the approach of materials to the concrete or fuel clad temperature criteria, take appropriate action to determine the cause and return the canister to normal operation. If the measurement or other evidence suggests that the concrete accident temperature criteria (350°F) has been exceeded for more than 24 hours, the HSM must be removed from service unless the licensee can provide test results in accordance with ACI-349, appendix A.4.3, demonstrating that the structural strength of the HSM has an adequate margin of safety.

**Basis:** The temperature measurement should be of sufficient scope to provide the licensee with a positive means to identify conditions which threaten to approach temperature criteria for proper HSM operation and allow for the correction of off-normal thermal conditions that could lead to exceeding the concrete and fuel clad temperature criteria.

If the HSM is removed from service, one option is to unload the cask into the spent fuel pool. If a spent fuel pool is not available, alternate means shall be employed to reduce cask temperatures.