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 50-287 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Duke Power Co. 05000287
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 PARKER, W.O. Duke Power Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 DENTON, H.R. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 REID, R.W. Operating Reactors Branch 4

SUBJECT: Forwards supplemental response to NRC 800223 request for info re primary coolant sys pressure isolation valves. Neither continuous surveillance nor periodic testing is now being performed. Check valves display no lack of integrity.

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APR 18 1980

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

April 11, 1980

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. R. W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4


Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Sir:

In response to a request by Mr. Philip Polk of your staff, the attached information is provided supplementing my letter of March 13, 1980, which responded to Mr. Eisenhut's letter of February 23, 1980 concerning primary coolant system pressure isolation valves.

As stated previously, based on Duke Power's review of the concern, no modifications to the Oconee Operating License are considered necessary.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

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
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Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
April 11, 1980
Page Two

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR., being duly sworn, states that he is Vice President of Duke Power Company; that he is authorized on the part of said Company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this document; and that all statements and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.



William O. Parker, Jr., Vice President

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of April, 1980

Notary Public



Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

September 20, 1984

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Supplemental Response to Request for Information
NRC Letter Dated February 23, 1980

Item 1

Describe the valve configuration at your plant and indicate if an Event V isolation valve configuration exists within the Class I boundary of the high pressure piping connecting PCS piping to low pressure system piping; e.g., (1) two check valves in series, or (2) two check valves in series with a MOV.

Response

As stated in our previous response, the low pressure portion of each low pressure injection line at Oconee is isolated from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by two check valves inside containment and a normally-closed motor-operated valve (MOV) outside containment. The break between high and low pressure piping occurs at the MOV. The valve lineup corresponds to the Event V configuration only during quarterly testing of the MOV. The MOV is also opened while the system is performing its normal decay heat function and in the event of an Engineered Safeguards actuation. However, in both these cases RCS pressure is low.

Item 2

If either of the above Event V configurations exist at your facility, indicate whether continuous surveillance or periodic tests are being accomplished on such valves to ensure integrity. Also indicate whether valves have been known, or found, to lack integrity.

Response

Neither continuous surveillance nor periodic testing is being accomplished currently. However, the check valves in question have exhibited no lack of integrity. In order to verify the integrity of these valves, the Oconee 3 check valves were leak tested in 1979 following an extended outage. The valves exhibited little or no leakage, in all cases less than the equivalent of 1 gpm (allowable unidentified leakage) at full system pressure. The test was determined to be impractical due to the extensive critical path time required during unit startup and the hazard to personnel performing the test, and will not be repeated on a periodic basis.

Item 3

If either of the above Event V configurations exist at your facility, indicate whether plant procedures should be revised or if plant modifications should be made to increase reliability.

Response

Since these check valves have demonstrated no lack of integrity, and since gross failure of both check valves coupled with opening of the MOV while RCS pressure is high would be required for an Event V breach of the primary coolant pressure boundary, no plant modifications are considered to be warranted at this time. However, in order to preclude even this small possibility, the inservice testing program is being revised so that the MOV's are exercised only at cold shutdown. An evaluation is in progress to determine a suitable method for verifying the integrity of the check valves, such as monitoring the pressure between the valves. If this approach is implemented, the pressure would be monitored following each shutdown during which the check valves are exercised. Continuous surveillance would not be accomplished, since the probability of gross failure of the valves during power operation would be extremely remote, although slight leakage might occur which would tend to increase pressure between the valves with no adverse consequences.