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SUBJECT: Forwards justification for continued operation supporting alternate schedule, per NRC Bulletin 88-011.

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May 10, 1989

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-269 and 50-270
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414
NRC Bulletin No. 88-11
Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification

Gentlemen:

My March 10, 1989 letter to the NRC Document Control Desk transmitted an alternate schedule to the one requested in NRC Bulletin 88-11, Action 1.d. The alternate schedule was requested to allow sufficient time for the Westinghouse Owners Group to obtain monitoring data, define thermal transients, perform required analyses, update stress and fatigue analysis, and address NRC Bulletin 88-11, Action 1.b, in a generic basis. My March 10, 1989 submittal indicated that a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) supporting the alternate schedule would be submitted to the NRC prior to May 10, 1989. Please find attached the JCO for McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations. Duke Power Company has determined that it is acceptable for McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations to continue power operation for at least ten additional heatup-cooldown cycles. Duke Power will address the requirements of Bulletin 88-11 by January 1991.


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I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Very truly yours,

H. B. Tucker



JGT/WPL15. DOC

Attachment

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NRC Resident Inspector
McGuire Nuclear Station

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION

REGARDING

PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE STRATIFICATION

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 and 2

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 and 2

BACKGROUND

It was first reported in INPO SER 25-87 that temperature measurements at a German PWR indicated thermal transients different than design. Recent measurements at several domestic PWR's have indicated that the temperature difference between the pressurizer and the hot leg results in stratified flow in the surge line, with the top of the flow stream being hot (pressurizer temperature) and the bottom being colder (hot leg temperature). The top-to-bottom temperature difference can reach 250°F to 300°F in certain modes of operation, particularly Modes 3, 4, or 5 during heatup and cooldown.

Surge line stratification causes two effects:

- Global bending of the pipe is different than that predicted in the original design.
- Fatigue life of the piping could be reduced due to the global and local stresses from stratification and striping.

More recently, the NRC has issued Bulletin 88-11 "Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification," December 20, 1988, identifying actions to be taken by licenses.

- a) Conduct visual inspection - walkdown
- b) Update stress and fatigue analysis to account for stratification and striping
- c) Obtain monitoring data, as necessary

The bulletin encourages licensees to perform actions b) and c) above through collective efforts with other plants. In October 1988, Duke Power Company and other members of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) authorized a program to perform a generic evaluation of surge line stratification in Westinghouse PWR's that will address portions of Bulletin 88-11.

The WOG program is designed to benefit from the experience gained in the performance of several plant specific analyses on Westinghouse PWR surge lines. These detailed analyses included definition of revised thermal transients (including stratification) and evaluations of pipe stress, fatigue usage factor, thermal striping, fatigue crack growth, leak before-break, and support loads. The overall analytical approach used in all of these analyses has been consistent and has been reviewed, in detail, by the NRC staff.

As of March 1989, plant specific analyses have been performed on five domestic Westinghouse PWR's. In addition, twelve Westinghouse plants have completed or

are currently performing an interim evaluation of surge line stratification which includes finite element structural analysis of their specific configuration under stratified loading conditions.

WOG Program Status

As part of the current WOG Program, surge line physical and operating data has been collected and summarized for all domestic Westinghouse PWR's (55 units). Information relating to piping layout, supports and restraints, components, size, material, operating history, etc, has been obtained. This data has been evaluated in conjunction with available monitoring data and plant specific analyses performed by Westinghouse. The results of this evaluation were presented to the NRC in a meeting on April 11, 1989. The evaluation is being formalized into a Westinghouse topical report (WCAP (WCAP 12277, Proprietary and WCAP-12278, Non-proprietary version) scheduled for submittal to the NRC on June 15, 1989.

This topical report forms the basis for the following justification for continued operation.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION

A. Stratification Severity

Thermal stratification ($\Delta T > 100^\circ\text{F}$) has been measured on all surge lines for which monitoring has been performed and which have been reviewed by the WOG to date (eight surge lines).

The amount of stratification measured and its variation with time (cycling) varies. This variation has been conservatively enveloped and applicability of these enveloping transients has been demonstrated for plant specific analyses.

Various surge line design parameters were tabulated for each plant. From this, four parameters judged to be relatively significant were identified.

- A. Pipe inside diameter
- B. Piping slope (average)
- C. Entrance angle of hot leg nozzle
- D. Presence of mid-line vertical riser

These parameters were used in a grouping evaluation which resulted in the definition of 10 monitoring groups corresponding to various combinations of these parameters at Westinghouse PWR's. Approximately 40% of the plants fall into one group for which the enveloping thermal transients, discussed above, are applicable. The remaining 60% of Westinghouse PWR's are divided among the other nine additional groups. Although monitoring data has not yet been received representative of all these groups, in general, the combination of significant parameters of these nine groups is expected to decrease the severity of stratification below that of the enveloping transients. This conclusion is also supported by a comparison of available monitoring data.

B. Structural Effects

Significant parameters which can influence the structural effects of stratification are:

- a. Location and design of rigid supports and pipe whip restraints
- b. Pipe layout geometry and size
- c. Type and location of piping components

Although the material and fabrication techniques for Westinghouse surge lines are reasonably consistent and of high quality, the design parameters listed above vary among Westinghouse PWR's. This variation in design is primarily a result of plant specific routing requirements.

A preliminary evaluation, comparing the ranges of these parameters to those of plants for which plant-specific analysis and interim evaluations are available (approximately 20% of Westinghouse PWR's), has been performed. This comparison indicates a high degree of confidence that, from a combined transient severity and structural effects standpoint, the worst configuration has most likely been evaluated. This conclusion is supported by plant-specific analyses covering five plants and interim evaluations of six additional plants (interim evaluation is in progress on six more plants as of March 1989). These analyses and evaluations have included various piping layouts, pipe sizes, support and restraint designs and piping components. Although the full range of variation in these parameters has not been evaluated, experience gained from these evaluations indicates that further evaluations will not result in a more limiting configuration than those already evaluated.

C. Operating Procedures

The WOG currently has available the surveys of operating procedures performed in support of existing plant-specific analyses. Experience indicates that heatup and cooldown procedures have a significant effect on stratification in the surge line. All conclusions reached by the WOG to date have assumed a steam bubble mode heatup and cooldown procedure which may result in a temperature difference between the pressurizer and reactor coolant system (RCS) hot leg of more than 300°F. In many cases, individual plant operating procedures and technical specifications provide limits on this value. It is also known that some procedures utilize nitrogen, during at least part of the heatup/cooldown cycle, as a means of providing a pressure absorbing space in the pressurizer. Based on information currently available to the WOG, a high confidence exists that the steam bubble mode heatup, assumed to date, is conservative with respect to Westinghouse PWRs.

D. Remaining Life

The design codes for surge line piping have requirements for checking pipe stress limits and the effects of fatigue loadings. These stress limits provide a means of controlling stress from primary loads such as pressure, deadweight, and design mechanical loading, as well as stress from secondary loads such as thermal and anchor motion effects.

Stratification in the surge line is a secondary load which will only affect the qualification of secondary stresses. The qualification of primary stresses is not affected by this loading.

Secondary stresses are controlled to prevent excessive displacements and gross plasticity and to prevent excessive fatigue loadings in the pipe. The basic

characteristic of a secondary stress is that it is self limiting; thus, a failure from a single application of a secondary loading is not expected.

For the stratification issue, the potential effects of excessive displacements are being investigated through a detailed visual observation of the surge line during the walkdowns required per Bulletin 88-11 action 1.a. Section F of this JCO, Inspection History, provides information regarding visual surge line inspections at McGuire and Catawba.

The effects of secondary stresses on the remaining life of the surge line have been evaluated on a generic basis through the WOG program. The following summarizes the results of this evaluation.

All plant specific analyses performed as of March, 1989 have demonstrated compliance with applicable ASME Codes and a surge line fatigue life in excess of a 40 yr. plant life. Review of plant specific fatigue calculations indicates that the surge line fatigue life is primarily dependent on the number of heatup and cooldown cycles, rather than years of operation.

Considering the worst case years of operation (28.5 yr) in combination with the worst case number of heatup-cooldown cycles (75, at a different plant) at any Westinghouse PWR, and assuming a 40 year life for all surge lines, it is estimated that no more than approximately 50% of the fatigue life has been used at any Westinghouse plant to date.

For a design life considering 200 heat-up-cooldown cycles (used in plant specific analyses), this would indicate approximately 100 remaining cycles. This number of remaining cycles far exceeds the postulated worst case number for the two year time frame needed to resolve the stratification issue.

E. Leak Before Break

All the plant specific analyses performed to date that have included the loadings due to stratification and striping have validated the "leak-before-break" concept and have substantiated a 40-year plant life. Fatigue crack growth calculations, performed as part of these plant specific analyses, have demonstrated that any undiscovered crack as large as 10% of the wall thickness would not grow to cause leakage within a 40 year plant life. Nevertheless, any postulated through wall crack propagation would most likely result in "leak-before-break" and thus permit a safe and orderly shutdown.

F. Inspection History

The NDE inspection history at McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations, as well as all other domestic Westinghouse designed PWR's, has not revealed any service induced degradation in the surge line piping that has been attributed to thermal stratification.

Duke Power Company performed a visual inspection of the McGuire Unit 1, Catawba Unit 1, and Catawba Unit 2 surge lines in March, January, and April, 1989 respectively. The results of these inspections did not indicate any gross discernable distress or structural damage in the surge lines. The results of the McGuire Unit 1 inspection were transmitted to the NRC per H. B. Tucker's April 12, 1989 letter to the Document Control Desk. The results of

the Catawba Unit 1 and Catawba Unit 2 inspection were transmitted to the NRC per H. B. Tucker's February 1, 1989 and May 5, 1989 letters to the Document Control Desk.

Duke Power Company will perform a visual inspection of the McGuire Unit 2 pressurizer surge line during the next available cold shutdown, exceeding 7 days duration. A planned cold shutdown exceeding 7 days duration is scheduled for July 5, 1989. Duke Power will submit a letter to the staff, within 30 days after completion of this inspection, per reporting requirements 1 and 3 of Bulletin 88-11. Should the results of this inspection indicate any gross discernable distress or structural damage, this letter will also address the need for corrective actions, repair, plant specific analysis and/or monitoring, etc., as appropriate.

Summary of Conclusions From WOG Program

Based on information assembled on surge lines for all domestic Westinghouse PWR's, and evaluation of that information in conjunction with plant-specific and other interim evaluation results, the WOG concludes that:

- A high degree of confidence exists that further evaluation will confirm that the worst combination has already been evaluated for stratification severity, structural effects and operating procedures.
- All plant specific analyses, to date, have demonstrated a 40 year life of the surge line. Assuming that further evaluation leads to the same conclusion for the remaining Westinghouse PWR's, the worst case remaining life is approximately 100 heatup-cooldown cycles.
- Through wall crack propagation is highly unlikely, however, "leak-before-break" would permit a safe and orderly shutdown if a through wall leak should develop.
- NDE inspection history demonstrates the present day integrity of Westinghouse PWR pressurizer surge lines.
- While additional monitoring, analyses, and surveys of operating procedures are expected to further substantiate the above conclusions, the presently available information on surge line stratification indicates that Westinghouse PWR's may be safely operated while additional data is obtained.

Overall Conclusion

Based on the above discussions, Duke Power Company believes it is acceptable for McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations to continue power operation for at least ten additional heatup-cooldown cycles. Duke Power Company has committed to address the requirements of Bulletin 88-11 by January, 1991.