

ATTACHMENT
DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVISION

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3.5 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS

3.5.1 Operational Safety Instrumentation

Applicability

Applies to unit instrumentation and control systems.

Objective

To delineate the conditions of the unit instrumentation and safety circuits necessary to assure reactor safety.

Specifications

- 3.5.1.1 The reactor shall not be in a startup mode or in a critical state unless the requirements of Table 3.5.1-1, Column C are met.
- 3.5.1.2 In the event that the number of protective channels operable falls below the limit given under Table 3.5.1-1, Column C; operation shall be limited as specified in Column D.
- 3.5.1.3 For on-line testing or in the event of a protective instrument or channel failure, a key-operated channel bypass switch associated with each reactor protective channel may be used to lock the channel trip relay in the untripped state. Status of the untripped state shall be indicated by a light. Only one channel bypass key shall be accessible for use in the control room. Only one channel shall be locked in this untripped state or contain a dummy bistable at any one time.
- 3.5.1.4 For on-line testing or maintenance during reactor power operation, a key-operated shutdown bypass switch associated with each reactor protective channel may be used in conjunction with a key-operated channel bypass switch as limited by 3.5.1.3. Status of the shutdown bypass switch shall be indicated by a light.
- 3.5.1.5 During startup when the intermediate range instruments come on scale, the overlap between the intermediate range and the source range instrumentation shall not be less than one decade. If the overlap is less than one decade, the flux level shall not be greater than that readable on the source range instruments until the one decade overlap is achieved.
- 3.5.1.6 In the event that one of the trip devices in either of the sources supplying power to the control rod drive mechanisms fails in the untripped state, the power supplied to the rod drive mechanisms through the failed trip device shall be manually removed within 30 minutes. The condition will be corrected and the remaining trip devices shall be tested within eight hours. If the condition is not corrected and the remaining trip devices tested within the eight hour period, the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition within an additional four hours.

Bases

Every reasonable effort will be made to maintain all safety instrumentation in operation. A startup is not permitted unless three power range neutron instrument channels and three channels each of the following are operable: reactor coolant temperature, reactor coolant pressure, pressure-temperature, flux-imbalance flow, power-number of pumps, and high reactor building pressure. The engineered safety features actuation system must have three analog channels and two digital channels functioning correctly prior to a startup. Additional operability requirements are provided by Technical Specifications 3.1.12 and 3.4 for equipment which are not part of the RPS or ESFAS.

Operation at rated power is permitted as long as the systems have at least the redundancy requirements of Column C (Table 3.5.1-1). A tripped channel is considered to be operable. This is in agreement with redundancy and single failure criteria of IEEE-279 as described in FSAR Section 7.

There are four reactor protective channels. A fifth channel that is isolated from the reactor protective system is provided as a part of the reactor control system. Normal trip logic is two out of four. Required trip logic for the power range instrumentation channels is two out of three. Minimum trip logic on other channels is one out of two.

The four reactor protective channels were provided with key operated bypass switches to allow on-line testing or maintenance on only one channel at a time during power operation. Each channel is provided alarm and lights to indicate when that channel is bypassed. There will be one reactor protective system bypass switch key permitted in the control room. That key will be under the administrative control of the Shift Supervisor. Spare keys will be maintained in a locked storage accessible only to the station Manager.

Each reactor protective channel key operated shutdown bypass switch is provided with alarm and lights to indicate when the shutdown bypass switch is being used. There are four shutdown bypass keys in the control room under the administrative control of the Shift Supervisor. The use of a key operated shutdown bypass switch for on-line testing or maintenance during reactor power operation has no significance when used in conjunction with a key operated channel bypass switch since the channel trip relay is locked in the untripped state. The use of a key operated shutdown bypass switch alone during power operation will cause the channel to trip. When the shutdown bypass switch is operated for on-line testing or maintenance during reactor power operation, reactor power and RCS pressure limits as specified in Table 2.3-1A, B, or C are not applicable.

The source range and intermediate range nuclear instrumentation overlap by one decade of neutron flux. This decade overlap will be achieved at 10^{-10} amps on the intermediate range instrument.

Power is normally supplied to the control rod drive mechanisms from two separate parallel 600 volt sources. Redundant trip devices are employed in each of these sources. If any one of these trip devices fails in the

untripped state on-line repairs to the failed device, when practical, will be made, and the remaining trip devices will be tested. Four hours is ample time to test the remaining trip devices and in many cases make on-line repairs.

Containment isolation valves on non-essential systems are isolated by diverse signals from high containment pressure and low reactor coolant system pressure devices. The systems considered to be non-essential include:

1. Letdown line
2. RC Pump seal return line
3. Quench Tank sample line
4. Quench Tank gaseous vent
5. Reactor Building purge lines
6. Reactor Building sump drain line
7. Reactor Building atmosphere sample line
8. Pressurizer sample line
9. OTSG sample line
10. OTSG drain line

Containment isolation valves on essential systems are isolated by high containment pressure only. The systems considered to be essential include:

1. Component cooling to RC pumps
2. Low pressure service water cooling to RC pump motor

REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 7.1

TABLE 3.5.1-1
INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	(A) <u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	(B) <u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	(C) <u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	(D) <u>Operator Action If Conditions Of Column C Cannot Be Met</u>
1. Nuclear Instrumentation Intermediate Range Channels	2	NA	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (b)
2. Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Channels	2	NA	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (b) (c)
3. RPS Manual Pushbutton	1	1	1	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
4. RPS Power Range Instrument Channels	4	2	3(a)	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
5. RPS Reactor Coolant Temperature Instrument Channels	4	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
6. RPS Pressure-Temperature Instruments Channels	4	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
7. RPS Flux Imbalance Flow Instrument Channels	4	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
8. RPS Reactor Coolant Pressure				
a. High Reactor Coolant Pressure Instrument Channels	4	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
a. Low Reactor Coolant Pressure Channels	4	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
9. RPS Power-Number of Pumps Instrument Channels	4	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (h)

TABLE 3.5.1-1
INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS (cont'd)

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	(A) <u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	(B) <u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	(C) <u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	(D) <u>Operator Action If Conditions Of Column C Cannot Be Met</u>
10. RPS High Reactor Building Pressure Channels	4	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
11. RPS Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (g)				
a. Loss of Turbine	4	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
b. Loss of Main Feedwater	4	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours
12. ESF High Pressure Injection System and Reactor Building Isolation (Non-essential Systems)				
a. Reactor Coolant Pressure Instrument Channels	3	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
b. Reactor Building 4 PSIG Instrument Channels	3	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
c. Manual Pushbutton	2	1	2	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
13. ESF Low Pressure Injection System				
a. Reactor Coolant Pressure Instrument Channels	3	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)

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TABLE 3.5.1-1
INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS (cont'd)

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	(A) <u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	(B) <u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	(C) <u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	(D) <u>Operator Action If Conditions Of Column C Cannot Be Met</u>
b. Reactor Building 4 PSIG Instrument Channels	3	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
c. Manual Pushbutton	2	1	2	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
14 ESF Reactor Building Isolation (Essential Systems) & Reactor Building Cooling System				
a. Reactor Building 4 PSIG Instrument Channel	3	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
b. Manual Pushbutton	2	1	2	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
15. ESF Reactor Building Spray System				
a. Reactor Building High Pressure Instrument Channel	3	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
b. Manual Pushbutton	2	1	2	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
16. Turbine Stop Valves Closure	2	1	2	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (f)

TABLE 3.5.1-1

INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS (cont'd)

NOTES:

- (a) For channel testing, calibration, or maintenance, one of the three minimum operable channels may be put into manual bypass leaving a one out of two trip logic for a maximum of four hours.
- (b) When 2 of 4 power range instrument channels are greater than 10% rated power, hot shutdown is not required.
- (c) When 1 of 2 intermediate range instrument channels is greater than 10^{-10} amps, hot shutdown is not required.
- (d) (Deleted)
- (e) If minimum conditions are not met within 48 hours after hot shutdown, the unit shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.
- (f) One channel may be inoperable for no more than 24 hours before going to the hot shutdown condition.
- (g) This requirement is applicable as follows:
 - Unit 1 - following Summer 1981 refueling outage
 - Unit 2 - following Fall 1981 refueling outage
 - Unit 3 - immediately upon the effective date of this license amendment
- (h) The RCP monitors provide inputs to this logic. For operability to be met either all RCP monitor channels must be operable or 3 operable with the remaining channel in the tripped state.

The High Pressure Injection System under normal operating conditions has one pump operating. At least once per month, operation is rotated to another high pressure injection pump. This verifies that the high pressure injection pumps are operable.

The requirements of the Low Pressure Service Water System for cooling water are more severe during normal operation than under accident conditions. Rotation of the pump in operation on a monthly basis verifies that two pumps are operable.

The low pressure injection pumps are tested singularly for operability by opening the borated water storage tank outlet valves and the bypass valves in the borated water storage tank fill line. This allows water to be pumped from the borated water storage tank through each of the injection lines and back to the tank.

Testing the manual operability of power-operated valves in the Low Pressure Injection System gives assurance that flow can be established in a timely manner even if the capability to operate a valve from the control room is lost.

With the reactor shut down, the valves in each core flooding line are checked for operability by reducing the Reactor Coolant System Pressure until the indicated level in the core flood tanks verify that the check and isolation valves have opened.

Power Operated Valves LP-17 and LP-18, are boundary valves between high pressure and low pressure design piping. As such, functional testing of these valves is performed during cold shutdown conditions when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is below the design pressure of the Low Pressure Injection System piping and the potential for over-pressurization of the low pressure system is eliminated. Check Valves CF-12, CF-14, LP-47, and LP-48 are located on the high pressure piping and therefore can be leak tested with the Reactor Coolant System at hot shutdown conditions.

REFERENCE

- (1) FSAR, Section 6