

DUKE POWER COMPANY

REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

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October 25, 1978

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

RE: RII:CMH
50-269/78-15
50-270/78-15
50-287/78-16

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

With regard to your letter of September 29, 1978 which transmitted OIE Inspection Report 50-269/78-15, 50-270/78-15, 50-287/78-16, Duke Power Company does not consider this information to be proprietary. Attached are responses to the two items of noncompliance listed in the report.

Your letter also indicated concern with apparent weaknesses in the contamination control program at Oconee and requested that those actions taken or planned to improve this program be described. In this regard, there has been and is an awareness of the need to improve the quality of the Oconee contamination control program. Actions have been and are being taken as discussed below:

- (a) The primary frisking points to avoid spread of contamination to other station areas are the exits from the Radiation Control Areas. As noted in the inspection report, background levels prevent many exits from being used as frisking points. To improve this situation, a modification is being processed to shield sample lines creating the high background levels at three of the main frisking points. Other piping interferences have prevented shields from being installed at these locations however, and relocation of the sample lines is being evaluated.

Five other areas where the background levels cannot be pinpointed to specific problem components are to be improved by the installation of frisking booths. Evaluation of the floor loading in areas where the booths are to be installed was required and it is expected that the booths will be available by January, 1979.

To assure that personnel are properly frisking themselves, periodic checks have been and are continuing to be made by Health Physics personnel.

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
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- (b) The smear survey frequencies in the Interim Radwaste Building corridors have been changed to weekly as committed at the time of the inspection. It should be noted however that the primary method of contamination control in this and other Radiation Control Areas is the "stepoff pad." These pads serve as the boundary between clean and contaminated areas. Each "stepoff pad" is checked daily for contamination. If the step-off pad is found contaminated from improper use, then the areas around it are checked and the limits of contamination spread are defined, posted and cleaned. The corridor checks are an additional verification that contamination is not present. The personnel friskers provide further assurance that contamination is not present. The recently installed portal monitors are a third verification that contamination is not present on personnel leaving station areas.
- (c) The "Contamination Area" outside the radwaste solidification area has been cleaned up. In addition, reemphasis has been given to the station organization responsible for housekeeping matters in that area. It is anticipated that this action will result in more timely cleanup of contamination hazards.

Three portal monitors have been previously ordered to be used to check individuals leaving the Restricted Area. At the time of the subject inspection, these were not in use as actions to provide electrical power and procedures covering their use had not yet been completed. The monitors are currently in service and, to the extent that they can be maintained operable, provide a check on employees who leave the Radiation Control Area.

The above and other efforts will continue as necessary to assure the quality of the contamination control program at Ocone.

Very truly yours,



William O. Parker, Jr.

RLG:scs
Attachment

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Response to OIE Inspection Report
50-269/78-15, 50-270/78-15, 50-287/78-16

ITEM A:

10 CFR 20.201(b) requires that each licensee shall make or cause to be made such surveys as may be necessary for him to comply with the regulations in this part. 10 CFR 20.203(b) states that "each radiation area shall be conspicuously posted with a sign or signs having the radiation caution symbol and the words: "CAUTION RADIATION AREA."

Contrary to the above, the licensee had not performed the radiation surveys necessary to ensure that radiation areas in the Interim Radwaste Building were identified and properly posted. Radiation levels exceeding 5 mr/hr (9-25 mr/hr) were measured in three separate accessible areas of the building during a radiation survey performed on August 2, 1978, as requested by the inspector.

This is an infraction.

RESPONSE:

The infraction resulted from a personnel error where the individual failed to adhere to the procedural requirements of procedures HP/O/B/1000/54 (Health Physics Shift Routines) and HP/O/B/1000/07 (Roping Off, Barricading and Posting of Radiation Control Zones).

The immediate corrective action was to post the entrances to the interim waste facility with appropriate Radiation Area signs. Additionally, one major contributor to the existing radiation levels was a sample sink drain hose routed to a hallway floor drain. This hose was rerouted to a floor drain within a posted RCZ control boundary.

The Health Physics Technician assigned the responsibility of HP procedure HP/O/B/1000/54 (HP Shift Routines) for the time of the occurrence received a written reprimand as a form of corrective disciplinary action.

ITEM B:

Technical Specification 6.4.1 states, in part, that the station shall be operated and maintained in accordance with approved procedures. Operating Procedure OP/O/A/1510/4, "Spent Fuel Shipping, NAC-1 Cask," steps 6.7 and 6.8 require that, in preparing a loaded spent fuel cask for shipment, the trunnion down nuts be torqued to 50 ft-lbs and the closure head impact limiter bolts torqued to 60 ft-lbs.

Contrary to the above, Operating Procedure OP/O/A/1510/4, "Spent Fuel Shipping, NAC-1 Cask," was not followed on July 27, 1978, in that trunnion tie-down nuts

B (Cont'd):

and closure head impact limiter bolts, although tightened, were not torqued as specified prior to initialling the procedure steps as completed.

This is an infraction.

RESPONSE:

The infraction resulted from a personnel error where the procedure for shipping spent fuel (OP/O/A/1510/04) was not strictly adhered to for the two steps in question.

For immediate corrective action, the bolts on the trunnion bracket and on the impact limiter were retorqued to the required values. The job supervisor was counseled on the incident and was instructed to follow procedures as they are written at all times.