# Official Transcript of Proceedings

# NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board Teleconference with Petitioner, Michael Mulligan, Citizen, re: 2.206 - Emergency Ultrasonic Inspection Test or Best Available Flaw Detection Technology for USA Reactor Plants Similar to the Thousands of Cracks Discovered in Belgium Nuclear Power Plants.

Docket Number: 50-271

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB)

CONFERENCE CALL

RE

BELGIUM NUCLEAR PLANT VESSEL CRACKS IN USA PLANTS

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TUESDAY,

MAY 19, 2015

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The conference call was held, Rob Taylor, Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding.

PETITIONER: MICHAEL MULLIGAN

PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS

ROB TAYLOR, Petition Review Board Chairman

STEPHEN KOENICK, Petition Manager

BOB HARDIES, Senior Technical Advisor

MERRILEE BANIC, 2.206 Petition Coordinator

PATRICIA JEHLE, Office of the General Counsel

NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF

ROBERT CARPENTER, Office of Enforcement

MEENA KHANNA, Branch Chief

REGIONAL OFFICE PARTICIPANTS

STEPHEN HAMMANN, Region 1

VIJAY MEGHANI, Region 3

JOON PARK, Region 3

REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE LICENSEE

PHILIP COUTURE, Entergy

C O N T E N T S

P R O C E E D I N G S

2:05 p.m.

MR. KOENICK: I'd like to thank everyone for attending this meeting. My name is Stephen Koenick. I'm a Project Manager in the Division of Reactor Licensing.

And we're here today to allow the Petitioner, Michael Mulligan to address the Petition Review Board regarding his 2.206 Petition dated March 25, 2015[sic] submitted by email on March 26, 2015.

I'm also the Petitioner Manager for this Petition. And the Petition Review Board Chairman is Robert Taylor.

As part of the Petition Review Board's review of this Petition, that can now be found in Adams under accession number ML15090A487. Michael Mulligan has requested this opportunity to address the Petition Review Board.

The meeting is scheduled from 2:00 to 3:00 p.m. eastern time. The meeting is being recorded by the NRC Operations Center. And will be transcribed by a Court Reporter.

The transcript will become a supplement to the Petition. And the Transcript will also be made publicly available.

So I'd like to open this up with introductions. I'd like the rest of the Petition Review Board to introduce themselves. What we'll do is we'll go around the room here at Headquarters. And then we'll figure out how to get everybody on the phone.

So first, I'd like to turn it over to Rob.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Hi, this is Rob Taylor, Chair of the PRB.

MR. HARDIES: I'm Bob Hardies, Senior Level Advisor, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, Division of Engineering.

MS. BANIC: Lee Banic, 2.206 Petition Coordinator, NRR.

MS. JEHLE: Patricia Jehle, Office of the General Counsel.

MS. KHANNA: Meena Khanna, Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing.

MR. KOENICK: Excellent. So that's here with us at Headquarters. Can we go through any other NRC participants from Headquarters on the phone?

MR. CARPENTER: This is Rob Carpenter, OE.

MR. KOENICK: Okay. Any other Headquarters participants?

(No response)

MR. KOENICK: Hearing none, are there any

Regional Office -- participants from Regional Offices? We can start from Region I?

MR. HAMMANN: This is Steve Hammann from the Region I, Decommissioning and Technical Support Branch.

MR. KOENICK: Okay. Region II? We probably don't have anybody from Region II.

(No response)

MR. KOENICK: Region III?

MR. MEGHANI: This is Vijay Meghani and Joon Park from Region III, Division of Reactor Safety.

MR. KOENICK: Excellent. And Region IV, I don't believe we have anyone?

(No response)

MR. KOENICK: Okay. Are there any representatives for the licensee on the phone?

MR. COUTURE: Phil Couture with Entergy.

MR. KOENICK: And the Court Reporter is on the line?

COURT REPORTER: Yes, Sir. Dylan Stroman with Neal R. Gross Court Reporters.

MR. KOENICK: Thank you. Okay. Is there any -- are there any other members on the call that have not been identified? With the exception of our Petitioner? We'll get to you last.

(No response)

MR. KOENICK: Okay. Hearing none, Michael Mulligan, would you please introduce yourself for the record?

MR. MULLIGAN: Hello. I'm Michael Mulligan. I live in Hinsdale, New Hampshire. I'm a whistle blower. I worked at a nuclear plant, for Vermont Yankee for ten years or so.

I was in the Navy on a submarine, on a nuclear submarine. And that's it.

MR. KOENICK: Okay. Thank you. I'd like to emphasize that we need to speak clearly and loudly to make sure that the Court Reporter can accurately transcribe this meeting.

If you do have something that you would like to say, please first state your name for the record. And for those dialing into the meeting, please remember to mute your phones to minimize any background noise or distractions.

At this time I'd like to turn it over to the PRB Chairman, Robert Taylor.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Thanks, Steve. This is Rob Taylor from the Deputy Director of NRR's Division of Safety Systems. And I'll be serving as the PRB Chairman for Mr. Mulligan's Petition that we're

discussing today.

Mr. Mulligan, thank you for submitting your Petition. I think you're familiar with the process. But there are some aspects that I do want to go through at the beginning here before we get into your discussion and presentation.

Just for some background on the process. Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the Petition process. The primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process.

This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activity. Depending on the results of this evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRC issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve the problem.

The NRC staff guidance for this position of 2.206 Petition Request is in management directive 8.11, which is publically available.

The purpose of today's meeting is to give the Petitioner, Mr. Mulligan, an opportunity to provide any additional explanation or support for the Petition before the Petition Review Board's initial consideration and recommendation.

I want to be clear that this meeting is not a hearing. Nor is it an opportunity for the Petitioner to either question or examine the PRB on the merits of the issues presented in the Petition Request.

No decisions regarding the merits of this Petition will be made at this meeting. Following this meeting the Petition Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations. The outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed with the Petitioner.

The Petition Review Board typically consists of a Chairman, myself, usually a manager at the senior executive service level at the NRC. It has a Petitioner Manager and a PRB coordinator, who have introduced themselves during the opening of this meeting.

Other members of the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on the content of the information in the Petition Request. The members have already gone around and introduced themselves, including the subject matter experts that will weigh in or evaluate Mr. Mulligan's Petition.

As described in our process, the NRC staff may ask clarifying questions in order to better understand the Petitioner's presentation and to reach a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject the

Petitioner's request for review under the 2.206 process.

I'd like to summarize the scope of the Petition under consideration and the NRC activities to date. On March 26, 2015, Mr. Mulligan submitted to the NRC, a Petition under 2.206 regarding Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant. And the operating U.S. Nuclear Plants in which he requested a number of actions.

The major ones are as follows. He requested immediate full scale ultrasonic inspections similar or with better technology on Vermont Yankee and Kewaunee. He requested large bore hole samples be cut out of both vessels and transport the vessel specimens to a respected metallurgical laboratory for comprehensive offsite testing.

He requested an immediate NRC report and public meeting on the vulnerabilities with U.S. reactor cracking and these weakened vessels. He requested all U.S. plants be ultrasonically tested within six months if distressed and unsafe results are discovered.

Now, let me take a moment to discuss the NRC activities to date. On May 4 of this year, the Petitioner Manager contacted you to discuss the 10 CFR 2.206 process. And to offer you an opportunity to

address the PRB.

Mr. Mulligan requested to address the PRB by phone prior to its internal meeting to make the initial recommendation to accept or reject the Petition or review it.

On May 13 of this year, the Petition Manager arranged a courtesy call with the NRC technical expert, Robert (Bob) Hardies to discuss the Petition. The call between Mr. Mulligan, Mr. Hardies and the Petitioner Manager took place last week.

As a reminder for the phone participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks. As this will help us in preparation of the meeting transcript that will be made publically available. Thank you.

Mr. Mulligan, with that, I'd like to turn it over to you, to allow you an opportunity to provide information you believe the PRB should consider as part of this position. We've allocated 40 minutes for your presentation.

MR. MULLIGAN: I'm Mike Mulligan. Thank you very much for this opportunity. I generally know that I'm very lucky to be living in the United States of America.

I know that if this was -- I mean, if I had

this concern in another country, say Russia or China or something like that, you know, they'd probably find me on the side of the road dead.

So, I know that we live in the greatest nation on the planet. And I'm thankful to be living here. I thank the NRC for this opportunity.

I really thank them for talking -- for allowing me to talk with Mr. Hardies. He was a -- he just -- he was extraordinary as far as his abilities.

As far as you talked about, as far as for Vermont Yankee and Kewaunee, I essentially wanted either ultrasonic testing or the best technology or similar to what they did over in Belgium or over in Europe and stuff like that. So, I don't know if I said that right in the way you just got done talking about it.

We know with any crack in the vessel, none have been discovered so far in that. In the worst case, if a crack happened and it was large enough, and it would basically bypass a lot of designs of the facility.

And so it would be a particularly nasty accident. The most likely result would be a small leak or -- but you never know. And the systems will be able to handle it.

But, that would just be marginally better

then the worst case. Because it would bring terrible repercussions to the nuclear industry.

Even if we -- even if, you know, we went through this and we did a lot of investigations on the vessels we're testing, even finding a core crack would be pretty dramatic as far as what it would do to the industry.

As far, you know, if you -- generally, most of the vessels have been immune to inspections. I know they do ten year inspections on, thanks to Mr. Hardies, on the weld areas and that type of stuff.

But it would be terrible repercussions. Because it would, you know, question the NRC. It would question the utilities. You know, how come, you know, how come the reactor vessels weren't fully inspected and have ultrasonic testing or better.

It's interesting, the Belgium nuclear regulator, the FANC, the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, here's a quote. This is how they discovered it. In 1912 -- in 2012, a new type of in-surfaced ISI inspection of the reactor vessel by ultrasonic testing was introduced in the Belgium nuclear plants.

These inspections were introduced in France in order -- and to search for underclad cracks that may be presented in the base metal directly below

the interface to the cladding. These underclad cracks if present, have particular orientations at a surface and were created by the welding process of the austenitic strip cladding and to the ferric base metal.

The underclad is like, I imagine is, it's like our cladding in our domestic vessels that are inside the -- that are on the outside -- inside the -- on the surface of inside the vessel.

So, I -- in talking with Mr. Hardies, we talked about taking samples of some shutdown reactor vessels similar to the Belgium reactors. And I know what Mr. Hardies wants for Christmas next year. And that there would be samples taken from an assortment of reactor vessels.

That would be to cut out a piece of the reactor vessel. And then bring it into a laboratory and to, you know, to go wild with the testing and stuff like that.

And as far as my understanding that would be a wonderful idea as far as the verified and knowledge that we have. And as far as what happens, what a reactor vessel during its life.

And it would help us, you know, to do a lot of testing that might discover some other flaws in the reactor. And just like with the Belgium reactors, you

know, they went on a journey looking for one type of flaw and they discovered a completely different flaw.

One thing should be noted, is that they had a discover -- they had to institute a special kind of ultrasonic test. It sounds like it was more sensitive then normal.

And then as this thing went on, they decided that they even need a more sensitive type of ultrasonic test. And I think there's a lot of limitations with ultrasonic tests.

You should get it in -- if you could get some of these, you know, these specimens into the -- into a laboratory, you know, you could be -- you could have more confidence that this type of accident would never happen in the United States fleet.

AREVA recently had troubles -- well, basically, it's my -- I've become educated with this kind of problem. And I made a set of poor assumptions whenever I started this.

But today it's generally, it's a forging issue. And either did a state of the art type of thing. They didn't think about it or there was a shortcoming. And forging -- and during the forging process, water was inside the forging as they were pouring it. And as it was cooling down.

And in this process, hydrogen was released from the water. And it's this hydrogen business that's causing hydrogen flaking, as far as I think, was going on.

But I'm no expert. I do have a little better understanding of what's going on here. And there's uncertainty. You know, like there's uncertainty if we can see everything in the vessel as it sits right now.

Especially when we don't do a lot of testing. We only test a small part of the vessel. And there is uncertainty with the forging process. And there's even uncertainty with the forging today, what's going on. Which is really astounding.

With AREVA, they had lower then their expected mechanical toughness properties. In other words, it's weaker and probably it would -- cracks would proliferate more easily.

It revolves generally around high carbon contact. It's a -- that's what's the mechanism that makes the metal weaker. And it is a simple forging problem that everybody's astonished that they didn't detect.

And you notice that. And even with all the -- even if there is no radiation on it in the vessel or

because the vessels are quite radioactive. AREVA still didn't discover the flaws until much like they even got one and the reactor plant just, you know, almost it's all buttoned up and stuff. And they're going to have to take it apart, take it out or something.

And so there you go again. Some of this stuff is hard to detect. And there's uncertainty of the bureaucracy. Are they capable of discovering these things? It's like I said, that accented so bad. You know, you can imagine if they -- or could be so bad.

You could imagine if it was, like I said, a small crack was discovered and the repercussions would be so dock and dire. You know, that would be hard to stay to yourself. We've got to disclose this.

There would be a lot of pressure to not disclose things. You know, maybe you get -- the higher ups might not know about it. But the lower guys would sit there and say holy smokes, you know, maybe the best thing to do is keep this quiet.

Mr. Hardies is a Chief of Component Integrity Branch of the Division of Engineering in the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. He gave me a pretty neat phrase. He said, you never know what is discussed be -- you never know what is discussed privately between the licensee and a regulator.

He was talking about the Belgium guys. And all I know is it was an interesting comment.

What is most interesting to me is the Belgium regulator, they, you know, they went back and then said they've got to do some more testing. They tested hydrogen flakes in a test reactor.

And they put a lot -- put these pieces of metal in a heavy radiation field. And the preliminary results, the material properties, fracture test toughness, is more strongly affected by radiation then predicted in theoretical models.

And that, you know, I've talked to a few people. And they basically say we -- between us and the Europeans, we all generally got only a few of these companies that do these kind of testings, contractors or whatever have you.

And they're generally more alike then not alike. And that type of thing. And they're all intermixed and the information is kind of shared between them and all that sort of stuff.

So, you know, we're -- like I said, we're more alike then not. And so, you know, and so to have -- the big thing is this testing of this metallic flake, you know, is raising questions of their modeling of the metal and how it responds.

And that's a, you know, that's a -- the regulators are usually looking for proof. You know, everything they do is they look for proof. And they, you know, they want everybody to have evidence and all that sort of stuff.

And I think the harder things a lot of times, because there's nothing there. And so a lot of times it only really revolves around what's in your head. And that is the idea of what are the uncertainties associated with say the reactor vessel?

And that's the things that, you know, you can't prove. And that is very worrisome. So, and you know, I think the United States of America, you know, the greater public would say, you know, we don't want to push on the reactor vessel inspected or tested.

We want the vessel tested with the best technology available. We're the greatest nation on the planet. And we understand that it's probably an action that's very infrequent. But if you had one, there would be a tremendous amount of consequences to it.

And so I think the public would say, we want to know the absolute current best technology type of condition that the reactor vessels are in now. And we want proof that, you know, that this terrible event wouldn't occur.

So like I said, I was told that, you know, the ultrasonic testing on the welds happen every ten years. It's from the insides and that. And the most worrisome aspect about that is that Mr. Hardies told me that there was never any flaw discovered in it.

And we look around and now once I talked about the reactor heads, you know, once those were considered a perfect barrier. And there was a lot of margin of safety there. And the fact that barrier should not -- should not, you know, there's no evidence that the reactor heads could have a flaw in it.

Of course, now we know. Even as the evidence and leaks were building up, the Agency and the FirstEnergy failed to prevent that kind of an accident. And stuff and we know that most of the Agency and FirstEnergy had terribly flawed bureaucracies.

And I think if we could have seen a lot of that, you know, if it was disclosed to the outsiders, you know, and people would have rebelled. And we would have fixed you. If we could see the flaw, the bureaucratic flaws in both the agency and the utility and stuff.

And so that was a -- that was one of the lessons learned, is how much we don't know about what these bureaucracies do behind our backs and stuff. And

so, the reactor heads, we know that have flaws.

And we know a lot of different nozzles and piping right next to the reactor have a -- they discovered flaws in it or cracks in it and they dig them out -- dig out the flaw and reweld it and stuff like that.

What is surprising is that in all this testing in all these reactors, they never found one flaw in it, in the weld area and stuff. It just doesn't make sense. To me it doesn't.

And you know, they might have found a couple of flaws that were there, you know kind of, or a couple of indications that looked like a flaw. And then go in there and did we report about it? We thought there was a flaw in the core.

We discovered a flaw and we fixed it and all that sort of stuff. But to never discover a flaw in the welding -- in the components that were welded together of a vessel is kind of a -- doesn't -- it's nonsensical to me if you really want to know.

And the implications are that, you know, you're not using the best technology and the most sensitive technology available. And like I said, you know, with the Belgium guys, they went in hunting for one thing with sensitive gear. And that's how they discovered the metallic flakes.

So that kind of raises -- then they jacked it up again. And you know, they found tens and thousands of them and stuff. So, that just -- there's a question of whether we're using the right sensitivity for detecting these flaws.

You know, there's questions if we're looking -- not looking at the whole vessel also. I think, I don't know. You know, maybe when it was new, it was -- we couldn't -- we, you know, we used the best technology to look for flaws in these vessels.

And you know, and then decided, you know, and then we're all busy with new construction and all that sort of stuff. And we just couldn't conceive of the ideas that these vessels could develop a flaw later in life.

I know you have coupon testing. And I know you have a lot of secondary I'd call it of theoretical models of what radiation does to these vessels and stuff like that. You have a lot of that.

But that's not -- that's not -- that's, you know, that's that better theoretical stuff that I talked about that is placed in question. Are your models all accurate and stuff.

And I think there's a lot of uncertainty there to be truthful. And I think, you know, the United

States deserves to have proof with the best technology available that these vessels are safe.

You know, like I said, maybe if we go in and take the worst case PWR and take a couple of samples out of there. Do a couple of ultrasonic tests of a dead vessel and stuff, then you have like a, you know, you would have a more sense of what might be going on there.

And then of course if you did find flaws in the vessel, then you'd have to, you know, just like jacking it up as far as going to all the rest of the plants and demanding that they do similar kind of testing. That would be the kind of things that I am -- I'm asking for in this.

It's been noted, this is sound -- this is going to sound like, you know, not another issue. But the flipping the Palisades primary cooling pump power went out. One official told me that, you know, that basically these components sit in the bottom of the core.

That the blades break off and they found one between the core shroud and stuck in the core. And then there was a lot of other parts in different areas. There was Salem 2 was the same problem.

But one official told me, NRC official said -- basically implied that these guys sit in the bottom

of the thing and they stay there the whole cycle.

And I had a recent -- a different official tell me that oh no, those, there's a lot of flow in -- and now I'm paraphrasing, there's a lot of flow inside these vessel -- the bottom of the core. And these things are banging around.

And we just discovered cladding damage caused by components being in the bottom of the vessel and stuff. And you hear, you know, there's never no pictures of what kind of cladding damage there was.

And again, you know, I worry about the missing cladding. And what the vessel metal behind it, you know, would do in a reactor vessel.

I know that there is oxygen. Somebody said that there might be oxygen -- there was oxygen missing in the vessel. But on the other hand, I know that oxygen gets disassociated in water and a radiation field and there is oxygen in there.

And I know that oxygen sometimes collects up at the top of patrol light mechanisms in the housing. And that causes hydrogen and oxygen and causes all sorts of corrosion problems. And well, at least it did on one plant. I don't know, I can't say for certainty if they did.

So, I see a lot of uncertainty. Here, let

me just -- I'm talking about this. Mr. Hardies sent me this, the metallurgical sent me this document. metallurgical -- metallurgical, what am I talking about?

Nope, I was going to give it to him or -- well, anyways, the metallurgical aspects influence had a potential for hydrogen flakes and forging for reactor pressure components. You know, in the Belgium, seeing all of their dockets, I never seen any blackouts or security or hidden information.

So, you know, I count -- so this document is filled with blacked out pieces, information missing. That you know, either is privacy issues or I don't know what, you know, security issues.

And so, you know, there's 16 huge chunks of this document missing information because the NRC refuses to release it. One of the most interesting pieces of blacked out or redacted information is, you know, the -- at the bottom of this document, there's the references. And three of the references are blacked out.

I mean, it's just, you know, the labels or the headings or the titles of the documents are too classified. Or, you know, might give secrets away or something.

I mean, it's just ridiculous. So this goes to kind of like what I'm saying about bureaucracies. You never know what they -- you never know the reasons why they're hiding things.

They say they might have one reason. And all that sort of stuff. But there's never -- there is not an independent outside person or an organization looking and say for the NRC, is this legitimate that all this information is missing and stuff?

Or should the public, you know, it might be private information or competitive information. But there's countervailing public interests in releasing this information. And that is, you know, like I said, would be to have an outsider have, maybe have the power to, you know, straighten out our bureaucracy like Davis-Besse or the situation in that incident there and stuff.

And so we would never have a Davis-Besse accident and stuff. So we debate these issues and fully as the problem is developing. And you know, because everybody afterwards, Davis-Besse said, you know, we all had flaws. We had terrible flaws. And letting this plant, you know, run away from us and stuff.

And you know, part of that would be that you disclose all your flaws and you let the outsiders help

you -- help you -- and it would probably be painful. But it would help you clean up your bureaucracies.

And you know, that's always been my hope that we'd have a strong industry and a strong NRC. Where a lot of this stuff, this nonsense doesn't emerge and is corrected before it happens.

And so there would be less negative information out there that people use. And well, use in a wrong way. So, you know, it seems to be, to me I've seen a lot of the incidences that I've read about, inability to anticipate cracks and corrosions.

I wish, you know, as far as taking them samples, I wish the Agency would get, you know, move heaven and earth as far as getting these samples from some of these reactor vessels.

And I know that there's a radiation versus an altruism or doing good type of conflict here and stuff. But, you know, I don't know, is that an excuse not to do it?

I know -- I can't think of -- Yankee Atomic over in -- when they were shutting down and their controversy after they were shut down. And that was the question, what are you going to do with the core?

And the idea of taking samples of the core came up. And basically, they said that there was more

-- they were afraid of more negative information to the industry then that might do finding information that would be positive information.

In other words, they thought it was a risk releasing -- doing any samples on their reactor vessel. They thought it was a public relations risk and stuff. Instead of, you know, saying, you know, we want the honest truth.

We want all fundamental aspects of what we're going out there in front of us. We want nothing hidden. We want to see it all and then, you know, we trust people to make the right decisions and stuff like that.

It's only certain segments of a bureaucracy decide on their own that hey, this is not good. I'm going to hide this information and the rest of the bureaucracy doesn't see that. That's when we lose faith in the institution and all that sort of stuff.

So, like I said, the specimens are important. I'd like to, as far as to get some of the most vulnerable plants. I know there's 31 that have these forgings as Belgium. I think, or is it 61? In that document.

And so, there's a vulnerability of these having these metallic flakes in the United States fleet.

And so, that specimen, collect a specimen and a quick ultrasonic test of one of these dead vessels to make -- too just, you know with a high ability to detect flaws.

Probably much higher then we're currently doing now. Similar to the Belgium regulatory agency. And if we get nervous finding flaws, then I'd like to, you know, I think that proper thing to do is start testing vulnerable reactors on a, you know, within six months type of thing.

Again, I'd like to thank you for attending this opportunity to speak. Thank you. I'm all done.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Mr. Mulligan, this is Rob Taylor. Thank you for taking the time and providing those additional perspectives and thoughts for our consideration.

So at this time what I want to do is ask if there are any questions from staff here at Headquarters or our office enforcement representative who's on the phone, for Mr. Mulligan?

MR. CARPENTER: Yes, this is Rob Carpenter. I was going to say -- this is Rob Carpenter. I don't have any comments. But thanks Mr. Mulligan.

MR. MULLIGAN: Thank you. Thank you for being here.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Let me ask now, if the

representatives from Region I and Region III have any questions for Mr. Mulligan?

MR. HAMMANN: No questions from Region I.

MR. MEGHANI: No questions from Region III.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Thank you, Regions. Lastly, I would like to ask if the Licensee representative has any questions for Mr. Mulligan?

MR. CARPENTER: No questions.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Thank you. With that, Mr. Mulligan, the NRC would like to express its appreciation for you taking the time to engage in the 2.206 process. And for taking the time today to provide additional perspective and clarification on your Petition.

We will move forward with our process and evaluating your Petition to determine whether we need to take any action.

With that I would like to ask the Court Reporter if there is any additional information that you need for the transcript?

COURT REPORTER: Yes. I was actually wondering if I could get some spellings for a few of the names of the participants on the call?

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Of course.

COURT REPORTER: First, is it Ms. Khanna or Connley? The Branch Chief of Operating Rental Agency? Could you possibly spell your name?

MS. KHANNA: I'll provide you, but we can do this offline if you'd like. I think we'll be happy to get in touch with you if you'd like to do that.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Is that acceptable? We'll get you the spellings of all the participants.

COURT REPORTER: Oh, yes. That would be very helpful.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Okay.

COURT REPORTER: Aside from that, I only had one question that was a technical term. Was it potting damage or clotting damage?

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Cladding.

COURT REPORTER: Cladding damage. All right, great. Okay, that was the only question aside from the participants' names spellings.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Okay. Well, we'll reach out offline to get you those spellings.

COURT REPORTER: Excellent. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: Thank you for your time today. So with that, I'd like --

MR. MULLIGAN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: I'm sorry?

MR. MULLIGAN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN TAYLOR: All right. Thank you, Mr. Mulligan. And we're going to conclude the meeting now. Take care.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 2:48 p.m.)