

## **NRR-PMDAPEm Resource**

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**From:** Dietrich, Allison  
**Sent:** Friday, May 29, 2015 6:21 PM  
**To:** 'hikish@aep.com'  
**Cc:** 'Michael K Scarpello (mkscarpello@aep.com)'; 'dmburgoyne@aep.com'; Pelton, David; Dinsmore, Stephen; Rosenberg, Stacey; Biro, Mihaela; Kozak, Laura  
**Subject:** Additional APLA RAI for DC Cook Emergency License Amendment Request  
**Attachments:** RAI - APLA - May 29 2015.docx

By letter dated May 28, 2015, Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M, the licensee) submitted an emergency license amendment request for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Unit 1. The proposed amendment would revise TS 3.8.1 to permit a one-time extension of the completion time for an inoperable emergency diesel generator (EDG). It would also permit extensions of several surveillance frequencies related to the operation of the affected EDG.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment Branch of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is currently reviewing your submittal. The staff has determined that additional information is needed in order to complete the review. A request for additional information (RAI) is attached.

Please respond to this request by May 30, 2015.

Sincerely,

Allison W. Dietrich, Project Manager  
Plant Licensing Branch III-1  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
301-415-2846

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**Received Date:** 5/29/2015 6:20:00 PM  
**From:** Dietrich, Allison

**Created By:** Allison.Dietrich@nrc.gov

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## **DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1**

By letter dated May 28, 2015, the Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M), the licensee for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Unit 1, requested an amendment to the Appendix A Technical Specifications (TS) for Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-58. The proposed amendment would revise TS 3.8.1 to permit extending the Completion Time (CT) from 14 days to 65 days for an inoperable emergency diesel generator (EDG). The proposed amendment would also revise the TS Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.1.3 to extend the Surveillance Frequency (SF) from 31 days to 82 days, or within 3 days following the inoperable EDG being restored to service, and TS Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.7 to extend the SF from 92 days to 145 days, or within 3 days following the inoperable EDG being restored to service.

In order for the staff to proceed with its review of the proposed change, additional information is needed. Six requests for information (RAIs) related to probabilistic risk assessment were transmitted to the licensee on May 29, 2015. Two additional RAIs are provided below.

7. The LAR states that Tier 3 actions include protecting the alternate (Train A) equipment. Justify not including the Train A motor-driven AFW pump on the protected equipment list discussed in Tier 3 compensatory measures.
8. The risk assessment credits use of Unit 2 CVCS and AFW via cross-ties as means to provide RCS inventory and heat removal. Justify not including the Unit 2 equipment credited in the Unit 1 risk analysis on the protected equipment list discussed in Tier 3 compensatory measures.