



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

May 26, 2015

Mr. Scott Batson
Site Vice President
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Oconee Nuclear Station
7800 Rochester Highway
Seneca, SC 29672

**SUBJECT: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION – NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND
RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2015007, 05000270/2015007,
05000287/2015007**

Dear Mr. Batson:

On April 30, 2015, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution biennial inspection at your Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The inspection team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

Based on the inspection samples, the inspection team determined that your staff's implementation of the corrective action program supported nuclear safety. In reviewing your corrective action program, the team assessed how well your staff identified problems at a low threshold, your staff's implementation of the station's process for prioritizing and evaluating these problems, and the effectiveness of corrective actions taken by the station to resolve these problems. In each of these areas, the team determined that your staff's performance was adequate to support nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated other processes your staff used to identify issues for resolution. These included your use of audits and self-assessments to identify latent problems and your incorporation of lessons learned from industry operating experience into station programs, processes, and procedures. The team determined that your station's performance in each of these areas supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team determined that your station's management maintains a safety-conscious work environment adequate to support nuclear safety. Based on the team's observations, your employees are willing to raise concerns related to nuclear safety through at least one of the several means available.

S. Batson

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Anthony D. Masters, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 7
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287
License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Enclosure: INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2015007, 05000270/2015007, and
05000287/2015007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

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S. Batson

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DATE	5/20/2015	5/20/2015	5/18/2015	5/19/2015	5/19/2015	5/26/2015	
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S. Batson

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Letter to Scott Batson from Anthony D. Masters dated May 26, 2015.

SUBJECT: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION – NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND
RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2015007, 05000270/2015007,
05000287/2015007

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287

License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Report Nos.: 05000269/2015007, 05000270/2015007, 05000287/2015007

Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3

Location: Seneca, SC 29672

Dates: April 13 – 17, 2015
April 27 – 30, 2015

Inspectors: J. Worosilo, Senior Project Engineer, Team Leader
R. Rodriguez, Senior Project Engineer
S. Ninh, Senior Project Engineer
D. Terry-Ward, Construction Inspector

Approved by: A. Masters, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 7
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000269/2015007, 05000270/2015007, 05000287/2015007; April 13, 2015 – April 30, 2015; Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3; Biennial Inspection of the Problem Identification and Resolution Program.

The inspection was conducted by three senior project engineers and a construction inspector. No findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Rev. 5.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few number of deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.

The inspectors determined that overall, audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience (OE) usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensee's processes for performing and managing work and plant operations.

Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's CAP procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of the problem investigation program (PIPs). To verify that problems were properly identified, appropriately characterized and entered into the CAP, the inspectors reviewed PIPs that were issued between April 2013 and April 2015, including a detailed review of selected PIPs associated with the following risk-significant systems: reactor protection system, safe shutdown facility (SSF) and emergency feedwater system. Where possible, the inspectors independently verified that the corrective actions were implemented. The inspectors also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the inspectors selected a representative number of PIPs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including operations, maintenance, engineering, health physics, chemistry, and security. These PIPs were reviewed to assess each department's threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed selected PIPs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where PIPs were screened for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold.

The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns within the selected systems listed above and other plant areas to assess the material condition and to identify any deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed PIPs, maintenance history, corrective actions (CAs), completed work orders (WOs) for the systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period; however, in accordance with the inspection procedure, a five-year review was performed for selected systems for age-dependent issues.

Control room walkdowns were also performed to assess the main control room (MCR) deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were entered into the CAP and tracked to resolution. Operator workarounds and operator burden screenings were reviewed, and the inspectors verified compensatory measures for deficient equipment which were being implemented in the field.

Enclosure

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of selected PIPs to assess the adequacy of the root-cause and apparent-cause evaluations of the problems identified. The inspectors reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problem described in the PIPs and the guidance in licensee procedures Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 212, "Cause Analysis," Rev. 28 and NSD 208 "Problem Investigation Program," Rev. 42. The inspectors assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and had adequately addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality.

The inspectors reviewed selected industry OE items, including NRC generic communications, to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP.

The inspectors reviewed site trend reports, to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified.

The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution programs and processes, to verify that findings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these audits and assessments were consistent with the NRC's assessment of the licensee's CAP.

The inspectors attended various plant meetings to observe management oversight functions of the corrective action process. These included PIP screening meetings and Performance Improvement and Oversight Committee (PIOC) meetings.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Assessment

Problem Identification

The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was an appropriately low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating PIPs as described in licensee procedure NSD 208 "Problem Investigation Program" Rev. 42, management's expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate PIPs for any reason. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues.

Based on reviews and walkdowns of accessible portions of the selected systems, the inspectors determined that system deficiencies were being identified and placed in the CAP.

Problem Prioritization and Evaluation

Based on the review of PIPs sampled by the inspection team during the onsite period, the inspectors concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensee's CAP procedures as described in the PIP severity level determination guidance in NSD 208, "Problem Investigation Program," Rev. 42. Each PIP was assigned a priority level at the Central Screening Team (CST) meeting and adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk.

The inspectors determined that station personnel had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the licensee's CAP procedures and assigned cause determinations were appropriate, considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. A variety of formal causal-analysis techniques were used depending on the type and complexity of the issue consistent with NSD 212, "Cause Analysis," Rev. 28.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the inspectors determined that, overall, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected and non-recurring. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence, in that a review of performance indicators, CRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors examined the licensee's use of industry OE to assess the effectiveness of how external and internal OE information was used to prevent similar or recurring problems at the plant. In addition, the inspectors selected OE documents (e.g., NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and plant internal OE items, etc.) which had been issued since April 2013, to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to the Oconee Nuclear Station, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Assessment

Based on a review of selected documentation related to operating experience issues, the inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening OE for applicability to the plant. Industry OE was evaluated at either the corporate or plant level depending on the source and type of the document. Relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. Operating experience issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, OE was included in all root cause evaluations in accordance with licensee procedure NSD 212, "Cause Analysis," Rev. 28.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self-assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure NSD 607, "Self Assessments and Benchmarking," Rev. 19.

b. Assessment

The inspectors determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate. Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the inspector's independent review. The inspectors verified that PIPs were created to document all areas for improvement and findings resulting from the self-assessments, and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

During the course of the inspection, the inspectors assessed the station's safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) through review of the stations employee concerns program (ECP) and interviews with various departmental personnel. The inspectors reviewed a sample of ECP issues to verify that concerns were being properly reviewed

and identified deficiencies were being resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate.

b. Assessment

Based on the interviews conducted and the CRs reviewed, the inspectors determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees. Based on discussions conducted with a sample of plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

40A6 Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On April 30, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Batson and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary information examined during the inspection had been returned to the licensee.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel:

S. Batson, Site Vice President
A. Breland, Corrective Action Coordinator
J. Bryan, Engineering
E. Burchfield, General Manager Engineering
M. Carroll, OPS Human Performance Manager
E. Cleveland, I&C Engineering/Cyber Program Manager
P. Culbertson, Manager NOS
C. Duntom, Site Support Director
P. Fish, Operations Manager
L. Hancox, Employee Concerns
R. Matherson, Performance Improvement Manager
P. Metler – PI INPO Coordinator
T. Patterson, Organization Effectiveness Director
T. Ray, Plant Manager
J. Smith – Regulatory Affairs
P. Street, Site Emergency Preparedness (EP) Manager
C. Wasik, Regulatory Affairs Manager

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

Administrative Procedure (AD)-EG-ALL-1207, Plant Health Process, Rev.1
AD-EG-ALL-1209, System, Component, and Program health reports and Notebooks, Rev.2
AD-OP-ALL-0202, Aggregate Operator Impact Assessment, Rev.1
AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program, Rev.2
AD-PI-ALL-0101, Root Cause Evaluation, Rev.0
AD-PI-ALL-0102, Apparent Cause Evaluation, Rev.0
AD-PI-ALL-0103, Quick Cause Evaluation, Rev.0
AD-PI-ALL-0400, Operating Experience Program, Rev.1
AD-PI-ALL-0401, Significant Operating Experience Program, Rev.1
Nuclear System Directive: 120. Equipment Reliability Process, Rev.8
Nuclear System Directive: 203. Operability/Functionality, Rev.25
Nuclear System Directive: 204. Operating Experience Program (OEP) Description, Rev.16
Nuclear System Directive: 208. Problem Investigation Program (PIP)
Nuclear System Directive: 212. Cause Analysis, Rev.28
Nuclear System Directive: 704, Procedure Use and Adherence, Rev.24
E.M. 4.16 - Engineering Guidance for Resolving Operable but Degraded/Non-Conforming Items (OBDN), Rev.10
EDM - 203: Equipment Reliability Health Monitoring, Assessing / Reporting and Action Planning, Rev.6
OMP 2-23, Operations Shift Manager Rules of Practice, Rev. 21
AD-EG-ALL-1903, Cyber Security Critical Systems and Critical Digital Assets Identification and Assessment, Rev. 2

Attachment

AD-EP-ALL-0801, Design and Development of Drills and Exercises, Rev. 0
 AD-EP-ALL-0802, Conducting Drills and Exercises, Rev. 0
 AD-EP-ALL-0803, Evaluation and Critique of Drills and Exercises, Rev. 0
 AD-MN-ALL-0005, Nuclear Planning, Rev. 7
 AD-PI-ALL-0300, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Programs, Rev. 1
 AD-WC-ALL-0210, Work Request Initiation, Screening, Prioritization and Classification, Rev. 4
 EDM-601, Engineering Change Manual, Rev. 23
 EDM-601, Engineering Change Manual, Rev. 24
 EDM-601, Engineering Change Manual, Rev. 27
 EPA Section J, Emergency Plan A - Section J Protective Response, Rev. 006
 EPA APPENDIX 02, Emergency Plan A - Appendix 2 Meteorology and Offsite Dose Assessment Program, Rev. 003
 IP/ 3/A/0315/010 A, TXS RPS Channel A RC Temperature Transmitter Calibration, Rev. 001
 IP/ 3/A/0315/010 B, XS RPS Channel B RC Temperature Transmitter Calibration, Rev. 002
 NSD 117, Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities, Rev. 16
 NSD 607, Self-Assessment and Benchmarking, Rev. 19
 PD-EP-ALL-0401, Equipment Important To Emergency Response, Rev. 0
 PD-EP-ALL-0800, Drills and Exercises Program, Rev. 0
 PT/O/A/2000/002, Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment, Rev. 3
 PT/O/A/2000/010, Review of Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures, Rev. 001
 RP/O/A/1000/035, Severe Weather Preparations, Rev. 001
 SR/O/A/2000/003, Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility, Rev. 005
 SR/O/A/2000/004, Notification to States and Counties from the Emergency Operations Facility for Catawba, McGuire and Oconee, Rev. 004

Self-Assessments

O-CHM-SA-13-02, Compliance Assessment of CSM 5.1 (Emergency Response Guidelines) & CMS (Procedure use Guidelines During Emergency Response) With NSD-117 (Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities) and Emergency Plan A-Section B Onsite Emergency Organization, 6/11/2013
 O-ENG-SA-13-02, PIP 0-13-3188, Oconee Cyber Security Inspection Readiness Assessment, 03/27/2013
 O-ENG-SA-13-03, PIP O-13-07546, Vulnerability with Spare Protective Relaying on Critical Systems (Keowee, SSF, LCP), 07/7/2013
 O-ENG-SA-13-05, PIP 0-13-4756, NFPA 805 compensatory actions required due to lack of implementation of Protective Service Water, 04/30/13
 O-ENG-SA-13-09, PIP 0-12-9878, Integrated Design Review Assessment, 01/08/201
 O-MPJ-SA-13-08, PIP 0-13-07366, Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD) Assessment: PSW Pr Duke East, 07/10/13
 O-OMP-SA-14-05, PIP O-14-06151, EPC Contractor Engineering Performance Review, 5/29/2014
 O-OPS-SA-15-06, 2014 OPS PSC Events Common Cause, 3/03/2015

Engineering Changes

EC 0000107004, Unit 1 RPS/ES Software and Hardware Enhancement, Rev. 000
 EC 0000109782, 500 OHM Resistor Replacement on the Teleperm RPS/ESFAS, Rev. 000
 EC 0000103409, PSCS Computer Hardware Replacement, Rev. 000
 EC 0000098532, OD502300 - PSCS AIM 2007.06 Upgrade, Rev. 001

Drawings

- OFD-116N-1.2, Flow Diagram of Standby Shutdown Facility Temporary HVAC, Rev. 1
 OFD-101A-3.5, Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (SSF Portion), Rev. 26
 OFD-101A-2.5, Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (SSF Portion), Rev. 20
 OFD-101A-1.5, Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (SSF Portion), Rev. 26
 OFD-133A-2.5, Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System (SSF Aux. Service), Rev. 54
 O-0702-B, One Line Diagram 4160V and 600V Essential Load Centers Auxiliary Power Systems Standby Shutdown Facility, Rev. 26
 O-0703-K, One Line Diagram 600V and 208V Essential Motor Control Centers Auxiliary Power Systems Standby Shutdown Facility, Rev. 74

Problem Investigation Program (PIPs)

G-15-00110	O-13-08230	O-14-01592
G-15-00177	O-13-08493	O-14-01670
O-11-00387	O-13-08822	O-14-02200
O-12-10969	O-13-09104	O-14-02280
O-12-10969	O-13-09373	O-14-02280
O-13-02311	O-13-09412	O-14-02333
O-13-02432	O-13-09438	O-14-02338
O-13-04229	O-13-09586	O-14-02376
O-13-04254	O-13-10138	O-14-02724
O-13-04443	O-13-11251	O-14-02725
O-13-04615	O-13-11504	O-14-02779
O-13-04854	O-13-12491	O-14-02781
O-13-04971	O-13-12588	O-14-02811
O-13-05579	O-13-12613	O-14-02975
O-13-05683	O-13-12874	O-14-03177
O-13-05693	O-13-13165	O-14-03295
O-13-05693	O-13-13168	O-14-03636
O-13-05784	O-13-14166	O-14-04006
O-13-06184	O-13-14179	O-14-04539
O-13-06185	O-13-14278	O-14-04800
O-13-06270	O-13-15221	O-14-05220
O-13-06609	O-14 13629	O-14-06755
O-13-06822	O-14-00294	O-14-07045
O-13-06834	O-14-00466	O-14-07091
O-13-06844	O-14-00504	O-14-07507
O-13-06879	O-14-00656	O-14-07608
O-13-06879	O-14-00861	O-14-07774
O-13-06900	O-14-00932	O-14-07963
O-13-07343	O-14-01284	O-14-07964
O-13-07607	O-14-01312	O-14-07982
O-13-07608	O-14-01416	O-14-08412
O-13-07806	O-14-01531	O-14-08414
O-13-08205	O-14-01546	O-14-09103
O-13-08230	O-14-01585	O-14-09515

O-14-11173	O-15-00264	O-15-02282
O-14-11708	O-15-00458	O-15-02331
O-14-11896	O-15-00595	O-15-02483
O-14-13637	O-15-00909	O-15-02831
O-14-14049	O-15-01890	O-15-03013
O-14-14088	O-15-02235	O-15-03344

Work Orders

AR 00449413
01093473
01992770
01996171
01996172
01996173
02010768
02024241
02030564
02046842
02058184
02078327
02078442
02085347
02106094
02108470
02116177
02117540
02118641
02140144
02153776
02168953
02202040-01

Other Documents

OSS-0254.00-00-2002, Design Basis Specification for the Reactor Protective System, Rev. 19
EDM-601, Appendix G, Engineering Review Screen for Commercial Controls, Rev. 27
EDM-601, Appendix I, Engineering Review Screen for Equivalent Changes, Rev. 19
EDM-601, Appendix K, EC # 103409, PSCS Hardware Replacement, Engineering Review
Screen for Design Changes, Rev. 23
EDM-601, Appendix V, Cyber Security Review, Rev. 19
EDM-601, Appendix V, Cyber Security Review, Rev. 20
10 CFR 50.59 Screen, 0000103409 - 000 - PSCS COMPUTER HARDWARE REPLACEMENT,
06/26/2014
OD502300, 10 CFR 50.59 Applicability Determination, 10PSCS Aim 2007.06 Upgrade, dated:
07/22/2008
10 CFR 50.59 Screen, EC# 98532 PSCS Aim 2007.06 Upgrade, 12/16/2008
Root Cause Analysis Report, Unplanned Entry into Tech Spec 3.8.1.L, PIP 0-14-1284, Rev. 03
Reactor Protection System and Nuclear Instrumentation, Unit 1, System Health Report, Report
period 2014Q1 (01/1/2014 – 03/31/2014)

Reactor Protection System and Nuclear Instrumentation, Unit 1, System Health Report, Report period 2014Q2 (04/1/2014 – 06/30/2014)
Reactor Protection System and Nuclear Instrumentation, Unit 1, System Health Report, Report period 2014Q3 (07/1/2014 – 09/30/2014)
Reactor Protection System and Nuclear Instrumentation, Unit 1, System Health Report, Report period 2014Q4 (10/1/2014 – 12/31/2014)
LER 05000269, 05000270, 05000287/2013-003-00
SSF Power System 2014 Q3
Standby Shutdown Facility 2014 Q3
SSF Auxiliary Service Water 2014 Q3
Design Basis Specification for the Emergency Feedwater and the Auxiliary Service Water Systems, OSS-0254.00-00-1000, Rev. 54
Emergency Feedwater System Unit 1 System Health Reports (01/1/2014 - 12/31/2014)
Emergency Feedwater System Unit 2 System Health Reports (01/1/2014 - 12/31/2014)
Emergency Feedwater System Unit 3 System Health Reports (01/1/2014 - 12/31/2014)
Oconee TS 3.7.6, Upper Surge Tank (UST) and Hotwell (HW), Amendment 372, 374
Oconee UFSAR Chapter 10, Emergency Feedwater System, December 31, 2012
OP/2/A/1102/015, Filling and Draining FTC, Rev. 71
PT/1/A/0600/001, Periodic Instrument Surveillance, Rev. 331
SLC 16.10.7 Alternate Source of Emergency Feedwater (EFW)
CHM 3rd QTR 2014, Trend Report, 11/11/14
ENG 4TH QTR 2014 Trend Report, 2/11/15
PIT 4TH QTR 2014 Trend Report, 2/9/15
ONS Integrated Performance Assessment Report, Chemistry Department, Quarter 4, 2014
Site Integrated Performance Assessment Report, Quarter 1 2015

PIPs Generated as a Result of Inspection

O-15-03330
O-15-03344
O-15-03355
O-15-03397
O-15-03769