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Docket No: 50-425

NL-15-0875

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 2
Licensee Event Report 2015-002-00
Unit 2 Inadvertent Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report, 2015-002-00 for Unit 2. This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact George Gunn at (706) 848-3596.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "B. Keith Taber".

B. Keith Taber
Site Vice President - Vogtle

BKT/KDM

Enclosure: Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2015-002-00

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company

Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO
Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer
Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President – Fleet Operations
Mr. B. L. Ivey, Vice President – Regulatory Affairs
Mr. B. K. Taber, Vice President – Vogtle 1 & 2
Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President – Engineering
Mr. D. L. Manigo, Operating Experience Coordinator – Vogtle 1 & 2
RType: CVC7000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator
Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Senior Project Manager – Vogtle 1 & 2
Mr. L. M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector – Vogtle 1 & 2

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 2
Licensee Event Report 2015-002-00
Unit 2 Inadvertent Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation

Enclosure

Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2015-002-00



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 2		2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000425	3. PAGE 1 OF 3
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4. TITLE
Vogtle Unit 2 Inadvertent Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	14	2015	2015	002	00	5	13	2015	N/A	
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									N/A	

9. OPERATING MODE	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)			
3	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10. POWER LEVEL	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

LICENSEE CONTACT Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Karen Morrow, Licensing Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 706-848-3365
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13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
N/A					N/A				

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED	15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On March 14, 2015 at 1207 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Unit 2 was operating in Mode 3 following an unplanned reactor trip and safety injection, a valid Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) actuation signal was received on B-train Auxiliary Feedwater system during post-trip recovery and unit stabilization. Both Train A and Train B motor driven AFW pumps were in service at the time. Upon receipt of the AFW actuation signal the B-train discharge valves stroked to the full open position. Operators immediately restored AFW discharge valves to their previous positions without any adverse impacts on the unit.

The plant remained in Mode 3 and decay heat continued to be removed via the Atmospheric Relief Valves. Unit 1 was unaffected. This event had no adverse effect on the health and safety of the public, and is of very low safety significance. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to actuation of a system listed in 10CFR 50.739a)(2)(iv)(B).



**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 2	05000425	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	2 OF 3
		2015	- 002	- 00	

NARRATIVE

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to actuation of a system listed in 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) in that a valid AFW actuation signal was received.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

Mode 3, 0 percent rated thermal power

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On March 14, 2015 at 1207 EDT, Unit 2 was being stabilized in mode 3 following an unplanned reactor trip and safety injection when a valid actuation signal was received on B-train AFW. At the time, the Operations crew was performing steps in a unit operating procedure (UOP) to disable an AFW signal for "trip of both main feed pumps." During the steps to disable the AFW actuation logic, the logic was disabled then re-enabled causing an AFW actuation to be processed for B-train AFW system. The Steam Generator Level Control (SGWL) operator immediately identified the issue and throttled the discharge valves back to their original position to maintain SG levels stable.

Prior to disabling the AFW actuation signal, the UOP directed the crew to perform a subsection of a different procedure to test the annunciator associated with AFW actuation. It was unnecessary to perform the full annunciator test procedure since it was an 18-month surveillance and only a specific subsection was required. Prior to performing the B-train annunciator test, the crew did not review a precaution in the test procedure that warned the user to ensure one main feedwater pump is reset so that no AFW actuation signals would be generated. Instead, the crew's actions were driven by an assumption the plant was already in the correct configuration to proceed.

Since both main feedwater pumps were in a tripped condition, plant conditions for performing the test were not satisfied, resulting in a re-actuation of the AFW system during performance of the test procedure. The SGWL operator responded by throttling the AFW discharge valves to their previous position with no significant impact on steam generator water levels.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The AFW actuation occurred as a result of human error. The apparent cause of this event is deviation from standards by the operating crew to review the precautions and limitations of the test procedure, as required. Since the unit was in a post-trip recovery condition instead of the expected conditions associated with a normal unit shutdown, the initial conditions of the test procedure were not established and not recognized by the operating crew and performance of the test procedure resulted in the B-train AFW actuation.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

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NARRATIVE

E. SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The AFW actuation occurred as a result of human error and was not caused by equipment malfunction. There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event. The unit was already in shutdown conditions when the actuation occurred. Decay heat removal was maintained throughout the event. This event had no consequence to the safety and health of the public and is considered to be of very low safety significance.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action was restoration of the AFW discharge valves to their throttled position. Additional corrective actions include shift briefings on the event, supervisor challenge to ensure standards and behaviors are the same for outage and online work, development of operating experience, and training on the event occurrence to emphasize standards and lessons learned.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Failed Components:

None – No components failed as a result of actuation.

2. Previous Similar Events:

Indian Point Unit 2 (Event Number 43016) - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Automatic Start

3. Energy Industry Identification System Code:

[PWR/4] – Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor
 [BA] – Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater System
 [JE] – Engineered Safety Features Actuation System