



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
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LISLE, IL 60532-4352

May 6, 2015

Mr. Raymond Lieb
Site Vice President
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 N. State Rte. 2, Mail Stop A-DB-3080
Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION-NRC PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2015007

Dear Mr. Lieb:

On April 10, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution biennial inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed report documents the results of this inspection, which were discussed on April 10, 2015, with you and other members of your staff.

Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team determined that your staff's implementation of the corrective action program supported nuclear safety. In reviewing your corrective action program, the team assessed how well your staff identified problems at a low threshold, your staff's implementation of the station's process for prioritizing and evaluating these problems, and the effectiveness of corrective actions taken by the station to resolve these problems. In each of these areas, the team determined that your staff's performance was adequate to support nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated other processes your staff used to identify issues for resolution. These included your use of audits and self-assessments to identify latent problems and your incorporation of lessons learned from industry operating experience into station programs, processes, and procedures. The team determined that your station's performance in each of these areas supported nuclear safety. Discussed in the enclosed report is an identified weakness associated with the review of 10 CFR 21 reports.

Finally, the team determined that your station's management maintains a safety-conscious work environment adequate to support nuclear safety. Based on the team's observations, your employees are willing to raise concerns related to nuclear safety through at least one of the several means available.

R. Lieb

-2-

In accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Enclosure:
Inspection Reports 05000346/2015007
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-346
License No: NPF-3

Report No: 05000346/2015007

Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) Facility:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Location: Oak Harbor, OH

Dates: March 23 through April 10, 2015

Inspectors: J. Rutkowski, Project Engineer, Team Lead
M. Jones, Reactor Inspector, DRS
R. Telson, Reactor Operations Engineer, NRR
T. Briley, Resident Inspector

Approved by: J. Cameron, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Report (IR) 05000346/2015007; 03/23/2015–04/10/2015; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection

This inspection was performed by two NRC regional inspectors, one headquarters inspector, and the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station resident inspector. No findings of significance or violations of NRC requirements were identified during this inspection. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG–1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5, dated February 2014.

Problem Identification and Resolution

On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team determined that implementation of the corrective action (CA) program at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station was generally good. The licensee demonstrated a low threshold for identifying problems and entering them in the CA program. Items entered into the CA program were screened and prioritized in a timely manner using established criteria; were properly evaluated commensurate with their safety significance; and corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance. The team noted that the licensee reviewed operating experience for applicability to station activities. Audits and self-assessments were determined to be performed at an appropriate level to identify deficiencies. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, workers at the site expressed freedom to enter safety concerns directly into the CA program or through their supervisors.

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152B)

The activities documented in Sections .1 through .4 constituted one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.

.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action (CA) program implementing procedures and attended CA program meetings to assess the implementation of the CA program by site personnel.

The inspectors reviewed risk and safety significant issues in the licensee's CA program since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection in August 2013. The selection of issues ensured an adequate review of issues across NRC cornerstones. The inspectors used issues identified through NRC generic communications, department self assessment, licensee audits, operating experience (OE) reports, and NRC documented findings as sources to select issues. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed condition reports (CRs) generated as a result of facility personnel's performance in daily plant activities. The inspectors also reviewed a selection of work orders, self-assessment results, audits, performance indicator reports, system health reports, and completed investigations from the licensee's various investigation methods, which included root cause, full apparent cause, limited apparent cause, and human performance investigations.

The inspectors selected the auxiliary feedwater system to review in detail. The inspectors' review was to determine whether the licensee staff were properly monitoring and evaluating the performance of this system through effective implementation of station monitoring programs. A 5-year review on the auxiliary feedwater system was also undertaken to assess the licensee staff's efforts in monitoring for system degradation due to aging aspects. The inspectors also performed partial system walkdowns of the component cooling water system to determine if there were readily identifiable issues with the system and if any identified issues were adequately described in the CA program and system health documents.

During the reviews, the inspectors determined whether the licensee staff's actions were in compliance with the facility's corrective action program and Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B requirements. Specifically, the inspectors determined if licensee personnel were identifying station issues at the proper threshold, entering the station issues into the station's CA program in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also determined whether the licensee staff assigned the appropriate investigation method to ensure the proper determination of root, apparent, and contributing causes. The inspectors also evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for

selected issue reports, completed investigations, and eight NRC previously identified findings that included principally non-cited violations (NCVs).

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

b. Assessment

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

Based on the information reviewed, including initiation rates of CRs and interviews, the inspectors determined that the licensee has a low threshold for initiating CRs, and from the CRs reviewed, the threshold was appropriate. Some of the non-supervisory personnel interviewed stated that the CA program was not effective for low-level issues but also stated that they would report nuclear safety issues. The inspectors did not identify any safety significant item that was not entered into the CA program. The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of problem identification as adequate.

Observations

The inspectors found that issues were being identified and captured in the licensee's programs and particularly in the CA program. During non-outage months of 2014, licensee documents indicated an initiation rate of about 300 to 370 CRs per month. In Year 2013 non-outage periods, CR generations were about 350 to 500 CRs per month. The licensee classified greater than 95 percent of 2014 CRs as "low-level" CRs and classified them as "close to a work order or trending" or to a "fix" category. No formal cause determination is required for low-level CRs by the licensee's programs.

The inspectors also noted that the licensee's procedures allowed specific low-level non-safety issues to be addressed through the work order notification/request system without initiating a CR. A licensee Nuclear Maintenance Screening Committee screens equipment work order notifications/requests to determine if CRs should have been generated. The inspectors reviewed the functioning of that committee by observing a committee meeting. The inspectors did not identify any instances where CRs should have been written and were not.

The inspectors did identify that licensee's corporate team model includes a FIN-SRO [Fix-It-Now Senior Reactor Operator] which serves as the chairman of the screening committee but that Davis-Besse has not had a FIN-SRO for approximately 2 years. The inspectors did note that the current FIN manager served as committee chairman and previously held a senior reactor operator license. The licensee initiated CR2015-04922, "Notification Review Board is not staffed with a FIN-SRO."

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's efforts and a licensee presentation on their efforts to address industry concerns regarding the cumulative impacts of regulation. Part of the licensee's actions include efforts to minimize the initiation of CRs for issues that are not safety related and can be addressed totally outside of the CA program.

The inspectors also noted through interviews that the majority of the 16 security officers interviewed stated that they do not directly generate CRs but, instead, bring issues to their supervisors.

Findings

No findings were identified.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's overall performance in the prioritization and evaluation of issues was appropriate. In particular, the inspectors observed that while the majority of issues identified were at a low level of significance, those issues and issues of more significance were assigned a review and action level appropriate for the identified condition evaluation and in accordance with governing procedures. Issues were being appropriately screened by supervisors of originators, the Management Review Board, and Operations shift management for items potentially impacting equipment operability. Evaluations in apparent cause and root cause reports reviewed by the inspectors were adequate. There were no items identified by the inspectors in the backlogs of the CA program or maintenance that were risk significant, either individually or collectively. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's work order backlog and associated performance metric data and concluded that equipment issues were generally being addressed appropriately.

Observations

The inspectors reviewed CR2013–10934, "Declining Trend in Station Human Performance," CR2013–08561, "Use of a Questioning Attitude During Maintenance," CR2015–01246, "DB Mechanical Maintenance Unit Safety Performance Review Required," and CR2014–18342, "CNRB Executive Summary Item—Recent lapses in Operator Fundamentals are Resulting in Consequential Errors" to review the licensee's investigation of causes for human performance issues. The licensee's multiple apparent cause investigations generally shared the conclusions that issues were due to one or several of the following issues:

- Multiple focus areas caused some human performance tools to be unintentionally overlooked;
- Lack of focus due to the numerous administrative requirements (pre-job briefs, meetings, etc.);
- There was a misalignment among management, supervisor, and worker expectations;
- Supervisors were not spending enough time in the field engaging workers effectively; and
- Lack of training on and effective use of management observations.

The inspectors questioned if the licensee looked at the commonality among the various identified issues. Specifically the inspectors questioned why the investigators did not look deeper into why supervisors and management were not spending more time in the field with crews and if there were some issue(s) preventing such action. There was in one apparent causes a statement that administrative requirements may be a contributor to the overall issues associated with human performance and oversight of activities.

Findings

No findings were identified.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

On the basis of the corrective action documents reviewed, the inspectors concluded that the CAs appeared appropriate for the identified issues. Those CAs addressing selected NRC documented violations were also determined to be effective and timely. The inspectors' review of the previous five years of the licensee's efforts to address issues with the auxiliary feedwater system did not identify any negative trends or inability by the licensee to address long-term issues.

Observations

The licensee had numerous CRs written to document human performance issues. The inspectors, as part of their review of human performance investigations, reviewed licensee performance indicator D-SPO-04A-Feb 15, "Performance Errors & performance Error Rate." That indicator of the monthly performance error rate (errors per hours worked) from September 2013 through February 2015 remained relatively stable with some decline in February of 2015. The number of performance errors had decreased consistent with the numbers of recorded work hours. The two largest counted departments (Operations and Security) were also the organizations which experienced the highest number of performance errors in February 2015 (10 and 7 respectively).

The inspectors performed numerous key word searches of the licensee corrective actions program system related to the auxiliary feedwater systems to search for repetitive/repeat issues. The inspectors did not identify any trends that would indicate an increase in the age related issues for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system.

The inspectors also noted that the licensee had two repeat NRC findings during the last 3 years. One was associated with failure to close "trash" gates in the containment and one associated with water in a manhole. For the second occurrence of each of these NRC findings, the licensee initiated corrective action that should prevent the occurrence of another repeat for the same issues.

Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the facility's OE program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed OE program implementing procedures, attended CA program meetings to observe the use of OE information, completed evaluations of OE issues and events, and selected monthly assessments of the OE composite performance indicators. The inspectors' review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively integrating OE into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the

licensee's program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if CAs, as a result of OE, were identified and implemented in an effective and timely manner.

Assessment

Overall, the inspectors determined that the licensee was adequately evaluating industry OE for relevance to the facility. Both internal and external OE was effectively disseminated across the various plant departments and was being incorporated into lessons learned for training, daily status meetings, and pre-job briefs. System Engineers utilized industry OE to resolve equipment operational problems. The inspectors also verified that the use of OE in formal CA program products such as root cause evaluations and apparent cause evaluations was appropriate and adequately considered. Generally, OE that was applicable to the facility was thoroughly evaluated and actions were implemented in a timely manner to address any issues that resulted from the evaluations.

Observations

The inspectors noted that the licensee continued to exhibit weakness in maintaining the 10 CFR Part 21 notification database up-to-date to ensure appropriate screening and evaluations were performed in a timely manner. The NRC inspectors had originally identified the weakness in NRC Problem Identification and Resolution IR 2013007, dated August 9, 2013, which had resulted in backlogged 10 CFR Part 21 notifications when the Part 21 coordinator was transferred to another group. The licensee had initiated CR2013-12246 to review all backlogged 10 CFR Part 21 notifications and perform periodic reviews going forward on a monthly basis.

In December 2014, the licensee identified through a focused self-assessment that the 10 CFR Part 21 database was not adequately kept up-to-date due to several notifications that had not been listed, numerous notifications that were listed with no documented resolution, and reviews only being performed several times per year. Condition report 2015-00282 was generated to update the database, track monthly reviews via the notification tracking process, and develop a new performance indicator to monitor performance. While updating the database, the licensee identified one example where a 10 CFR Part 21 notification was received but an evaluation had not been performed for approximately 18 months. The notification did involve equipment installed in the station's safety-related auxiliary feedwater system. Condition report 2015-03210 was generated to document the issue and an evaluation was performed which concluded there were no impacts on auxiliary feedwater system operability.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee staff's ability to identify and enter issues into the CA program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and audits.

Assessment

The inspectors concluded that self-assessments and audits were typically accurate, thorough, and effective at identifying most issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The inspectors concluded that personnel involved in audits and self-assessments were knowledgeable in the subject area they audited or assessed. In many cases, self-assessments and audits identified issues that were not previously recognized by the licensee.

Observations

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessment of their self-assessment and benchmarking program. The two provided assessments appeared to review and assess the compliance of their programs with existing procedural requirements and did not generally look at the effectiveness of the programs. However, the inspectors overall assessment of the self-assessment process did indicate that the programs appeared to meet licensee intended requirements for identifying issues.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee's safety conscious work environment (SCWE) through the reviews of the facility's employee concerns program (ECP) implementing procedures, discussions with the coordinator of the employee concern program, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports. The inspectors also reviewed the results from a 2013 and a 2014 SCWE survey.

As part of the overall inspection effort, inspectors discussed department and station programs with a variety of people. In addition, the inspectors held scheduled interviews with 31 non-supervisory individuals, in groups of 3 to 7 people, from various departments to assess their willingness to raise nuclear safety issues. Additionally at least 21 personnel were randomly interviewed on their views of the effectiveness of the CA program.

The individuals for the scheduled interviews were randomly selected to provide a distribution across the various departments at the site and in particular departments in which approximately 20 to 40 percent of people did not express positive responses to 2014 survey questions on CA program effectiveness or interactions with management or the ECP. In addition, to assessing individuals' willingness to raise nuclear safety

issues, the interviews also included discussion on any changes in the plant environment over the last 18 months. Other items discussed included:

- knowledge and understanding of the CA program;
- effectiveness and efficiency of the CA program;
- willingness to use the CA program; and
- knowledge and understanding of ECP.

Assessment

The inspectors did not identify any issues of concern regarding the licensee's safety conscious work environment. Information obtained during the interviews indicated that an environment was established where the majority of licensee personnel felt free to raise nuclear safety issues without fear of retaliation. Licensee personnel were aware of and generally familiar with the CA program and other processes, including the ECP and the NRC, through which concerns could be raised; safety significant issues could be freely communicated to supervision. The inspectors did not observe and were not provided any examples where there was retaliation for any raising of nuclear safety issues. Documents provided to the inspectors regarding SCWE surveys and monitoring of the safety culture and SCWE generally supported the conclusions from the interviews.

Observations

While all interviewees stated that they would discuss issues with their supervisors and would bring up any and all nuclear safety issues, several interviewees voiced opinions that the CA program is not effective for low-level issues. Several of the interviewed security officers indicated that they did not interface with CA program and that the program was not effective in addressing issues within their department.

Other general themes mentioned by interviewees were previously identified and discussed in licensee apparent causes and investigations. These included the interviewees' expressed beliefs that the station craft manning should be larger and that craft supervision was burdened with excessive administrative requirements.

The majority of interviewed personnel stated that they had not used the ECP program or saw no need to use the program because they had other avenues to address their concerns. Two of the interviewed personnel said they would not use the ECP program because of some past perceived issues with the program maintaining confidentiality.

The inspectors concluded that the interview results appeared consistent with SCWE survey results. The inspectors noted that the licensee had documented and investigated the concerns identified in the SCWE surveys.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On April 10, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to the Site Vice President, Mr. R. Lieb, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

R. Lieb, Site Vice President
K. Byrd, Director, Site Engineering
G. Cramer, Manager, Site Protection
J. Cuff, Manager, Training
J. Cunnings, Manager, Site Maintenance
J. Hook, Manager, Design Engineering
D. Imlay, Director, Site Performance Improvement
G. Laird, Manager, Technical Services Engineering
B. Matty, Manager, Plant Engineering
P. McCloskey, Manager, Site Regulatory Compliance
D. Noble, Manager, Radiation Protection
R. Oesterle, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations
R. Patrick, Manager, Site Work Management
D. Saltz, Director, Site Maintenance
J. Sturdavant, Regulatory Compliance
L. Thomas, Manager, Nuclear Supply Chain

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

D. Kimble, Senior Resident Inspector, Davis-Besse
J. Cameron, Branch Chief

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Closed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

PLANT PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Revision
DBBP-RC-0009	Site Continuous Performance Improvement	7
RPM 34	Maintenance Rule Program Manual	34
NG-EN-00333	Vendor Manual Control	9
NOBP-LP-1107	Security Operating Experience (SOE) Guideline	4
NOBP-LP-2005	Employee Concerns Program Staff Manual	3
NOBP-LP-2008	FENOC Corrective Action Review Board	16
NOBP-LP-2010	FENOC Trend Coding	11
NOBP-LP-2011	FENOC Cause Analysis	17
NOBP-LP-2013	SCWE Review Team	2
NOBP-LP-2018	Integrated Performance Assessment and Trending	10
NOBP-LP-2022	Compliance Auditing	12
NOBP-LP-2023	Performance Assessment	14
NOBP-LP-2024	Fleet Oversight Reporting and Analysis	8
NOBP-LP-2040	Conducting Stream Analysis	0
NOBP-LP-2100	FENOC Operating Experience Process	11
NOP-CC-1003	Vendor Manuals and Vendor Technical Information	00-02
NOP-ER-3001	Problem Solving and Decision Making	5
NOPL-LP-2003	Policy - SCWE	2
NOPL-LP-2004	Policy - Nuclear Safety	2
NOPL-LP-2007	Policy - Corrective Action Program	1
NOP-LP-2001	Corrective Action Program	35
NOP-LP-2023	Conduct of Fleet Oversight	13
NOP-LP-2100	Operating Experience Program	7
NOP-WM-0001	Work Management Process	8
NOP-WM-1001	Order Planning Process	21
NOP-WM-1003	Nuclear Maintenance Notification Initiation, Screening, and Minor Deficiency Monitoring Processes	6
NOP-WM-4006	Conduct of Maintenance	7
NOP-WM-4006	Conduct of Maintenance	7
NOP-WM-9001	FIN, Minor, Toolpouch, Immediate, Urgent Maintenance	9

PLANT PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Revision</u>
NORM-LP-2002	Performance Assessment, Improvement Methods	1
NORM-LP-2003	Analytical Methods Guidebook	5
NORM-LP-2023	Performance Assessment Drivers	2

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
2013-01614	NRC Cyber Security - Connectivity of Access Authorization Computer to SGI	02/01/2013
2013-03594	MS-C-13-02-22: Condition Report 2012-08883 Generation Not Timely	03/12/2013
2013-07138	10CFR21-109 from Engine Systems Incorporated (ESI): Fuel Injectors failing onsite pressure leakage tests	05/06/2013
2013-08562	AFI CY.1-2 Erroneous Technical Chemistry Decisions	06/03/2013
2013-08565	AFI PI.2-1 Initiation of Condition Reports	06/03/2013
2013-08824	Improper entry into the Protected Area.	06/06/2013
2013-12246	NRC PI&R 2013: The Review of 10 CFR Part 21 Notices for D-B Applicability is Backlogged	08/08/2013
2013-12258	NRC PI&R 2013: ECP Program Observation	08/08/2013
2013-13535	AFP 1 Governor not responding during monthly testing.	08/31/13
2013-14176	Declining Trend in Reactor Coolant System Zinc Concentration	09/12/2013
2013-15593	Oil leak on #1 CCW pump inboard pump bearing	10/02/2013
2013-17025	Developing Theme in NRC Cross-Cutting Aspect P.1(c) - PI&R/CAP/Evaluation	10/23/2013
2013-18168	CC 1467 stroke time fell outside the expected stroke time range but under maximum stroke time	11/11/2013
2013-18194	CC1467 – Immediate Investigation Does Not Provide Confidence for Continued Functionality	11/12/2013
2013-18434	Control Room Annunciator alarms unable to be reset	11/17/2013
2014-00907	Foreign Material found in CCW Pump 3 Motor OB Bearing Sight Glass	01/20/2014
2014-01172	Perform higher level cause analysis for closure of CC1495 during installation of switch cover for LSSL3757A	01/24/2014
2014-01222	NRC Green NCV for Radioactive Effluent Controls Program	01/24/2014

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
2014-01660	Some Unattended Openings and Protected Area Boundary Controls challenge 10 CFR 73.55. (i) (5) (iii)	01/31/2014
2014-02127	Small amount of water spilled on RPV during APSR Uncoupling	02/05/2014
2014-03111	CCW Pump 1 IB Pump Bearing Oil at low level mark	02/17/2014
2014-03112	CCW Pump 3 OB Pump Bearing oil at low level mark	02/17/2014
2014-03235	Site Protection Challenged the Requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 (o)(1) and (2) during 18RFO Containment Entry	02/18/2014
2014-03273	CR- 2013 SCWE Survey Results for Regulatory Compliance	02/19/2014
2014-03479	2013 SCWE results for Site Chemistry	02/21/2014
2014-05359	CC1467 stroke open time outside expected range	03/21/2014
2014-05944	Through wall leak RCPM 2-2 upper and lower air cooler end bells	03/30/14
2014-06516	CC1467 open stroke time outside the expected range	04/08/2014
2014-07555	Flow Not Indicating on FI4630, Aux Feedwater flow to SG#1 PAM Panel #1	04/25/14
2014-08550	MS-C-14-03-02: Test Requirement Applicability Form Inappropriately Used	05/06/14
2014-09399	The 2013 DBNPS SCWE survey results for Site Protection	05/23/2014
2014-10647	PA-DB-14-02: Site Protection rated marginally effective	06/19/2014
2014-11017	NRC 2014 UHS Triennial Inspection - Minimum AFW Bearing and Governor Cooling Water Flow Requirements	06/26/14
2014-11018	UHS Triennial Inspection - AFW Pump 1 Oil Cooler Cooling Water Flow Balancing	06/26/14
2014-11131	2014 NRC Triennial Heat Sink Inspection: Vulnerability for initial CST Temperature	06/30/14
2014-1138	MS-C-14-01-13: Engineering Inspection Team (EIT) reviews were not performed for two engineering changes reviewed	01/23/14
2014-11546	Oil leakage observed from #3 CCW pump inboard bearing	07/10/2014
2014-1172	Perform higher level causal analysis for closure of CC1495 during installation of switch cover for LSSL3757A	01/24/14
2014-11930	10 CFR Part 21 Notification of Defect – Static O-Ring Pressure and Temperature Switches	07/18/2014

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
2014-12399	Inadequate Physical Search for Live Ammunition During the issuing of SAAB Weapons and Associated Equipment , DB 2014 Force on Force (FOF)	07/30/2014
2014-13027	TM Periodic Review Ineffective Corrective Actions	08/13/14
2014-13381	The station did not complete required fire watch posts on several occasions between 11 August and 20 August 2014.	08/21/2014
2014-13469	Technical Services Engineering Integrated Performance Assessment and Trending (IPAT) Missed Opportunity	09/24/14
2014-13855	Yellow Key Performance Indicator D-SPO--5B Open	
2014-14322	Security Management did not effectively provide the proper resources/materials for personnel to complete the Nuclear Safety Culture Survey	09/12/2014
2014-17259	Multiple NRC NCVs issued in 2014 for Fire Protection	11/18/2014
2014-18342	CNRB Executive Summary Item - Recent lapses in Operator Fundamentals are resulting in consequential errors	12/15/14
2014-18372	Operations Corrective Action not completed timely manner	01/15/2015
2014-7555	Flow not indicating on FI4630, Aux Feedwater flow to SG #1 PAM Panal #1	04/25/14
2015-00223	Collective Significance of recent issues related to Control of Ignition Sources (HOT WORK)	01/07/2015
2015-00282	FO-SA-2014-0068 10CFR Part 21 Deficiencies	01/08/2015
2015-00318	Incorrect Data Acquisition on High Pressure Injection Pump 1-1 (P58-1) during performance of surveillance test DB-SP-03218 on 11/18/2014.	01/09/2015
2015-00960	Site Protection experienced two red pillars from the 2014 SCWE survey : Pillar 1, Management Support and Pillar 2, Effective Normal Process Resolution Processes (CAP).	01/22/2015
2015-01178	NRC CDBI 2015 CCW Pump 1 outboard motor bearing oil leak	01/27/2015
2015-01269	Part 21 - Defective Barton Differential Pressure Switches - Model 288A, 289A (#EN50439	01/29/2015
2015-01320	Foxboro 10 CFR PART 21 Event Notification Event #48863	01/30/2015
2015-01470	FO-SA-2014-0068-005, PI&R Inspection, GAP in CR-2014-16299 Closure Summary	02/03/2015
2015-01519	Part 21 susceptibility to Foxboro power supplies JY6547A and JY6547B	02/04/2015

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
2015-01788	10 CFR Part 21 Notice on Foxboro Power Supply had not evaluated in a timely manner	02/11/2015
2015-02388	FO-SA-2014-0068-001: PI&R Assessment Repeat/Similar Events Following Apparent or Root Cause Evaluations	02/25/2015
2015-02445	FO-SA-2014-0068-002, PI&R Inspection, GAP in CR 2014-13211 Corrective Action Closed to Notifications/Orders	02/25/2015
2015-02686	MS-C-15-02-22: Corrective action for door mortise stock code changes not completed as written	03/03/2015
2015-02835	MS-C-15-02-22: CR 2013-13211 Preventative Action Items Tracked by SAP Notifications Vice in Corrective Action Program	03/05/2015
2015-02924	MS-C-15-02-22: Replacement mortises not reviewed and accepted for plant doors	03/06/2015
2015-04434	Potentially Defective Valve Diaphragms Identified in a 10 CFR Part 21 Notice in Stock	04/01/2015

OPERATING EXPERIENCE

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
OE 2013-0832	RIS 13-05, NRC Position on the Relationship between General Design Criteria and Technical Specification Operability	05/17/2013
OE 2013-0919	RIS 13-07, NRC Staff Position on the use of American Society of Mechanical Engineers Certification Mark	05/30/2013
OE 2013-1378	RIS 13-11, Resolution of Licensing Process Expectations for Pressurized Water Reactor Fuel Assemblies Susceptible to Top Nozzle Stress Corrosion Cracking in Dry Cask Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation	09/13/2013
OE 2014-0272	IN 14-01, Fuel Safety Limit Calculation Inputs were Inconsistent with NRC-Approved Correlation Limit Values	02/27/2014
OE 2014-0700	L4-14-33, Direct Current Circuits Challenge Appendix R Fire Analysis	06/17/2014
OE 2014-0721	Nonconservative Decisions and Equipment Performance Problems Result In a Reactor Scram, Two Safety Injections, and Water-Solid Conditions Recommendations 1 & 3 (DB)	06/20/2014

OPERATING EXPERIENCE

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
OE 2014-1061	Discoloration identified on EDG Week Tank #2 (DB-T153-2) shell bottom	09/11/2014
OE 2014-1106	L2-14-46, Multiple Electrical Faults Result in Explosion of Unit Auxiliary Transformer and Automatic Scram	09/18/2014
OE 2014-1207	DB Effectiveness Review IER L2-12-14, Automatic Reactor Scram Resulting from a Design Vulnerability in the 4.16-kV Bus Undervoltage Protection Scheme	10/13/2014
OE 2015-0277	L3-15-7, Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling Caused by Offsite Transmission Line Testing	03/17/2015

AUDITS, ASSESSMENTS AND SELF-ASSESSMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
	Davis Besse SCWE Survey Results for December 2014	12/1/14
Cycle 18 PMEAR	Davis Besse 10 CFR 50.65 Maintenance Rule Periodic Maintenance Effectiveness Assessment Report (PMEAR)	5/6/14
DB-PA-13-01	1st Trimester 2013 Functional Area Ratings	6/7/13
DB-PA-13-02	2nd Trimester 2013 Functional Area Ratings	10/3/13
DB-PA-13-03	3rd Trimester 2013 Functional Area Ratings	1/31/14
DB-PA-14-01	1st Trimester 2014 Functional Area Ratings	6/2/14
DB-PA-14-02	2nd Trimester 2014 Functional Area Ratings	9/22/14
DB-PA-14-03	3rd Trimester 2014 Functional Area Ratings	2/5/15
DB-PHR-2014-2	Davis Besse Plant Health Report 2014 Second Half	1/29/15
FO-BN-2014-0003	Radioactive Material Storage	2/25/15
FO-SA-2014-0068	Focused assessment to determine station's level of performance in key programs in preparation for the NRC Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspections scheduled for March 23 through April 10, 2015	3/19/15
FO-SA-2014-0068	Problem Identification & Resolution Inspection	12/8/14
FO-SA-2015-0709	2015 Pre-NIEP Self-Assessment	2/4/15
IP-SA-DB-2013-0042	Davis-Besse Radiation Protection - Second Half 2013 IPAT Report	1/28/14
IP-SA-DB-2013-0046	Davis-Besse Maintenance - Second Half 2013 IPAT Report	1/28/14
IP-SA-DB-2014-0131	Davis-Besse Radiation Protection First Half 2014 - IPAT Report	8/25/14
IP-SA-DB-2014-0135	Davis-Besse Maintenance First Half 2014 - IPAT Report	8/25/14

AUDITS, ASSESSMENTS AND SELF-ASSESSMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
IP-SA-DB-2014-0136	Davis-Besse Design Engineering First Half 2014 - IPAT Report	08/25/2014
IP-SA-DB-2015-0011	Davis-Besse Corrective Action Program	1/23/15
MS-C-13-02-22	Multi-Site Fleet Oversight Audit of Fleet Corrective Action Program (CAP) in accordance with NOP-LP-2023	4/15/13
SN-SA-2013-0074	Status of Self-Assessment/Benchmarking Program	8/6/13
SN-SA-2013-0148	Completed Self-Assessment and Benchmarking Quality	1/8/14
SN-SA-2014-0353	ECP Participation at Davis-Besse	
SN-SA-2014-0384	Assessment/Analysis of Continuing FRO Accredited Training Programs	7/29/14
SN-SA-2014-0468	2014 Self Assessment	10/17/2014
SN-SA-2014-0625	Semi-Annual Review of On-Line and Outage Maintenance Backlog	11/24/14
SN-SA-2015-0709	2015 Pre-NIEP Self-Assessment	

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Revision</u>
OS-021, Sheet 1	Operational Schematic Component Cooling Water System	37
OS-021, Sheet 2	Operational Schematic Component Cooling Water System	31

OTHER

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
14-020	Bechtel ECP Case Record	
14-033	Bechtel ECP Case Record	
D-14-045	ECP Case Record	
D-14-050	ECP Case Record	
D-15-004	ECP Case Record	
D-SPO-04A	Performance Errors & Performance Error Rate	02/15/2015
ECP 11-0497-0000	TM Jumper Level Switch for LSL1818 to Provide Manual Operation of Pump P47-2	08/09/2011
	ECP Issues Log	2014 and 2015

ROOT CAUSES AND APPARENT CAUSES REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
2013-08561	Use of a Questioning Attitude During Maintenance	06/03/2013
2013-08563	INPO 2013: AFI RP.1-1 Enforcement of Radiation Protection Standards	06/03/2013
2013-10934	Declining Trend in Station Human Performance	07/17/2013
2013-16513	NRC-Identified Green Finding for the High Pressure Injection (HPI) Pump Motor Fuse Communication Issue	10/16/2013
2013-17025	Developing Theme in NRC Cross-Cutting Aspect P.1(c) - PI&R/CAP/Evaluation	10/23/2013
2013-19113	EDG 2 Ventilation Controller PM Work Order 200488034 Not Recognized as Making EDG 2 Unavailable	12/02/2013
2014-09494	CTRM Annunciators fast flash and can't be acknowledged when alarm received	05/26/2014
2014-13211	Door 308, Broken Door Latch	08/18/2014
2014-18342	CNRB Executive Summary Item – Recent lapses in Operator Fundamentals are resulting in consequential errors	01/21/2015
2015-01246	DB Mechanical Maintenance Unit Safety Performance review required	03/05/2015

CONDITION REPORTS GENERATED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
2015-04922	Extended vacancy in staffing of FIN-SRO position	04/09/2015
2015-04182	Walkdown observed Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine 2 Governor Valve Limit Switch Misalignment	03/27/2015

WORK ORDERS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
200000004	Replace Screw and Nut	05/28/2003
200009025	CC4: Disassemble and Inspect Valve Actuator	05/28/2003
600851462	2013 Part 21 Reports Requiring Review	08/26/2013
600954789	Engineering Evaluation Request 2015 Part 21 Reports Requiring Review	03/11/2015
600955255	Engineering Evaluation Request Incorporation of Vendor Information Process in Design Basis Analysis Report	03/13/2015

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agencywide Document Access Management System
AFW	Auxiliary Feedwater
CA	Corrective Action
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CNRB	Corporate Nuclear Review Board
CR	Condition Report
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
ECP	Employee Concerns Program
FIN-SRO	Fix-It-Now Senior Reactor Operator
IR	Inspection Report
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR	Nuclear Reactor Regulation
OE	Operating Experience
PARS	Publicly Available Records System
PI&R	Problem Identification and Resolution
SCWE	Safety Conscious Work Environment

R. Lieb

-2-

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

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