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APR 20 2015

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial No. 15-180
MPS Lic/GJC R0
Docket No. 50-423
License No. NPF-49

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2015-001-00
UNLATCHED DUAL TRAIN HELB DOOR RESULTS
IN POTENTIAL LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2015-001-00 documenting an event that occurred at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 on February 19, 2015. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. William D. Bartron at (860) 444-4301.

Sincerely,


John R. Daugherty
Site Vice President – Millstone

Attachments: 1

Commitments made in this letter: None

FE22
NRR

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
2100 Renaissance Blvd, Suite 100
King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713

R. V. Guzman
NRC Project Manager Millstone Units 2 and 3
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North
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11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2738

NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Millstone Power Station

ATTACHMENT

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2015-001-00
UNLATCHED DUAL TRAIN HELB DOOR RESULTS
IN POTENTIAL LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Millstone Power Station Unit 3	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000423	3. PAGE 1 OF 3
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4. TITLE
Unlatched Dual Train HELB Door Results in Potential Loss of Safety Function

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
02	19	2015	2015	001	00	04	20	2015		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)			
1	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
100	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

LICENSEE CONTACT William D. Bartron, Supervisor Nuclear Station Licensing	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (860) 444-4301
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13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On February 19, 2015, with Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) at 100% power and in operating mode 1, an individual on a fire watch rove processed through a dual train high energy line break (HELB) door normally and upon checking the door after passage the individual noted the door did not latch. The Control Room was promptly notified. An operator was dispatched to investigate. The operator exercised the door lock-set mechanism freeing the latch allowing the door to properly latch. The door was inoperable for approximately 7 minutes. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered and exited appropriately.

Although no definite failure mechanism was identified, the door was experiencing high usage due to compensatory fire watch roves entering/exiting the door. The door lockset mechanism was manually manipulated and then tested several times satisfactorily by maintenance personnel. Further, the door design has the door swing such that the HELB event would act to open the door when the lockset mechanism fails. Engineering is evaluating the adequacy of the preventive maintenance frequency. Additionally, a design change to reverse the door swing such that the HELB event would cause the door to close and thus not rely on the lock-set mechanism is being considered. Additional corrective actions are being taken in accordance with the station's corrective action program.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.



**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	
Millstone Power Station Unit 3	05000423	2015	- 001 -	00	2 OF 3

NARRATIVE

1. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On February 19, 2015, with Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) at 100% power and in operating mode 1, an individual on a fire watch rove processed through a dual train high energy line break (HELB) door normally and upon checking the door after passage the individual noted the door did not latch. The Control Room was promptly notified. An operator was dispatched to investigate. The operator exercised the door lock-set mechanism freeing the latch allowing the door to properly latch. The door was inoperable for approximately 7 minutes. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered, and exited appropriately.

This event was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), (NRC event # 50836) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This event is also being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

BACKGROUND:

This door fulfills the requirements of a Security Door, Technical Requirement Manual Fire Door, CO2 Door, Dual Train Protection Door, and a HELB Door. It is a key card actuated door with a crash bar on one side and a thumb latch on the other side. The door is part of the HELB barrier for the A and B 480 volt switchgear.

2. CAUSE:

Although no definite failure mechanism was identified, the door was experiencing high usage due to compensatory fire watch roves entering/exiting the door. Further the door design has the door swing such that the HELB event would act to open the door when the latch fails.

3. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES:

Given the low likelihood of an Auxiliary Building HELB occurring during the time the door was not properly latched (7 minutes), the consequences of this event was of very low safety significance.

4. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Since this event occurred on the back shift, a maintenance technician was called in to inspect the door lock-set mechanism and affect any necessary repairs. The technician reported his inspection was satisfactory. He exercised the door lock-set mechanism from both the crash bar and the thumb release mechanisms approximately 30 times without any repeat indications of the latch sticking or not functioning. He also noted he tightened one screw on the mechanism that he found loose during this inspection. Continued exercises of the door mechanism after tightening the screw showed no difference in the smooth and proper operation of the door lockset mechanism.

It was identified that the door was experiencing high usage due to compensatory fire watch roves entering/exiting the door. Equipment repairs have been completed eliminating the need for this high frequency fire rove activity. Additionally, the preventive maintenance for the door lock-set mechanism has been changed.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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NARRATIVE

A design change to reverse the door swing such that the HELB event would cause the door to close and thus not rely on the lock-set mechanism is being considered.

Additional corrective actions are being taken in accordance with the station's corrective action program.

5. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

- MPS3 LER 2014-004-00, Unlatched Dual Train HELB Door Results in Potential Loss of Safety Function.

6. Energy Industry Identification System (EIS) codes:

- Door – DR
- Switchgear – SWGR