

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)

BASES

BACKGROUND

According to ONS Design Criteria (Ref. 1), the reactor core and its interaction with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) must be designed for inherently stable power operation, even in the possible event of an accident. In particular, the net reactivity feedback in the system must compensate for any unintended reactivity increases.

The MTC relates a change in core reactivity to a change in reactor coolant temperature (a positive MTC means that reactivity increases with increasing moderator temperature; conversely, a negative MTC means that reactivity decreases with increasing moderator temperature). Therefore, a coolant temperature increase will cause a reactivity decrease with a negative MTC. Reactivity increases that cause a coolant temperature increase will thus be self limiting. The same characteristic is true when the MTC is positive and coolant temperature decreases occur.

MTC values are predicted at selected burnups during the safety evaluation analysis and are confirmed to be acceptable by measurements. Reactor cores are designed so that the beginning of cycle (BOC) MTC is less than or equal to zero when THERMAL POWER is 95% RTP or greater. The actual value of the MTC is dependent on core characteristics, such as fuel loading and reactor coolant soluble boron concentration. The core design may require additional burnable absorbers to yield an MTC at BOC within the range analyzed in the accident analysis. The end of cycle (EOC) MTC is also limited by the requirements of the accident analysis. Fuel cycles that are designed to achieve high burnups or that have changes to other characteristics are evaluated to ensure the MTC does not become more negative than the value assumed in the safety analyses.

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BASES

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Trip Setpoints/Allowable Value (continued)

inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. All field sensors and signal processing equipment for these channels are assumed to operate within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. The trip setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables are set. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION accuracy. A detailed description of the methodology used to determine the Allowable Value, trip setpoints and associated uncertainties is provided in Reference 4.

Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Value ensure that the limits of Chapter 2.0, "Safety Limits," in the Technical Specifications are not violated during anticipated transients and that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the anticipated transient or accident and the equipment functions as designed. Note that in LCO 3.3.1 the Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.1-1 for Functions 1 through 8 and 11 are the LSSS.

Each channel can be tested online to verify that the setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. Surveillances for the channels are specified in the SR section.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY

Each of the analyzed accidents and transients that require a reactor trip to meet the acceptance criteria can be detected by one or more RPS Functions. The accident analysis contained in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), takes credit for most RPS trip Functions. Functions not specifically credited in the accident analysis were qualitatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These Functions are high RB pressure, high RCS temperature, turbine trip, and loss of main feedwater. These Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance. These Functions also serve as backups to

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Functions that were credited in the safety analysis. The LCO requires all instrumentation performing an RPS Function to be OPERABLE. Failure of any instrument renders LCO, and the affected channel(s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions. The three channels of each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 of the RPS instrumentation shall be OPERABLE during its specified Applicability to ensure that a reactor trip will be actuated if needed. Additionally, during shutdown bypass with any CRD trip breaker closed, the applicable RPS Functions must also be available. This ensures the capability to trip the withdrawn CONTROL RODS exists at all times that rod motion is possible. The trip Function channels specified in Table 3.3.1-1 are considered OPERABLE when all channel components necessary to provide a reactor trip are functional and in service for the required MODE or Other Specified Condition listed in Table 3.3.1-1.

Only the Allowable Values are specified for each RPS trip Function in the LCO. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoint measured by CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS does not exceed the Allowable Value if the bistable is performing as required. A trip setpoint found less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is considered OPERABLE with respect to the uncertainty allowances assumed for the applicable surveillance interval provided that operation, testing and subsequent calibration are consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint calculations. Each Allowable Value specified is more conservative than instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip Function. These uncertainties are defined in Reference 4.

For most RPS Functions, the Allowable Value in conjunction with the nominal trip setpoint ensure that the departure from nucleate boiling (DNB), centerline fuel melt, or RCS pressure SLs are not challenged. Cycle specific values for use during operation are contained in the COLR.

Certain RPS trips function to indirectly protect the SLs by detecting specific conditions that do not immediately challenge SLs but will eventually lead to challenge if no action is taken. These trips function to minimize the unit transients caused by the specific conditions. The Allowable Value for these Functions is selected at the minimum

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BASES

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deviation from normal values that will indicate the condition, without risking spurious trips due to normal fluctuations in the measured parameter. The Allowable Values for bypass removal Functions are stated in the Applicable MODE or Other Specified Condition column of Table 3.3.1-1.

The safety analyses applicable to each RPS Function are discussed next.

1. Nuclear Overpower

a. Nuclear Overpower - High Setpoint

The Nuclear Overpower - High Setpoint trip provides protection for the design thermal overpower condition based on the measured out of core neutron leakage flux.

The Nuclear Overpower - High Setpoint trip initiates a reactor trip when the neutron power reaches a predefined setpoint at the design overpower limit. Because THERMAL POWER lags the neutron power, tripping when the neutron power reaches the design overpower will limit THERMAL POWER to prevent exceeding acceptable fuel damage limits.

Thus, the Nuclear Overpower - High Setpoint trip protects against violation of the DNBR and fuel centerline melt SLs. However, the RCS Variable Low Pressure, and Nuclear Overpower Flux/Flow Imbalance, provide more direct protection. The role of the Nuclear Overpower - High Setpoint trip is to limit reactor THERMAL POWER below the highest power at which the other two trips are known to provide protection.

The Nuclear Overpower - High Setpoint trip also provides transient protection for rapid positive reactivity excursions during power operations. These events include the rod withdrawal accident and the rod ejection accident. By providing a trip during these events, the Nuclear Overpower - High Setpoint trip protects the unit

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BACKGROUND Reactor Building Pressure (continued)

The ESPS channels of the Reactor Building Spray System are formed by two identical two-out-of-three logic networks with the active elements originating in six Reactor Building pressure sensing pressure switches.

Three independent pressure switches containing normally open contacts from one protective channel's two-out-of-three logic inputs. Three other identical pressure switches from the two-out-of-three logic inputs of the second protective channel. Either of the two protective channels is capable of initiating the required protective action.

Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values

Trip setpoints are the nominal value at which the bistables are set. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION accuracy.

The trip setpoints used in the bistables are selected such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment induced errors for those ESPS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 2), the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.5-1 in the accompanying LCO are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the trip setpoints and associated uncertainties is provided in the Reference 3. The actual nominal trip setpoint entered into the bistable is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.

Setpoints, in accordance with the Allowable Values, ensure that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and the equipment functions as designed.

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available, the reactor coolant pumps continue to circulate coolant through the steam generators, maximizing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown. With a loss of offsite power, the response of mitigating systems, such as the High Pressure Injection (HPI) System pumps, is delayed.

The TSVs remain open during power operation. These valves close upon a reactor trip.

- a. For an HELB or an MSLB inside containment, steam is discharged into containment from both steam generators until closure of the TSVs. After TSV closure, steam is discharged into containment only from the affected steam generator.
- b. An MSLB outside of containment and upstream from the TSVs is not a containment pressurization concern. The uncontrolled blowdown of both steam generators must be prevented to limit the potential for uncontrolled RCS cooldown and positive reactivity addition. Closure of the TSVs isolates the break and limits the blowdown to a single steam generator.
- c. An event such as increased steam flow through the turbine will terminate on closing the TSVs.
- d. Following a steam generator tube rupture, closure of the TSVs isolates the ruptured steam generator from the intact steam generator.

The TSV Closure function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 2).

LCO

Two TSV Closure channels are required to be OPERABLE.

This LCO provides assurance that the TSVs will perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the 10 CFR 100 limits (Ref. 3).

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B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.4 Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The BWST supports the ECCS and the Reactor Building Spray System by providing a source of borated water for ECCS and reactor building spray pump operation. In addition, the BWST supplies borated water to the refueling canal for refueling operations.

A normally open, motor operated isolation valve is provided in each LPI line to allow the operator to isolate the BWST from the LPI System after the LPI pump suction has been transferred to the reactor building sump following depletion of the BWST during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Use of a single BWST to supply both ECCS trains is acceptable because the BWST is a passive component, and passive failures are not assumed to occur coincidentally with a LOCA.

This LCO ensures that:

- a. The BWST contains sufficient borated water to support the ECCS during the injection phase;
- b. Sufficient water volume exists in the reactor building sump to support continued operation of the ECCS and reactor building spray pumps at the time of transfer to the recirculation mode of cooling; and
- c. The reactor remains subcritical following a LOCA and returns subcritical following a MSLB once borated water from the ECCS reaches the core.

Insufficient water inventory in the BWST could result in insufficient cooling capacity by the ECCS when the transfer to the recirculation mode occurs.

Improper boron concentrations could result in a reduction of SDM or excessive boric acid precipitation in the core following a LOCA, as well as excessive caustic stress corrosion of mechanical components and systems inside containment.

BASES

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SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

return to power. With offsite power available, the reactor coolant pumps continue to circulate coolant through the steam generators, maximizing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown. With a loss of offsite power, the response of mitigating systems, such as the High Pressure Injection (HPI) System pumps, is delayed.

The TSVs remain open during power operation. These valves close upon a reactor trip.

- a. For an HELB or an MSLB inside containment, steam is discharged into containment from both steam generators until closure of the TSVs. After TSV closure, steam is discharged into containment only from the affected steam generator.
- b. An MSLB outside of containment and upstream from the TSVs is not a containment pressurization concern. The uncontrolled blowdown of both steam generators must be prevented to limit the potential for uncontrolled RCS cooldown and positive reactivity addition. Closure of the TSVs isolates the break and limits the blowdown to a single steam generator.
- c. Steam flow to the turbine if not controlled by the turbine control valves will terminate on closing the TSVs.
- d. Following a steam generator tube rupture, closure of the TSVs isolates the ruptured steam generator from the intact steam generator.

The TSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36, (Ref. 3).

LCO

This LCO requires that the two TSVs in each steam line be OPERABLE. The TSVs are considered OPERABLE when the isolation times are within limits and they close on an isolation actuation signal.

This LCO provides assurance that the TSVs will perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the 10 CFR 100 limits (Ref. 4).

BASES

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REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.2.1 (continued)

instrument may not be available for comparison. The CHANNEL CHECK provides verification that the OPERABLE source range channel is energized and indicates a value consistent with current unit status.

The Frequency of 12 hours is consistent with the CHANNEL CHECK Frequency specified similarly for the same instruments in LCO 3.3.9.

SR 3.9.2.2

SR 3.9.2.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 18 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source range nuclear instrument is a complete check and re-adjustment of the channel, from the pre-amplifier input to the indicator. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance during the conditions that apply during a unit outage. Industry experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.
 3. 10 CFR 50.36.
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Attachment 2

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)

BASES

BACKGROUND

According to ONS Design Criteria (Ref. 1), the reactor core and its interaction with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) must be designed for inherently stable power operation, even in the possible event of an accident. In particular, the net reactivity feedback in the system must compensate for any unintended reactivity increases.

The MTC relates a change in core reactivity to a change in reactor coolant temperature (a positive MTC means that reactivity increases with increasing moderator temperature; conversely, a negative MTC means that reactivity decreases with increasing moderator temperature). Therefore, a coolant temperature increase will cause a reactivity decrease. Reactivity increases that cause a coolant temperature increase will thus be self limiting. The same characteristic is true when the MTC is positive and coolant temperature decreases occur.

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negative
MTC

MTC values are predicted at selected burnups during the safety evaluation analysis and are confirmed to be acceptable by measurements. Reactor cores are designed so that the beginning of cycle (BOC) MTC is less than or equal to zero when THERMAL POWER is 95% RTP or greater. The actual value of the MTC is dependent on core characteristics, such as fuel loading and reactor coolant soluble boron concentration. The core design may require additional burnable absorbers to yield an MTC at BOC within the range analyzed in the accident analysis. The end of cycle (EOC) MTC is also limited by the requirements of the accident analysis. Fuel cycles that are designed to achieve high burnups or that have changes to other characteristics are evaluated to ensure the MTC does not become more negative than the value assumed in the safety analyses.

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BASES

BACKGROUND
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Trip Setpoints/Allowable Value (continued)

inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. All field sensors and signal processing equipment for these channels are assumed to operate within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. The trip setpoints are the nominal values at which the bistables are set. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION accuracy. A detailed description of the methodology used to determine the Allowable Value and trip setpoints, ~~including their explicit uncertainties~~ is provided in Reference 4. and associated

Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Value ensure that the limits of Chapter 2.0, "Safety Limits," in the Technical Specifications are not violated during anticipated transients and that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the anticipated transient or accident and the equipment functions as designed. Note that in LCO 3.3.1 the Allowable Values listed in Table 3.3.1-1 for Functions 1 through 8 and 11 are the LSSS.

Each channel can be tested online to verify that the setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal. Surveillances for the channels are specified in the SR section.

that require a reactor trip to meet the acceptance criteria

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Each of the analyzed accidents and transients can be detected by one or more RPS Functions. The accident analysis contained in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), takes credit for most RPS trip Functions. Functions not specifically credited in the accident analysis were qualitatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These Functions are high RB pressure, high RCS temperature, turbine trip, and loss of main feedwater. These Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance. These Functions also serve as backups to Functions that were credited in the safety analysis.

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)

The LCO requires all instrumentation performing an RPS Function to be OPERABLE. Failure of any instrument renders the affected channel(s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions. The three channels of each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 of the RPS instrumentation shall be OPERABLE during its specified Applicability to ensure that a reactor trip will be actuated if needed. Additionally, during shutdown bypass with any CRD trip breaker closed, the applicable RPS Functions must also be available. This ensures the capability to trip the withdrawn CONTROL RODS exists at all times that rod motion is possible. The trip Function channels specified in Table 3.3.1-1 are considered OPERABLE when all channel components necessary to provide a reactor trip are functional and in service for the required MODE or Other Specified Condition listed in Table 3.3.1-1.

Only the Allowable Values are specified for each RPS trip Function in the LCO. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoint measured by CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS does not exceed the Allowable Value if the bistable is performing as required. A trip setpoint found less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is considered OPERABLE with respect to the uncertainty allowances assumed for the applicable surveillance interval provided that operation, testing and subsequent calibration are consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint calculations. Each Allowable Value specified is more conservative than instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip Function. These uncertainties are defined in Reference 4.

For most RPS Functions, the Allowable Value in conjunction with the nominal trip setpoint ensure that the departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) or RCS pressure SLs are not challenged. Cycle specific values for use during operation are contained in the COLR. , centerline fuel melt,

Certain RPS trips function to indirectly protect the SLs by detecting specific conditions that do not immediately challenge SLs but will eventually lead to challenge if no action is taken. These trips function to minimize the unit transients caused by the specific conditions. The Allowable Value for these Functions is selected at the minimum deviation from normal values that will indicate the

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BASES

BACKGROUND

Reactor Building Pressure (continued)

The ESPS channels of the Reactor Building Spray System are formed by two identical two-out-of-three logic networks with the active elements originating in six Reactor Building pressure sensing pressure switches.

Three independent pressure switches containing normally open contacts from one protective channel's two-out-of-three logic inputs. Three other identical pressure switches from the two-out-of-three logic inputs of the second protective channel. Either of the two protective channels is capable of initiating the required protective action.

Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values

Trip setpoints are the nominal value at which the bistables are set. Any bistable is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION accuracy.

The trip setpoints used in the bistables are selected such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment induced errors for those ESPS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 2), the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.5-1 in the accompanying LCO are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the trip setpoints, ~~including their uncertainties~~ ^{and associated} is provided in the Reference 3. The actual nominal trip setpoint entered into the bistable is more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.

Setpoints, in accordance with the Allowable Values, ensure that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and the equipment functions as designed.

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BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
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available, the reactor coolant pumps continue to circulate coolant through the steam generators, maximizing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown. With a loss of offsite power, the response of mitigating systems, such as the High Pressure Injection (HPI) System pumps, is delayed.

The TSVs remain open during power operation. These valves close upon a reactor trip.

- a. For an HELB or an MSLB inside containment, ~~the analysis assumes the TSV in the affected steam generator remains open. For this scenario, steam is discharged into containment from both steam generators until closure of the TSVs in the intact steam generator occurs.~~ After TSV closure, steam is discharged into containment only from the affected steam generator.
- b. An MSLB outside of containment and upstream from the TSVs is not a containment pressurization concern. The uncontrolled blowdown of both steam generators must be prevented to limit the potential for uncontrolled RCS cooldown and positive reactivity addition. Closure of the TSVs isolates the break and limits the blowdown to a single steam generator.
- c. An event such as increased steam flow through the turbine will terminate on closing the TSVs.
- d. Following a steam generator tube rupture, closure of the TSVs isolates the ruptured steam generator from the intact steam generator.

The TSV Closure function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 2).

LCO

Two TSV Closure channels are required to be OPERABLE.

This LCO provides assurance that the TSVs will perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the 10 CFR 100 limits (Ref. 3).

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B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.4 Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The BWST supports the ECCS and the Reactor Building Spray System by providing a source of borated water for ECCS and reactor building spray pump operation. In addition, the BWST supplies borated water to the refueling canal for refueling operations.

A normally open, motor operated isolation valve is provided in each LPI line to allow the operator to isolate the BWST from the LPI System after the LPI pump suction has been transferred to the reactor building sump following depletion of the BWST during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Use of a single BWST to supply both ECCS trains is acceptable because the BWST is a passive component, and passive failures are not assumed to occur coincidentally with a LOCA.

This LCO ensures that:

- a. The BWST contains sufficient borated water to support the ECCS during the injection phase;
- b. Sufficient water volume exists in the reactor building sump to support continued operation of the ECCS and reactor building spray pumps at the time of transfer to the recirculation mode of cooling; and
- c. The reactor remains subcritical following a LOCA and MSLB once borated water from the ECCS reaches the core

returns subcritical following a

Insufficient water inventory in the BWST could result in insufficient cooling capacity by the ECCS when the transfer to the recirculation mode occurs.

Improper boron concentrations could result in a reduction of SDM or excessive boric acid precipitation in the core following a LOCA, as well as excessive caustic stress corrosion of mechanical components and systems inside containment.

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

return to power. With offsite power available, the reactor coolant pumps continue to circulate coolant through the steam generators, maximizing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown. With a loss of offsite power, the response of mitigating systems, such as the High Pressure Injection (HPI) System pumps, is delayed.

The TSVs remain open during power operation. These valves close upon a reactor trip.

- a. ~~For an HELB or an SLB inside containment, the analysis assumes the TSV for the affected steam generator remains open. For this scenario, steam is discharged into containment from both steam generators until closure of the TSVs in the intact steam generator occurs.~~ After TSV closure, steam is discharged into containment only from the affected steam generator.
- b. An MSLB outside of containment and upstream from the TSVs is not a containment pressurization concern. The uncontrolled blowdown of both steam generators must be prevented to limit the potential for uncontrolled RCS cooldown and positive reactivity addition. Closure of the TSVs isolates the break and limits the blowdown to a single steam generator.
- c. Steam flow to the turbine if not controlled by the turbine control valves will terminate on closing the TSVs.
- d. Following a steam generator tube rupture, closure of the TSVs isolates the ruptured steam generator from the intact steam generator.

The TSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36, (Ref. 3).

LCO

This LCO requires that the two TSVs in each steam line be OPERABLE. The TSVs are considered OPERABLE when the isolation times are within limits and they close on an isolation actuation signal.

This LCO provides assurance that the TSVs will perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the 10 CFR 100 limits (Ref. 4).

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.2.1 (continued)

instrument may not be available for comparison. The CHANNEL CHECK provides verification that the OPERABLE source range channel is energized and indicated a value consistent with current unit status.

The Frequency of 12 hours is consistent with the CHANNEL CHECK Frequency specified similarly for the same instruments in LCO 3.3.9.

SR 3.9.2.2

SR 3.9.2.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 18 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source range nuclear instrument is a complete check and re-adjustment of the channel, from the pre-amplifier input to the indicator. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance during the conditions that apply during a unit outage. Industry experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.
 3. 10 CFR 50.36.
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