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16.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

16.5.10 RCS Leakage

COMMITMENT RCS leakage, including loss of reactor coolant through reactor coolant pump seals and system valves to connecting systems which vent to the gas vent header and from which coolant can be returned to the reactor coolant system, shall be ≤ 30 gpm.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. RCS Leakage evaluated as unsafe. <u>OR</u> RCS leakage > limit.	A.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<u>AND</u> A.2 Be in MODE 5.	36 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 16.5.10.1 Initiate evaluation of safety implications of RCS leakage.	Once within 4 hours of detection

BASES

The requirement(s) of this SLC section were relocated from the CTS.1.6.2, 3.1.6.6, and 3.1.6.9 during the conversion to ITS

Water inventory balances, radiation monitoring equipment, boric acid crystalline deposits, and physical inspections can disclose reactor coolant

leaks. Any leak of radioactive fluid, whether from the reactor coolant system primary boundary or not can be a serious problem with respect to in-plant radioactivity contamination and cleanup or it could develop into a still more serious problem; and therefore, first indications of such leakage will be followed up as soon as practicable.

Although some leak rates on the order of GPM may be tolerable from a dose point of view, especially if they are to closed systems, it must be recognized that leaks in the order of drops per minute through any of the walls of the primary system could be indicative of materials failure such as by stress corrosion cracking. If depressurization, isolation and/or other safety measures are not taken promptly, these small breaks could develop into much larger leaks, possibly into a gross pipe rupture. Therefore, the nature of the leak, as well as the magnitude of the leakage must be considered in the safety evaluation. The safety evaluation shall assure that the exposure of offsite personnel to radiation is within the guidelines of 10 CFR 20.

The upper limit of 30 gpm is based on the contingency of a complete loss of station power. A 30 gpm loss of water in conjunction with a complete loss of station power and subsequent cooldown of the reactor coolant system by the turbine bypass system (set at 1,040 psia) and steam driven emergency feedwater pump would require more than 60 minutes to empty the pressurizer from the combined effect of system leakage and contraction. This will be ample time to restore electrical power to the station and makeup flow to the reactor coolant system.

REFERENCES

N/A