

Attachment #1

Revised Technical Specification Bases

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The 95 percent confidence level that DNB will not occur is preserved by ensuring that the DNBR remains greater than the DNBR design limit based on the applicable CHF correlation for the core design. In the development of the applicable DNBR design limit, uncertainties in the core state variables, power peaking factors, manufacturing-related parameters, and the CHF correlation may be statistically combined to determine a statistical DNBR design limit. Additional retained thermal margin may also be applied to the statistical DNBR design limit to yield a higher thermal design limit for use in establishing DNB-based core safety and operating limits. In all cases, application of statistical CNBR design methods preserves a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent confidence level that DNB will not occur.

The Variable Low RCS Pressure Protective Limits presented in the Core Operating Limits Report represent the conditions at which the minimum allowable DNBR is predicted to occur for the limiting combination of thermal power and number of operating reactor coolant pumps. This curve is based upon the design nuclear peaking factors provided in the Core Operating Limits Report.

Since power peaking is not a directly measurable quantity, DNBR limited power peaks and fuel melt limited power peaks are separately correlated to measurable reactor power and power imbalance. The Axial Power Imbalance Protective Limits presented in the Core Operating Limits Report define the values of reactor power as a function of axial imbalance that correspond to the more restrictive of two thermal limits - MDNBR equal to the DNBR limit or the linear heat rate equal to the centerline fuel melt limit.

The core protection safety limits are based on an RCS flow less than or equal to 385,440 gpm (4 pump operation). Three pump operation is analyzed assuming 74.7 percent of four pump flow. The maximum thermal power for three pump operation is provided with the Axial Power Imbalance Protective Limits in the Core Operating Limits Report.

References

- (1) Correlation of Critical Heat Flux in a Bundle Cooled by Pressurized Water, BAW-10000A, May 1976
- (2) BWC Correlation of Critical Heat Flux, BAW-10143P-A, April, 1995.

4.5.5 Low Pressure Injection System Leakage

Applicability

Applies to Low Pressure Injection System leakage.

Objective

To maintain a preventive leakage rate for the Low Pressure Injection System which will prevent significant off-site exposures.

Specification

4.5.5.1 Acceptance Limit

The maximum allowable leakage from the Low Pressure Injection System components (which includes valve stems, flanges and pump seals) shall not exceed two gallons per hour.

4.5.5.2 Test

Every 18 months, the following tests of the Low Pressure Injection System shall be conducted to determine leakage:

- a. The portion of the Low Pressure Injection System, except as specified in (b), that is outside the containment shall be tested either by use in normal operation or by hydrostatically testing at 350 psig.
- b. Piping from the containment emergency sump to the low pressure injection pump suction isolation valve shall be pressure tested at no less than 59 psig.
- c. Visual inspection shall be made for excessive leakage from components of the system. Any excessive leakage shall be measured by collection and weighing or by another equivalent method.

Bases

The leakage rate limit for the Low Pressure Injection System is a judgement value based on assuring that the components can be expected to operate without mechanical failure for a period on the order of 200 days after a loss of coolant accident. The test pressure (350 psig) achieved either by normal system operation or by hydrostatically testing, gives an adequate margin over the highest pressure within the system after a design basis accident. Similarly, the pressure test for the return lines from the containment to the Low Pressure Injection System (59 psig) is equivalent to the design pressure of the containment. The dose to the thyroid calculated as a result of this leakage is 1.78 rem for a two-hour exposure at the site boundary.

REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 15.15.4, and 6.3.3.2.2

Bases Revision
09/24/98

Attachment #2

Markup of Existing Technical Specifications Bases

Insert A

The Variable Low RCS Pressure Protective Limits presented in the Core Operating Limits Report represent the conditions at which the minimum allowable DNBR is predicted to occur for the limiting combination of thermal power and number of operating reactor coolant pumps. This curve is based upon the design nuclear peaking factors provided in the Core Operating Limits Report.

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References

- (1) Correlation of Critical Heat Flux in a Bundle Cooled by Pressurized Water, ~~BAW-10000, March, 1970.~~ *BAW-10000A, May 1976.*
- (2) ~~Correlation of 15x15 Geometry Zircaloy Grid Rod Bundle CHF Data with the BWC Correlation, BAW-10143P, Part 2, August 1981.~~
BWC Correlation of Critical Heat Flux, BAW-10143P-A, April, 1995.

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REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 15.15.4, and 6.3.3.2.2