

## **Guidance for Evaluating FBI Identification and Criminal History Records Checks for Allowing Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive Material**

Each licensee is responsible for determining whether to grant an individual unescorted access to certain radioactive materials. The licensee shall allow only trustworthy and reliable individuals, approved in writing by the licensee, to have unescorted access to radioactive material quantities of concern (listed in Attachment 2 of the Order) and devices containing that radioactive material. The trustworthiness and reliability (T&R) determination, to grant an individual unescorted access to certain radioactive materials, is made by the licensee's Reviewing Official, based on information gathered from all four elements of the background check and evaluated by the Reviewing Official. The minimum four background check elements are: 1) fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal history records check, 2) verifying employment history, 3) verifying education, and 4) personal references. The purpose of this guidance is to address the fingerprinting component of the T&R determination.

Unescorted access determinations require an evaluation of a person's trustworthiness and reliability. When a person's life history shows evidence of unreliability or untrustworthiness, questions arise whether the person can be relied on and trusted to exercise the responsibility necessary for working with risk-significant radioactive materials. The purpose of the T&R determination requirement, for unescorted access, is to provide reasonable assurance that those individuals are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety, including the potential to commit or aid theft and/or radiological sabotage. This is a licensee's business decision as to what criteria it uses for the bases of the trustworthiness and reliability determination. Some indicators that licensees should consider for what may be a trustworthiness and reliability concern can be found in Increased Control guidance in Q and A #34 (Enclosure 2 to the transmittal letter of this Order).

In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the Reviewing Official should consider the following factors:

- (1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
- (2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
- (3) The frequency and regency of the conduct;
- (4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
- (5) The extent to which participation is voluntary;
- (6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes;
- (7) The motivation for the conduct;
- (8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
- (9) The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final determination remains the responsibility

of the licensee. In every case, the Reviewing Official should evaluate trustworthiness and reliability based on an accumulation of information which supports a positive finding, prior to granting unescorted access. Items to consider include:

1. The Reviewing Official should evaluate the information collected for consistency and adequacy.
2. True identity should be evaluated by comparing applicant provided identification and personal history data to pertinent information from the background check, and other data sources.
3. The Reviewing Official should determine whether inconsistencies determined through review or investigation, are intentional, innocent, or an oversight. Willful or intentional acts of omission or untruthfulness could be grounds for denial of unescorted access.

When a licensee submits fingerprints to the NRC pursuant to an NRC Order, it will receive a FBI identification and criminal history record since the individual's eighteenth birthday. The licensee will receive the information from the criminal history check of those individuals requiring unescorted access to radioactive materials, and the licensee's Reviewing Official should evaluate that information using the guidance below.

The licensee's Reviewing Official is required to evaluate all available information in making a T&R determination for unescorted access to radioactive materials, including the criminal history records information pertaining to the individual as required by the NRC Order. The FBI identification and criminal history records check is used in the determination of whether the individual has a record of criminal activity that indicates that the individual should not have unescorted access to radioactive materials subject to this Order. Each determination of T&R for unescorted access to radioactive materials, which includes a review of criminal history information, must be documented to include the basis for the decision made.

Licenses shall not make a final determination solely on the basis of criminal history checks information involving an arrest more than 1 year old for which there is not information on the disposition of the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an acquittal.

All information collected is to be considered by the licensee in making a trustworthiness or reliability determination for unescorted access. Potentially disqualifying information obtained from confidential/unnamed sources must be substantiated and documented, and should not be used as a sole basis to deny access authorization unless corroborated. Licensees should establish criteria in writing that would disqualify someone from being granted authorized access.

The FBI identification and criminal history records check is used to evaluate whether the individual has a record of criminal activity that may compromise his or her trustworthiness and reliability. Identification of a criminal history through the FBI criminal history records check does not automatically indicate unreliability or lack of trustworthiness of the employee. The licensee will have to judge the nature of the criminal activity, length of employment, and recency of the criminal activity. The licensee can authorize individuals with criminal records for unescorted access to radioactive materials, based on a documented evaluation of the basis for determining that the employee was reliable and trustworthy notwithstanding his or her criminal history. Each evaluation conducted in review of criminal history and other background checks information, should be documented to include the decision making basis.

At a minimum, the licensee should consider the following elements when evaluating the results of the FBI Identification and Criminal History Records check:

1. Committed, attempted to commit, aided, or abetted another who committed or attempted to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, sedition, or terrorism.
2. Publicly or privately advocated actions that may be inimical to the interest of the United States, or publicly or privately advocated the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
3. Knowingly established or continued a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage agent or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means. (Ordinarily, the licensee should not consider chance or casual meetings or contacts limited to normal business or Official relations.)
4. Joined or engaged in any activity knowingly in sympathy with or in support of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or any State or any subdivisions thereof by unlawful means, or which advocate the use of force and violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means. (Ordinarily, the licensee should not consider chance or casual meetings or contacts limited to normal business or official relations.)
5. Deliberately misrepresented, falsified or omitted relevant and material facts from documentation provided to the licensee.
6. Has been convicted of a crime(s) which, in the Reviewing Official's opinion, indicate poor judgment, unreliability, or untrustworthiness.

These indicators are not meant to be all inclusive nor intended to be disqualifying factors. Licensees can also consider how recent such indicators occurred and other extenuating or mitigating factors in their determinations. Section 149.c.(2)(B) of the AEA requires that the information obtained as a result of fingerprinting be used solely for the purposes of making a determination as to unescorted access suitability. Unescorted access suitability is not a hiring decision, and the NRC does not intend for licensees to use this guidance as such. Because a particular individual may not be suitable for unescorted access does not necessarily mean that he is not suitable for escorted access or some other position that does not involve NRC-regulated activities.