NRC00013



Combined License Application Review FERMI 3

Safety Panel 2

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Panelists

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Recommendation 4.2 – Framework

- SECY-12-0025 contains proposed orders and requests for information in response to lessons learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi
 - Discussed approach for new reactors
- Order EA-12-049 specifies requirements for mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external events
- JLD-ISG-2012-01 provides guidance for meeting Order EA-12-049

Recommendation 4.2 – Approach

- Initial phase mitigation for the first 72 hours will use the ESBWR passive safety systems
- Final phase mitigation to cover indefinite time beyond the initial 72 hours
 - Will use same passive safety systems, supported by offsite resources

- Core cooling via the isolation condenser system
 - Safety-related passive closed-loop cooling system
 - Natural circulation, no reliance on ac power
 - Transfers decay heat to atmosphere

- Containment cooling via the passive containment cooling system
 - Transfers decay heat via heat exchangers to the atmosphere with no reliance on ac power
- Spent fuel cooling uses pool water inventory

- Initial phase mitigation (72 hours) provided by existing ESBWR passive safety systems
- No transition phase mitigation required as adequate time is available to bring in offsite resources, if needed

 Final phase mitigation continues to use passive safety systems with periodic replenishment of water inventories using offsite equipment or other available resources

Recommendation 4.2 – Conclusions

- Fermi 3 mitigation strategies provide core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities, as discussed in Order EA-12-049
- License condition requires completion of the overall integrated plan, as described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 12-06, and full implementation of the guidance and strategies prior to fuel load

Recommendation 7.1 – Framework

- SECY-12-0025 discussed approach for new reactors
- Order EA-12-051 specifies requirements for reliable spent fuel pool instrumentation
- JLD-ISG-2012-03 provides guidance for meeting Order EA-12-051

Recommendation 7.1 – Approach

- Use level instruments provided in the ESBWR certified design
- Expanded the ESBWR level instrument description to include independent power source connectivity and instrument design accuracy

Recommendation 7.1 – Safety Review/Conclusions

- Fermi 3 fully addressed all design features identified in JLD-ISG-2012-03
- License condition requires a training program on establishing alternate power connections to level instruments

Recommendation 9.3 – Framework

- To conform to the direction in SECY-12-0025, applicants should perform an assessment of
 - Communications systems and equipment needed during prolonged station blackout condition
 - Onsite and augmented staffing capability to respond to a multi-unit event

Recommendation 9.3 – Approach

- Applicant committed to follow NRC endorsed guidance
 - NEI 12-01, "Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities," Revision 0

- Staff modified the license condition
 - Reference schedules required by 10 CFR 52.99(a) and 10 CFR 52.103(a) for completion of Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) and fuel load
 - Changed license condition timing from two years before initial fuel load to 18 months before last date scheduled for completing ITAAC

Recommendation 9.3 – Conclusion

- Revised license condition is acceptable
 because
 - Responsive to SECY-12-0025
 - Requires use of endorsed guidance in NEI 12-01