This page provides an abstract, justification, and target dates for a potential rule that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prioritized in its Common Prioritization of Rulemaking listing.

Please visit the <u>Rulemaking Priorities</u> page on the NRC's public Web site for additional information about this page and to view the entire Common Prioritization of Rulemaking listing.

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Requirements for Radiological Sabotage

Abstract

The proposed rule would amend the Commission's regulations to revise the existing security requirements that apply during the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI), and during the storage of SNF and high-level waste at a Monitored Retrievable Storage Installation (MRS). This rule would require conforming changes to the ISFSI and MRS licensing requirements. The specific objectives of this rule are to update the ISFSI security requirements to improve the consistency and clarification of the security requirements for both types of ISFSI licensees (i.e., general and specific); make generically applicable requirements similar to those imposed on ISFSI licensees by the post September 11, 2001, security orders; and use a risk-informed, performance-based structure in ISFSI and MRS security regulations. This rulemaking would also address Issue 11 of PRM 72-6 filed by Ms. Sandra Gavutis, Executive Director for C-10 Research and Education Foundation Inc. Issue 11 requested that the NRC require Hardened On-Site Storage at all nuclear power plants as well as away-from-reactor dry cask storage sites; and that all nuclear industry interim on-site or offsite dry cask storage installations or ISFSIs be fortified against terrorist attack. In addition, the petitioner requested that all sites should be safeguarded against accident and age-related leakage.

Justification

The rule scores 35 points (10, 10, 10, 5) because of the following reasons:

A. Moderate contributor toward one goal and implements one goal strategy (security strategies 1).

B. Significant contributor toward one or more strategy (regulatory effectiveness strategies 1 and 2).

C. Significant contributor toward one or more considerations or the Commission has provided specific direction and priority/schedule on the rulemaking. Commission direction to go forward with the rule. Codifies security orders thus closing a regulatory gap.

D. Significant contributor toward one or more considerations. Significant interest in this rule from industry and stakeholders and addresses a petition (PRM-72-6).

Start Dates	Reg Basis	PR Sent to	FR Sent to	Publication
	Completed	Comm/EDO	Comm/EDO	Date
1/1/11	06/30/16	01/31/18	06/30/19	12/15/19