

GROUP B

FOIA/PA NO: 2014-0508

RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN PART

The following types of information are being withheld:

- Ex. 1: Records properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526
- Ex. 2: Records regarding personnel rules and/or human capital administration
- Ex. 3: Information about the design, manufacture, or utilization of nuclear weapons
 Information about the protection or security of reactors and nuclear materials
 Contractor proposals not incorporated into a final contract with the NRC
 Other _____
- Ex. 4: Proprietary information provided by a submitter to the NRC
 Other _____
- Ex. 5: Draft documents or other pre-decisional deliberative documents (D.P. Privilege)
 Records prepared by counsel in anticipation of litigation (A.W.P. Privilege)
 Privileged communications between counsel and a client (A.C. Privilege)
 Other _____
- Ex. 6: Agency employee PII, including SSN, contact information, birthdates, etc.
 Third party PII, including names, phone numbers, or other personal information
- Ex. 7(A): Copies of ongoing investigation case files, exhibits, notes, ROI's, etc.
 Records that reference or are related to a separate ongoing investigation(s)
- Ex. 7(C): Special Agent or other law enforcement PII
 PII of third parties referenced in records compiled for law enforcement purposes
- Ex. 7(D): Witnesses' and Allegers' PII in law enforcement records
 Confidential Informant or law enforcement information provided by other entity
- Ex. 7(E): Law Enforcement Technique/Procedure used for criminal investigations
 Technique or procedure used for security or prevention of criminal activity
- Ex. 7(F): Information that could aid a terrorist or compromise security

Other/Comments: _____

McNamara, Nancy

From: Tift, Doug
Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2014 2:08 PM
To: Firsick, Michael (Michael.Firsick@ct.gov)
Cc: McNamara, Nancy
Subject: SIT at Millstone

Mike,

We have received final approval to conduct a Special Inspection Team (SIT) at Millstone to inspect the repetitive failures of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Our team will entrance on Monday (February 3).

The Special Inspection will occur in 2 phases. The first phase will occur next week. The second phase will occur when the licensee completes their Root Cause Analysis. Our best estimate at this point is that we will complete our inspection and conduct our exit meeting in March. Our final report will be issued within 45 days of our exit meeting.

A press release announcing the SIT will be issued Monday morning. I'll get you an advanced copy about an hour before it is issued.

-Doug

Doug Tift

Regional State Liaison Officer

Office: 610-337-6918

Cell: (b)(6)

Tifft, Doug

From: Tifft, Doug
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2014 4:08 PM
To: Sheehan, Neil; Screnci, Diane
Cc: McNamara, Nancy
Subject: RE: Millstone SIT press release

Thanks.

From: Sheehan, Neil
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2014 4:04 PM
To: Tifft, Doug; Screnci, Diane
Cc: McNamara, Nancy
Subject: RE: Millstone SIT press release

You bet

From: Tifft, Doug
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2014 4:04 PM
To: Screnci, Diane; Sheehan, Neil
Cc: McNamara, Nancy
Subject: Millstone SIT press release

Diane / Neil,

Could Nancy and I please get a heads up copy of the Millstone SIT press release before it goes out on Monday?

Thanks,
-Doug

Doug Tifft

Regional State Liaison Officer
Office: 610-337-6918
Cell: (b)(6)

Tifft, Doug

From: Nieh, Ho
Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2014 2:07 PM
To: Dean, Bill; Lew, David
Cc: Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Scott, Michael; McKinley, Raymond; Cook, William; McNamara, Nancy; Tifft, Doug; Screnci, Diane; Sheehan, Neil
Subject: Millstone TDAFW SIT

FYI – Ray M, Bill C, and I had a call with Millstone (SVP and licensing staff) to communicate our plans to come back and look at the TDAFW bearing lock-nut issue.

We told them we'd be sending one inspector out for a few days to follow up, and that we would be re-exiting.

Also, we let them know that we would be informing the state of our plans.

Dominion did not raise any concerns or issues.

Ho

Ho Nieh
Director, Division of Reactor Projects
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Tifft, Doug

From: Tifft, Doug
Sent: Tuesday, June 24, 2014 8:53 AM
To: Firsick, Michael (Michael.Firsick@ct.gov)
Cc: McNamara, Nancy
Subject: Millstone SIT update

Mike,

I just wanted to touch base with you regarding the two special inspections we have open at Millstone.

As you are aware, the first SIT, looking into the AFW pump failures, was re-opened. No update here, the re-exit meeting has not been scheduled yet.

For the second SIT, regarding the NOUE, the team will conduct an exit meeting onsite on July 15. I don't have a time yet for the exit meeting. We will keep you posted.

Let me know if you have any questions.

-Doug

Doug Tifft

Regional State Liaison Officer

Office: 610-337-6918

Cell: (b)(6)

Tifft, Doug

From: Tifft, Doug
Sent: Thursday, August 28, 2014 1:06 PM
To: Semancik, Jeffrey (Jeffrey.Semancik@ct.gov)
Cc: McNamara, Nancy
Subject: Millstone SITs
Attachments: millstone SIT Rev FINAL Jackson.pdf; Millstone IR1408_final.pdf

Jeff,

Today, the NRC will be issuing two inspection reports, one for each of the recent Special Inspection Teams. They will be issued on listserv this afternoon. Attached are advanced copies of the reports. Please do not discuss publicly until after the NRC makes the reports public.

The first SIT for the repetitive failures of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump documents two findings, one White and one Green.

The White finding is documented as a self-revealing, apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, corrective action, Corrective Action, involving Dominion's failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the Unit 3 TDAFW pump was operated from May 2013 through February 2014 in an adverse configuration due to installation of an inappropriate cam follower bearing within the turbine control valve linkage. As a result of this adverse configuration, the pump experienced three overspeed trips during the subject timeframe. As a consequence, Dominion violated TS 3.7.1.2, since TDAFW was determined to be either failed or unreliable for greater than the TS allowed outage time. Dominion corrected the condition by installing the proper cam follower bearing.

The Green finding is documented as a self-revealing, Green non-cited violation of TS 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, involving Dominion's failure to maintain an adequate maintenance procedure to ensure reliable performance of the TDAFW system. Specifically, TDAFW responded to an August 2013 reactor trip but was subsequently shut down and declared inoperable after observed flow and pressure oscillations. Dominion staff discovered the control valve linkage misaligned due to a loose cam follower bearing retaining nut.

The second SIT for the dual unit trip and loss of offsite power event documents one Severity Level III apparent violation and two green findings.

The team identified a Severity Level III apparent violation (AV) of 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments," for Dominion's failure to complete a 50.59 evaluation and obtain a license amendment for a change made to the facility as described in the UFSAR. Specifically, Dominion removed a special protection system (SPS) called Severe Line Outage Detection (SLOD), which was described in the UFSAR. Dominion concluded in the 50.59 review that a full 50.59 safety evaluation was not required and, therefore, prior NRC approval was not needed to implement this change. The team concluded that prior NRC approval was required. Long term corrective actions for this issue have yet to be implemented. However, interim compensatory measures are in place and include: (1) Once per shift, verify all four 345 kV lines to the Millstone switchyard are in service, and (2a) with one or more 345 kV lines OOS, enter TS 3.8.1.1 for one offsite source inoperable (72 hours), or (2b) within 72 hours, reduce load to a total station output of ≤ 1750 MWe (Gross), 1650 MWe (Net).

One of the Green findings was issued because Dominion did not ensure correct implementation of their design change process procedure when establishing licensing basis requirements for removal of the special protection system (SPS). The other Green finding was issued because the Millstone Unit 3 control room personnel did not implement their emergency operating procedures (EOPs) in a timely manner and in accordance with usage guidelines.

For both the White and the severity level III violation the licensee has the option to either accept the White/violation or request a conference to further discuss before the NRC makes its final determination.

I know this is a lot of information, so please don't hesitate to give me a call if you have any questions.

-Doug

Doug Tiff

Regional State Liaison Officer

Office: 610-337-6918

Cell (b)(6)

From: [Cook, William](#)
To: [Chambers, Michael](#); [Haagensen, Brian](#); [Arner, Frank](#)
Cc: [Finney, Patrick](#); [Ambrosini, Josephine](#)
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 TDAFWP SDP Info
Date: Thursday, February 20, 2014 2:51:03 PM
Attachments: [image001.png](#)

Thanks Mike.

From: Chambers, Michael
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 2:36 PM
To: Cook, William; Haagensen, Brian; Arner, Frank
Cc: Finney, Patrick; Ambrosini, Josephine
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 TDAFWP SDP Info

I can call in from pretty much anywhere. I have nothing to add to Frank's analysis but that I agree with it.

Michael Chambers, BSME, PE
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
RIV Security Inspector
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Arlington, Tx 76011-4511
(C) (b)(6)
michael.chambers@nrc.gov

DISCOVER



FEBRUARY 16-22, 2014

From: Cook, William
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 10:28 AM
To: Haagensen, Brian; Arner, Frank
Cc: Finney, Patrick; Ambrosini, Josephine; Chambers, Michael
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 TDAFWP SDP Info

Will do, thanks Brian. When I get the conf call info, I will forward to everyone.

From: Haagensen, Brian
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 11:26 AM
To: Arner, Frank; Cook, William
Cc: Finney, Patrick; Ambrosini, Josephine; Chambers, Michael
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 TDAFWP SDP Info

Frank's analysis is the same as mine. I can be on the call but will be at Ginna next week

B/6

on a PI&R inspection. Just let me know where and give me a number to call in.

Brian

From: Arner, Frank
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 11:16 AM
To: Cook, William
Cc: Finney, Patrick; Haagensen, Brian; Ambrosini, Josephine; Chambers, Michael
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 TDAFWP SDP Info

I am sorry guys for inconvenience but will be on delayed

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

I will be back March 4th week.....but I would definitely suggest Mike being in on that call if at all possible

My take is this....and I have to be careful to separate the now condition with what was before....seated tight vs. not seated tight

We have evidence that after at least one of the overspeeds the rack drifted back to the 7 position in one of the CRs....that makes sense as the oil pressure bled off and like the vendor said below 90 rpm reset itself on the electrical OS

Given their existing procedures at the time and methods...FR.H.1 and SBO recovery

The AO would reset linkage...then get to the step where he opened the trip throttle valve....there was not instruction on how fast to open just open and no cautions
So if that was the case....the AOV upstream is wide open....the operator starts to open trip throttle valve....the governor valve is about 75% open in this case...stem travel about .6 inches of the >86 inches they previously had set up for stroke.

My take on it is unless I'm missing something...the steam would immediately begin rolling the turbine shaft, spinning the gear to the governor, which is calling for a speed demand and not seeing enough...which would result in a force to fully open the governor valve and stem to the full open condition....prior to reaching the setpoint...this would or could drive the stem and linkage into the fully open linkage sticking position....but it also would move the cam roller bearing to the fully open position...it likely wasn't rolling but was sliding with the cam roller bearing being degraded.

Now the turbine speed comes up quickly...as operator is looking and assuming the Governor valve will take over...as written in the procedures...however, the governor system is in the same position as it had been for each of these surveillances when it tripped several times...therefore the governor doesn't take over...speed can keep increasing and it will trip again

Only difference is it may not have as much water...1 or 2 seconds coming out through seals during the initial attempt..... this 2nd time around...will that help? We will never be able to define that.

I think their existing revised recovery procedures are still weak in my opinion...they still

don't have a way for the operator to use the trip throttle valve, monitor speed locally and control the situation if the governor valve simply cant respond.

The one difference to note, is that the FCVs to the SGs will be open (I think) and this will create more load while the turbine is spinning up.....such that the governor and stem and linkage will have more time to try to break free before hitting the OS setting.....???? how much who knows...we do know that with the SRV on discharge open it delayed the OS trip up to 9 seconds...now that puts out about I'm guessing now...about 200-300 gpm max with friction losses considered in discharge piping of SRV...so 1000 gpm to all SGs and it may take 15-??? Seconds to get to overspeed if governor stem never responds??? But it may not matter anyway since if it can't break free at 9 seconds why would it matter if it has more time...there isn't any more force applied as I understand it

Perhaps some of these assumptions are in error...if so would be glad to understand the difference.

And if this is how it would work, the licensee needs to somehow be able to give a reason for why it would be able to break free from the same position it was in prior to all the surveillances when it failed.....i.e. Rack full open position 10

From: Cook, William
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 10:19 AM
To: Fred O Cietek (Generation - 6)
Cc: Finney, Patrick; Arner, Frank; Haagensen, Brian; Ambrosini, Josephine
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 TDAFWP SDP Info

Great, I'd like to have Pat and Frank participate if they are available; and Brian and Jo, as well. It will be a collective judgment on the recovery capability and credit, and not just my view.
Bill

From: Fred O Cietek (Generation - 6) [<mailto:fred.o.cietek@dom.com>]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 10:02 AM
To: Cook, William
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 TDAFWP SDP Info

Yes, I will include any write-ups in the meeting notice.

Thanks.

From: Cook, William [<mailto:William.Cook@nrc.gov>]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 9:59 AM
To: Fred O Cietek (Generation - 6)
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 TDAFWP SDP Info

Yes, any day except Tuesday is generally good. If you can provide a written summary prior to the discussion, I think that would be more beneficial for the dialogue.

From: Fred O Cietek (Generation - 6) [mailto:fred.o.cietek@dom.com]
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2014 9:45 AM
To: Cook, William
Subject: Millstone 3 TDAFWP SDP Info

Hi Bill,

Our engineering and operations folks have put together a position on recoverability. I'd like to have them discuss their conclusions with you sometime next week. I'd also like to review the number of demands. Are you potentially available?

Thanks.
Fred

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Krohn, Paul

From: McKinley, Raymond
Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2014 10:55 AM
To: Krohn, Paul
Subject: Re: Millstone 3 Update-Potential Additional Support for Monday

Thanks Paul. Jigar may have I&C design skills but I am not sure. Did I send you the OD?

Sent via My Workspace for iOS

On Saturday, May 31, 2014 at 10:51:38 AM, "Krohn, Paul" <Paul.Krohn@nrc.gov> wrote:

Gentleman,

Here's the latest on MS3 TDAFWP. Suspect we will be looking to add some more expertise to SIT team on Monday.

Please respond back to me and let me know about your availability for next Monday (Frank, Mike O. And Mike C.), both for in office support and also potentially at the MS site.

Paul

PS - I know Mike is already back at PIL for second week of CDBI.
Sent from NRC BlackBerry

From: McKinley, Raymond
Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2014 10:05 AM
To: Nieh, Ho
Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Dean, Bill; Lew, David; Scott, Michael; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Jackson, Donald; Krohn, Paul; Ambrosini, Josephine; Haagensen, Brian; Cataldo, Paul; McNamara, Nancy; Tifft, Doug
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 Update

All,

U3 Status as of Saturday morning:

Mode 3. They have 1 RCP running. Encountering difficulty starting the other 3. On hold until the RCP issue is resolved. TDAFP activities are on hold as well pending resolution of the RCP issue.

Ho asked a question below. Here is my assessment of their TDAFP plan:

As I mentioned below, the licensee determined that this was a maintenance activity rather than a design change as it is an adjustment of the high speed stop and high speed setting within the bounds of their current allowable band. They ran it through their 50.59 screen and it screened out. The line between design change and maintenance activity is very gray, and a case can be made one way or the other. The design change process is much more rigorous than the maintenance activity process, and it is also more time consuming.

During my calls yesterday with Lori Armstrong (Licensing Director and FSRC Chair). I was very clear: regardless of the process used to control the activity, the end result had to be absolutely correct, effective, and within their licensing and design bases. I pointed out that the maintenance activity process path, while the path

13/7

of least resistance, does not provide the same level of rigor as the design change process. So, by proceeding down the maintenance activity path, they may not avail themselves of all the tools and reviews provided by the design change process which are intended to ensure a very high degree of engineering control and rigor.

Having said that, a high quality end state is achievable via the maintenance activity process, so the activity can be performed safely and effectively. The licensee has chosen their path. Our Residents and SIT team will inspect the processes used and the end result.

I took a look at the Operability Determination (which included the 50.59 screen). They presented a reasonable case for the proposed activity and appeared to consider the salient points. It appears reasonable.....on paper. The allowable speed range which will support the desired discharge pressure to meet required flow is 4455 to 4545 RPM +/- 10 rpm. They are lowering the speed setting to 4475 rpm. They did consider instrument accuracies, but a much more detailed inspection would be needed to be sure it was thorough enough (probably on the order of a CDBI). So, while it looks OK on paper, there is very very little margin left on the low end....20 rpm of margin over this range. Of course, they will have to test it. Will the machine work? Yes, but just very close to its operating limits. Given the choice of operating closer to the low end or closer to the high end, the low end seems to be the better choice. The high end challenges overspeed and relief valve lift which could prevent adequate injection flow and damage the machine. On the low end, if speed drifts too low, adequate injection flow may not be achieved, but operators could bump up the speed. Ultimately, the problem is that there is not much margin to work with. The machine is operating at the very limits of its capability.

In order to fully inspect the licensee's actions, we would need a Terry Turbine TDAFP expert, and an Instrumentation Engineer with design expertise to evaluate the impact of integrated system instrument accuracy as it relates to the available margin. We currently do not have that level of expertise on the SIT team.

Ray M

Sent via My Workspace for iOS

On Saturday, May 31, 2014 at 5:06:24 AM, "Nieh, Ho" <Ho.Nieh@nrc.gov> wrote:

Thanks for the follow up Ray.

Where did things end up on whether the adjustment constituted a design change?

Ho Nieh
Director, Division of Reactor Projects
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1
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King of Prussia, PA 19406
(610) 337-5229 (Office)
(b)(6) (Mobile)
(610) 337-6928 (Fax)
ho.nieh@nrc.gov

From: McKinley, Raymond
Sent: Friday, May 30, 2014 9:26 PM
To: Dean, Bill; Lew, David; Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Jackson, Donald; Krohn, Paul
Cc: Ambrosini, Josephine; Haagensen, Brian; Cataldo, Paul
Subject: Millstone 3 Update

FSRC approved OD for transition to mode 3. Licensee will adjust high speed stop and setting lower in the allowable band and test in mode 3 as a maintenance activity bounded by existing analyses per FSRC. Branch 5 will follow results. I have no immediate safety concerns with path forward. PMT testing in mode 3 will provide additional insights. SIT inspection activities will need to intrusively look into licensee course of action and outcome. We may need additional inspectors with the right TDAFP skill set to meet all SIT

objectives given these developments. I have advised Paul Cataldo to evaluate SIT team expansion or escalation to AIT on Monday by COB. Weekend licensee activities and results will better inform that recommendation.

I will update in AM.

Ray M

Sent via My Workspace for iOS

Krohn, Paul

From: Arner, Frank
Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2014 9:54 PM
To: Krohn, Paul
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 Update-Potential Additional Support for Monday

Paul.....Monday I have some personal items which need to be accomplished...as it is my normal SDO... but I can perform some work activities via home office off and on during PM

I'd prefer to work via home office/ KOP this week, as I'm scheduled to go out to Pilgrim next Sunday June 8 for a week of backfill...so it's much more convenient with respect to other obligations to work from down here this week.

I definitely need to devote some focus to wrapping up the Feb. SIT documentation this week as well as we are looking to put some finishing touches on it.

I would agree with Ray's assessment of the issue. Actually, I'm not even sure testing would show completely whether the impact of going to 4475 is not sat. I think It's more of an analysis type thing, since the SG backpressures in design space are assumed to usually be at highest backpressure or worst case SRV setting when determining if enough flow can be achieved. During testing at power the SG backpressures as you know are lower than this. That's my initial take anyway. It's clearly better to have more margin and lower speed...and the analysis piece just needs to support the rest I would guess.

I can always review fro home office/ KOP wed and give my take. My gut feel is the impact on achieving the decay heat flow requirements should still be achievable given actual SRV settings, etc. but as you know in design space the worst case conditions and accuracies are always assumed.

F

From: Krohn, Paul
Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2014 10:52 AM
To: Arner, Frank; Cook, William; Chambers, Michael; Orr, Michael
Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Cataldo, Paul; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James
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Ray M

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Thanks for the follow up Ray.

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Ray M

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Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2014 1:42 PM
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Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Cataldo, Paul; Trapp, James
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 Update-Potential Additional Support for Monday

Paul et al:

When we were last up there looking at the TDAFW did we look at the IST pump trend analysis and does anyone recall whehter there was any evidence of degradation? This is not a today question but I would be interested if there has been any signs of degradation over time.

Thanks

Ray

From: Krohn, Paul
Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2014 10:51 AM
To: Arner, Frank; Cook, William; Chambers, Michael; Orr, Michael
Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Cataldo, Paul; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James
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Paul

PS - I know Mike is already back at PIL for second week of CDBI.
Sent from NRC BlackBerry

From: McKinley, Raymond
Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2014 10:05 AM
To: Nieh, Ho
Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Dean, Bill; Lew, David; Scott, Michael; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Jackson, Donald; Krohn, Paul; Ambrosini, Josephine; Haagensen, Brian; Cataldo, Paul; McNamara, Nancy; Tift, Doug
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 Update

All,

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Ray M

Sent via My Workspace for iOS

On Saturday, May 31, 2014 at 5:06:24 AM, "Nieh, Ho" <Ho.Nieh@nrc.gov> wrote:

Thanks for the follow up Ray.

Where did things end up on whether the adjustment constituted a design change?

Ho Nieh
Director, Division of Reactor Projects
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1
2100 Renaissance Boulevard, Suite 100
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(610) 337-5229 (Office)

(b)(6) Mobile)

(610) 337-6928 (Fax)

ho.nieh@nrc.gov

From: McKinley, Raymond

Sent: Friday, May 30, 2014 9:26 PM

To: Dean, Bill; Lew, David; Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Jackson, Donald; Krohn, Paul

Cc: Ambrosini, Josephine; Haagensen, Brian; Cataldo, Paul

Subject: Millstone 3 Update

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I will update in AM.

Ray M

Sent via My Workspace for iOS

Krohn, Paul

From: Arner, Frank
Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2014 8:06 PM
To: Lorson, Raymond; Krohn, Paul; Cook, William; Chambers, Michael; Orr, Michael
Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Cataldo, Paul; Trapp, James
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 Update-Potential Additional Support for Monday

Ray, great question...while I'm not absolutely sure given the range of transients and accidents in the licensing bases, the limiting required accident flow rate of 918 gpm was for the feedwater line break casewhich would be a different scenario a bit from the SBO case, or where the inventory requirement is strictly based on decay heat and there is not a break. That's a guess though...I am not positive, but for the SBO case the important piece is makeup to the SGs as decay heat begins at its maximum and then shortly thereafter decreases in a relatively pretty quick timeframe. That's why I was thinking you may be able to credit a MDW FW pump but I guess it would be based on where the break was from and a single failure on top of it. Not very risk based, but still a design licensing bases case with the break and single failure.

f

-----Original Message-----

From: Lorson, Raymond
Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2014 9:13 AM
To: Arner, Frank; Krohn, Paul; Cook, William; Chambers, Michael; Orr, Michael
Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Cataldo, Paul; Trapp, James
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 Update-Potential Additional Support for Monday

Thanks Frank. I didnt think that there would be a significant impact but had to ask. The explanantion makes sense in all areas except I dont understand the piece about relying on the MDAFW to meet a flow requirement from design sg pressure conditions. I am wondering how this is considered in the SBO analysis?

I didnt realize that you were carrying around all those numbers in your head!

Ray

From: Arner, Frank
Sent: Sunday, June 01, 2014 12:38 AM
To: Lorson, Raymond; Krohn, Paul; Cook, William; Chambers, Michael; Orr, Michael
Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Cataldo, Paul; Trapp, James
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 Update-Potential Additional Support for Monday

Ray, I don't believe we really had looked at the trend of DP at a given speed and flowrate over time, but there was data from the actual full flow test at power performed in January.

However, I seem to recall the TDAFW pump had about a 5% margin or so at min flow conditions, but that margin was likely smaller at the full flow conditions.

The full flow test at power showed about 1088 gpm from the TDAFW pump including the 82 gpm from recirc flow with a DP about 1348 psid when adjusted to the rated speed of 4500 rpm.

I believe they had established in a calculation for the comprehensive pump test a minimum test flow of 1030 gpm at 1345.9 psid which included instrument uncertainty

While the speed reduction proposed would take the actual tested DP down from 1348 psid and 1088 gpm....affinity laws. 4450 rpm vs. 4500...the change in flowrate should be small 1088 to 1082 gpm with a lower dp based on speed reduction under the same test conditions. It appears at least from an initial view that they should still meet that lower end of the flow and pressure requirements based on current pump performance...or the last one at full flow.

The full flow test at power though was performed with steam generator pressure at about 945 psig.

In design worst case space, the main steam pressure would be about 1200 psig (main steam safety valve setpoint range). So if the pump put out 1375 discharge pressure when tested at SG pressure of 945 psig, it would increase to about 1525 psig for the most challenging backpressure event at the same speed. (4500 rpm) This would mean the actual discharge pressure of the pump would be about 255 psig higher during this event or about 1372 + 255 or 1627 psig. Because of this, the actual flowrate in the design case, based on pump curve would be much lower than the tested 1088 gpm that existed during the full flow test. Actual pump discharge pressure would fall between the value of 1627 and the 1372 measured during the online test. Flowrate for TDAFW could be about 750 gpm but then you would also have one MDAFW I believe with single failure.

At any rate the TS requirement that the terry turbine pump develop a head greater or equal to 3780 feet (1636 psid) when SG pressure greater than 800 psig when tested on recirc flow shouldn't be impacted by a speed reduction from 4500 rpm design to 4475 rpm, as they were getting about 1731 psid on recirc flow before. Affinity laws show lowest would be about 1711 psid based on that speed change. So from the current TS requirement speed change would make it.

That is considering if the current TS is as restrictive as it needs to be.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lorson, Raymond

Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2014 1:42 PM

To: Krohn, Paul; Arner, Frank; Cook, William; Chambers, Michael; Orr, Michael

Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Cataldo, Paul; Trapp, James

Subject: RE: Millstone 3 Update-Potential Additional Support for Monday

Paul et al:

When we were last up there looking at the TDAFW did we look at the IST pump trend analysis and does anyone recall whether there was any evidence of degradation? This is not a today question but I would be interested if there has been any signs of degradation over time.

Thanks

Ray

From: Krohn, Paul

Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2014 10:51 AM

To: Arner, Frank; Cook, William; Chambers, Michael; Orr, Michael

Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Cataldo, Paul; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James

Subject: Fw: Millstone 3 Update-Potential Additional Support for Monday

Gentleman,

Here's the latest on MS3 TDAFWP. Suspect we will be looking to add some more expertise to SIT team on Monday.

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Paul

PS - I know Mike is already back at PIL for second week of CDBI.

Sent from NRC BlackBerry

From: McKinley, Raymond

Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2014 10:05 AM

To: Nieh, Ho

Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Dean, Bill; Lew, David; Scott, Michael; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Jackson, Donald; Krohn, Paul; Ambrosini, Josephine; Haagensen, Brian; Cataldo, Paul; McNamara, Nancy; Tift, Doug

Subject: RE: Millstone 3 Update

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Where did things end up on whether the adjustment constituted a design change?

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Krohn, Paul

From: Orr, Michael
Sent: Monday, June 02, 2014 1:26 PM
To: Krohn, Paul
Cc: Arner, Frank
Subject: RE: Millstone 3 Update-Potential Additional Support for Monday

Paul,

Sorry, I did not get a chance to check email over the weekend at all. I figured I'd get a call from you if I was really needed for something. Just getting around to email today. I read below and wanted to let you know that I'll read thru the whole thread on the rest of them as soon as I can dedicate the time this afternoon.

Mike

From: Krohn, Paul
Sent: Saturday, May 31, 2014 10:51 AM
To: Arner, Frank; Cook, William; Chambers, Michael; Orr, Michael
Cc: McKinley, Raymond; Cataldo, Paul; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James
Subject: Fw: Millstone 3 Update-Potential Additional Support for Monday

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Sent via My Workspace for iOS

DeBoer, Joseph

From: Nieh, Ho
Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2014 2:07 PM
To: Dean, Bill; Lew, David
Cc: Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Scott, Michael; McKinley, Raymond; Cook, William; McNamara, Nancy; Tift, Doug; Screnci, Diane; Sheehan, Neil
Subject: Millstone TDAFW SIT

FYI – Ray M, Bill C, and I had a call with Millstone (SVP and licensing staff) to communicate our plans to come back and look at the TDAFW bearing lock-nut issue.

We told them we'd be sending one inspector out for a few days to follow up, and that we would be re-exiting.

Also, we let them know that we would be informing the state of our plans.

Dominion did not raise any concerns or issues.

Ho

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6/12

Krohn, Paul

From: Cook, William
Sent: Monday, June 16, 2014 3:04 PM
To: DeBoer, Joseph; Arner, Frank; Chambers, Michael; Shaffer, Steve
Cc: Krohn, Paul; Ambrosini, Josephine; Trapp, James; Lorson, Raymond; Jackson, Donald
Subject: FW: Millstone SIT Conference Call - Tuesday 1000

Purpose of the call is to get our August 9, 2013 TDAFWP questions and concerns on the licensee's plate. They may or may not have answers, with the folks they have available on the call tomorrow. I will be on site Wednesday (6/18) to discuss, with the PRA folks and a licensed operator, the control room abandonment (due to fire) procedure, EOP 3509.1, and gather any additional information desired by the team and available to us. Please be prepared on the call tomorrow with your questions and requests, if any.

Thanks,
Bill

From: Thomas G Cleary (Generation - 4) [mailto:thomas.g.cleary@dom.com]
Sent: Monday, June 16, 2014 2:50 PM
To: Cook, William; Brian C Haagensen (Generation - 6)
Cc: Thomas G Cleary (Generation - 4); William D Bartron (Generation - 4); Clark D Maxson (Generation - 4)
Subject: Millstone SIT Conference Call - Tuesday 1000

Ready talk:

(b)(6)

Access Code

(b)(6)

*Tom Cleary
Millstone Licensing*

(b)(6)

Mailstop 475/5

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Trapp, James

From: Nieh, Ho
Sent: Friday, June 27, 2014 3:39 PM
To: Scott, Michael
Cc: Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Finney, Patrick
Subject: MS TDAFW SIT

Mike – fyi. Those on cc and I met today to discuss next steps on subject SIT, which are as follows:

1. Review additional licensee info to finalize potential PD & refine estimate of safety significance
2. DRS/DRP internal alignment (maybe next week)
3. Exit with licensee (phone)
4. SERP

Timing of the above is mostly TBD ... we recognized that there's another SIT in progress, there are pros/cons on options for timing of exits. My preference is to be timely in wrapping up the TDAFW SIT, but we should not feel rushed because we it's better to have our ducks in a row before we exit.

Bottom line is that we'll need to discuss further next week.

Ho

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Krohn, Paul

From: Schmidt, Wayne
Sent: Friday, July 11, 2014 3:10 PM
To: Krohn, Paul; Cahill, Christopher; Cook, William
Subject: Re: DRS Updates for July 11, 2014

0309 for valves that were not installed is not correct. There was no operational event or condition.

The follow-up that has already been done has been great. If there is a pad for the valves sitting in the warehouse or for those in the plant then we handle that with the sdg.


Sent from Divide

On Jul 11, 2014 12:19:54 PM, "Krohn, Paul" <Paul.Krohn@nrc.gov> wrote:

Bill and Dave,


Relatively busy week. Here are some highlights for DRS:

Outside of Scope



- MS SIT #1 – continue to move forward. Will exit early next week with potentially GTG on TDAFWP. Issue of cam nut backing out will be a separate Green (nut was against a hard stop such that travel was arrested and cam follower would have stayed in groove to support TDAFWP functionality).

Outside of Scope



Outside of Scope

Krohn, Paul

From: Trapp, James
Sent: Saturday, July 12, 2014 6:53 PM
To: Krohn, Paul
Subject: Re: DRS Updates for July 11, 2014

Thanks Paul - great summary.

Sent via My Workspace for iOS

On Friday, July 11, 2014 at 12:19:54 PM, "Krohn, Paul" <Paul.Krohn@nrc.gov> wrote:

Bill and Dave,

Relatively busy week. Here are some highlights for DRS:

Outside of Scope

B/16

Paul

Krohn, Paul

From: Dean, Bill
Sent: Friday, July 11, 2014 2:37 PM
To: Krohn, Paul
Subject: RE: DRS Updates for July 11, 2014

Indeed a busy week. Thanks for the update Paul.

BILL

From: Krohn, Paul
Sent: Friday, July 11, 2014 12:20 PM
To: Dean, Bill; Lew, David
Cc: Trapp, James; Gray, Mel; Dimitriadis, Anthony; Rogge, John; Jackson, Donald; Noggle, James; Collins, Daniel; Schmidt, Wayne; Cahill, Christopher; Cook, William; Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael; Walker, Tracy; Ferdas, Marc; Clifford, James
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Outside of Scope

13/17

Outside of Scope

Paul

From: Gary J. Closius (Generation - 4)
To: Finney, Patrick
Cc: Clark D. Maxson (Generation - 4); William D. Bartron (Generation - 4); Thomas G. Cleary (Generation - 4); Brian C. Haagensen (Generation - 6); Haagensen, Brian
Date: Friday, July 11, 2014 4:28:34 PM
Attachments: Valve Stem Connector Sketck w Loose Nut.pdf
Additional Engineering loose nut in ACE019548 (3).docx

Pat, I have uploaded two new documents into the Certrec database for the MPS3 TDAFW pump special inspection (inspection ID - 93812 Special Inspection (SIT) - Millstone Unit 3 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Special Inspection). I have also attached them to this e-mail.

They are:

1. Title - Additional Engineering loose nut in ACE019548 (3)
2. Title - Valve Stem Connector Sketck w Loose Nut

The documents provide MPS engineering's assessment of why the pump cam follower bearing nut loosened.

If you have any questions please contact me.

THANKS

Gary J. Closius
Licensing
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
Millstone Power Station
Phone: (860) 444-4232 (work)
(b)(6) (home)
FAX: (860) 440-2091
e-mail: gary.j.closius@dom.com

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B/18

Krohn, Paul

From: Cook, William
Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2014 4:50 PM
To: Schmidt, Wayne; Cahill, Christopher
Cc: Trapp, James; Krohn, Paul
Subject: Millstone U-3 IMC 0309 Risk evaluation
Attachments: Millstone Unit 3 7-15-14 TDAFWP FTS.docx

Wayne and Chris,

The draft risk evaluation I did for the IMC 0309 is attached. I believe you both are familiar with how I did it and it doesn't need further detailed explanation. However, depending upon what the licensee finally comes up with for a cause of the FTS, the exposure time may change. For example, if the K1 relay failure can be traced back to the last ST, then the exposure time is T vice T/2. Likewise, if the failure is attributed to the recent maintenance activities, then the exposure time may be one day. I talked with Jeff Mitman (he has the duty in HQ) and explained the delay in making an SIT decision and the potential for a change in the exposure time. He knows he will likely be talking with one of you rather than me tomorrow.

I'll be sort of available between tomorrow and Monday, so don't hesitate to call me if you need to. The cell phone coverage is a little spotty at (b)(6) so use her land line if you need to (b)(6). (b)(6) I'll be back in the office Tuesday (7/22) and available to go to Millstone if we decide to launch a team inspection.

Thanks,
Bill

William A. Cook
Senior Reactor Analyst,
Division of Reactor Safety,
USNRC Region I

610-337-5074 (work)
(b)(6) (cell)

To assess the risk significance of this TDAFWP failure to start (FTS) condition, the Region I SRA used the Millstone Unit 3 SPAR model for assessing the internal risk contribution. Based upon the importance of the TDAFWP in mitigation of the fire events that lead to control room abandonment (reference Dominion emergency operating procedure 3509.1), the SRA used a developed event tree to assess the external events (fire) contribution. The SRA made the following assumptions:

- The TDAFW pump FTS was non-recoverable.
- Millstone Unit 3 SPAR model event AFW-TDP-FS-P2 was changed from its nominal failure to start probability of $6.49E-3$ to 1.0 (failure)
- The maintenance performed on 7/14/14 did not cause/contribute to the pump failure.
- The time of failure is unknown, but the last successful surveillance was completed on 6/1/14 or 44 days prior to the event. Therefore, the fault exposure time is 22 days representing a T/2 failure time approximation.
- The initiating event frequencies (IEF) for fires involving a control room abandonment (using EOP 3509.1) are: control room fires - $4.48E-04$; instrument rack room fires - $1.5E-04$; and cable spreading room fires - $4.5E-05$; or a total fire frequency of $6.43E-04$ /yr
- The zero test and maintenance model was used to assess internal risk

Based upon the 22 day exposure time, the internal events conditional core damage probability (CCDP) contribution, using the SPAR model, was approximately $8.5E-7$. The external (fire) events contribution was estimated at approximately $3.9E-5$ ($CCDP = IEF \times TDAFWP \text{ FTS} \times 22/365$). The total CCDP value is $3.9E-5$ and places this plant condition in the SIT/AIT overlap region.

Krohn, Paul

From: Dean, Bill
Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2014 11:19 PM
To: Scott, Michael; Nieh, Ho; Trapp, James; Krohn, Paul; Lew, David
Subject: Re: Ms3 tdafwp

Thanks for the update Mike.
Bill Dean
Regional Administrator
Region I, USNRC

----- Original Message -----

From: Scott, Michael
Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2014 10:00 PM
To: Dean, Bill; Nieh, Ho; Trapp, James; Krohn, Paul; Lew, David
Subject: Ms3 tdafwp

Successful test run tonight. Staff okay with licensee's troubleshooting and replacement of controller as most likely cause. At conclusion of test could not reset governor, possible blown fuse removing test gear. So licensee still working on it. May or may not avoid shutdown. Next update tomorrow morning unless major concerns arise among staff.

Sent from my NRC blackberry
Michael Scott

(b)(6)

Krohn, Paul

From: Scott, Michael
Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2014 11:19 AM
To: Dean, Bill; Nieh, Ho
Cc: Krohn, Paul; Trapp, James; Lew, David
Subject: RE: Region I - Summary of Events - 0845 Meeting

Bill:

We will update you on Millstone status at 3pm - Cyndi has that on your calendar. The risk numbers for the AIT/SIT being in overlap are the numbers for the latest event only - t/2. Evidently their fire risk is heavily dependent on the TDAFWP so they can't take much out-of-service time before the risk numbers get to the SIT/AIT overlap range.

Mike

-----Original Message-----

From: Dean, Bill
Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2014 9:23 AM
To: Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael
Cc: Krohn, Paul; Trapp, James; Lew, David
Subject: RE: Region I - Summary of Events - 0845 Meeting

I have a tentative slot at 3 pm today when I am back in the office to discuss the TDAFW finding #2, if necessary. Can we use that time slot to talk about this matter? Is the SIT/AIT based on just this event or the collective issues dating back a year or more?

-----Original Message-----

From: Nieh, Ho
Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2014 6:58 AM
To: Scott, Michael; Trapp, James; Lew, David; Dean, Bill
Cc: Clifford, James; Collins, Daniel; Krohn, Paul; McNamara, Nancy; Tifft, Doug; Sheehan, Neil; Screnci, Diane
Subject: RE: Region I - Summary of Events - 0845 Meeting

Thanks Mike.

I'm supportive of either approach, since I think they would both be within the process.

My thought with upgrading to an AIT, if the 0309 review dictates, was that it might enable a holistic view of TDAFW reliability at Millstone.

When I spoke to the site reg affairs director last night before leaving the site, I mentioned that we were sending up an inspector and are doing a 0309 review for the current failure she did not seem surprised by that.

She also asked about what our plans were for the TDAFW SIT. I said we've pretty much finalized the PDs and the associated risk assessments, and that we'd get in touch with them soon on next steps.

Will be on my way back from Millstone today see you tomorrow.

Ho

Ho Nieh
Director, Division of Reactor Projects
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1
2100 Renaissance Boulevard, Suite 100
King of Prussia, PA 19406
(610) 337-5229 (Office)
(b)(6) Mobile)
(610) 337-6928 (Fax)
ho.nieh@nrc.gov

From: Scott, Michael
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2014 5:08 PM
To: Trapp, James; Lew, David; Dean, Bill
Cc: Clifford, James; Collins, Daniel; Nieh, Ho; Krohn, Paul; McNamara, Nancy; Tifft, Doug; Sheehan, Neil; Screnci, Diane
Subject: RE: Region I - Summary of Events - 0845 Meeting

Bill/Dave:

Heads up: Preliminary risk numbers suggest overlap range between SIT and AIT for the latest MS3 TDAFWP event. Will know more tomorrow, but wanted you to be aware. Will keep you posted. Jim, Paul, and I conferred and take the view that, given the history and the fact that another SIT would be kind of "here we go again," we are thinking AIT. I discussed it with Ho as well. He is thinking along lines of perhaps not exiting SIT #1, but rather upgrading it to an AIT. In his view, if I am stating it correctly, that would be a more cogent message than exiting from an SIT with a GTG finding right into an AIT. Either way, the thought is that a higher-power, higher-visibility team needs to take a look at whatever programmatic linkages might exist among the various TDAFWP issues.

Obviously - more to come.

Mike

From: Trapp, James
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2014 10:01 AM
To: Lew, David; Dean, Bill
Cc: Clifford, James; Walker, Tracy; Collins, Daniel; Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael; Krohn, Paul; McNamara, Nancy; Tifft, Doug; Sheehan, Neil; Screnci, Diane; Shay, Jason
Subject: Region I - Summary of Events - 0845 Meeting

~~Official Use Only - Pre-Decisional Information~~

Reactors

Millstone Unit 3 – the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump failure its monthly surveillance test. The test occurred at ~ 0500 today, the pump speed increased to ~ 1600 rpm and then ramped down to zero rpm. The pump was quarantined by the operations staff and ~ 20 minutes later, the pump unexpectedly began to increase in speed. The pump was tripped. Troubleshooting by Dominion is in progress. The test was being performed following some minor (believed to be unrelated maintenance) so the 72 hour LCO was entered at 0300 on July 14th. The Region I staff will perform a IMC 0309 review to determine if a reactive team is appropriate.

Millstone – SIT on dual unit trip exit meeting is today (Nieh/Jackson onsite). SIT team on previous turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump failures will meet today to reach consensus on significance of the August 2013 backing off of the cam follower gear. Exit for this SIT, if consensus is green finding, would possibly occur via teleconference this week.

Outside of Scope

Trapp, James

From: Cook, William
Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2014 3:50 PM
To: Cahill, Christopher
Cc: Trapp, James; Schmidt, Wayne
Subject: Revision 2 to the Milestone Unit 3 SERP package for peer review.
Attachments: SERP Package for MS U-3 TDAFWP PD rev2.docx

For your review, thanks.

William A. Cook
Senior Reactor Analyst,
Division of Reactor Safety,
USNRC Region I

610-337-5074 (work)

(b)(6) (cell)

B/22

Trapp, James

From: Haagensen, Brian
Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2014 6:52 AM
To: Schmidt, Wayne; Ambrosini, Josephine; McKinley, Raymond; Shaffer, Steve; McKown, Louis; Day, Neil
Cc: Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael; Trapp, James; Welling, Blake; McKinley, Raymond; Shaffer, Steve; DeBoer, Joseph; Orr, Dan; Cook, William; Cahill, Christopher; Day, Neil; McKown, Louis; Pickett, Douglas; Beasley, Benjamin
Subject: RE: Millstone U3 TDAFW ST Failure - 1630 update 9/10

Millstone Unit 3 ran the TDAFW pump last night. The pump ran normally at 2224. However, while restoring the pump rack setting (repositioning the control valve for a subsequent restart) at 0152, the pump started all by itself again. They also found some anomalous readings on the relays.

They are continuing to troubleshoot the problem.

Brian

From: Schmidt, Wayne
Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2014 6:48 AM
To: Ambrosini, Josephine
Cc: Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael; Trapp, James; Welling, Blake; McKinley, Raymond; Shaffer, Steve; DeBoer, Joseph; Orr, Dan; Cook, William; Cahill, Christopher; Haagensen, Brian; Day, Neil; McKown, Louis; Pickett, Douglas; Beasley, Benjamin
Subject: Re: Millstone U3 TDAFW ST Failure - 1630 update 9/10

Got a call on the way up that they were going to do an instrumented maintenance run. I told them not to wait on me, when I got to the site around 2230 they had just completed the run and the startup looked normal. They had some information from electrical check that were done post-failure that looked anomalous to them and they were still trying to understand. They said if they were ready to do a run overnight they would call - I did not get a call. Headed in shortly.

Sent from Divide

On Sep 10, 2014 4:52:16 PM, "Ambrosini, Josephine" <Josephine.Ambrosini@nrc.gov> wrote:

Bottom Line Up Front:

At 1125 on September 9, Millstone entered TS 3.7.1.2 to perform the TDAFW pump operational test. The pump started, got to 2465 rpm, 550psig discharge pressure before stopping, then restarting itself and got to rated speed ~ 16 minutes after initial start. Dominion staffed the Outage Control Center and began troubleshooting activities. The LCO expires Saturday, 9/13, at 1125. This is a similar event to one that happened July 15. Millstone determined that the July 15 failure was due to problems with the K1 relay and associated power supply.

Licensee Actions:

- Troubleshooting team staffed and have started work using the plans developed for the July failure. Current plans are to complete the surveillance (including the electrical checks put into place

as a corrective action following the July failure), reset the trip valve, and restore to its normal post-test environment. At this point, the troubleshooting team will take additional voltage checks and set up for an instrumented run of the TDAFW system. (No ETA for instrumented run – residents have action to get Wayne's number to the OCC in case the run happens overnight)

- Dominion verified the availability of replacement parts for any potential failure mode. They currently have a governor assembly and two relief valves on site in the warehouse, but are running into obsolescence issues with respect to the electrical components. If these failures are due to similar relay issues, Dominion will probably be looking at component/subcomponent repairs vs full replacement.
- Dominion is also exploring temp mod options to remove some or all of the suspect circuits. If they choose this path, we will need to inspect the mod closely.
- Dominion is in contact with several vendors (ESI, Reliant, and others provided by the Terry Turbine Working Group). None are enroute, but I expect them by the end of the week.
- Working on procedural issues if repairs require a full-flow test in Mode 1. Currently, Dominion does not have the capability to perform this test at power.

NRC Actions:

- Initial resident response included walking down the system and attending OCC meetings to gather this information.
- Wayne Schmidt and Joe DeBoer have been dispatched to the site, with Dan Orr to follow later. I have informed the licensee that these inspectors are coming, but have not called it an official Special Inspection as I did not get word that the charter was signed out yet. Let me know if you want me to set up a call with site management to discuss this.
- Resources look good on our end. I have Brian and Neil Day is here through the end of the week. Lou McKown will be available by the weekend, assuming his move proceeds on track (Welcome to Millstone, by the way!) and now I'll have the team up here as well.

Outside of Scope

Let me know if you have any questions. Next update: tomorrow morning, during plant status.

Jo Ambrosini

USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

Millstone Generating Station

860-447-3170

Trapp, James

From: Schmidt, Wayne
Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2014 6:48 AM
To: Ambrosini, Josephine
Cc: Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael; Trapp, James; Welling, Blake; McKinley, Raymond; Shaffer, Steve; DeBoer, Joseph; Orr, Dan; Cook, William; Cahill, Christopher; Haagensen, Brian; Day, Neil; McKown, Louis; Pickett, Douglas; Beasley, Benjamin
Subject: Re: Millstone U3 TDAFW ST Failure - 1630 update 9/10

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Outside of Scope

Let me know if you have any questions. Next update: tomorrow morning, during plant status.

Jo Ambrosini

USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

Millstone Generating Station

860-447-3170

Trapp, James

From: Crisden, Cherie
Sent: Friday, July 25, 2014 4:28 PM
To: Dean, Bill; Lew, David; Bearde, Diane; Bickett, Brice; Klukan, Brett; Warnek, Nicole; Clifford, James; Dwyer, James; Welling, Blake; Ragland, Randolph; Haverkamp, Trisha; Linde, Amy; Scott, Michael; Pinkham, Laurie; McKenzie, Kieta; Thompson, Margaret; Schroeder, Daniel; Burritt, Arthur; Dentel, Glenn; Bower, Fred; McKinley, Raymond; Powell, Raymond; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Schmidt, Wayne; Cahill, Christopher; Cook, William; Heater, Keith; Powell, Gerry; Cowan, Grace; Dimitriadis, Anthony; Noggle, James; Gray, Mel; Krohn, Paul; Rogge, John; Jackson, Donald; Teator, Jeffrey; Holmes, Marcy; Gallagher, Diane; Coughlin, Sara; Gore, Francis; Beckford, Kaydian; Hasan, Nasreen; Sparks, Scott; Checkle, Melanie; Orth, Steven; Gryglak, Magdalena; Pelke, Paul; Loughheed, Patricia; Campbell, Vivian; Maier, Christi; Browder, Rachel; Willis, Dori; Sanders, Carleen; Powell, Tamara; Hilton, Nick; Carpenter, Robert; Casey, Lauren; Norman, Kerstun; Faria-Ocasio, Carolyn; Fretz, Robert; Furst, David; Gulla, Gerald; Marenchin, Thomas; Sreenivas, Leelavathi; Woods, Susanne; Wray, John; Coker, Shyrl; Frye, Timothy; Burgess, Michele; Scott, Catherine; Jehle, Patricia; Lemoncelli, Mauri; Nieh, Ho; Hanley, Kyle; Collins, Daniel; Holahan, Patricia; Silva, Patricia; Nick, Joseph; Kennedy, Silas; Finney, Patrick; Ambrosini, Josephine; Shaffer, Steve; DeBoer, Joseph; Day, Neil; Haagensen, Brian; McKown, Louis; Circle, Jeff; Arner, Frank
Subject: Revised: Region I Panel Schedule for July 29, 2014 ~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY PRE-DECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION~~
Attachments: SERP Package for MS U-3 TDAFWP PD rev2.docx

UPDATE: THE REGION I PANEL SCHEDULE FOR 7/29 HAS BEEN REVISED TO CHANGE THE START TIME FOR THE MILLSTONE SERP.

THE SERP WILL BEGIN AT 11AM.

From: Crisden, Cherie
Sent: Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:44 PM
To: Subject: Region I Panel Schedule for July 29, 2014 ~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY PRE-DECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION~~

Good Afternoon,

For next week's Millstone SERP, please refer to the attached, SERP worksheet, in lieu of the one that was previously sent. Changes are highlighted in RED.

Thanks,
Cherie

From: Crisden, Cherie
Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2014 4:10 PM
To: Dean, Bill; Lew, David; Bearde, Diane; Bickett, Brice; Klukan, Brett; Crisden, Cherie; Warnek, Nicole; Clifford, James; Dwyer, James; Welling, Blake; Ragland, Randolph; Haverkamp, Trisha; Linde, Amy; Scott, Michael; Pinkham, Laurie; McKenzie, Kieta; Thompson, Margaret; Schroeder, Daniel; Burritt, Arthur; Dentel, Glenn; Bower, Fred; McKinley, Raymond; Powell, Raymond; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Schmidt, Wayne; Cahill, Christopher; Cook, William; Heater, Keith; Powell, Gerry; Cowan, Grace; Dimitriadis, Anthony; Noggle, James; Gray, Mel; Krohn, Paul; Rogge, John; Jackson, Donald; Teator, Jeffrey; Holmes, Marcy; Gallagher, Diane; Coughlin, Sara; Gore, Francis; Beckford, Kaydian; Hasan, Nasreen; Sparks, Scott; Checkle, Melanie; Orth, Steven; Gryglak, Magdalena; Pelke, Paul; Loughheed, Patricia; Campbell, Vivian; Maier, Christi; Browder, Rachel; Willis, Dori; Sanders, Carleen; Powell, Tamara; Hilton, Nick; Carpenter,

Robert; Casey, Lauren; Norman, Kerstun; Faria-Ocasio, Carolyn; Fretz, Robert; Furst, David; Gulla, Gerald; Marenchin, Thomas; Sreenivas, Leelavathi; Woods, Susanne; Wray, John; Coker, Shyrl; Frye, Timothy; Burgess, Michele; Scott, Catherine; Jehle, Patricia; Lemoncelli, Mauri; Nieh, Ho; Hanley, Kyle; Collins, Daniel; Holahan, Patricia; Silva, Patricia; Nick, Joseph; Kennedy, Silas; Finney, Patrick; Ambrosini, Josephine; Shaffer, Steve; DeBoer, Joseph; Day, Neil; Haagensen, Brian

Subject: Region I Panel Schedule for July 29, 2014 ~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY PRE-DECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION~~

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY PRE-DECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION~~

This message provides:

- (1) Next Week's Schedule for Region I Enforcement Items
- (2) A Heads-up on Upcoming Region I Enforcement Items

(1) TUESDAY, JULY 29, 2014

11:00 AM SERP for Millstone (EA-14-092) – Incorrect configuration of the TDAFW pump renders it inoperable

Requested Participants: Region I (DRP and DRS division management, SIT members, PB5 representatives, Regional Counsel, Enforcement); OE; NRR

Attached Information: Panel Worksheet

*HQ participants please meet in the OE Conference Room
Region I Participants please meet in the Sequoia Room*

*The Panels and SERP will be conducted via VTC
A Teleconference Bridge-line is available if remote parties will be participating.
Please respond to this email if you intend to call in.
BRIDGELINE : (888) 677-8698; Passcode 86553#*

Outside of Scope

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