

Jaime H. McCoy Vice President Engineering December 8, 2014

ET 14-0037

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

1) Letter ET 13-0035, dated November 21, 2013, from J. P Broschak,

WCNOC, to USNRC

Subject:

Docket No. 50-482: Supplemental Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Revision to the Wolf Creek Generating Station Fire Protection Program Related to Alternative Shutdown Capability

Gentlemen:

Reference 1 provided the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) application to revise the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). Attachment I to Reference 1 (page 10 of 64), Section 3.4, "Defense-In-Depth Evaluation," describes the defense-in-depth fire protection features utilized to meet the concept of defense-in-depth described in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. Section 3.4 states, in part:

Defense-in-depth fire protection features established for meeting the above objectives for the control room includes the following:

8. Cables carrying voltages greater than 120 VAC/125 VDC are not run in the control room. Cables in the control room are limited to those that terminate in the control room for instrumentation and control circuits as well as lighting and other ancillary uses.

During a review of external operating experience, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Event Report (IER) 14-33, "Direct Current Circuits Challenge Appendix R Fire Analysis," it was identified that there are cables carrying voltages of 250 VDC in the control room. These cables are associated with hand switches and indication circuits for the Turbine Generator direct current (DC) Emergency Lube Oil Pump and the Emergency DC Seal Oil Pump. These cables are IEEE-383, "Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," qualified which indicates that they will not readily ignite and propagate a fire. The presence of the 250 VDC cables in the control room does not adversely impact the conclusion that the fire protection defense-in-depth features within the control room provide reasonable assurance that a severe fire that causes the evacuation of the control room is unlikely.

Item 8, in Section 3.4, is revised to state:

8. Cables in the control room are limited to those that terminate in the control room for instrumentation and control circuits as well as lighting and other ancillary uses.

The additional information does not expand the scope of the application and does not impact the no significant hazards consideration determination presented in Reference 1.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation," a copy of this submittal is being provided to the designated Kansas State official.

This letter contains no commitments. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4156, or Mr. Steven R. Koenig at (620) 364-4041.

Sincerely,

Lamo H McCoy

JHM/rlt

cc: T. A. Conley (KDHE)

M. L. Dapas (NRC)

C. F. Lyon (NRC)

N. F. O'Keefe (NRC)

Senior Resident Inspector (NRC)

STATE OF KANSAS SS **COUNTY OF COFFEY**

Jaime H. McCoy, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath says that he is Vice President Engineering of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation; that he has read the foregoing document and knows the contents thereof; that he has executed the same for and on behalf of said Corporation with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

Vice President Engineering

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 8th day of December, 2014.