APPENDIX A

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A.1 Permit Conditions

<u>Permit Condition</u>: The Commission's regulations at 10 CFR 52.24 require an ESP to specify any terms and conditions of the ESP the Commission deems appropriate. A permit condition is not needed when an existing NRC regulation requires a future regulatory review of a matter to ensure adequate safety during design, construction, or inspection activities for a new plant. The staff is proposing that the Commission include nine permit conditions, which are set forth below, to control various safety matters.

Permit Condition No.	SER Section	Description	
2.	1 & 2.2 – Geogra	aphy and Demography & Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities	
1	2.1.2.4/2.1.2.5	An applicant for a combined license (COL) or construction permit (CP) referencing this early site permit shall notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff when the COL applicant has acquired the required authority and control over the Exclusion Area (prior to issuance of any combined license that references this ESP) and shall provide confirmation that the basis for that conclusion includes the following:	
		 The COL or CP applicant shall complete the acquisition of 0.34 km² (85 ac.) of land, including mineral rights, from the USACE that is currently part of the confined disposal facility north of the site. 	
		2. The COL or CP applicant shall modify the existing PSEG Site Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the existing PSEG Site Security Plan, and reach agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), to extend the protections for the Delaware River portion of the existing Salem and Hope Creek Exclusion Area to cover the Delaware River portion of the Exclusion Area related to the ESP.	
		3. The COL or CP applicant shall reach agreement with the USACE for any land within the EAB that will not be owned by the COL applicant to obtain legal authority from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to either allow the COL applicant and its surrogates to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area or require that the USACE exercise that control in the manner specified by the COL or CP applicant.	

Permit Condition No.	SER Section	Description		
2	2.2.3.4.1/2.2.3.5	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit shall demonstrate that the nearest structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety of the selected plant design can withstand the effects of potential explosions associated with the relocated gasoline storage tank and the gasoline delivery tanker truck. The applicant shall demonstrate this by using the methodologies provided in RG 1.91 and RG 1.78 for direct explosion and vapor cloud explosion, respectively, to confirm that a minimum safe distance exists between the nearest plant SSCs important to safety and the relocated gasoline storage tank and the gasoline delivery tanker truck such that the SSCs would not experience an overpressure in excess of 1.0 psi in the event of an explosion.		
	2.5 – Geology, Seismology, and Geotechnical Engineering			
3	2.5.3.5	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit shall perform detailed geologic mapping of excavations for safety-related structures; examine and evaluate geologic features discovered in those excavations; and notify the Director of the Office of New Reactors, or the Director's designee, once excavations for safety-related structures are open for examination by NRC staff.		
4	2.5.4.5	An applicant for a COL or CP Referencing this early site permit shall remove and replace the soils directly above the Vincentown Formation for soils under or adjacent to Seismic Category I structures to minimize any liquefaction potential.		

Permit Condition No.	SER Section	Description
		13.3 – Emergency Planning
5	13.3.4.3.2	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit shall propose a license condition for the licensee to perform the following: (i) No later than 18 months before the latest date set forth in the schedule submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(a) for completing the inspections, tests, and analyses in the ITAAC, the licensee shall have performed an assessment of on-site and augmented staffing capability for responding to a multi-unit event. The staffing assessment shall be performed in accordance with the latest NRC-endorsed revision of NEI 12-01, "Guidance for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities," (ii) At least one hundred eighty (180) days before the date scheduled for initial fuel loading, as set forth in the notification submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.103(a), the licensee shall complete implementation of corrective actions identified in the staffing assessment described above and identify how the augmented staff will be notified given degraded communications capabilities, including any related emergency plan and implementing procedure changes and associated training.
6	13.3.4.3.2	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit shall propose a license condition for the licensee to perform the following: (i) No later than 18 months before the latest date set forth in the schedule submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(a) for completing the inspections, tests, and analyses in the ITAAC, the licensee shall have performed an assessment of on-site and offsite communications systems and equipment relied upon during an emergency event to ensure communications capabilities can be maintained during an extended loss of ac power. The communications capability assessment shall be performed in accordance with the latest NRC-endorsed revision of NEI 12-01, "Guidance for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities," (ii) At least one hundred eighty (180) days before the date scheduled for initial fuel loading, as set forth in the notification submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.103(a), the licensee shall complete implementation of corrective

Permit Condition No.	SER Section	Description	
		actions identified in the communications capability assessment described above, including any related emergency plan and implementing procedure changes and associated training.	
7	13.3.4.3.2	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit shall revise the emergency plan to describe on-shift personnel assigned emergency plan implementing functions associated with the chosen reactor technology and the number of proposed reactor units. In addition, the COL or CP applicant shall propose a license condition for the licensee to perform the following: (i) No later than 18 months before the latest date set forth in the schedule submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(a) for completing the inspections, tests, and analyses in the ITAAC, the licensee shall have performed an on-shift staffing analysis in accordance with the latest NRC-endorsed revision of NEI 10-05, "Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Capabilities," (ii) At least one hundred eighty (180) days before the date schedule for initial fuel loading, as set forth in the notification submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.103(a), the licensee shall incorporate any changes to the emergency plan needed to bring staffing to the required levels.	
8	13.3.4.3.4	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit and the AP1000 standard design shall propose a license condition for the licensee to develop an Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme with fully developed site-specific EALs, in accordance with the latest NRC-endorsed revision of NEI 07-01, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, Advanced Passive Light Water Reactors," with few or no deviations or differences. All deviations or differences from NEI 07-01 must be fully described in the COL application, including providing the initiating condition, operating modes, notes, EAL threshold(s), basis information, and developer guidance for how a particular setpoint is (or will be) determined. The EALs shall have been discussed and agreed upon with State and local officials. The fully developed site-specific EAL scheme shall be submitted to the NRC at least one hundred eighty (180) days before the date scheduled for initial fuel loading, as set forth in the notification submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.103(a).	

Permit Condition No.	SER Section	Description
9	13.3.4.3.4	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit and the U.S. EPR, ABWR, or US- APWR standard design shall propose a license condition for the licensee to develop an Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme with fully developed site-specific EALs, in accordance with the latest NRC-endorsed revision of NEI 99-01, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," with few or no deviations or differences, other than those attributable to the specific reactor design. All deviations or differences from NEI 99-01 must be fully described in the COL application, including providing the initiating condition, operating modes, notes, EAL threshold(s), basis information, and developer guidance for how a particular setpoint is (or will be) determined. The EALs shall have been discussed and agreed upon with State and local officials. The fully developed site-specific EAL scheme shall be submitted to the NRC at least one hundred eighty (180) days before the date scheduled for initial fuel loading, as set forth in the notification submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.103(a).

A.2 COL Action Items

<u>COL Action Items</u>: The COL action items set forth in the SER and incorporated herein identify certain matters that shall be addressed in the FSAR by an applicant for a COL or CP who submits an application referencing the PSEG Site ESP. These items constitute information requirements but do not form the only acceptable set of information in the FSAR. An applicant may depart from or omit these items, provided that the departure or omission is identified and justified in the FSAR. In addition, these items do not relieve an applicant from any requirement in 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 that governs the application. After issuance of a CP or COL, these items are not controlled by NRC requirements unless such items are restated in the preliminary safety analysis report or FSAR, respectively.

The staff identified the following COL action items with respect to individual site characteristics in order to ensure that particular significant issues are tracked and considered during the review of a later application referencing any ESP that might be issued for the PSEG Ste.

Action Item No.	SER Section	Subject To Be Addressed	Reason For Deferral		
		2.2 – Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facil	ities		
2.2-1	2.2.3.4.2	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit will, after selecting a reactor technology, evaluate the impact on the proposed plant at the PSEG Site of toxic chemicals processed, stored, used, or transported within the vicinity of the PSEG Site, to identify chemicals that lead to concentration above the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) at the power block boundary, and provide a detailed control room habitability assessment.	The ESP applicant used Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such no control room is identified on site. Since the design of the control room at the proposed ESP site is not available, it is expected to be evaluated at the COL stage.		
2.2-2	2.2.3.4.2	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit will, after selecting a reactor technology, identify potentially toxic, flammable, or explosive hazardous materials to be stored onsite, and evaluate their possible impact on the proposed plant at the PSEG Site.	The ESP applicant used Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such no control room is identified on site. Since the quantities of the chemicals used are not available, and the design of the control room is not available, it is expected to be evaluated at the CP or COL stage.		
	2.3 – Meteorology				
2.3-1	2.3.5.4.2	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should verify specific release point characteristics and specific locations of receptors of interest used to generate the long-term (routine release) atmospheric dispersion site characteristics. Any	The ESP applicant screened out specific receptors of interest adjacent to the Delaware River, many of which contained the highest χ/Q values. A		

Action Item No.	SER Section	Subject To Be Addressed	Reason For Deferral
		different exposure pathways and dose receptor locations, including those in sectors adjacent to the Delaware River, should be identified and discussed in order to demonstrate that long- term release atmospheric dispersion estimates fall within the site characteristic values in the ESP and to provide assurance of compliance with NRC dose requirements.	COL or CP applicant should ensure that any new potential exposure pathways are identified and considered in these sectors at the COL stage.
	•	2.4 – Hydrologic Engineering	
2.4-1	2.4.2.4	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should design the site grading to provide flooding protection to safety-related structures at the ESP site based on a comprehensive flood water routing analysis for a local PMP event without relying on any active surface drainage systems that may be blocked during this event.	Detailed design of the site grading plan and storm water management system are beyond the scope of an ESP review. As such, final site drainage patterns are not yet known.
2.4-2	2.4.10.4	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should address whether the intake structure of the selected design is a safety-related SSC. If so, the applicant should address necessary flooding protection for a safety-related intake structure at the ESP site based on the design basis flooding event and associated effects.	Detailed site flooding protection requirements are beyond the scope of an ESP review as the ESP applicant has not selected a reactor technology.
2.4-3	2.4.12.4	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should refine hydrogeologic parameters and model estimates of dewatering rates and drawdowns beneath existing site structures	Additional groundwater characterization information, not yet known at the ESP stage, will be provided at the COL stage.

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		after determination of the final excavation geometry consistent with a selected reactor technology.	
		2.5 – Geology, Seismology, and Geotechnical Engineer	ing
2.5-1	2.5.4.4.1	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should perform additional investigations in order to provide additional information on the extent, thickness, and nature of the oxidized material in the Vincentown Formation beneath the area of Seismic Category I structures for the selected reactor technology. The applicant should also remove less dense soils with considerably lower SPT N-values in order to meet the soil condition requirements.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.
2.5-2	2.5.4.4.2	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should conduct additional subsurface investigations to evaluate and fully characterize the engineering properties of the Vincentown and Hornerstown Formations and their potential lateral and vertical variation. The applicant should also perform additional strength tests to further evaluate the soil shear strength parameter for the Vincentown and Hornerstown Formations.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with

Action Item No.	SER Section	Subject To Be Addressed	Reason For Deferral
			corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.
2.5-3	2.5.4.4.2	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should perform additional borings to provide information for further evaluation of the shear strength properties of the Navesink formation.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.
2.5-4	2.5.4.4.2	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should perform additional borings and unit weight determinations for the materials underlying the Mount Laurel Formation.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing

Action Item No.	SER Section	Subject To Be Addressed	Reason For Deferral
			will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.
2.5-5	2.5.4.4.3	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should perform additional subsurface investigations and correlate the plot plans and profiles of each Seismic Category I structure with the subsurface profile and material properties, and ensure placement of safety-related structures on competent foundation bearing material.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.

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2.5-6	2.5.4.4.5	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should provide specific details regarding the lateral and vertical extent of the excavation consistent with the selected reactor technology.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.

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2.5-7	2.5.4.4.5	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should evaluate the method of excavation support and the stability of temporary excavation slopes or support.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.
2.5-8	2.5.4.4.5	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should include in the COL application, an ITAAC for the soil backfill, with specifications to ensure a V _s of 304.8 m/s (1,000 ft/s) or higher below Seismic Category I structures.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.

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2.5-9	2.5.4.4.5	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should provide, consistent with the selected reactor technology, (i) details for the backfill quantities, types and sources; (ii) lateral loading conditions; (iii) information on the type and characteristics of backfill materials; and (iv) lateral pressure evaluation from backfill materials.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing
2.5-10	2.5.4.4.5	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should include the geotechnical instrumentation plan and heave monitoring schedule in the COL application.	 will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology. The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.

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2.5-11	2.5.4.4.6	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should evaluate and implement, during the COL application stage, design measures appropriate for the chemical characteristics of the Category 1 fill, site soils and site groundwater.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.
2.5-12	2.5.4.4.6	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should perform, consistent with the selected reactor technology, evaluation of groundwater conditions as they affect the loading and stability of foundation materials, and also provide detailed dewatering and groundwater control plans.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.

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2.5-13	2.5.4.4.7	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should develop the foundation input response spectra (FIRS) and the Soil Structure Interaction (SSI) analysis at the COL application stage.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.
2.5-14	2.5.4.4.8	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should perform additional geotechnical investigation, consistent with RG 1.132, including the performance of additional borings and a detailed liquefaction assessment to determine if zones of lower blow counts, which might indicate a potentially weak liquefiable zone, are present underneath the competent layer. If the additional borings and analyses identify areas where potential for liquefaction may be present, the applicant should remove unsuitable materials and either replace it with competent material or improve it to eliminate liquefaction potential.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.

Action Item No.	SER Section	Subject To Be Addressed	Reason For Deferral
2.5-15	2.5.4.4.8	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should evaluate non-seismic liquefaction.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.
2.5-16	2.5.4.4.10	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should analyze the stability of all planned safety-related facilities, including static and dynamic bearing capacity, rebound, settlement, and differential settlements under dead loads of fills and plant facilities, as well as lateral loading conditions.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.

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2.5-17	2.5.4.4.10	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should conduct laboratory testing on intact samples and conduct consolidation testing for materials having a high percentage of fine-grained particles.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.
2.5-18	2.5.4.4.11	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should describe the design criteria and methods, including the factors of safety (FSs) from the design foundation stability analyses consistent with the selected reactor technology.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.

Action Item No.	SER Section	Subject To Be Addressed	Reason For Deferral
2.5-19	2.5.4.4.12	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should improve subsurface conditions in cases where foundation soils do not provide adequate bearing capacity for safety-related structures.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.
2.5-20	2.5.5.4	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should perform a slope stability analysis consistent with the selected reactor technology. Slope stability analysis will include the evaluation of deep slope failure surfaces that may extend into the Delaware River and various water level considerations.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design, and as such, Seismic Category I structures for the proposed site are not identified and the location and extent of these structures is not known at the ESP stage. At the COL stage, additional subsurface investigations along with corresponding analyses and testing will be necessary for soils under these specific structures based on the selected reactor technology.

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		3.5.1.6 – Aircraft Hazards	
3.5.1.6-1	3.5.1.6.4	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit (ESP), should evaluate and demonstrate compliance with the design-basis aircraft accident probability acceptance criterion of 1×10^{-7} per year or less, in accordance with the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) guidance provided in NUREG-0800, Chapter 19 ("Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Severe Accident Evaluation for New Reactors"), and should provide the determined core damage frequency (CDF) baesd on the design selected.	Conditional core damage probability (CCDP) is determined based on design-specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as part of the "Severe Accidents" section, the technical review of which is conducted in conjunction with a COL application review.
		11.4 – Liquid and Gaseous Waste Management System	IS
11-1	11.4	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should verify that the calculated radiological doses to members of the public from radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents for one or more new units which may be built at the PSEG Site are bounded by the radiological doses included in the ESP application, and must address and justify any discrepancies. This includes any changes made to address differences in reactor design used to calculate radiological doses (e.g., basis of the liquid and gaseous radiological source terms, and liquid effluent discharge flow rates and site-specific dilution flow rates). The COL or CP applicant should also provide detailed information, reflecting plant and site-specific COL design considerations, on the solid waste management system used to process radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design. Details on control, monitoring, and maintenance of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents are not known at the ESP stage.

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		13.3 – Emergency Planning	
13.3-1	13.3.4.2	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should submit to the NRC updated letters of agreement or memoranda of understanding with offsite support organizations to reflect the chosen plant design.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design.
13.3-2	13.3.4.3.6	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should revise the emergency plan to describe the components, availability, and power supplies for the Federal Telecommunications System (FTS), including all required communications and data links associated with the chosen reactor technology.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design. Details associated with FTS are not known at the ESP stage.
13.3-3	13.3.4.3.8	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit and the US-APWR standard design should revise the emergency plan to describe the location and capabilities of the Operations Support Center (OSC).	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design. Description of OSC cannot reflect US-APWR specific design at the ESP stage. A COL applicant will select a specific plant design in conjunction with the COL application.
13.3-4	13.3.4.3.9	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should revise the emergency plan to describe the radiation monitoring and other systems and equipment, including potential major release points from the plant and river water level	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design. Details on radiation monitoring and related

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		monitoring requirements, associated with the chosen reactor technology that support accident assessment activities. The emergency plan should also identify the specific monitoring capability for the radiological parameters identified in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, and dose assessment and projection modeling system.	systems are not known at the ESP stage.
13.3-5	13.3.4.3.10	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should revise the emergency plan to describe the availability of a proposed causeway for use as an alternate route for evacuating the site. If appropriate, the applicant should update the evacuation time estimate (ETE) analysis for the PSEG Site to reflect the causeway, and provide confirmation that the ETE update was provided to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.	The ESP applicant is not required to and is not planning to build the proposed causeway at the ESP stage.
13.3-6	13.3.4.3.11	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit and the US-APWR design control document (DCD) should revise the emergency plan to identify the location of the onsite personnel decontamination facility.	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design. A COL applicant will select a specific plant design in conjunction with the COL application.
13.3-7	13.3.4.3.13	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should revise the emergency plan to describe the method for determining atmospheric transport and diffusion throughout the 10-mile plume exposure emergency planning zone during	The ESP applicant used a Plant Parameter Envelope (PPE) instead of a specific plant design. A method for determining atmospheric transport and diffusion will be adopted following

Action Item No.	SER Section	Subject To Be Addressed	Reason For Deferral
		emergency conditions, including the ability to periodically estimate total population exposure.	the selection of a reactor technology by the COL applicant.
13.3-8	13.3.4.3.17	An applicant for a COL or CP referencing this early site permit should explain how any updated evacuation time estimate (ETE) information for the PSEG Site interfaces with any ETE updates that may have been provided for the nearby Salem and Hope Creek units.	The ESP applicant used the year 2000 U.S. Census Bureau data - the most current available at the ESP application submission - to develop the ETE, which is required to be updated at the COL application stage.

A.3 Site Characteristics

<u>Site Characteristics</u>: Based on site investigation, exploration, analysis, and testing, the applicant initially proposes a set of site characteristics. These site characteristics are specific physical attributes of the site, whether natural or man-made. Site characteristics, if reviewed and approved by the staff, are specified in the ESP. The staff proposes to include the following site characteristics in any ESP that might be issued for the PSEG Site.

Site Characteristic	Value	Definition
	2.1 - Geography and Demogr	raphy
Exclusion Area Boundary	Since PSEG has not selected a specific reactor design, only boundaries of the power block area and a theoretical plant center point within the power block area are shown within the proposed EAB. The proposed EAB is a circle at least 600 meters (1968 feet) from the edge of the power block area in all directions, and extends beyond the PSEG Site property line to the west into the Delaware River and to the north and northeast. The total area encompassed by the EAB is 743 acres, of which 224 acres is in the Delaware River and 288 acres is in land currently owned by PSEG. No public roads, railroads, or structures other than existing Salem and Hope Creek power plant facilities are located within any part of the EAB. See Figure A.3-1.	The area surrounding the reactor(s), in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area.

Site Characteristic		Value	Definition
Low Population Zone		The area falling within a 5-mile radius around the center point of the new plant. This area is dominated by the open waters of Delaware Bay and low coastal wetlands to the east and west of the bay.	The area immediately surrounding the exclusion area that contains residents.
Population Center Distance		The population center nearest to the PSEG Site containing more than about 25,000 residents is the city of Wilmington, DE, with the nearest boundary 14.8 miles (23.8 km) north of the new plant center point.	The minimum allowable distance from the reactor to the nearest boundary of a densely populated center containing more than about 25,000 residents is 1 and 1/3 times the distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the Low Population Zone (LPZ).
		2.3 - Meteorology	
Ambient Air Tem	perature and	Humidity	
Maximum Dry-Bulb Temperature	2% annual exceedance	88 ºF / 73 ºF	The ambient dry-bulb temperature (and mean coincident wet-bulb temperature) that will be exceeded 2% of the time annually.
	1% annual exceedance	90 °F / 75 °F	The ambient dry-bulb temperature (and mean coincident wet-bulb temperature) that will be exceeded 1% of the time annually.
	0.4% annual exceedance	93 ºF / 76 ºF	The ambient dry-bulb temperature (and mean coincident wet-bulb temperature) that will be exceeded 0.4% of the time annually.

Site Charac	teristic	Value	Definition
	0% annual exceedance (record)	108 °F / 79 °F	The highest recorded ambient dry-bulb temperature and mean coincident wet-bulb temperature.
	100-year return period	105.9 °F / 82.4 °F	The ambient dry-bulb temperature (and mean coincident wet-bulb temperature) that has a 1% annual probability of being exceeded (100-year mean recurrence interval).
Minimum Dry-Bulb Temperature	99% annual exceedance	14 °F	The ambient dry-bulb temperature below which dry-bulb temperatures will fall 1% of the time annually.
	99.6% annual exceedance	10 °F	The ambient dry-bulb temperature below which dry-bulb temperatures will fall 0.4% of the time annually.
	100% annual exceedance (record)	-15 °F	Lowest recorded dry-bulb temperature.
	100-year return period	-18.7 °F	The ambient dry-bulb temperature for which a 1% annual probability of a lower dry-bulb temperature exists (100-year mean recurrence interval).
Maximum Wet- Bulb Temperature	1% annual exceedance	77 °F	The ambient wet-bulb temperature that will be exceeded 1% of the time annually.

Site Characteristic	Value	Definition
0.4% annual exceedance	79 °F	The ambient wet-bulb temperature that will be exceeded 0.4% of the time annually.
0% annual exceedance (record)	86.2 °F	Highest recorded wet-bulb temperature.
100-year return period	87.4 °F	The ambient wet-bulb temperature that has a 1% annual probability of being exceeded (100-year mean recurrence interval).
UHS Ambient Air Temperatur	e and Humidity	
Meteorological Conditions Resulting in the Minimum Water	82.69°F WBT	Historic worst 1-day daily average wet-bulb temperature and coincident dry-bulb temperature.
Cooling During any 1 Day	87.12°F DBT	
Meteorological Conditions Resulting in the Minimum Water	78.02°F WBT	Historic worst 5-day daily average wet-bulb temperature and coincident dry-bulb temperature.
Cooling During any Consecutive 5 Days	83.47°F DBT	
Meteorological Conditions Resulting in the Minimum Water	75.87°F WBT	Historic worst 30-day daily average wet-bulb temperature and coincident dry-bulb temperature.
Cooling During any Consecutive 30 Days	82.65°F DBT	

Site Characteristic		Value	Definition
Basic Wind Sp	peed		
3-Second Gust		117.7 mi/h	The nominal 3-second gust wind speeds in miles per hour (mph) at 33 ft. above ground associated with a 100-year return period.
Importance Factors		1.15	Multiplication factor applied to basic wind speed used to assess wind impacts on strucutres.
Hurricane			
Hurricane Wind Speed		159 mi/h	Maximum nominal 3-second gust wind speed at 33 ft. above ground over open terrain having a probability of exceedance of 10-7 per year.
Hurricane Missiles	Schedule 40 Pipe	6.625 in dia x 15 ft long 287-lb pipe at 99 ft/sec Horizontal	Design-Basis Hurricane Missile Spectrum from RG 1.221.
	Automobile	16.4 ft x 6.6 ft x 4.3 ft 4000-lb. automobile at 130 ft/sec Horizontal	Design-Basis Hurricane Missile Spectrum from RG 1.221.
	Solid Steel Sphere	1 in diameter sphere at 86 ft/sec Horizontal	Design-Basis Hurricane Missile Spectrum from RG 1.221.

Site Characteristic		Value	Definition
Tornado			
Maximum Wind Speed		200 mi/h	Maximum wind speed resulting from passage of a tornado having a probability of occurrence of 10 ⁻⁷ per year.
Maximum Translat	ional Speed	40 mi/h	Translation component of the maximum tornado wind speed.
Rotational Speed		160 mi/h	Rotation component of the maximum tornado wind speed.
Radius of Maximur Speed	m Rotational	150 feet	Distance from the center of the tornado at which the maximum rotational wind speed occurs.
Pressure Drop		0.9 lbf/in. ²	Decrease in ambient pressure from normal atmospheric pressure resulting from passage of the tornado.
Rate of Pressure Drop		0.4 psi/s	Rate of pressure drop resulting from the passage of the tornado.
Tornado Missiles	Schedule 40 Pipe	6.625 in dia x 15 ft long 287-lb pipe at 112 ft/sec Horizontal	Design-Basis Tornado Missile Spectrum from RG 1.76, Revision 1.
	Automobile	16.4 ft x 6.6 ft x 4.3 ft 4000-lb. automobile at 112 ft/sec Horizontal	Design-Basis Tornado Missile Spectrum from RG 1.76, Revision 1.

Site Characteristic		Value	Definition
	Solid Steel Sphere	1 in diameter sphere at 23 ft/sec Horizontal	Design-Basis Tornado Missile Spectrum from RG 1.76, Revision 1.
Winter Precipita	tion		
100-Year Snowpack		24 lb/ft ²	Weight of the 100-year return period snowpack (to be used in determining normal precipitation loads for roofs).
48-Hour Probable Maximum Winter Precipitation		21 inches of water	PMP during the winter months (to be used in conjunction with the 100-year snowpack in determining extreme winter precipitation loads for roofs).
Normal Winter Precipitation Event		24 lb/ft ²	The highest ground-level weight (in lb/ft ²) among: (1) the 100-year return period snowpack; (2) the historical maximum snowpack; (3) the 100-year return period two- day snowfall event; or (4) the historical maximum two- day snowfall event in the site region. (to be used in determining the precipitation load for roofs).
Extreme Frozen Winter Precipitation Event		20.51 lb/ft ²	The highest of (1) the 100-year return period two-day snowfall event; and (2) the historical maximum snowfall event in the site region. (to be used in determining the precipitation load for roofs).
Short-Term (Accident Release) Atmospheric Dispersion			
0-2 hr χ/Q Value @ EAB		4.71 x 10 ⁻⁴ s/m ³	The 0-2 hour atmospheric dispersion factor to be used to estimate dose consequences of accidental airborne releases at the EAB.

Site Characteristic	Value	Definition
0-8 hr χ/Q Value @ LPZ outer boundary	8.47 x 10⁻ ⁶ s/m³	The 0-8 hour atmospheric dispersion factor to be used to estimate dose consequences of accidental airborne releases at the LPZ.
8-24 hr χ/Q Value @ LPZ outer boundary	5.50 x 10⁻ ⁶ s/m³	The 8-24 hour atmospheric dispersion factor to be used to estimate dose consequences of accidental airborne releases at the LPZ.
1-4 day χ/Q Value @ LPZ outer boundary	2.15 x 10 ⁻⁶ s/m ³	The 1-4 day atmospheric dispersion factor to be used to estimate dose consequences of accidental airborne releases at the LPZ.
4-30 day χ/Q value @ LPZ outer boundary	5.60 x 10 ⁻⁷ s/m ³	The 4-30 day atmospheric dispersion factor to be used to estimate dose consequences of accidental airborne releases at the LPZ.
Long-Term (Routine Release)	Atmospheric Dispersion	
Annual Average Undepleted/No Decay χ/Q Value @ Site Boundary, east-northeast, 0.24 mile	1.00 x10⁻⁵ s/m³	The maximum annual average site boundary undepleted/2.26-day decay χ/Q value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.
Annual Average Undepleted/ 2.26-day Decay χ /Q Value @ Site Boundary, east-northeast, 0.24 mile	1.00 x10⁻⁵ s/m³	The maximum annual average site boundary undepleted/2.26-day decay χ/Q value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.

Site Characteristic	Value	Definition
Annual Average Depleted/ 8.00-day Decay χ/Q Value @ Site Boundary, east-northeast, 0.24 mile	9.50 x10 ⁻⁶ s/m ³	The maximum annual average site boundary depleted/8.00-day decay χ/Q value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.
Annual Average D/Q Value @ Site Boundary, east-northeast, 0.24 mile	4.10 x10 ⁻⁸ 1/m ²	The maximum annual average site boundary relative deposition factor (D/Q) value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.
Annual Average Undepleted/No Decay χ /Q Value @ Nearest Resident, northwest, 2.8 mile	2.40 x10 ⁻⁷ s/m ³	The maximum annual average resident undepleted/no decay atmospheric dispersion factor (χ/Q) value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.
Annual Average Undepleted/ 2.26-day Decay χ/Q Value @ Nearest Resident, northwest, 2.8 mile	2.40 x10 ⁻⁷ s/m ³	The maximum annual average resident undepleted/2.26 day decay χ/Q value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.
Annual Average Depleted/ 8.00-day Decay χ/Q Value @ Nearest Resident, northwest, 2.8 mile	1.90 x10 ⁻⁷ s/m ³	The maximum annual average resident depleted/8.00-day decay χ/Q value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.
Annual Average D/Q Value @ Nearest Resident, northwest, 2.8 mile	9.60 x10 ⁻¹⁰ 1/m ²	The maximum annual average resident relative deposition factor (D/Q) value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.

Site Characteristic	Value	Definition
Annual Average Undepleted/No Decay χ /Q Value @ Nearest Farm, northwest, 4.9 mile	1.10 x10 ⁻⁷ s/m ³	The maximum annual average farm undepleted/no decay atmospheric dispersion factor (χ/Q) value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.
Annual Average Undepleted/ 2.26-day Decay χ/Q Value @ Nearest Farm, northwest, 4.9 mile	1.10 x10 ⁻⁷ s/m ³	The maximum annual average farm undepleted/2.26- day decay χ/Q value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.
Annual Average Depleted/8.00- day Decay χ/Q Value @ Nearest Farm, northwest, 4.9 mile	8.20 x10 ⁻⁸ s/m ³	The maximum annual average farm depleted/8.00-day decay χ/Q value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.
Annual Average D/Q Value @ Nearest Farm, northwest, 4.9 mile	3.50 x10 ⁻¹⁰ 1/m ²	The maximum annual average farm relative deposition factor (D/Q) value for use in determining gaseous pathway doses to the maximally exposed individual.
	2.4 – Hydrologic Engineeri	ing
Hydrology		
Proposed Facility Boundaries	Figure A.3-1 (taken from SSAR Figure 1.2-3) depicts the proposed facility boundary.	PSEG Site boundary areas within which all safety- related SSCs will be located.
Highest Ground Water	3.05 m (10 ft) NAVD88	The maximum elevation of groundwater at the PSEG Site.


Site Characteristic	Value	Definition
Maximum Stillwater Flood Elevation (Storm Surge) + 10% Astronomical High Tide	7.53 m (24.7 ft) NAVD88	The stillwater elevation, without accounting for wind- induced waves, the water surface reaches during a flood event.
Wave Runup (Storm Surge)	2.26 m (7.4 ft)NAVD88	The height of water reached by wind-induced waves running up on the site.
Combined Effects Maximum Flood Elevation (Design Basis Flood)	9.78 m (32.1 ft) NAVD88	The water surface elevation at the point in time where the combination of the still water level and wave runup is at its maximum.
Local Intense Precipitation	46.7 cm (18.4 in.) per hour	The depth of PMP for duration of 1 hour on a 1 square- mile drainage area. The surface water drainage system should be designed for a flood produced by the local intense precipitation.
Frazil, Surface or Anchor Ice	The PSEG Site has the potential for frazil and surface ice.	Potential for accumulated ice formation in a turbulent flow condition.
Minimum River Water Surface Elevation	-4.85 m (-15.9 ft) NAVD88 for less than 6 hours	The river surface water elevation and duration for which the low water level conditions exist at the PSEG Site.
Maximum Ice Thickness	45.2 cm (17.8 in.)	Maximum potential ice thickness on the Delaware River at the PSEG Site.
Hydraulic Conductivity	SSAR Table 2.4.12-9	Groundwater flow rate per unit hydraulic gradient.
Hydraulic Gradient	SSAR Tables 2.4.12 -7 and 2.4.12-8	Slope of groundwater surface under unconfined conditions or slope of hydraulic pressure head under confined conditions.

Site Characteristic	Value	Definition	
	2.5 – Geology, Seismology, and Geotech	nical Engineering	
Basic Geologic and Seismic Ir	nformation		
Capable Tectonic Structures	No capable tectonic structures were identified in the site vicinity that could generate surface deformation or vibratory ground motion.	In SSAR Section 2.5.3.3, the applicant concluded no data suggest there are capable tectonic sources that could generate surface deformation or vibratory ground motion in the site vicinity. Based on review of SSAR Section 2.5.3.3, independent examination of references cited in the SSAR, and direct geologic field observations performed during a site audit, the staff confirmed the applicant's conclusion that no data suggested the presence of capable tectonic sources which could generate surface deformation or vibratory ground motion in the site vicinity.	
Vibratory Ground Motion			
Ground Motion Response Spectra (Site Safe Shutdown Earthquake)	Appendix A Figure A3-2	Site specific response spectra.	
Stability of Subsurface Materials and Foundations			
Liquefaction	Soils below the competent layer are not susceptible to liquefaction.	Liquefaction potential for the subsurface material at the site.	
Minimum ultimate bearing capacity	420,000 psf	Load bearing capacity of the competent soil layer supporting the loads exerted by plant structures without soil failure.	

Site Characteristic	Value	Definition
Minimum shear wave velocity	1613 ft/sec	The minimum propagation velocity of shear waves through the foundation materials.



Figure A.3-1 – The proposed facility boundary for the PSEG Site (from SSAR Figure 1.2-3)





A.4 Bounding Design Parameters

<u>Bounding Parameters</u>: The bounding design parameters set forth postulated values of design parameters that provide design details to support the NRC staff's review of an ESP application. Since the NRC staff is relying on certain design parameters specified in the ESP application to reach its conclusions on site suitability, these bounding design parameters would be included in any ESP that might be issued for the PSEG Site. A COL or CP application referencing an ESP must contain information sufficient to demonstrate that the actual characteristics of the design chosen by the COL or CP applicant falls within the bounding design parameters specified in the ESP.

Bounding Design Parameters	Value	Definition		
2.4 – Hydrologic Engineering				
Site Grade	11.25 m (36.9 ft) NAVD88	Finished plant grade for the power block area on the PSEG Site.		

Note: Since PSEG has not selected a reactor design, accident source terms (activity by isotope, contained in post-accident airborne effluents) specific to the reactor design that will be selected are not available at the ESP stage.

A.5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

<u>Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria</u>: An ESP application proposing complete and integrated emergency plans for review and approval should propose the inspections, tests, and analyses that the holder of a COL referencing the ESP shall perform, and the acceptance criteria that are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that, if the inspections, tests, and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, the facility has been constructed and will be operated in conformity with the emergency plans, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the Commission's rules and regulations.

A.5.1 ITAAC for the ESP

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
1.0 Emergency Classifica	ation System		
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and state and local response plans for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.	1.1 A standard emergency classification and emergency action level (EAL) scheme exists, and identifies facility system and effluent parameters constituting the bases for the classification scheme. [D.1**] [**D.1 corresponds to NUREG-0654/ FEMA- REP-1 evaluation criteria.]	1.1 An inspection of the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be performed to verify that they have displays for retrieving facility system and effluent parameters as specified in the Emergency Classification and EAL scheme, and the displays are functional.	 1.1(a) The parameters referenced in the Emergency Classification and EAL scheme are retrievable in the Control Room, TSC and EOF. 1.1(b) The ranges of the displays encompass the values specified in the Emergency Classification and EAL scheme.

PSEG Site Emergency Planning ITAAC

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
2.0 Notification Methods	and Procedures		
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) – Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations; the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.	2.1 The means exist to notify responsible State and local organizations within 15 minutes after the licensee declares an emergency. [E.1]	2.1 A test will be performed to demonstrate the capabilities for providing initial notification to the offsite authorities after a simulated emergency classification.	2.1 The States of Delaware and New Jersey, and Kent, New Castle, Cumberland, and Salem Counties received notification within 15 minutes after the declaration of an emergency from the Control Room, TSC, or EOF.

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
	2.2 The means exist to notify emergency response personnel. [E.2]	2.2 A test of the primary and backup emergency response organization (ERO) notification systems will be performed	 2.2 A test of the primary and backup ERO notification system resulted in: a. ERO personnel received the notification message; b. Mobilization communication validated by personnel response to the notification system or by telephone; c. Response to electronic notification and plant public address system demonstrated during normal working hours, and off hours
	2.3 The means exist to notify and provide instructions to the populace within the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ). [E.6]	2.3 A full test of the Prompt Alerting and Notification System and the Emergency Alert System capabilities will be conducted.	2.3 Notification and clear instructions to the public accomplished in accordance with the emergency plan requirements.
3.0 Emergency Commun	ications		
10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) – Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.	3.1 The means exist for communications among the Control Room, TSC, EOF, principal State and local emergency operations centers (EOCs), and field monitoring teams. [F.1.d]	 3.1(a) A test will be performed to demonstrate (both primary and secondary methods/systems) the ability to communicate from the Control Room, TSC and the EOF to responsible State and local government agencies. 3.1(b) A test will be performed to demonstrate (both primary and secondary methods 	 3.1(a) Demonstrated (both primary and secondary methods/systems) the ability to communicate from the Control Room, TSC and the EOF to responsible State and local government agencies. 3.1(b) Demonstrated (both primary and secondary methods/systems) the ability to communicate from the TSC and the EOF to PSEG field monitoring teams.

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
		communicate from the TSC and the EOF to PSEG field monitoring teams	
	3.2 The means exist for communications from the Control Room, TSC, and EOF to the NRC headquarters and regional office EOCs (including establishment of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) [or its successor system] between the onsite computer system and the NRC Operations Center.) [F.1.f]	3.2 A test will be performed to demonstrate the ability to communicate from the Control Room, TSC and the EOF to the NRC Operations Center utilizing the Emergency Notification System (ENS). The Health Physics Network (HPN) is tested to ensure communications between the TSC and EOF with the NRC Operations Centers. ERDS is established [or its successor system] between the onsite computer systems and the NRC Operations Center.	3.2 Communications are established between the Control Room, TSC and EOF to the NRC headquarters and regional office EOCs utilizing the ENS. The TSC and EOF demonstrated communications with the NRC Operations Center using the HPN. The access port for ERDS [or its successor system] is provided and successfully completes a transfer of data from the Unit to the NRC Operations Center.
4.0 Public Education and	d Information	-	
10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) – Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local	4.1 The licensee has provided space which may be used for a limited number of the news media. [G.3.b]	4.1 An inspection of the as- built facility/area provided for the news media will be performed in the Emergency News Center/Joint Information Center (ENC/JIC).	 4.1 The ENC/JIC included equipment to support the ENC/JIC operations, including communications with: a. TSC and EOF b. Principal State and local EOCs c. The news media Designated space is available for news media briefings.

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established.			
5.0 Emergency Facilities	and Equipment		
10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) – Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.	5.1 The licensee has established a TSC and an onsite Operations Support Center (OSC). [H.1, H.9]	5.1 An inspection of the as- built TSC and OSC will be performed, including a test of their capabilities.	5.1.1 The TSC has at least 1875 ft ² of floor space (75 ft ² per person for a minimum of 25 persons).
			5.1.2 Communication equipment is installed in the TSC and OSC, and voice transmission and reception are accomplished.
			5.1.3 The TSC ventilation system includes a high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA), and charcoal filter and radiation monitors are installed.
			5.1.4 The TSC has the means to receive, store, process, and display plant and environmental information, and

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			enable the initiation of emergency measures and the conduct of emergency assessment. These capabilities are demonstrated during testing and acceptance activities.
			5.1.5 A reliable and backup electrical power supply is available for the TSC.
			5.1.6 There is an OSC located inside the Protected Area.
	5.2 The licensee has established an EOF. [H.2]	5.2 An inspection of the EOF will be performed, including a test of the capabilities.	5.2.1 Demonstrated communications between the Control Room, TSC, EOF, field monitoring teams, NRC, responsible State and county agencies, and the ENC/JIC.
			5.2.2 The parameters referenced in the Emergency Classification and EAL scheme are retrievable in the EOF.
			5.2.3 Demonstrated the capability of the EOF to respond to events at two or more reactors on the site in accordance with emergency plan implementing procedures (EPIPs), including the capabilities to discriminate plant data, staffing and operation of the facility.
6.0 Accident Assessmen	t		
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) – Adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential off-site consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.	6.1 The means exist to provide initial and continuing radiological assessment throughout the course of an accident. [I.2].	6.1 A test of the Emergency Plan will be conducted by performing a drill or exercise to verify the capability to perform accident assessment.	 6.1 Using selected monitoring parameters specified in the PSEG Site Emergency Plan, including EALs (ITAAC Acceptance Criteria 1.1), simulated degraded plant conditions are assessed and protective actions are initiated in accordance with the following criteria: a. Demonstrated the ability to obtain onsite radiological surveys and samples. b. Demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency workers.

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			 c. Demonstrated the ability to assemble and deploy field monitoring teams within 60 minutes from the decision to do so. d. Demonstrated the ability to satisfactorily collect and disseminate field team data. e. Demonstrated the ability to develop dose projections. f. Demonstrated the ability to make the decision whether to issue radioprotective drugs (KI) to onsite emergency workers. g. Demonstrated the ability to develop appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) and notify appropriate authorities within 15 minutes of development.
	6.2 The means exist to determine the source term of releases of radioactive material within plant systems, and the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors. [I.3]	6.2 A test will be performed to demonstrate that the means exist to determine the source term of releases of radioactive material within plant systems, and the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors.	6.2 Demonstrated through training or drills that Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) provide direction to accurately calculate the source terms and the magnitude of the release of postulated accident scenario releases.

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
	6.3 The means exist to continuously assess the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment, accounting for the relationship between effluent monitor readings, and onsite and offsite exposures and contamination for various meteorological conditions. [I.4]	6.3 A test will be performed that provides evidence that the impact of a radiological release to the environment can be assessed by using the relationship between effluent monitor readings, and onsite and offsite exposures and contamination for various meteorological conditions.	6.3 Demonstrated through training or drills that EPIPs provide direction to continuously assess the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment, accounting for the relationship between effluent monitor readings, and onsite and offsite exposures and contamination for various meteorological conditions.
	6.4 The means exist to acquire and evaluate meteorological information. [I.5]	6.4 A test will be performed to acquire and evaluate meteorological data/ information.	6.4 Demonstrated that meteorological data necessary to implement the EPIPs is retrievable in the Control Room, TSC and EOF.
	6.5 The means exist to determine the release rate and projected doses if the instrumentation used for assessment is off-scale or inoperable. [I.6]	6.5 A test will be performed of the capabilities to determine the release rate and projected doses if the instrumentation used for assessment if off-scale or inoperable.	6.5 Demonstrated through training or drills that EPIPs provide direction to determine release rate and projected dose rates when instruments are off-scale or inoperable.
	6.6 The means exist for field monitoring within the plume exposure EPZ. [I.7]	6.6 A test will be performed of the capabilities for field monitoring within the plume exposure EPZ.	6.6 Demonstrated through training or drills that the field monitoring teams were dispatched and able to locate and monitor a radiological release within the plume exposure EPZ during a radioactive release scenario.
	6.7 The means exist to make rapid assessment of actual or potential	6.7 A test will be performed of the capabilities to make rapid assessments of	6.7 Demonstrated through training or drills using EPIPs:

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
	magnitude and locations of radiological hazards through liquid or gaseous release pathways, including activation, notification means, field team composition, transportation, communication, monitoring equipment, and estimated deployment times. [I.8]	actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiological hazards through liquid or gaseous release pathways, including activation, notification means, field team composition, transportation, communication, monitoring equipment, and estimated deployment times.	 a. A qualified field monitoring team was promptly notified, activated, briefed and dispatched from the EOF during a radiological release scenario. b. The team used monitoring equipment, transportation, communication from the field and located specific sampling locations. c. The team made rapid assessment of actual or potential magnitude and locations of any radiological hazards from simulated liquid or gaseous releases.
	6.8 The capability exists to detect and measure radioiodine concentrations in air in the plume exposure EPZ, as low as $10^{-7} \mu Ci/cc$ (microcuries per cubic centimeter) under field conditions. [I.9]	6.8 A test will be performed of the capabilities to detect and measure radioiodine concentrations in air in the plume exposure EPZ, as low as $10^{-7} \mu Ci/cc$ under field conditions.	6.8 A field monitoring team demonstrated, in accordance with the appropriate EPIP(s), the use of sampling and detection equipment for air concentrations in the plume exposure EPZ during a radioactive release scenario as low as $10^{-7} \mu$ Ci/cc.
	6.9 The means exist to estimate integrated dose from the projected and actual dose rates, and for comparing these estimates with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) protective action guides (PAGs). [I.10]	6.9 A test will be performed of the capabilities to estimate integrated dose from the projected and actual dose rates, and for comparing these estimates with the EPA PAGs.	6.9 Personnel demonstrated the ability to estimate integrated dose from the dose assessment program and the field monitoring team reading during a radioactive release scenario. The results were successfully compared with the EPA PAGs.
7.0 Protective Response			·

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria		
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) – A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume exposure EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Guide-lines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.	 7.1 The means exist to warn and advise onsite individuals of an emergency, including those in areas controlled by the operator, including: [J.1] 1. Employees not having emergency assignments. 2. Visitors. 3. Contractor and construction personnel. 4. Other people who may be in the public access areas, on or passing through the site, or within the owner controlled area. 	7.1 A test will be performed of the capabilities to warn and advise onsite individuals of an emergency, including those in the Owner Controlled Area and the immediate vicinity.	 7.1 Demonstrated the ability to warn and advise onsite individuals including: 1. Non-essential employees. 2. Visitors. 3. Contractor and construction personnel. 4. Other personnel within the Owner Controlled Area and the immediate vicinity. 		
8.0 Exercises and Drills	8.0 Exercises and Drills				
10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) – Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic	8.1 Licensee conducts a full participation exercise to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, which includes participation by	8.1 A full participation exercise (test) will be conducted within the specified time periods of	8.1.1 The exercise is completed within the specified time periods of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E; onsite exercise objectives have been met, and there are no uncorrected onsite exercise deficiencies.		

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be) corrected.	the State and local agency within the plume exposure EPZ, and each State within the ingestion control EPZ. [N.1]	10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.	
			A. Accident Assessment and Classification
			 Demonstrated the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine EAL parameters, and correctly classify the emergency throughout the exercise.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. Determined the correct highest emergency classification level based on events which were in progress, considering past events and their impact on the current conditions, within 15 minutes from the time the initiating condition(s) or EAL is identified.
			B. Notifications
			 Demonstrated the ability to alert, notify and mobilize site emergency response personnel.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. Completed the designated checklist and performed the plant page announcement of the emergency classification.
			b. Activated the Emergency Outdial System following the initial event classification for an Alert or higher.
			 Demonstrated the ability to notify responsible State agencies within 15 minutes and the NRC within

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			60 minutes after declaring an emergency.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. Transmitted information using the designated checklist, in accordance with approved Emergency Plan documents within 15 minutes of event classification
			 b. Transmitted follow-up notification information using the designated checklist, in accordance with approved Emergency Plan documents.
			c. Transmitted information using designated checklist within 60 minutes of event classification to the NRC.
			 Demonstrated the ability to warn or advise onsite individuals of emergency conditions.
			Standard Criteria:
			 Initiated notification of onsite individuals (via public address, Owner Controlled Area sirens or telephone) using designated checklist.
			4. Demonstrated the capability of the Prompt Alerting System to operate properly for public notification when required.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. <u>></u> 90 percent of the sirens operate properly as indicated by the siren feedback system.
			C. Emergency Response
			1. Demonstrated the capability to direct and control

emergency operations.
Standard Criteria:
 a. Overall emergency command and control demonstrated in the Control Room (simulator) in the early phase of the emergency and by the TSC within 90 minutes from initial event classification of Alert or higher.
 Demonstrated the ability to transfer Emergency Coordinator function from the Shift Manager in the Control Room (simulator) to the Emergency Duty Officer in the TSC and later to the Emergency Response Manager in the EOF.
Standard Criteria:
a. Briefings were conducted prior to turnover responsibility. Personnel documented transfer of duties.
 Demonstrated the ability to prepare for 24-hour staffing requirements.
Standard Criteria:
a. Completed 24-hour staff assignments.
4. Demonstrated the ability to perform assembly and accountability for all personnel in the Protected Area within 30 minutes of an emergency (after accountability message has been announced) requiring Protected Area accountability.
Standard Criteria:
a. Protected Area personnel accountability completed within 30 minutes of an emergency (after accountability message has been announced) requiring Protected Area accountability.

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			D. Emergency Response Facilities
			 Demonstrated activation of the Operations Support Center (OSC) and full functional operation of the TSC and EOF within 90 minutes of event classification.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. The TSC and OSC activated within 90 minutes of the initial classification of an Alert or higher.
			 b. The EOF activated within 90 minutes of the initial classification of Site Area Emergency or higher.
			 Demonstrated the adequacy of the equipment, security provisions, and habitability precautions for the TSC, OSC, EOF and ENC/JIC, as appropriate.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. Demonstrated the adequacy of the emergency equipment in the emergency response facilities including availability and general consistency with the EPIPs.
			 Personnel assigned to the ERO implemented and followed applicable EPIPs.
			c. The Shift Radiation Protection Technician (on-shift), Radiological Assessment Coordinator (TSC), and Radiological Support Manager (EOF) implemented the designated checklist if an onsite/offsite release occurred.
			3. Demonstrated the adequacy of communications for all

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			emergency support resources.
			Standard Criteria:
			 Emergency response communications listed in the EPIPs are available and operational.
			b. Communications systems are tested in accordance with the TSC, OSC and EOF activation checklists.
			c. Emergency response facility personnel are able to operate all specified communications systems.
			d. Clear primary and backup communications links are established and maintained for the duration of the exercise.
			E. Radiological Assessment and Control
			 Demonstrated the ability to obtain onsite radiological surveys and samples.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. Radiation Protection Technicians demonstrated the ability to obtain appropriate instruments (range and type) and perform surveys.
			b. Airborne samples taken when the conditions indicate the need for the information.
			2. Demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency workers.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. Emergency workers issued self-reading dosimeters when radiation levels require, and exposures

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			controlled to 10 CFR Part 20 limits (unless the Shift Manager or Emergency Duty Officer, or designee, authorizes emergency limits).
			b. Exposure records are available from the site database (primary), a personal computer database (backup), or a hard copy report (backup).
			 Demonstrated the ability to assemble and dispatch field monitoring teams.
			Standard Criteria:
			 An onsite Field Monitoring Team is ready to be deployed within 60 minutes of being requested from the declaration of an Alert or higher.
			 Demonstrated the ability to satisfactorily collect and disseminate field team data.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. Field team data to be collected is dose rate or counts per minute (cpm) from the plume, both open and closed window, and air sample (gross/net cpm) for particulate and iodine, if applicable.
			b. Radiological data disseminated from the Field Team to the Offsite Field Team Coordinator/ Communicator.
			5. Demonstrated the ability to develop dose projections.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. The Shift Radiation Protection Technician performed timely and accurate dose projections, in accordance with the EPIPs.
			6. Demonstrated the ability to develop appropriate

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			protective action recommendations (PARs), and notified New Jersey and Delaware within 15 minutes of a General Emergency declaration or of an update of the previously issued PARs.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) and Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) dose projections from the dose assessment computer code, established in accordance with the EPIPs.
			b. PARs developed within 15 minutes of data availability.
			c. PARs transmitted via voice, fax, or electronically within 15 minutes, as required by the EPIPs.
			F. Public Information
			 Demonstrated the capability to develop and disseminate clear, accurate, and timely information to the news media.
			Standard Criteria:
			 a. Media briefings provided within approximately 60 minutes of activation of the ENC/JIC.
			2. Demonstrated the capability to establish and effectively operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. Calls answered in a timely manner with the correct information.
			b. Calls returned or forwarded, as appropriate, to demonstrate responsiveness.

Planning Standard	EP Program Elements	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
			c. Rumors identified and addressed.
			G. Evaluation
			1. Demonstrated the ability to conduct a post-exercise critique, to determine areas requiring improvement and corrective action.
			Standard Criteria:
			a. Drill and Exercise objectives developed to allow for performance evaluation.
			 b. Significant problems in achieving the objectives discussed to ensure understanding of why objectives were not fully achieved.
			8.1.2 Onsite emergency response personnel were mobilized in sufficient numbers to fill emergency response positions identified in Emergency Plan Section 3, Emergency Organization, and they successfully performed assigned responsibilities.
			8.1.3 The exercise was completed within the specified time periods of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, offsite exercise objectives were met, and there were no uncorrected offsite exercise deficiencies; or a license condition requires offsite deficiencies to be corrected prior to operation above 5 percent of rated thermal power.
9.0 Implementing Procedures			
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.V - No less than 180 days before the scheduled issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power reactor	9.1 The licensee has submitted detailed implementation procedures for its emergency plan no less	9.1 An inspection of the submittal letter will be performed.	9.1 The licensee has submitted detailed EPIPs for the onsite emergency plan no less than 180 days before fuel load.

Planning	EP Program	Inspections,	Acceptance Criteria
Standard	Elements	Tests, Analyses	
or a license to possess nuclear material, the applicant's detailed implementation procedures for its emergency plan shall be submitted to the Commission.	than 180 days before fuel load.		