NRC FORM 195 (2-76)

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TO: Mr. Robert W. Reid

FROM: Carolina Power & Light Company, Raleigh, North Carolina, E. E. Uley

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DESCRIPTION

Ltr. re our 10/15/75 request....regarding the reviewing of the design bases for the reactor vessell supports for Unit No. 2.

(2-P)

ENCLOSURE

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME:

H. B. Robinson #2

DISTRIBUTION FOR REACTOR VESSEL SUPPORT INFO FOR OPERATING REACTORS PER MR. TRAMMELL 7-12-76

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NRC FORM 195 (2-76)

CP&L

Carolina Power & Light Company

September 21, 1976

FILE: NG-3517(R)

SERIAL: NG-76-1277

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ATTN: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

H. B. ROBINSON UNIT NO. 2
LICENSE NO. DPR-23
DOCKET NUMBER 50-261
REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL SUPPORTS

Dear Mr. Reid:

Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L) was requested by the NRC staff on October 15, 1975 to review the design bases for the reactor vessel supports of the H. B. Robinson Unit 2 plant. The review was to determine if certain transient loads that may be imposed upon the supports as a result of a reactor coolant pipe rupture immediately adjacent to the reactor vessel had been appropriately considered. The review was requested because of changes in design techniques now used on new plants to assess the reactor vessel support loads imposed by transient differential pressure forces in the annular region around the reactor vessel and across the core barrel within the reactor vessel. We informed you on December 9, 1975 that these loads were not considered in the design of the reactor vessel support system.

Since October 1975, we and several other utilities with operating Westinghouse PWR's have met to jointly investigate several options available to us to address the adequacy of the reactor pressure vessel supports in operating plants. Of the options available, it is the conclusion of CP&L and the utility group that the best solution is to develop an augmented inservice inspection program which will further ensure that the postulated rupture of the reactor coolant pipe at the vessel nozzles will not occur. This program will provide a positive impact on plant safety and eliminate the need to perform an extensive and lengthy analysis to show that the results of the postulated pipe rupture are acceptable. The NRC staff was advised of our decision to develop this augmented inservice inspection program at a meeting on May 25, 1976 and by our letter to you dated July 20, 1976.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation was employed to develop a program for this augmented inservice inspection and to prepare a document outlining the program and its technical bases. This document has been completed and will be formally transmitted to you the week of September 13 by Westinghouse as generic report WCAP-8802, "Augmented Inservice Inspection of Piping Welds at the Reactor Vessel Nozzles."

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336 Fayetteville Street • P. O. Box 1551 • Raleigh, N. C. 27602

We request that the NRC conduct a review of this document to determine the acceptability of the augmented inservice inspection program described therein. Upon your acceptance of this program, a specific augmented inspection program consistent with WCAP-8802 and our current inservice inspection plan will be developed for the H. B. Robinson plant.

As stated in WCAP-8802 it is expected that detailed analyses considering the inelastic system would confirm the shutdown capability of the plant, but would require a considerable amount of time and expense to complete. We emphasize that the augmented inservice inspection program was chosen in lieu of the analyses because of its positive effect on the safety of the plant in further ensuring that the postulated pipe break will not occur.

Yours very truly,

E. E. Utley
Vice President
Bulk Power Supply

MFP/mjc