NRC FORM 195 (2-76)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS		50-26/
NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL				INCIDENT REPORT
TO: Mr Moseley		FROM: Caroling Pwr & Light Co		DATE OF DOCUMENT 4-16-76
		Raleigh, NC E E Utley		DATE RECEIVED 4-19-76
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PLANT NAME: Robinson #1 NOTE: IF PER				with the course at the course
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File: NG-3513 (R)

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET 50-261

LICENSE NO. DPR-23

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 76-7

In accordance with Section 6.9.2.a of the Technical Specifications for the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, the attached Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within fourteen (14) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4.

Yours very truly,

Serial: NG-76-

E. E. Utley Vice-President Bulk Power Supply

CSB:mvp Attachment

cc: Messrs. W. G. McDonald

E. Volgenan

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE, PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) LICENSEE LICENSE EVENT NAME LICENSE NUMBER H B R 2 001-1 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 DOCKET NUMBER SOURCE REPORT DATE 0 | 5 | 0 | - | 0 | 2 | 6 | 1 | T L 0 4 0 2 7 | 6 | | 1| **EVENT DESCRIPTION** During performance of a Periodic Test on Boric Acid Heat Tracing, no current flow was old | found in Primary Ckt 56. (Secondary was operating properly). Breakers were opened to 80 04 facilitate repair. This inadvertently deenergized ckts 25 and 55 creating a low 80 temp. condition in system. Low temp. was noted and breakers were reclosed. (76-7) 80 0 6 PRIME COMPONENT 80 SYSTEM COMPONENT COMPONENT CODE CODE SUPPLIER VIOLATION [A ] KT BR Α W W 1 1 2 1 0 CAUSE DESCRIPTION Maintenance personnel inadvertently opened Heat Tracing Ckts. 25 and 55 while making 60 repairs on ckt. 56. A clearance for ckt. 56 was not obtained. Personnel will 80 receive instruction on clearance procedure. 80 FACILITY METHOD OF STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION E A 00 NA 13 46 80 FORM OF CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE ZZ NΑ NΑ 10 11 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 0 0 0 ZNA 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 0 0 0 NA 11 12 80 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES NA 80 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION ZNA 10 80 **PUBLICITY** NA 80 ADDITIONAL FACTORS 80 1/2.77-1-1-7. J. 803 -McGirt PHONE: 332-1351

GPO 881 - 661

# Supplementary Information For Reportable Occurrence 76-7

1. Report No: 50-261/76-7

2a. Report Date: April 8, 1976

2b. Occurrence Date: April 2, 1976

3. <u>Facility:</u>
H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2
Hartsville, South Carolina 29550

#### 4. Identification of Occurrence

There was a loss of power to circuit #55 of the Boric Acid Heat Tracing System which caused a low temperature condition in the boric acid pump discharge piping to the Boric Acid blender. This low temperature condition constitutes a violation of Technical Specification 3.2.2.e and is a reportable occurrence in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(2).

#### 5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at 100% of rated power. Periodic Test (PT-7.3), "Boric Acid Heat Tracing Operability", had been performed. During the PT it was found that Boric Acid Heat Tracing circuit #56 primary had no current flow because of a burned open wire. Circuit #56 secondary was operating properly. Circuit #56 is in a portion of line from the boric acid blender to the charging pump suction lines. Circuit #56 primary had to be deenergized to safely repair the circuit.

## 6. Description of the Occurrence

At 1140 on April 2, 1976, in order to secure power to repair circuit #56 primary a breaker was opened in each of the two (Primary and Secondary) Heat Trace Power Panels. About 35 minutes later a low temperature alarm for circuit #55 was acknowledged at the Heat Tracing alarm panel. At that time it was realized that the breakers (opened for circuit #56) also supplied power to both primary and secondary of circuits #25 and 55. The power was immediately restored by closing the above breakers and circuit #55 returned to a greater than 145 F condition. Circuit #25 remained greater than 145 F the whole time. Circuit #25 is in a portion of line from the boric acid transfer pump discharge to the boric acid filter discharge. Circuit #55 is in a portion of line from the boric acid transfer pump discharge piping to the boric acid blender. Repairs on circuit #56 primary had not been completed prior to reclosure of the breakers. Circuit #56 primary was restored to service later in the day at 1950 hours.

#### 7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Investigation of the occurrence revealed that there had been no clearance made on circuit #56 to facilitate the repair. Maintenance personnel opened the breakers in the Heat Trace Power Panels without the cognizance of operations personnel.

Plant policy requires that opening circuits at breakers always requires that the established clearance procedure be utilized and that Operations personnel shall have cognizance of the clearance. The cause of the occurrence was failure to adhere to Plant Policy in obtaining clearances.

# 8. Analysis of Occurrence

The occurrence could have been avoided if the clearance procedure for opening breakers had been utilized. In doing so, operations would have been known which breakers were opened and perhaps known that this would have opened circuits #25 and 55 primary and secondary.

# 9. Corrective Action

It has been determined that more training is required for the I and C Group regarding Plant Clearance procedures. Plant Management will administer training that it determines to be the most effective.

# 10. Failure Data

None.

# CP&L

## Carolina Power & Light Company

# H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT Post Office Box 790 Hartsville, South Carolina

April 2, 1976

50-261/76-7

Robinson File No. 2-0-4-a-1

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Mr. Donald Knuth, Director Directorate of Regulatory Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Sirs:

In accordance with Section 6.6.2 of the Technical Specifications, the following Reportable Occurrence is reported:

On April 2, 1976, while performing PT-7.3, Boric Acid Heat Tracing, it was discovered that Circuit 56 (primary) had no current flow and was inoperative. Circuit 56 (secondary) was operating properly. This circuit covers a portion of the charging pumps suction lines.

Later on April 2, at 1140, in order to secure power to repair Circuit 56, a breaker was opened in each of the two Heat Trace Power Panels. About 35 minutes later due to a temperature alarm it was realized that these breakers also supplied both primary and secondary on Circuits 25 and 55, and power was immediately restored. These circuits cover portions of the boric acid pump discharge piping.

This constitutes an immediate Reportable Occurrence as defined in Technical Specifications 3.2.2.e and 6.9.2.a.(2). It was reported to the NRC, Atlanta and Mr. B. J. Furr of Carolina Power & Light Company on April 2, 1976.

Yours very truly,

Jack B. McGirt, Manager H. B. Robinson SEG Plant